Always On VPN Intermittent 13801 Error

Always On VPN error 13801 is common when establishing an IKEv2 VPN connection. Typically, the issue is related to a configuration error or a problem with certificate deployment. However, administrators may encounter the 13801, an IKE authentication error, intermittently. Configuration errors are binary. If there is a misconfiguration, IKEv2 never works at all. However, a configuration error seems unlikely since the connection works occasionally yet fails at other times.

Client Authentication

The minimum application policy (Enhanced Key Usage, or EKU) requirement for the device authentication certificate for IKEv2 is Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2). When intermittent 13801 errors occur, administrators may find multiple certificates in the local computer certificate store with the Client Authentication EKU issued by different certificate authorities. Commonly, Intune-managed Windows devices may include several certificates with Client Authentication.

Certificate Selection

When Windows attempts to establish an Always On VPN IKEv2 connection, and there are multiple certificates in the local computer certificate with Client Authentication defined, Windows must choose one certificate to use for the connection. If Windows chooses incorrectly, you will receive the 13801 IKE authentication failure error. If Windows selects the right one, the connection succeeds.

Resolution

There are several ways to resolve this issue. The best way is to update the Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy (EKU). When Windows encounters multiple client authentication certificates in the local computer certificate store, it will prefer any certificate with the IP security IKE intermediate application policy for IKEv2 VPN connections. Including the IP security IKE intermediate application policy on the Always On VPN device authentication certificate ensures proper certificate selection when multiple client authentication certificates are present.

Note: This change must be made to the Intune certificate enrollment template when using Intune with PKCS or SCEP.

Certificate Template

To update an existing Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy, open the certificate templates management console (certtmpl.msc) and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click the VPN device authentication certificate template and choose Properties.
  2. Select the Extensions tab.
  3. Click on Application Policies.
  4. Click Edit.
  5. Click Add.
  6. Select the IP security IKE intermediate application policy.
  7. Click Ok.
  8. Click Ok.
  9. Click Ok.

Once complete, any certificates issued after this change is applied will now include the IP security Ike intermediate application policy.

Force Renewal

Administrators may wish to update all certificates immediately rather than wait until they renew to receive the new setting. The course of action depends on how certificates are issued.

On-Premises

When issuing certificates using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on-premises, right-click the Always On VPN device authentication certificate template and choose Reenroll All Certificate Holders. This will force all domain-joined clients with Autoenroll permissions on the template to renew their certificate on their next enrollment cycle, regardless of the certificate’s lifetime.

Intune

Follow the steps below to force re-enrollment for all certificate holders when deploying certificates using Intune.

SCEP – Add the IP Security IKE Intermediate application policy to the Intune VPN policy. After this change is applied, Intune will reenroll all endpoints.

PKCS – A new Intune device configuration policy must be created that includes the IP security IKE intermediate application policy. Assign the new policy and remove the old one to replace all certificates.

PowerShell

It’s also possible to resolve this issue using PowerShell. Administrators can use the Set-VpnConnection PowerShell cmdlet to select a certificate based on the root certification authority (CA) or a specific custom application policy defined on the Always On VPN device authentication certificate. Be sure to add the -AllUserConnection switch when working with the device tunnel.

Root CA

Open a PowerShell command window and run the following command.

$RootCA = Get-Child-Item -Path Cert:\LocalMachine\My\<thumbprint of root CA certificate>
Set-VpnConnection -Name <name of VPN profile> -MachineCertificateIssuerFilter $RootCA

Application Policy

Open a PowerShell command window and run the following command.

Set-VpnConnection -Name <name of VPN profile> -MachineCertificateEKUFilter <OID>

Note: When using a custom application policy Windows will return a warning message stating the EKU could not be validated. You can safely disregard this warning.

Intune Remediation

While running PowerShell commands locally might be helpful for troubleshooting and targeted evaluation testing, deploying settings via PowerShell at scale is challenging. For those organizations managing their devices using Microsoft Intune, I’ve published a few detection and remediation scripts on GitHub to perform these tasks.

