Microsoft AD CS Adds Post-Quantum Cryptography Support with ML-DSA

Despite predictions of its decline, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) continues to evolve. Following significant enhancements introduced in late 2025, including CRL partitioning and support for 16K database pages, the May 2026 update adds another important capability: support for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

ML-DSA

Specifically, the May 2026 update adds support for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 in Windows Server 2025 for AD CS. This enables administrators to begin evaluating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and assessing PQC readiness in enterprise PKI environments

Configuration

After applying the May 2026 update to an issuing Certification Authority (CA), administrators will find new PQC algorithms under the Algorithm name drop-down list, as shown here.

Certificate template Cryptography tab listing the ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 algorithms

Note: If you don’t see these new algorithms, ensure you have selected Key Storage Provider from the Provider Category drop-down list. In addition, ensure that you select Signature on the Request Handling tab.

Test Results

Initial testing across common enterprise certificate scenarios produced mixed results. While PQC works well in some scenarios, other workloads still show limitations.

Code Signing

Code signing with an ML-DSA-44 certificate issued by AD CS works perfectly. For example, I can use Set-AuthenticodeSignature to sign a PowerShell script, as shown here.

Set-AuthenticodeSignature signing a PowerShell script with an ML-DSA-44 certificate

Viewing the file’s properties shows that the encryption algorithm used to sign the file was ML-DSA-44, as expected.

File digital signature details showing the ML-DSA-44 signature algorithm

IIS

TLS-based workloads proved more challenging. Attempts to configure an HTTPS binding in IIS failed with the following error message.

There was an error while performing this operation. A specified logon session does not exist. It may already have been terminated. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x80070520).

IIS error binding an ML-DSA certificate to an HTTPS site: a specified logon session does not exist

RRAS and SSTP

Similar limitations occurred when testing remote-access VPN scenarios using RRAS and SSTP. Specifically, configuring a PQC TLS certificate for SSTP in RRAS failed. Although I was able to assign the certificate using Set-RemoteAccess, the RemoteAccess service failed to start.

RemoteAccess service failing after assigning an ML-DSA certificate for SSTP

Remote Desktop

Unfortunately, using PQC certificates for RDP also fails. Although I could assign the PQC certificate to the RDP listener, clients fail to connect using RDP and return the following error message.

This computer can’t connect to the remote computer. Try connecting again. If the problem continues, contact the owner of the remote computer or your network administrator.

Error code: 0x904
Extended error code: 0x7

Remote Desktop connection error 0x904 with extended error 0x7 when using an ML-DSA certificate

Summary

The May 2026 update marks an important milestone for AD CS by introducing initial support for PQC algorithms, allowing organizations to begin evaluating ML-DSA certificates in enterprise environments. Early testing shows promising results for signing scenarios such as code signing; however, broader infrastructure workloads, including TLS, VPN, and Remote Desktop, remain limited today. Although PQC support is still in its early stages, these updates demonstrate Microsoft’s ongoing investment in AD CS and provide administrators with an opportunity to begin preparing their PKI environments for the post-quantum future. Additional PQC enhancements, including ML-KEM support and broader ecosystem integration, are anticipated in future Windows updates.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Microsoft May 2026 Security Updates (KB5087539)

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the Enterprise: Timeline and Readiness

Techmentor Event Microsoft HQ 2026

I’m pleased to announce I’ll be attending the Techmentor Event at Microsoft Headquarters in Redmond, WA, August 3-7, 2026. Register now and save $500.00 with the discount code HICKS.

Sessions

I’ll be delivering three sessions at this year’s event.

Join Me

The event is shaping up to be one of the best, with industry experts from around the world presenting on many important topics. Be sure to join me! Don’t miss out on this fantastic opportunity to learn from the best in the industry. Register today. Hope to see you there!

