Always On VPN Security Updates November 2026

Always On VPN security updates

Microsoft released the November 2026 security updates today, which include three vulnerabilities affecting Always On VPN deployments. This month’s release addresses issues in the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE). And for a change, there are NO vulnerabilities in the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) this month!

SSTP Vulnerabilities

SSTP is commonly used for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. Because SSTP is, by design, exposed directly to the Internet, vulnerabilities affecting this protocol deserve attention. This month’s updates address the following two SSTP vulnerabilities. Both are rated Important.

CVE-2026-105561 – Windows SSTP Denial of Service Vulnerability (CVSS 7.5)

CVE-2026-105510 – Windows SSTP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVSS 7.0)

IKE Vulnerability

The November 2026 security updates also address a spoofing vulnerability in the Windows IKE Extension. Always On VPN implementations that use the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel are affected. Microsoft rates this vulnerability as Important.

CVE-2026-122169 – Windows IKE Extension Spoofing Vulnerability (CVSS 7.5)

Not Using IKEv2?

If you are not using the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel, ensure the following IKEv2 ports are blocked at the edge firewall.

  • Inbound UDP port 500 (IKE)
  • Inbound UDP port 4500 (IKE NAT-T)

In addition, consider disabling IKEv2 on the RRAS server entirely. Guidance for doing this is in my earlier post, Always On VPN IKEv2 Security Vulnerability April 2026.

No RRAS Vulnerabilities

RRAS has been a regular fixture in the monthly security updates, with several CVEs disclosed in most recent releases. September 2026 alone included eight RRAS CVEs, four of them rated Critical. It is refreshing to report that the November 2026 release includes no RRAS vulnerabilities at all.

Summary

This is a relatively light month for Always On VPN administrators. All three vulnerabilities are rated Important, and none are rated Critical. However, SSTP and IKE are both Internet-facing services in most Always On VPN deployments, so administrators should plan to deploy these updates during their next scheduled maintenance window and avoid unnecessary delays.

Additional Information

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

Microsoft November 2026 Security Updates

Always On VPN Security Updates September 2026

90 DAYS LEFT: Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027 – Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

Heads up, fellow Windows Server administrators! There are now just THREE MONTHS remaining before Windows Server 2016 reaches end of support, so now is the time to finalize any migrations for workloads hosted on this platform. Mainstream support ended on January 11, 2022, and Windows Server 2016 has since remained in extended support. However, extended support ends on January 12, 2027. After that date, Microsoft will no longer provide security updates or technical support, increasing the risk of running production workloads due to exposure to newly discovered vulnerabilities and exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is February 3-5, 2027. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t risk running unsupported workloads in 2027! Complete your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Always On VPN Security Updates September 2026

Microsoft released the September 2026 security updates today, which include numerous fixes affecting Always On VPN deployments. This month’s edition addresses vulnerabilities in Windows Server Routing and Remote Access (RRAS), VPN protocols such as Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) and Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2). The updates also include Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), a crucial supporting infrastructure service for Always On VPN.

RRAS

September 2026 Microsoft security updates include 8 CVEs for RRAS. Four are rated Critical, the most severe having a CVSS rating of 9.8.

RCEs

The following five CVEs are Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities. Four are rated Critical.

Privilege Escalation

The following two CVEs are RRAS privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Both are rated Important.

Denial of Service

Finally, the last CVE addresses a denial-of-service vulnerability in RRAS.

VPN Protocols

The following section outlines vulnerabilities addressed in the September 2026 security updates affecting commonly used VPN protocols.

SSTP

The following four CVEs cover vulnerabilities in SSTP. One is rated critical with a CVSS score of 9.8. The rest are rated Important.

IKEv2

The following CVEs address vulnerabilities in the IKEv2 VPN protocol. All are rated important.

AD CS

Microsoft AD CS is commonly deployed to issue and manage certificates used for encryption and user and device authentication in Always On VPN deployments. The following four CVEs address vulnerabilities disclosed in AD CS. The first two are privilege escalation vulnerabilities, the third covers information disclosure, and the last addresses a tampering vulnerability. All are rated Important.

Summary

The September 2026 Microsoft security updates address several critical vulnerabilities affecting organizations that have deployed Microsoft Always On VPN. Administrators are encouraged to update their systems as soon as possible.

Additional Information

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

Microsoft September 2026 Security Updates

What’s New in Entra Global Secure Access Client v2.32.294.0

On August 26, 2026, Microsoft released version 2.32.294 of the Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) client. This release addresses challenges caused by overlapping local and private network address spaces, improves tunnel creation performance, and prepares the client to receive future upgrades through Windows Update.

Changes in v2.32.294

GSA client v2.32.294 includes the following new features and capabilities.

Prefer Local Network

The Prefer Local Network option allows users to access resources on their current local network when its address space overlaps with a private application’s subnet. Common scenarios include accessing a local printer or casting to a nearby device.