Summary

The intermittent Always On VPN 13801 IKE authentication credentials are unacceptable error message is best resolved by updating the Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy (EKU). Although using PowerShell also works, it doesn’t scale effectively. SCCM or Intune remediations can help, but I’d encourage you to update the certificate template as best practice instead.

Additional Information

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13801

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13806

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13868

Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025

Are you ready? In just a few short weeks(!) Microsoft will release the February 2025 security updates. This is a critical update because Microsoft plans to enable full enforcement of strong certificate mapping on Active Directory Domain Controllers (DCs) with this release. Administrators unprepared for this may incur outages for workloads using certificate-based authentication such as Always On VPN, Wi-Fi, and others.

Reminder: There’s still space available in my Certificates and Intune Masterclass. Register now!

KB5014754

Microsoft introduced strong certificate mapping with the May 2022 update KB5014754 to address vulnerabilities identified with certificate-based authentication. The update makes changes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certification authorities (CAs) to embed the principal’s Security Identifier (SID) on issued certificates with a new certificate extension. The update also changes domain controller behavior to monitor and optionally enforce strong certificate mapping for authentication.

Enforcement Mode

When first introduced, the update is configured in compatibility mode. If a certificate that isn’t strongly mapped is presented for authentication, an event is recorded in the event log indicating that. Microsoft has been planning for years to enable full enforcement. After many delays, that time is now upon us. Specifically, full enforcement for strong certificate mapping will be enabled by default on DCs after applying the February 2025 security updates.

Note: Administrators can switch back to compatibility mode for now. See below for more details.

Limitations

Initially, the strong certificate mapping update was applied only to online certificate templates. Specifically, those templates are configured to build the subject name from Active Directory information. However, offline templates, where the subject name is supplied in the request, do not include this information by default. Crucially, any certificate issued with Microsoft Intune with PKCS or SCEP uses offline templates and is not strongly mapped. The lack of strong certificate mapping options for Intune-issued certificates forced Microsoft to delay its full enforcement deadline until these limitations were resolved.

Updates

In October 2024, Microsoft Intune announced support for strong certificate mapping for PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators can now configure these certificates to include strong certificate mapping. However, administrators must take action to affect this change.

PKCS

To enable strong certificate mapping for PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure that the certificate connector is running at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, the following registry key must be configured on the connector server.

Key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector
Name: EnableSidSecurityExtension
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

The Intune Certificate Connector server must be restarted for this change to take effect. No changes are required on the PKCS certificate policy in Intune.

SCEP

To enable strong certificate mapping for SCEP certificates, administrators must add the following attribute/value pair to the Subject alternative name settings on their existing Intune SCEP certificate policy.

Attribute: URI
Value: {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}

Intune SCEP profile subject alternative name with the URI attribute OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

Preparation

Administrators using certificate-based authentication against on-premises Active Directory should ensure all user and device authentication certificates include embedded SID information. For certificates issued on-premises, with Intune using PKCS or certificates issued by Entra Conditional Access, the certificate should now have the extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, including the principal’s SID.

Certificate with the SID extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2


SCEP certificates issued using Intune will include the following information in the Subject Alternative Name field.

URL=tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-24:sid:<sid>

Certificate subject alternative name with the tag:microsoft.com SID URL


Note: This applies to certificates issued using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune as those certificates are deployed using a SCEP device configuration policy.

Opt-Out

With the February 2025 security update, all domain controllers will be switched to full enforcement mode. Authentication requests using certificates without strong mapping will be denied in this configuration.

If your organization is not prepared to move to full enforcement mode, the February 2025 update allows administrators to opt out and switch back to compatibility mode by enabling the following registry key on all domain controllers.

Key: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc
Name: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc’ -Name ‘StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement’ -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

September 2025

Administrators are strongly encouraged to update all user and device authentication certificates before September 2025. With the September 2025 security update, Microsoft will no longer honor the opt-out registry settings and strictly enforce strong certificate mapping for all certificate-based authentication requests.

Troubleshooting

Certificate authentication is commonly used for Always On VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. If full enforcement mode is enabled on domain controllers and a certificate is presented for authentication that is not strongly mapped, administrators may see the following event log information recorded on the Network Policy Server (NPS).