The Case for 6-Day Public TLS Certificates

In February 2025, Let’s Encrypt introduced the option to enroll for public TLS certificates with a 6-day validity period.  This represents a significant shift toward short-lived certificates and aligns with the broader industry trend of reducing certificate lifetimes to improve security. While this may seem aggressive at first glance, organizations that have embraced automation will find that extremely short-lived certificates offer compelling security and operational advantages in some scenarios.

Benefits

Extremely short-lived TLS certificates offer several important security and operational benefits, particularly for organizations that have already embraced automation for certificate lifecycle management. Key advantages include:

  • Minimized Risk of Key Compromise – 6-day certificates dramatically reduce the exposure window of private key compromise events, giving attackers a limited window of opportunity to exploit key access.
  • Automation Validation – Short-lived certificates force organizations to adopt and validate automated enrollment and renewal processes, ensuring that certificate lifecycle management is reliable and resilient.
  • IP Address Support – 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt support IP addresses, allowing administrators to secure workloads that do not have entries in DNS.

Use Cases

6-day TLS certificates are well-suited for a range of modern workloads, especially those that benefit from frequent key rotation, automation, and dynamic provisioning. 6-Day TLS certificates are well-suited for the following workloads:

  • High Value Resources – Using 6-day TLS certificates is beneficial for high-security or sensitive workloads where frequent key rotation is desired.
  • Test Labs – High-frequency certificate rotation allows for thorough testing of automation processes to ensure operational reliability of production deployments. Rapid iteration of 6-day TLS certificates allows administrators to identify potential issues and implement changes before long-term certificates expire.
  • Ephemeral Infrastructure – 6-day TLS certificates work well with dynamic workloads such as containers, where environments are rapidly provisioned and destroyed. These hosts might only live for a few hours or days, making short-lived certificates an ideal choice in this scenario.
  • Workload Bootstrapping – 6-day TLS certificates can be used where a certificate is required only to perform initial configuration. For example, an IP-based TLS certificate can be used to configure TLS services, then later migrated to a long-term certificate when DNS is configured and the service is placed into production.

Enterprise Usage

Administrators will find that 6-day public TLS certificates work well with many popular Windows Server workloads. Here are a few examples.

  • Always On VPN – Enterprise secure remote access is a popular target for attackers because the service is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates ensures frequent key rotation, reducing exposure to key compromise.
  • Remote Desktop Services – Many organizations continue to use Remote Desktop Gateway to provide access to on-premises applications, another workload that is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates is equally effective in this scenario.

What About DirectAccess?

Although DirectAccess would be another ideal Windows Server workload for 6-day TLS certificates, my testing shows that it does not work. The root cause is that 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt do NOT include subject information (the field is blank). Unfortunately, because of the way in which DirectAccess validates this certificate, it requires information in this field. More details can be found here.

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2026/03/16/directaccess-iphttps-and-lets-encrypt-6-day-certificates/

Summary

If you are automating certificate enrollment and renewal, it shouldn’t matter if the certificate is valid for 6 days or 60 days. In fact, shorter lifetimes can significantly improve your security posture by minimizing risk and enforcing operational discipline around certificate management. Organizations that invest in automation today will be well-positioned to adopt even shorter certificate lifetimes in the future, while those relying on manual processes will find it increasingly difficult to keep up.

Questions?

Do you have questions about certificate lifecycle automation in your environment? I’m happy to help you validate your approach and address any challenges you’re encountering. Fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more information.

Additional Information

Let’s Encrypt Issues First Six-Day Certificate

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in the Enterprise

Webinar: Certificate Automation for Windows Infrastructure

If you manage Windows Server workloads that require public TLS certificates like Always On VPN, DirectAccess, Remote Desktop Gateway, Internet Information Services (IIS), and others, you know that certificate expirations don’t send friendly reminders. Certificates expire quietly. Too often, end users are the ones who sound the alarm—when resources are already unavailable. Of course, this never happens at a convenient time. It’s usually the middle of the night, on the weekend.