Support for Prefer Local Network is included in this client release. However, the administrative setting required to expose the option to users is not yet available in the traffic forwarding profile. Once Microsoft makes this setting available, administrators can enable the feature and allow users to turn it on when needed.

Windows Update

Beginning in November 2026, the GSA client will automatically receive upgrades through Windows Update. Endpoints must be running GSA client 2.31.125 or later (2.32.294 or later for Windows on Arm).

Administrators can opt out of automatic updates when installing or upgrading the GSA client using the following command.

GlobalSecureAccessInstaller.exe /quiet /norestart EnableWindowsUpdates=0

Additional Enhancements

GSA client v2.32.294 accelerates the creation of new tunnels, improving connection performance. The installer also includes .NET Runtime 10.0.9. Additional changes include telemetry and accessibility enhancements, the removal of LastMile for Office 365 telemetry, and miscellaneous bug fixes.

Summary

Global Secure Access client v2.32.294 introduces useful improvements for users working on networks with overlapping address spaces and lays the groundwork for automatic client upgrades through Windows Update. The release also improves tunnel creation performance and includes several updates to telemetry, accessibility, runtime, and reliability. Administrators should evaluate Windows Update behavior and determine whether automatic upgrades are appropriate for their deployment and change management requirements.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) Client v2.32.294.0

Microsoft Entra Global Secure Access (GSA)

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Microsoft Entra Internet Access

Entra Private Access and VPN Migration Strategies on Entra.News

Always On VPN Security Updates July 2026

Microsoft released the July 2026 Windows security updates today, including several fixes that directly affect Always On VPN deployments. This month’s release addresses vulnerabilities in the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP), Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS), making it an important update for organizations using Always On VPN.

SSTP Remote Code Execution

The highest-priority issue for Always On VPN administrators is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP). SSTP is commonly used for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. Because SSTP is, by design, exposed directly to the Internet, vulnerabilities affecting this protocol deserve immediate attention. Microsoft rates this vulnerability as Critical with a CVSS base score of 8.1.

CVE-2026-50694 – Windows SSTP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

IKE Vulnerabilities

These vulnerabilities primarily affect IKE-based VPN connections and could allow an attacker to disrupt VPN connectivity using specially crafted packets. While Microsoft rates these vulnerabilities as Important rather than Critical, organizations should still plan to deploy these updates promptly.

CVE-2026-50721 – IKEv1 Denial of Service via RSA-SHA1 authentication payload

CVE-2026-50722 – IKEv2 Denial of Service via RSA-SHA1 authentication payload

CVE-2026-12413 – IKEv2 Denial of Service via malformed fragmentation

CVE-2026-50696 – IKE Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

RRAS Vulnerabilities

The July 2026 security updates also address several vulnerabilities in the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS). All are rated Important by Microsoft.

CVE-2026-57096 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2026-49791 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2026-50451 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Summary

The SSTP RCE vulnerability is particularly concerning because the service is typically exposed to the Internet and could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute code remotely. Organizations should prioritize deployment of this update. The IKE and RRAS vulnerabilities are rated Important and can generally be addressed during the next scheduled maintenance window, although administrators should avoid unnecessary delays in applying these updates.

REMINDER: Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027 – Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

With just over six months remaining before Windows Server 2016 reaches end of support, now is the time to begin planning migrations for workloads hosted on this platform. Mainstream support ended on January 11, 2022, and Windows Server 2016 has since remained in extended support. However, extended support ends on January 12, 2027. After that date, Microsoft will no longer provide security updates or technical support, increasing the risk of running production workloads due to exposure to newly discovered vulnerabilities and exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is September 1-3, 2026. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t leave these mission-critical infrastructure services to the last minute! Begin planning your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Microsoft AD CS Adds Post-Quantum Cryptography Support with ML-DSA

Despite predictions of its decline, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) continues to evolve. Following significant enhancements introduced in late 2025, including CRL partitioning and support for 16K database pages, the May 2026 update adds another important capability: support for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

ML-DSA

Specifically, the May 2026 update adds support for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 in Windows Server 2025 for AD CS. This enables administrators to begin evaluating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and assessing PQC readiness in enterprise PKI environments

Configuration

After applying the May 2026 update to an issuing Certification Authority (CA), administrators will find new PQC algorithms under the Algorithm name drop-down list, as shown here.

Certificate template Cryptography tab listing the ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 algorithms

Note: If you don’t see these new algorithms, ensure you have selected Key Storage Provider from the Provider Category drop-down list. In addition, ensure that you select Signature on the Request Handling tab.

Test Results

Initial testing across common enterprise certificate scenarios produced mixed results. While PQC works well in some scenarios, other workloads still show limitations.