Network Policy Server denied access to a user.

NPS event stating Network Policy Server denied access to a user

The details of the event include the following.

Reason Code: 16
Reason: Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.

NPS event details with reason code 16, authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch

Obviously, the user does not enter their password when using certificates for authentication. However, the indication of a credential mismatch can be caused by missing strong certificate mapping information when the DC is in full enforcement mode.

Note: There are other causes for reason code 16 failures on NPS. Further investigation may be required to determine the root cause.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Training: Certificates and Intune Masterclass

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Entra Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS

KB5014754: Certificate-Based Authentication Changes on Windows Domain Controllers

Always On VPN and Cloud PKI for Intune Error 853

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune is a PKI-as-a-Service offering that allows organizations to issue and manage digital certificates without on-premises infrastructure. Certificates are excellent phishing-resistant credentials that are well-suited for applications requiring strong authentication, such as secure remote access with Always On VPN. However, administrators may encounter errors when attempting to authenticate users or devices using certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Error 853

After publishing certificates with Cloud PKI for Intune and configuring the on-premises Always On VPN infrastructure to support this, administrators will find that the Always On VPN connection fails to connect. Attempts to manually start the connection result in the following error message.

“The remote access connection completed, but authentication failed because the certificate that authenticates the client to the server is not valid. Ensure the certificate used for authentication is valid.”

In the event log on the Windows client, you’ll find an event ID 20227 from the RasClient source that includes the following error message.

“The user <domain>\<user> dialed a connection named <VPN connection name> which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 853.”

Error 853 (ERROR_EAP_USER_CERT_INVALID) indicates the user certificate is invalid.

Certificate

Upon further investigation, the certificate shows no issues, is valid, is trusted, and has a private key.

NPS

Looking at the event log on the Network Policy Server (NPS), you’ll find a corresponding event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source that includes the following error message.

“Network Policy Server denied access to a user.”

Looking at the authentication details section of this event log entry yields the following important clue.

Reason Code: 258
Reason: The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.

Failed Revocation Check

Since the NPS server indicates that it rejected the authentication request because it could not perform a revocation check, let’s bring the user authentication certificate to the NPS server and perform some tests.

Export Certificate

Open the user certificate store (certmgr.msc) on the client and expand Personal > Certificates. Right-click on the certificate in question and choose All Tasks > Export. Export the certificate only (not the private key) and copy the file to the NPS server.

Verify Certificate

Open a PowerShell or command window on the NPS server and run the following command to validate the certificate.

certutil.exe -verify -urlfetch <path to exported certificate>

For example.

certutil.exe -verify -urlfecth .\rdeckard.cer

The command generates a lot of output, but if you look at the very end of the data stream, you’ll see two interesting items.

  • Revocation check skipped – no revocation information available
  • Leaf certificate revocation check passed

Based on this information the user certificate (the leaf certificate) passed a revocation check. However, it would appear that another certificate in the chain does not include revocation information. Since there is only a root and issuing CA in the chain, and root certificates don’t include revocation information because they are the self-signed root of trust, it would appear that revocation information is missing from the issuing CA certificate.

We can confirm this by scrolling up in the previous command’s output to where the verification of the issuing CA certificate takes place. Here, you’ll see that the issuing CA certificate is missing CDP (CRL Distribution Point) information.

When NPS attempts to validate the certificate and the certificate chain, it expects to find CDP information, which it will use to check if the issuing CA certificate has been revoked. The revocation check fails without this information, and the authentication request is rejected.

Design Error?

Missing CDP information is not unusual for end-entity (leaf) certificates when they are short-lived. An example is Entra ID conditional access certificates, which do not include CDP information by design. However, I expect this information to be listed on an issuing CA certificate. Why it’s not there, I’m not sure. I’ll investigate this in more depth and report on anything I learn that’s new.

Workaround

To move forward using Cloud PKI for Intune certificates with Always On VPN, administrators must implement the following registry setting on all NPS servers handling authentication requests for Always On VPN servers.