Did you miss the webinar? You can view it on demand here!

Current State

Most Windows IT teams are still managing certificates the same way they did years ago, using spreadsheets, calendar reminders, and an assortment of renewal scripts. It usually works… until it suddenly doesn’t.

Free Webinar

I’m pleased to announce that I’ll be joining Todd Gardner from CertKit for a free live webinar on Tuesday, May 26, at 11:00 AM CDT, in which we will break down the following:

  • Why certificate mismanagement causes so much pain at scale
  • How to build real automation that works across your full environment, including internal services and vendor appliances
  • A live demonstration of CertKit showing end-to-end discovery, monitoring, and automated renewal

There will also be time for live Q&A, so bring your questions!

Join Us!

If you’re tired of patching the problem with fragile scripts and assorted reminders, join us to learn about a fully automated solution that can dramatically improve the situation. Register now and don’t miss this opportunity to reduce your TLS certificate management burden and end the need for 2 AM certificate renewal fire drills.

Webinar Details

Webinar: TLS Certificate Automation for Windows Infrastructure
Hosts: Todd Gardner (CertKit) and Richard Hicks (Richard M. Hicks Consulting, Inc.)
Date: Tuesday, May 26
Time: 11:00 AM CDT
Registration: Click here to register!

Recording

If you missed the live event, you can view the on demand recording here!

IIS TLS Certificate Deployment with CertKit

With public TLS certificate lifetimes shrinking to just 47 days by 2029, administrators must find ways to automate certificate enrollment and renewal for workloads that require them. One of the most common is Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS). I’ve been using CertKit.io to handle this process for workloads like Always On VPN and DirectAccess, so it made sense to migrate my public-facing IIS servers to this solution as well. The migration went smoothly, but I encountered an unexpected issue when deploying a new IIS server using CertKit.

CertKit Agent

CertKit Agents make loading certificates on the server a breeze. The CertKit agent automatically detects installed software (e.g., Terminal Services, RRAS, DirectAccess, IIS, etc.) and handles the server-side process of assigning the TLS certificate to the application. For RRAS and DirectAccess, it works perfectly. For an IIS server with an HTTPS binding and TLS certificate already configured, it works without issue as well. However, I ran into a snag when I tried to deploy a certificate to a brand-new IIS server.

New Server

After installing the CertKit agent on an IIS server, it searches for existing HTTPS web bindings to identify the workload. However, on a freshly installed IIS server, no HTTPS bindings have been configured yet, so the agent doesn’t recognize the IIS workload.

Of course, you could create an HTTPS web binding before installing the agent, but you’ll need a TLS certificate first. This introduces the classic “chicken and egg” scenario. 🤪 Fortunately, there are a few ways to resolve the issue.

Windows Certificate Store

With this method, you configure the CertKit agent to download and install the certificate into the local computer certificate store on the IIS server. Once complete, you can create the HTTPS binding in the IIS Manager console or by using PowerShell. After that, restart the CertKit agent service by running the following PowerShell command.

Restart-Service -Name certkit-agent -PassThru

The IIS workload will now appear in the agent’s Software list. At that point, you can delete the Windows certificate store configuration and replace it with the IIS configuration.

Self-Signed Certificate

Using this method before installing the CertKit agent allows the agent to automatically discover IIS after installation, which can be helpful when deploying IIS servers programmatically. First, create a short-lived certificate (one day in this example) and configure the IIS site binding by running the following PowerShell commands.

$Hostname = 'www.example.net'
$Certificate = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName $Hostname -CertStoreLocation 'Cert:\LocalMachine\My' -KeyAlgorithm RSA -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm SHA256 -NotAfter (Get-Date).AddDays(1) -TextExtension @('2.5.29.37={text}1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1')
$Params = @{
    Name                 = 'Default Web Site'
    BindingInformation   = '*:443:'
    Protocol             = 'https'
    CertificateThumbPrint = $Certificate.Thumbprint
    CertStoreLocation    = 'Cert:\LocalMachine\My'
}
New-IISSiteBinding @Params

Once complete, run iisreset.exe to apply the changes. Now, when you install the CertKit agent, it will automatically detect IIS, and you can assign your public TLS certificate accordingly. You can delete the old self-signed certificate later if desired.