Code Signing

Code signing with an ML-DSA-44 certificate issued by AD CS works perfectly. For example, I can use Set-AuthenticodeSignature to sign a PowerShell script, as shown here.

Set-AuthenticodeSignature signing a PowerShell script with an ML-DSA-44 certificate

Viewing the file’s properties shows that the encryption algorithm used to sign the file was ML-DSA-44, as expected.

File digital signature details showing the ML-DSA-44 signature algorithm

IIS

TLS-based workloads proved more challenging. Attempts to configure an HTTPS binding in IIS failed with the following error message.

There was an error while performing this operation. A specified logon session does not exist. It may already have been terminated. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x80070520).

IIS error binding an ML-DSA certificate to an HTTPS site: a specified logon session does not exist

RRAS and SSTP

Similar limitations occurred when testing remote-access VPN scenarios using RRAS and SSTP. Specifically, configuring a PQC TLS certificate for SSTP in RRAS failed. Although I was able to assign the certificate using Set-RemoteAccess, the RemoteAccess service failed to start.

RemoteAccess service failing after assigning an ML-DSA certificate for SSTP

Remote Desktop

Unfortunately, using PQC certificates for RDP also fails. Although I could assign the PQC certificate to the RDP listener, clients fail to connect using RDP and return the following error message.

This computer can’t connect to the remote computer. Try connecting again. If the problem continues, contact the owner of the remote computer or your network administrator.

Error code: 0x904
Extended error code: 0x7

Remote Desktop connection error 0x904 with extended error 0x7 when using an ML-DSA certificate

Summary

The May 2026 update marks an important milestone for AD CS by introducing initial support for PQC algorithms, allowing organizations to begin evaluating ML-DSA certificates in enterprise environments. Early testing shows promising results for signing scenarios such as code signing; however, broader infrastructure workloads, including TLS, VPN, and Remote Desktop, remain limited today. Although PQC support is still in its early stages, these updates demonstrate Microsoft’s ongoing investment in AD CS and provide administrators with an opportunity to begin preparing their PKI environments for the post-quantum future. Additional PQC enhancements, including ML-KEM support and broader ecosystem integration, are anticipated in future Windows updates.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Microsoft May 2026 Security Updates (KB5087539)

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the Enterprise: Timeline and Readiness

Always On VPN IKEv2 Security Vulnerability April 2026

Microsoft published its Security Updates for April 2026 today, and the good news is that there are no Windows Server Routing and Remote Access (RRAS) vulnerabilities this month. However, they disclosed a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that impacts deployments using Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2).

IKE Service Extensions RCE

CVE-2026-33824 addresses a security vulnerability in the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions. This vulnerability is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical). Always On VPN implementations that use the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel are affected.

Impact

This vulnerability presents a unique challenge to Always On VPN administrators as IKEv2 is required to support device tunnel connections. Some implementations also use IKEv2 for the user tunnel. In either case, the vulnerable VPN server, often domain-joined, is reachable from the Internet, greatly increasing the attack surface and exposure to this vulnerability.

Recommendations

For deployments that use IKEv2 (device or user tunnel), administrators should update their RRAS server as soon as possible to protect against potential attacks on this service.

Not Using IKEv2?

If you are not using the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel, ensure the following IKEv2 ports are blocked at the edge firewall.

  • Inbound UDP port 500 (IKE)
  • Inbound UDP port 4500 (IKE NAT-T)

In addition, consider disabling IKEv2 on the RRAS server by opening an elevated command window and running the following command.

netsh.exe ras set wanports device = "WAN Miniport (IKEv2)" rasinonly = disabled ddinout = disabled ddoutonly = disabled maxports = 0

Optionally, you can use the Routing and Remote Access management console (rrasmgnt.msc) to perform this task.

  1. Right-click on Ports and choose Properties.
  2. Select WAN Miniport (IKEv2).
  3. Click Configure.
  4. Uncheck Remote access connections (inbound only).
  5. Uncheck Demand-dial routing connection (inbound and outbound).
  6. Enter 0 in the Maximum ports field.
  7. Click Ok.

Additional Information

Microsoft Security Updates for April 2026

CVE-2026-33824 – Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extension RCE

Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027: Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

Happy New Year, everyone! As the calendar rolls over to 2026, it’s time to start planning the migration of workloads hosted on Windows Server 2016. Mainstream support ended for Windows Server 2016 on January 11, 2022, after which it entered extended support. However, extended support for Windows Server 2016 ends on January 12, 2027, at which point it will be end of life and no longer supported. Running production workloads on Windows Server 2016 beyond this date exposes organizations to significant security risk, as it no longer receives security updates, leaving these systems vulnerable to exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is March 10-12, 2026. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t leave these mission-critical infrastructure services to the last minute! Begin planning your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Windows Secure Boot UEFI Certificates Expiring June 2026

For IT administrators responsible for managing Windows devices, a crucial certificate update milestone is coming in June 2026 that could result in degraded security for systems that are not updated. Specifically, the Microsoft certificates that manage UEFI Secure Boot trust will expire, potentially allowing untrusted or malicious software to load on affected machines during system boot.