Key = HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13
Name = IgnoreNoRevocationCheck
Type = DWORD
Value = 1

To implement this change using PowerShell, open an elevated PowerShell command window and run the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13\’ -Name IgnoreNoRevocationCheck -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the NPS server for the changes to take effect.

Additional Information

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune and Active Directory

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune and Certificate Templates

Strong Certificate Mapping for Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Troubleshooting Intune Failed PKCS Request

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune SCEP URL

Delete A Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune Certificate Authority

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune on RunAs Radio Podcast

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS

Microsoft recently announced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates Intune PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators are encouraged to update their Intune Certificate Connector servers and SCEP device configuration policies to support this capability as soon as possible.

PKCS

Organizations that use PKCS device configuration policies to deploy certificates to Intune-managed endpoints may have encountered the following error message in the event log on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

System.NullReferenceException: CertEnroll::CX509Extension::Initialize: Invalid pointer 0x80004003 (-2147467261 E_POINTER) at CERTENROLLLib.IX509Extension.Initialize(CObjectId pObjectId, EncodingType Encoding, String strEncodedData)

Known Issue

The above error is a known issue that has been resolved with the November security updates. If you encounter this error, install the latest Microsoft security update from November 2024.

Additional Information

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Delete A Cloud PKI for Intune Certificate Authority

Deleting an Always On VPN Device Tunnel

When Microsoft first introduced Cloud PKI for Intune, the solution did not allow administrators to delete a CA after it was created. As you are limited to just six Cloud PKI for Intune CAs, this was quite frustrating, especially during the testing and evaluation phase, where you may need to spin up a few instances before you decide on the features you need.

Are you interested in learning more about Cloud PKI for Intune? Register for my upcoming online training course, Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune. This three-day comprehensive, deep-dive course covers all aspects of issuing and managing certificates with Intune, including provisioning and managing Cloud PKI for Intune. Click here to learn more.

Delete Cloud PKI

Thankfully, Microsoft eventually realized this shortcoming and added this much needed feature a few months ago. However, removing an Intune Cloud PKI CA requires administrators to follow some specific steps to remove a CA successfully. Since Cloud PKI for Intune uses a two-tier deployment model, administrators must remove the issuing CA first and then the root CA if required.

Issuing CA

Follow the steps below to delete a Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Intune Policies

Be sure to delete any Intune device configuration policies relating to Cloud PKI for Intune before decommissioning a Cloud PKI for Intune CA. This includes trusted certificate policies, Wi-Fi policies, and VPN policies.

Pause CA

The first step of deleting a Cloud PKI for Intune CA is to pause the service. Pausing the service prevents new certificates from being issued while the administrator completes the remaining retirement tasks. Open the Intune portal (https://intune.microsoft.com), navigate to Tenant Administration > Cloud PKI, and click the CA to be deleted. Next, click Pause to pause the CA.

Revoke Certificates

Administrators must revoke all issued certificates before deleting the issuing CA. Click on any issued certificate to view its properties and then click the Revoke button, as shown here.

Complete this step for each certificate issued and active on the CA.

Note: It takes some time before the certificate status shows Revoked in the management console. Be patient!

Revoke CA Certificate

Once the administrator has revoked all issued certificates, click Revoke to revoke the issuing CA’s certificate.

Delete CA

Once the issuing CA certificate has been revoked the administrator will now have the option to delete the Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Root CA

After the administrator deletes the issuing CA, the root CA can be removed if necessary. Click on the root CA and click the Delete button.

Additional Information

Delete Microsoft Cloud PKI Certification Authority

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Certificate Templates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Active Directory

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune SCEP URL

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune on RunAs Radio

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Microsoft recently introduced support for strong certificate mapping in Intune to support changes introduced with the May 2022 security update KB5014754. Specifically, Intune now supports adding the SID for the principal in the subject name to the certificate for PKCS and SCEP device configuration policies.

Error

A few folks have contacted me about an error they encountered when configuring strong certificate mapping for Intune device configuration profiles using PKCS. Specifically, they would receive the following error message after specifying the URI value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} in the Subject Alternative Name section of the PKCS policy.