Summary

If you’re automating server builds, the self-signed certificate approach is typically the easiest because it enables IIS discovery immediately. For ad-hoc deployments, installing to the Windows certificate store first is usually the quickest option.

Additional Information

CertKit.io

CerKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS TLS Certificates

Midwest Management Summit (MMSMOA) 2026

I’m excited to be presenting two sessions at the upcoming Midwest Management Summit at Mall of America (MMSMOA), taking place May 3-7, 2026, at the Radisson Blu in Bloomington, MN. This is the premier systems management event in the U.S., offering unrivaled access to Microsoft and industry professionals from around the world.

Cloud PKI for Intune

My first session, Zero to Certificates in 5 Minutes with Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune, covers how to quickly configure and deploy certificates using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune. This session is ideal for anyone looking to streamline certificate management without the traditional heavy infrastructure burden.

Entra Private Access

My second session, Moving to Zero Trust: Entra Private Access for Always On VPN Administrators, explores the transition from traditional Always On VPN to Microsoft’s Entra Private Access, highlighting practical steps, architectural differences, and the benefits of maintaining secure access in a modern Zero Trust environment. I will also share important migration tips, tricks, and best practices.

Let’s Connect!

Looking forward to diving into these topics with everyone there. I hope to see some familiar faces and meet new ones, too! If you are attending the event, be sure to say hello!

Additional Information

Midwest Management Summit at Mall of America (MMSMOA)

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune on RunAs Radio

Microsoft Entra Private Access on RunAs Radio

The Myth of the Publish Certificate in Active Directory Setting

Certificate templates in Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) provide powerful, preconfigured settings that enable administrators to issue certificates tailored for specific purposes. For example, a certificate template could allow a user to authenticate to a Wi-Fi network or VPN gateway. Another template might control policies for enrolling for web server certificates in the enterprise. Templates define settings such as cryptographic parameters (key algorithm and length), validity period, application policies, enrollment requirements, and more. While there are myriad settings to choose from, one in particular is often enabled unnecessarily. And while it works without issue, there can be some hidden downsides to enabling this setting.

Publish Certificate in Active Directory

When creating a certificate template, there’s an option on the General tab called Publish certificate in Active Directory. From experience, this is one of the most misunderstood settings for certificate templates.

Certificate template General tab with the Publish certificate in Active Directory option

Intuitively, it would make sense to check this box on all published certificate templates. After all, I want the users or devices targeted by this certificate template to find them in Active Directory (AD) so they can enroll. Many administrators believe that enabling this setting is required to ‘see’ the published certificate template on the endpoint, as shown here.

Active Directory Users and Computers Published Certificates tab listing certificates published for a user

However, enabling the Publish certificate in Active Directory option is not required for enrollment. To ‘see’ certificates available for enrollment, the user or device must only have the Enroll permission on the template.

What Is It For?

So, what does the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting do? When this option is enabled, the issuing CA adds the certificate to the requesting principal’s Active Directory account. There are two common scenarios where this is required.

S/MIME

Adding a user’s certificate to their AD account makes the public key centrally discoverable, allowing Outlook and other S/MIME-enabled clients to automatically find recipients’ certificates for secure email encryption and signature validation. Without the certificate published in AD, users must manually exchange certificates, breaking seamless S/MIME encryption in most enterprise environments.

Encrypting File System (EFS)

Publishing a user’s EFS certificate to their Active Directory account allows Windows to locate the correct public key automatically when encrypting files. It ensures recovery agents and key archival processes function properly. Without the certificate in AD, EFS can fail to encrypt data consistently across machines or prevent access to encrypted files when users roam or recover profiles.