Update (November 2026): All three Microsoft 2011 Secure Boot certificates have now expired. The Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 expired on June 24, 2026, the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 on June 27, 2026, and the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 on October 19, 2026. Devices without the 2023 certificates continue to start normally and receive standard Windows updates, but they can no longer receive boot-related security updates, such as Secure Boot DB and DBX updates and Windows Boot Manager fixes. The steps below still apply to devices that have not yet been updated. See When Secure Boot certificates expire on Windows devices for details.

Secure Boot

Windows Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware security feature that ensures a computer boots only with trusted, digitally signed operating system loaders and drivers, preventing malicious code (such as rootkits or compromised bootloaders) from loading during startup. Introduced with Windows 8, it verifies the cryptographic signatures of boot components against a database of authorized keys, blocking unauthorized or tampered software to protect system integrity from the earliest stages of boot.

Chain of Trust

The UEFI Platform Key (PK) is the ultimate root of trust in Secure Boot. It is a single public key owned by the device manufacturer and stored in firmware. The PK certificate signs the Key Exchange Key (KEK) and grants authority to modify the other Secure Boot databases, such as the allowed database (DB) and the disallowed database (DBX). The DB and DBX contain certificates and signatures for authorized and unauthorized software, respectively.

Microsoft Secure Boot Certificate Expiration

Two crucial Microsoft Secure Boot certificates are set to expire in June 2026. They are:

  • Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 (stored in KEK)
  • Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (stored in DB)

In addition, another critical Microsoft Secure Boot certificate expires in October 2026.

  • Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 (stored in DB)

When these certificates expire, devices may fail to recognize trusted bootloaders, and future Secure Boot policies may not be applied. Updating the certificates ensures continued protection against malicious rootkits and ensures Windows firmware compliance

View Certificate Information

Ideally, administrators could use PowerShell to view these UEFI Secure Boot certificates. Sadly, the output of the Get-SecureBootUEFI PowerShell command is not particularly helpful and does not display any pertinent certificate details.

Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK

Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK output showing raw bytes without readable certificate details

PowerShell Script

To address this limitation, I’ve created a PowerShell script that allows administrators to view all UEFI certificates, including PK, KEK, and DB certificates, and optionally save them as base64-encoded files. The script is available on GitHub and in the PowerShell gallery.

Install-Script -Name Get-UEFICertificate -Scope CurrentUser

View UEFI Certificates

After downloading the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script, run the following command to view the KEK database.

Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK

Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK output listing the Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate

In this example, the only KEK certificate is the expiring Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate. Running the command and specifying the DB type shows only the expiring Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate.

Get-UEFICertificate -Type DB output listing the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate

Note: UEFI also includes hashes of specific executables in the DB and DBX databases. By default, this script focuses on UEFI certificates and omits hash calculations for brevity. Use the -IncludeHashes switch to view this information.

Updating Microsoft UEFI Certificates

With the October 2025 updates, Microsoft introduced new registry keys to enable and monitor the update status of these UEFI Secure Boot certificates.

Status

To begin, administrators can check the status of the update process by reading the value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key.

Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing\ -Name UEFICA2023Status | Select-Object UEFICA2023Status

PowerShell output showing the UEFICA2023Status registry value before the Secure Boot certificate update

Update

To initiate the update process, set the value of AvailableUpdates to 0x5944.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot’ -Name ‘AvailableUpdates’ -Value 0x5944

Next, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task.

Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName ‘\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update’

Once complete, the UEFICA2023Status indicates InProgress.

UEFICA2023Status registry value showing InProgress after starting the Secure-Boot-Update task

After a reboot, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task once more. The UEFICA2023Status should indicate that it has been updated (may require one more reboot!).

UEFICA2023Status registry value showing the Secure Boot certificate update completed after reboot

Updated Certificates

After the update process completes, run the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script to confirm that new certificates have been added to UEFI Secure Boot.

Get-UEFICertificate output showing the updated Microsoft KEK certificates

Updated Microsoft KEK Certificates

Get-UEFICertificate output showing the updated Microsoft DB certificates

Updated Microsoft DB Certificates

Summary

With multiple Microsoft Secure Boot CA certificates expiring in 2026, organizations need to ensure devices are updated to maintain a valid UEFI trust chain. This guide shows how to view existing firmware certificates, apply Microsoft’s Secure Boot CA 2023 updates, and confirm that new KEK and DB certificates have been installed. Completing this process now will ensure devices remain protected from tampered or malicious boot components as the 2026 expiration dates approach.

Additional Information

Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates

Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script on GitHub

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script in the PowerShell Gallery