“A value is required for Value. Value can include allowed variables combined with static text. UPN and Email address should include an @, for example: “{{AAD_Device_ID}}@contoso.com”. DNS cannot end with a symbol or contain an @ sign, e.g. “{{DeviceName}}.contoso.com“ or “{{DeviceName}}”. See support variables here: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2104597“

Resolution

Administrators will receive this message when adding the {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} variable to a PKCS device configuration policy. This error is expected because PKCS does not require (or support) the use of this value in this field. The {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} value is only required for SCEP Intune device configuration profiles.

To add the SID to a PKCS certificate, administrators must only define a registry value on the Intune Certificate Connector server as described here. No changes are required on the PKCS device configuration policy in Intune.

Additional Information

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes for Always On VPN

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

With the October 2024 Intune update, Microsoft introduced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates issued by Intune via the Intune Certificate Connector. Enabling strong certificate mapping support in Intune is an important change for those organizations using Microsoft Intune to issue and manage certificates for their users and devices, as it resolves a critical implementation blocker.

Note: This post was updated to clarify that adding the {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} for PKCS certificates is not required. This variable is only used for SCEP certificates.

Background

In May 2022, Microsoft released security update KB5014754, which added functionality to domain controllers and enterprise issuing certification authority (CA) servers, allowing the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) to enforce strong certificate mapping. Specifically, with KB5014754 installed, issuing CAs now add the requesting principal’s Security Identifier (SID) to the certificate in a new certificate extension. Domain controllers can be configured to reject authentication requests using certificates that do not include this information.

Today, DCs with KB5014754 installed will still allow authentication without strong certificate mapping. However, Microsoft has stated they will begin enforcing strong certificate mapping in February 2025, with an option to disable it via the registry. Starting in September 2025, full enforcement will be mandatory.

Update: Full Enforcement mode has been mandatory since the September 9, 2025 Windows security update. The StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry setting is no longer supported, and domain controllers deny certificate-based authentication when a certificate cannot be strongly mapped. See Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025 for details.

Microsoft strong certificate mapping enforcement timeline from KB5014754

Reference: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16

Limitation

The initial changes in KB5014754 applied only to online certificate templates, meaning those that build the subject name from Active Directory. However, deploying certificates with Intune using either PKCS or SCEP requires using an offline certificate template that allows the requestor to supply the subject name in the request. When using offline templates, a certificate is issued but does not embed the SID in the certificate. Using offline templates presents unique challenges to organizations moving to modern management with Intune and Entra ID.

Intune Changes

The October 2024 Intune update addresses this limitation by providing a method to include SID information in certificates using either SCEP or PKCS.

SCEP

To include the SID information in SCEP certificates, create or edit an existing SCEP device configuration policy and define a URI Subject Alternative Name (SAN) attribute with the value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} as shown here.

Intune SCEP profile with a URI subject alternative name set to OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

PKCS

To include SID information in PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure the Intune Certificate Connector is updated to at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, a registry setting must be enabled on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

On the server where the Intune Certificate Connector is installed, open the registry editor, navigate to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector, and change the value of EnableSidSecurityExtension to 1.

Registry editor showing EnableSidSecurityExtension set to 1 on the Intune Certificate Connector server

Optionally, administrators can update this setting at the command line by running the following PowerShell command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the Intune Certificate Connector server for the changes to take effect.

Certificates

SID information is added to certificates differently depending on which Intune device configuration policy type is used.

PKCS

PKCS certificates have the SID embedded in the certificate extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, as shown here.

PKCS certificate showing the SID in the 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 certificate extension

SCEP

SCEP certificates have the SID embedded in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field in the format “tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:<SID>” as shown here.

SCEP certificate showing the SID in the subject alternative name field

Migration

When making these changes to embed the SID in Intune-issued certificates in an existing Intune PKCS or SCEP configuration policy, the change will only affect certificates issued after the change is made. To update all certificate holders, you must create and deploy a new device configuration policy to targeted users or devices. Deleting the old profile (or ensuring it no longer applies) will remove the old certificate from the endpoint. If you’ve configured your Intune Certificate Connector to support revocation, the old certificate will also be revoked.