Drawbacks

There are very few scenarios outside of S/MIME and EFS that require the Publish certificate in Active Directory option to be enabled. However, enabling it doesn’t necessarily break anything, and this setting is often enabled by default (or carried over from the source template when duplicating), so administrators may miss this option. Issuing certificates in this way introduces some potential problems.

AD Database Bloat

Adding a certificate to each principal’s AD object increases the size of each object, thereby increasing the total size of the AD database. For organizations with large directories with hundreds of thousands or even millions of accounts, adding unnecessary data to each account can be very expensive in terms of database size, replication traffic, backup storage, and overall domain performance. Making matters worse, certificates published to AD live perpetually. They are not removed automatically when certificates are revoked or expire.

Service Accounts

Service accounts used for certificate enrollment, such as the Microsoft Intune Certificate connector, can be especially challenging. Here, if the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting is enabled on the Intune certificate template, the CA will add a certificate to the service account for every certificate it issues. While you can have many certificates associated with a single account, there is an upper limit, approximately 1250, based on my testing. After that, certificates will continue to be issued, but adding them to AD will fail.

Remediation

The following recommendations can help administrators correct this misconfiguration and limit its impact in their environment.

Disable Unnecessary Certificate Publishing

Administrators should clear the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting on all certificate templates that do not explicitly require it, such as those used for S/MIME or Encrypting File System (EFS). This prevents new certificates from being written to user or computer objects and does not require certificates to be reissued.

Remove Published Certificates

Administrators can remove unnecessary certificates from user, computer, and service account objects in AD to reduce object and overall AD database sizes. Perform the following steps to remove unneeded certificates.

  1. Open the Active Directory Users and Computers management console (dsa.msc) and double-click the target principal.
  2. Select the Published Certificates tab.
  3. Select a certificate (or all certificates) and click Remove.
Removing published certificates from the Published Certificates tab in Active Directory Users and Computers

Important Note: Use extreme caution when deleting certificates! Do not delete any certificates unless you are certain they are not required.

Managed Service Accounts

Managed Service Accounts in AD do not have a Published Certificates tab. Administrators can use the Attribute Editor to remove individual certificates from the userCertificate attribute on the account.

Attribute Editor for a managed service account showing the userCertificate attribute

Managed Service Account Attribute Editor

userCertificate attribute entries for a managed service account

Managed Service Account userCertificate Entries

Unfortunately, there is no option to view the certificate in the UI for Managed Service Accounts. To view detailed certificate information, see the PowerShell section below.

Existing Certificates Are Not Removed Automatically

Disabling the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting only stops future certificates from being published in AD. Certificates already written to Active Directory are never removed automatically, even after they expire or are revoked. In environments where this setting has been enabled for an extended period, large numbers of stale certificates often accumulate and continue to increase the AD database size.

Intune Certificate Connector Considerations

This issue is especially problematic for high-volume enrollment scenarios that use service accounts, such as the Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector. When publishing is enabled for Intune certificate templates, certificates issued on behalf of users are added to the service account, quickly leading to excessive certificate accumulation and potential attribute limits.

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module

Manually performing this cleanup at scale is impractical. To assist administrators with cleaning up unnecessarily published certificates, I’ve created the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module. This module includes functions to enumerate AD accounts that include certificates, show and optionally export certificates for AD accounts, and remove published certificates. The module also includes a function to enumerate published certificate templates that include the Publish certificate in Active Directory option enabled. You can install the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module from the PowerShell gallery by running the following command.

Install-Module -Name ADPrincipalCertificate -Scope CurrentUser

See the ADPrincipalCertificate GitHub repository for detailed usage information.

