Digital certificates issued by an internal, private Certification Authority (CA) such as Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) are widely used in enterprise environments to authenticate users and devices for workloads such as VPN, Wi-Fi (802.1x), Microsoft Configuration Manager, IPsec, and more. But how long should a user or device authentication certificate be valid? Most organizations accept the default of one year without much thought. In this post, I make the case for short-lived certificates, valid for weeks or months rather than years. They shrink the window an attacker has to exploit a compromised credential, and with the right automation in place, they add little operational overhead.
What is a Certificate?
A digital certificate is a document that binds an identity to an asymmetric key pair (public key and private key). Certificates offer strong, phishing-resistant authentication that improves security and assurance for users and devices authenticating to Microsoft Active Directory (AD). When a certificate is issued, an administrator decides how long the certificate will be valid. The importance of this setting is often overlooked.
Certificate Lifetime
Administrators must define the certificate’s validity period when creating a certificate template in AD CS or an Intune PKCS or SCEP device configuration policy. Most administrators select the default one-year validity period. However, public CAs are steadily moving to much shorter certificate lifetimes, and private enterprise deployments should strongly consider doing the same.
Public TLS Certificate Lifetime Reductions
The maximum lifetime of publicly trusted TLS certificates is set by the CA/Browser Forum, a voluntary consortium of public CAs, browser vendors, and other industry stakeholders that develops security standards and best practices for digital certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Those limits are dropping quickly, as described in the following sections.
Current Limits
For years, the maximum lifetime of a public TLS certificate was 398 days (approximately 13 months), a limit established largely in response to the previous decade’s plethora of SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. In April 2025, the CA/Browser Forum adopted a measure that reduces the maximum lifetime of public TLS certificates to 47 days. The reduction is being phased in on the following schedule.
- Before March 15, 2026: 398 days
- From March 15, 2026: 200 days
- From March 15, 2027: 100 days
- From March 15, 2029: 47 days
Why Shorter Lifetimes
Long-lived certificates pose significant challenges for administrators responding to key compromise events or zero-day vulnerabilities, which often require urgent, manual certificate replacement. Short-lived certificates limit the amount of time an attacker can exploit a stolen private key, reducing exposure and potential damage. They also provide the agility to update cryptography settings far more quickly than long-lived certificates allow.
Even Shorter Options
Some public CAs already go well beyond these limits. Let’s Encrypt has issued 90-day certificates for years, and in January 2026 it made six-day certificates (valid for 160 hours) generally available. Certificates with lifetimes this short are only practical with fully automated issuance and renewal.
Enterprise CA Certificates
Private enterprise PKI deployments like AD CS are not required to adhere to CA/Browser Forum mandates, and organizations are free to manage their internal PKI however they choose. Even so, it makes sense to follow industry trends and align with security best practices wherever possible. Public CAs set the pace, and private enterprise PKI can adopt similar strategies to bolster security.
AD Authentication
Short-lived certificates are especially valuable when certificates are used to authenticate to Active Directory, for the following reasons.
PKINIT
PKINIT is an extension to the Kerberos protocol that enables certificate-based authentication to AD. As described in the PKINIT protocol specification, it allows a principal (user or device) to authenticate to AD simply by demonstrating control of the private key. Protecting the private key is therefore vital.
TPM
Enrolling certificates in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is the best way to ensure private keys remain private. No one, including administrators, can export private keys protected by TPM. Administrators should ensure TPM enrollment for client authentication certificates whenever possible.
Recommended Certificate Lifetimes
Today, I recommend that my customers issue end-entity user and device authentication certificates with a lifetime of no more than one year for 2048-bit RSA certificates with private keys stored on TPM. There are compelling reasons to use much shorter lifetimes in some cases, including the following.
Shorter Lifetimes with TPM
Even with TPM, shorter lifetimes have value. Short-lived certificates renew sooner, so changes to certificate templates reach every client faster. A perfect example is the change required to support strong certificate mapping (KB5014754). Shorter lifetimes also provide more frequent key rotation.
Non-TPM
There may be scenarios where a client authentication certificate must be issued to a device without a TPM. Examples include virtual machines without TPM, VDI deployments, and legacy devices. These cases should be treated as exceptions and managed accordingly. Consider shortening the lifetime of non-TPM certificates to 90 days or less.
Privileged Users
Administrators or other privileged accounts enrolling for certificates can benefit from even shorter validity periods. Consider issuing client authentication certificates to these users with certificate lifetimes of 30 days or less.
Considerations
Short-lived certificates aren’t ideal in every case. For example, users or devices may be offline for a prolonged period during extended vacations, parental leave, or sabbaticals, and their certificates may expire while they’re away. That’s only a problem if they can’t re-enroll when they return. For AD CS, re-enrollment requires connectivity to an enterprise issuing CA server. Intune-managed endpoints simply need Internet access to obtain a new certificate.
Automation
Managing short-lived certificates manually is infeasible, so automation is the key to success. For client authentication certificates issued on-premises, enabling certificate autoenrollment via group policy ensures that all domain-joined devices enroll and renew their certificates automatically. Certificates deployed and managed using Microsoft Intune are automated by default. Short-lived certificates also leave less margin for clock errors, so be sure time synchronization is configured correctly in your Active Directory domain.
Summary
The next time you create a certificate template in AD CS or a certificate profile in Intune, give careful thought to the certificate lifetime. Start with no more than one year for TPM-backed end-entity certificates, and go shorter where it makes sense, such as for non-TPM devices and privileged users. Put automated enrollment and renewal in place to keep administrative overhead low. Following this guidance will reduce your organization’s attack surface and limit exposure to compromised certificates.
More Information
If you’d like to learn more about implementing short-lived certificates in your organization, fill out the form below, and I’ll provide more information.
References
Digital Certificates for Strong Authentication
Digital Certificates and TPM
Drawbacks of Multifactor Authentication
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT) in Kerberos Protocol