Entra Conditional Access

Entra Conditional Access certificates have included SID information since July 2023. More details here.

Cloud PKI for Intune

The changes above will also work with certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Other Cloud PKI Providers

Many other Cloud PKI providers, such as SCEPman and KEYTOS, already include the embedded SID in their certificates. Other cloud PKI providers may also include embedded SID. Consult your provider to confirm.

Additional Information

Microsoft Intune October 2024 Strong Certificate Mapping Update

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Strong Certificate Mapping Update for PKCS

Entra ID Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Implementing Strong Certificate Mapping in Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Free Entra Certificate-Based Authentication Training Course

I’m pleased to announce I’ll present a FREE online training course on Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication (CBA). The course will be delivered through the ViaMonstra Online Academy on Wednesday, November 6, beginning at 10:00 AM CST. Once again, this training course is entirely FREE, so don’t hesitate to register now! If you can’t attend the live session, you can always view the presentation recording later.

Course Highlights

Join me for this 90-minute live, online training session where you will learn:

  • How certificate-based authentication offers more robust protection than passwords alone and mitigates phishing and MFA bypass risks
  • How Entra CBA enables a seamless, passwordless user experience while maintaining high security and assurance
  • How Entra CBA eliminates the need for physical authentication devices such as FIDO keys or security tokens, reducing costs and complexity
  • How to configure and manage affinity binding and authentication strength policies for Entra CBA

When you attend the live event, you’ll have the opportunity to ask questions directly during the presentation, so be sure to register today and join us for this free training session!

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication (CBA)

Mini-Course – Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication

Always On VPN Security Updates October 2024

Microsoft has released the October 2024 security updates, and numerous issues may impact Always On VPN administrators. Although many CVEs affect Always On VPN-related services that are Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, none are critical this cycle.

RRAS Updates

This month, Microsoft has provided 12 updates for the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS), commonly deployed to support Always On VPN deployments. Most of these CVEs involve overflow vulnerabilities (heap and stack), input validation weaknesses, and buffer over-read and overflow vulnerabilities. All are rated important, and there are no known exploits currently.

CVE-2024-38212

CVE-2024-38261

CVE-2024-38265

CVE-2024-43453

CVE-2024-43549

CVE-2024-43564

CVE-2024-43589

CVE-2024-43592

CVE-2024-43593

CVE-2024-43607

CVE-2024-43608

CVE-2024-43611

Related Updates

In addition to the updates above, Microsoft also released fixes for security vulnerabilities in various related services that are important to Always On VPN administrators.

Windows Network Address Translation (NAT)

The following CVEs address denial of service vulnerabilities in the Network Address Translation (NAT) service.

CVE-2024-43562

CVE-2024-43565

Certificate Services

Always On VPN administrators will also find updates for CVEs affecting various certificate services-related components.

CVE-2024-43545 – OCSP Denial of Service Vulnerability

CVE-2024-43541 – Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) Denial of Service Vulnerability

CVE-2024-43544 – Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) Denial of Service Vulnerability

Recommendations

Always On VPN administrators are encouraged to update systems as soon as possible. However, since none of the CVEs is rated Critical, updates can be applied during standard update windows.

Additional Information

Microsoft October 2024 Security Updates

Workplace Ninja Summit Switzerland 2024

I’m excited to announce that I’ll be presenting at the upcoming Workplace Ninja Summit in beautiful Lucerne, Switzerland. The event takes place from September 16-19, 2024, and covers topics such as Microsoft Intune, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), Entra, PowerShell, Azure Virtual Desktop (AVD), Windows 365, and more.

My Sessions

I will be delivering two talks at this year’s conference.

  • Simplified Certificate Management with Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune
  • Strong Authentication with Entra Certificate-Based Authentication

I will provide links to the sessions with dates and times when they are available.

Let’s Connect!

Will you be attending the conference? Let’s get together! Drop me a note on X or LinkedIn, or fill out the form below, and we’ll discuss anything you’d like. Hope to see you there!

Contact Me