Summary

While the Publish certificate in Active Directory option is helpful for S/MIME and EFS deployments, it is unnecessary for most other scenarios and is often enabled when it isn’t needed. This results in the unnecessary addition of certificates to AD accounts, causing individual objects and the entire AD database to grow without benefit. Sadly, many vendor guides indicate that this setting is required when it often isn’t, so many environments suffer from this misconfiguration. Administrators should review the certificate template configuration and disable this setting when it isn’t needed. Additionally, use the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module to perform cleanup, if required.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module on GitHub

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module in the PowerShell Gallery

Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027: Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

Happy New Year, everyone! As the calendar rolls over to 2026, it’s time to start planning the migration of workloads hosted on Windows Server 2016. Mainstream support ended for Windows Server 2016 on January 11, 2022, after which it entered extended support. However, extended support for Windows Server 2016 ends on January 12, 2027, at which point it will be end of life and no longer supported. Running production workloads on Windows Server 2016 beyond this date exposes organizations to significant security risk, as it no longer receives security updates, leaving these systems vulnerable to exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is March 10-12, 2026. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t leave these mission-critical infrastructure services to the last minute! Begin planning your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Resolving PKCS Certificate Mapping Issues in Windows Autopilot Hybrid Join Deployments

Microsoft Windows Autopilot streamlines device provisioning through Intune, allowing IT administrators to preconfigure new Windows devices with minimal hands-on effort. However, when combined with Hybrid Entra Join and PKCS certificate deployment, specific challenges arise—particularly with certificate mapping and authentication.

Hybrid Entra Join

During autopilot provisioning, administrators may also choose to join the device to their on-premises Active Directory domain, a deployment model called Hybrid Entra join. Hybrid Entra join presents some unique challenges when using Autopilot to remotely provision devices. Specifically, the user must have connectivity to a domain controller to perform the first logon, as they do not have a user profile on the endpoint.

Device Tunnel

To support offline Hybrid Entra join during Autopilot provisioning, administrators can deploy the Always On VPN device tunnel to provide pre-logon connectivity to domain controllers. A device tunnel connection enables users to log on to their newly provisioned device remotely.

Requirements

The following prerequisites must be met to support the Always On VPN device tunnel.

  • The endpoint must be running Windows Enterprise edition.
  • An Always On VPN device tunnel profile must be assigned to the device.
  • A machine certificate must be deployed to the endpoint that includes the Client Authentication EKU (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2).

Note: If you plan to use the subscription step-up upgrade from Windows Professional to Windows Enterprise, the device tunnel will not connect automatically after provisioning is complete, which prevents the user from logging in. More details and a workaround for this issue can be found here.

Strong Certificate Mapping

Microsoft knowledge base article KB5014754, released in May of 2022, introduced changes to domain controllers to require strong certificate mapping when using certificates to authenticate to Active Directory (AD). It was initially deployed in compatibility mode, only warning administrators when certificates are used for authentication that aren’t strongly mapped. However, full enforcement is mandatory beginning with the September 2025 security updates. This requirement introduces some challenges when issuing certificates to the device using PKCS during Autopilot provisioning.

Intune PKCS Certificates

When using PKCS certificates and the Intune Certificate Connector, the endpoint’s on-premises AD security identifier (SID) is not added to the issued certificate during Autopilot. Interestingly, this does not happen when using SCEP certificates. If the device certificate is not strongly mapped, the Always On VPN device tunnel will still authenticate successfully because Always On VPN does not use AD to authenticate device connections. Instead, Always On VPN simply verifies the certificate (e.g., that it is not expired or revoked) and allows authentication if the certificate passes the validation.

However, enterprise Wi-Fi access may fail without strongly mapped certificates if device authentication is required. Also, there may be other scenarios where a device authentication certificate without strong mapping may cause authentication to fail.

Workarounds

There are a few ways to work around this limitation. Consider the following options.

Native Entra ID Join

The simplest way to avoid the challenges of PKCS certificates and Hybrid Entra join is to avoid it altogether in favor of native Entra join. However, this may not be an option for everyone.

Use SCEP

For some reason, certificates issued with SCEP do not suffer from this limitation. In my testing, SCEP certificates are always strongly mapped. However, deploying SCEP certificates is much more complex than using PKCS. (Pro tip: Cloud PKI for Intune uses SCEP and requires no configuration! It’s definitely something to consider.)

Short-Lived Certificates

Another option is to deploy temporary, short-lived certificates (valid for only a few days) using PKCS to ensure the Always On VPN device tunnel works, and then deploy a permanent, long-term certificate post-deployment that includes the strong mapping. To do this, administrators can leverage dynamic group assignments in Intune. For example, the administrator can assign the short-lived certificate to an Autopilot Provisioning devices group and later assign a long-term certificate to the Hybrid Joined devices group.

Here’s an example of the dynamic group membership configuration.

Autopilot Provisioning Devices:

(device.devicePhysicalIDs -any (_ -contains “[ZTDId]”)) -and (device.deviceTrustType -ne “ServerAD”)

Hybrid Entra Join Devices:

(device.deviceTrustType -eq “ServerAD”)

In this configuration, the initial PKCS certificate is deployed without the strong mapping when the endpoint is enrolled to Autopilot but has not yet joined the domain. During this time, the endpoint will only be a member of the Autopilot Provisioning Devices group and will receive the short-lived, temporary certificate. Later, once the endpoint has successfully joined the domain, the device will move from the provisioning group to the Hybrid Entra Join Devices group. When this happens, a permanent, strongly mapped long-term certificate is enrolled on the device.

Manual Certificate Mapping

Certificates can be manually mapped via the altSecurityIdentities property of the computer object in AD. Obviously, this doesn’t scale well, so my good friend Steve Prentice published a PowerShell script to automate this process. You can find more details and the script here.

Summary

Windows Autopilot streamlines device provisioning with Intune, but Hybrid Entra Join introduces challenges when PKCS certificates lack strong mapping during initial deployment, potentially disrupting VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. Administrators can avoid this by switching to native Entra join or by using workarounds such as switching to SCEP, using short-lived certificates, or manually mapping certificates.

Additional Information

KB5014754 – Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers

How To: Map a user to a certificate via all methods available in the altSecurityIdentities attribute

Hybrid Autopilot: Automating altSecurityIdentities

Configure Microsoft Entra hybrid join

Overview: Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft AD CS Training Course

I’m excited to announce that I’ve partnered once again with the fine folks at the ViaMonstra Online Academy to deliver a new live training course entitled PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The event consists of six weekly live webinars beginning on Thursday, January 15, 2026, at 3:00 PM CST.

Why AD CS Training?

Digital certificates are strong, phishing-resistant credentials that are an excellent choice for authentication to critical workloads like Always On VPN and enterprise Wi-Fi. However, managing certificate services infrastructure can be daunting. This course provides administrators with a fundamental understanding of enterprise PKI with Microsoft AD CS.

Course Overview

The event format for this course consists of six weekly live sessions on Thursdays starting on January 15, 2026. The classes are two hours long, running from 3:00 PM CST to 5:00 PM CST each day. During the course, we’ll cover the following topics.

  • PKI concepts and certificate use cases
  • Designing and deploying certificate authorities (CAs)
  • Configuring templates and enrollment
  • Managing revocation and maintenance

Who Should Attend

Organizations planning to use certificate authentication for enterprise VPN and Wi-Fi workloads will benefit from this training course. Also, those considering a new AD CS deployment will find this training beneficial. In addition, administrators managing an existing production AD CS environment will gain valuable insight.

Enroll Now

Registration for this training class is available now. The cost is $295.00—an incredible bargain! Don’t miss out on this fantastic opportunity to gain foundational AD CS skills. Click the registration link below and reserve your spot today!

Additional Information

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Enterprise PKI

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune