Configuring Proper Time Synchronization in an Active Directory Domain

Wall clock representing time synchronization

Accurate time is critical in an Active Directory environment. Kerberos authentication depends on it, and by default it tolerates no more than five minutes of clock skew between a client and a domain controller. Certificate validity periods, CRL publication, OCSP responses, and log correlation all depend on it too, which becomes even more important as organizations move to short-lived certificates. During a recent engagement to assess and remediate a customer’s Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) deployment, I noticed intermittent Kerberos authentication anomalies that didn’t line up with anything in the PKI itself. The root cause turned out to be time synchronization, which nobody had configured correctly across the domain. This post explains what I found and how I fixed it. I’ve reproduced the customer’s configuration in my lab, so the examples and output come from lab.richardhicks.net, but the process is the same one I used in the customer’s environment.

What I Found

When I reviewed time configuration across the customer’s domain, I found several problems, including the following.

  • Inconsistent domain controller configuration. Some domain controllers had never been configured and were still running the defaults. Others had been pointed manually at different external time sources, presumably by different administrators at different times. This resulted in more than one time root in the domain, which is exactly what the Windows time hierarchy is designed to prevent.
  • The PDC emulator was not authoritative. The domain controller holding the PDC emulator role had no external time source configured, so it wasn’t anchoring the domain to UTC.
  • Hyper-V was quietly providing the time. Most of the domain controllers were virtual machines running on Hyper-V. The Hyper-V time synchronization integration service (VMICTimeProvider) was enabled on all of them, and W32Time on the domain controllers was taking time from the host instead of the domain hierarchy.
  • The Hyper-V hosts had no time configuration at all. Most of the domain was running on Hyper-V hosts that were workgroup members. Workgroup machines don’t participate in the domain time hierarchy, and nobody had configured them. They were running on their own clocks, polling time.windows.com infrequently, if they could reach it at all.

The result was a loop with no anchor. The domain controllers took their time from the hosts, the hosts drifted on their own, and nothing in the environment was reliably tied to UTC. Different domain controllers on different hosts could disagree by a meaningful amount, which explained the inconsistent Kerberos behavior. In my lab, the PDC emulator showed the problem clearly.

PS C:\> w32tm.exe /query /status
Leap Indicator: 0(no warning)
Stratum: 1 (primary reference - syncd by radio clock)
...
ReferenceId: 0x564D5450 (source name: "VMTP")
...
Source: VM IC Time Synchronization Provider

Don’t be fooled by Stratum 1. The VM IC provider always reports Stratum 1, but the real source is the Hyper-V host’s clock. A quick comparison against a public time server showed the PDC emulator was about 840 milliseconds off UTC.

PS C:\> w32tm.exe /stripchart /computer:time.cloudflare.com /samples:3 /dataonly
Tracking time.cloudflare.com [162.159.200.1:123].
Collecting 3 samples.
17:36:52, +00.8405031s
17:36:54, +00.8443389s
17:36:56, +00.8415804s

That’s not enough to break Kerberos on its own, but it was drifting, and in the customer’s environment, with multiple hosts and multiple time roots, the differences were much larger.

How Time Sync Should Work

Before making changes, it’s worth reviewing how Windows time synchronization is designed to work in an Active Directory domain. The hierarchy is simple and consists of the following.

  • The forest root PDC emulator is the authoritative time source. It is the only domain controller that should synchronize with an external source, and it advertises itself as a reliable time server (AnnounceFlags 5).
  • All other domain controllers follow the domain hierarchy. They use the NT5DS type and synchronize with the PDC emulator (directly or through their domain’s PDC emulator in a multi-domain forest). They advertise as time servers, but not as reliable ones (AnnounceFlags 10, the default).
  • Domain members synchronize with a domain controller. This is the default behavior for every domain-joined machine, although virtual machines need one adjustment, which I cover next.

Virtual Machines

Virtualization adds a wrinkle. On Hyper-V, the time synchronization integration service registers its own W32Time provider, VMICTimeProvider, which feeds the guest time from the host. It’s enabled by default on every virtual machine, and on a domain-joined VM it competes with the domain hierarchy and usually wins. Microsoft’s guidance is to disable VMICTimeProvider on virtual domain controllers so they get their time from the PDC emulator instead. I recommend disabling it on domain member VMs as well, so every domain-joined machine follows the same hierarchy.

Workgroup Hyper-V Hosts

The Hyper-V hosts matter too. If they’re domain members, they’ll follow the domain hierarchy automatically. If they’re workgroup members, as they were here, they need to be configured explicitly. Even with VMICTimeProvider disabled, the host’s clock still sets each VM’s time at startup and after a restore from a saved state, and the host needs accurate time for its own logs and certificates.

Target Configuration

The end state looks like this. The PDC emulator and the Hyper-V hosts both sync with the same public source, and every domain-joined machine, physical or virtual, follows the domain hierarchy.

SystemTime sourceConfigured by
PDC emulatortime.cloudflare.comDC Time Sync GPO
Other domain controllersPDC emulatorDC Time Settings GPO
Domain members (physical and virtual)Domain controllersDomain Member Time Settings GPO
Hyper-V hosts (workgroup)time.cloudflare.comLocal configuration

Resetting Domain Controllers to the Default Configuration

With domain controllers configured inconsistently, the cleanest approach is to return every one of them to the default configuration and then manage time centrally with Group Policy. Resetting first is important. Local settings remain in the registry underneath any policy, and if a domain controller ever stops receiving the policy (for example, after the PDC emulator role moves), it falls back to whatever was configured locally. Leftover manual peer settings would quietly create a second time root.

Restoring the Defaults

The following commands reset W32Time on every domain controller in the domain. They re-enable the Hyper-V time provider (the default), restore domain hierarchy synchronization, reset the peer list to the stock time.windows.com,0x9 value, and set AnnounceFlags back to 10 with /reliable:no.

$DomainControllers = (Get-ADDomainController -Filter *).HostName
Invoke-Command -ComputerName $DomainControllers -ScriptBlock {
# Re-enable the Hyper-V time provider (default)
$VmicKey = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\VMICTimeProvider'
If (Test-Path -Path $VmicKey) {
Set-ItemProperty -Path $VmicKey -Name Enabled -Value 1
}
# Restore domain hierarchy sync, default peer list, and default AnnounceFlags (10)
w32tm.exe /config /manualpeerlist:"time.windows.com,0x9" /syncfromflags:domhier /reliable:no /update
Restart-Service -Name W32Time
w32tm.exe /resync /rediscover
}

I recommend this targeted approach over w32tm.exe /unregister and w32tm.exe /register. Re-registering the service rebuilds the entire W32Time configuration, but it can also remove the VMICTimeProvider subkey. That key is created by the Hyper-V integration components, not by W32Time, and it’s the key we’ll target with Group Policy in the next step.

Verifying the Reset

Next, confirm each domain controller is running the defaults and that no existing Group Policy is configuring W32Time.

Invoke-Command -ComputerName $DomainControllers -ScriptBlock {
Write-Output "=== $env:COMPUTERNAME ==="
w32tm.exe /query /configuration | Select-String 'Type:|NtpServer:|AnnounceFlags:' | ForEach-Object { $_.Line.Trim() }
w32tm.exe /query /source
Write-Output "Time policy present: $(Test-Path -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\W32Time')"
}

Each domain controller should report Type: NT5DS (Local) and AnnounceFlags: 10 (Local), and the time policy check should return False. If it returns True, another GPO is already configuring W32Time. Find it and remove those settings before continuing. Don’t be surprised if the source still shows VM IC Time Synchronization Provider on some domain controllers at this point. That’s the default behavior we’re about to fix.

Configuring Time Sync with Group Policy

With every domain controller back to a known state, the next step is to configure time centrally with three GPOs. Two are linked to the Domain Controllers OU, and the third is linked to the domain root for domain members. The design includes the following.

GPOApplies toSettings
DC Time SettingsAll domain controllersType NT5DS, AnnounceFlags 10, NTP client and server enabled, VMICTimeProvider disabled
DC Time SyncPDC emulator only (WMI filter)Type NTP, NtpServer time.cloudflare.com,0x8 time.nist.gov,0xa, AnnounceFlags 5
Domain Member Time SettingsAll domain members (linked to the domain root)VMICTimeProvider disabled

DC Time Sync is linked with a higher precedence (link order 1), so on the PDC emulator its values override the baseline from DC Time Settings. Every other domain controller receives only the baseline. A nice benefit of this design is that it follows the PDC emulator role automatically. If the role moves to another domain controller, the WMI filter matches the new role holder, and the old one falls back to the baseline with no administrator intervention. However, if the PDC emulator role moves to another DC, don’t forget to update the outbound access rules on the edge firewall to allow the new server to access the public time resource.

Choosing a Time Source

I used time.cloudflare.com as the primary time source for this customer, with time.nist.gov as a fallback. You can use any reliable public time service, such as time.windows.com or a regional pool.ntp.org address. Separate multiple servers with spaces in the NtpServer value.

Adding a Fallback Time Source

A single upstream time source works, but it makes the entire domain dependent on one provider. Microsoft recommends configuring three or more time servers when using multiple peers, or, with only two, marking one with the UseAsFallbackOnly flag (0x2). I chose the latter, setting NtpServer to time.cloudflare.com,0x8 time.nist.gov,0xa. The 0xa flag combines client mode (0x8) and fallback only (0x2), so W32Time uses NIST only when Cloudflare is unavailable. Keep the following in mind when choosing a fallback.

  • It removes a single point of failure. Cloudflare’s time service is highly reliable, but the service itself isn’t the only thing that can fail. A DNS resolution failure, a BGP route leak or hijack affecting the provider’s prefixes, an upstream ISP routing problem, or a firewall change can all make a single provider unreachable from your network. NIST runs on a completely separate network and doesn’t use anycast, so an event that affects one provider is unlikely to affect the other.
  • An outage isn’t catastrophic. Even if the PDC emulator can’t reach any upstream source, it keeps running on its own clock and continues serving time to the rest of the domain. Every domain controller and domain member still follows the PDC emulator, so the domain stays in sync with itself while slowly drifting from UTC. That’s what matters most for Kerberos, which compares the client’s clock with the domain controller’s clock, not with UTC. A typical system clock drifts by a few seconds per day at most, so an outage lasting hours or even days has no practical impact. When the time source becomes reachable again, W32Time corrects the accumulated offset automatically.
  • Both sources must handle leap seconds the same way. Cloudflare and NIST both insert leap seconds as a one-second step, so they’re a safe pair. Google, AWS, and Meta smear leap seconds instead, so don’t pair one of them with Cloudflare or NIST. The next section explains why.
  • A fallback doesn’t improve accuracy. A second source improves availability, not accuracy. With UseAsFallbackOnly, W32Time only consults NIST when Cloudflare is unreachable, so there’s nothing to cross-check against. Even with two active peers, there’s no majority to decide which one is right if they disagree. That’s fine for a typical Active Directory domain, which doesn’t require high-accuracy time.

Leap Second Considerations

Avoid mixing time services that handle leap seconds differently. A leap second is an occasional one-second adjustment to UTC that keeps it aligned with the Earth’s rotation. Most time services, including Cloudflare and NIST, apply it the standard way, by inserting the extra second all at once. Google (and AWS) instead “smear” it by slightly slowing their clocks over a 24-hour window, so during that period their time differs from other services by up to half a second. If a domain controller has both kinds of servers in its peer list, they disagree during a leap event, and the results are unpredictable. Pick one approach and use it consistently. You can read more about each approach in Google’s leap smear documentation and Cloudflare’s NTP documentation.

Allowing Outbound NTP

The PDC emulator must be able to reach both time services on UDP port 123. In the customer’s environment, as in my lab, outbound NTP was blocked at the edge firewall. I added a rule allowing outbound UDP 123 from the PDC emulator to the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of both time services. Cloudflare publishes its addresses in its documentation, and NIST publishes the list of servers that time.nist.gov rotates across. Be sure to include both address families if your domain controllers have IPv6 connectivity, because W32Time will often prefer IPv6 when the name resolves to both. Also, remember to update the rule if the PDC emulator role moves to a different server. You can validate reachability to both services from the PDC emulator before configuring anything.

w32tm.exe /stripchart /computer:time.cloudflare.com /samples:3 /dataonly
w32tm.exe /stripchart /computer:time.nist.gov /samples:3 /dataonly

If both return offsets, you’re good to go. An error of 0x800705B4 indicates a timeout, which usually means UDP 123 is blocked or the IPv6 path isn’t working.

Creating the GPOs

The following script creates the WMI filter and all three GPOs. It links the two domain controller GPOs to the Domain Controllers OU and the member GPO to the domain root. It requires the GroupPolicy and ActiveDirectory modules (Install-WindowsFeature -Name GPMC, RSAT-AD-PowerShell on Windows Server) and Domain Admin rights. Run it in Windows PowerShell 5.1. You can also download the script from GitHub.

#Requires -Modules GroupPolicy, ActiveDirectory
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Variables
$Domain = Get-ADDomain
$DomainFqdn = $Domain.DNSRoot
$DomainDn = $Domain.DistinguishedName
$DcOu = $Domain.DomainControllersContainer
$Pdc = $Domain.PDCEmulator
$PolicyKey = 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\W32Time'
$NtpServer = 'time.cloudflare.com,0x8 time.nist.gov,0xa'
# Create the WMI filter (or reuse it if it already exists)
$WmiFilterName = 'PDC Emulator'
$WmiQuery = 'SELECT * FROM Win32_ComputerSystem WHERE DomainRole = 5'
$SomPath = "CN=SOM,CN=WMIPolicy,CN=System,$DomainDn"
$WmiFilter = Get-ADObject -Server $Pdc -SearchBase $SomPath -LDAPFilter "(&(objectClass=msWMI-Som)(msWMI-Name=$WmiFilterName))" -Properties 'msWMI-ID'
If ($null -eq $WmiFilter) {
$WmiId = "{$([Guid]::NewGuid().ToString().ToUpper())}"
$Now = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString('yyyyMMddHHmmss.ffffff-000')
$FilterParams = @{
Server = $Pdc
Name = $WmiId
Type = 'msWMI-Som'
Path = $SomPath
OtherAttributes = @{
'msWMI-Name' = $WmiFilterName
'msWMI-Parm1' = 'Domain controller holding the PDC emulator role'
'msWMI-Parm2' = "1;3;10;$($WmiQuery.Length);WQL;root\CIMv2;$WmiQuery;"
'msWMI-Author' = "$env:USERNAME@$DomainFqdn"
'msWMI-ID' = $WmiId
'msWMI-CreationDate' = $Now
'msWMI-ChangeDate' = $Now
}
}
New-ADObject @FilterParams
}
Else {
$WmiId = $WmiFilter.'msWMI-ID'
}
# DC Time Settings (all domain controllers)
$AllDcGpo = New-GPO -Name 'DC Time Settings' -Comment 'Baseline W32Time settings for all domain controllers' -Server $Pdc
$Gpo = @{ Name = $AllDcGpo.DisplayName; Server = $Pdc }
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\Parameters" -ValueName 'Type' -Type String -Value 'NT5DS' | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\Config" -ValueName 'AnnounceFlags' -Type DWord -Value 10 | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\TimeProviders\NtpClient" -ValueName 'Enabled' -Type DWord -Value 1 | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\TimeProviders\NtpServer" -ValueName 'Enabled' -Type DWord -Value 1 | Out-Null
# Disable the Hyper-V time provider (Group Policy Preference, writes to the service key)
$PrefParams = @{
Name = $AllDcGpo.DisplayName
Server = $Pdc
Context = 'Computer'
Action = 'Update'
Key = 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\VMICTimeProvider'
ValueName = 'Enabled'
Type = 'DWord'
Value = 0
}
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue @PrefParams | Out-Null
# DC Time Sync (PDC emulator only)
$PdcGpo = New-GPO -Name 'DC Time Sync' -Comment 'External NTP source for the PDC emulator' -Server $Pdc
$Gpo = @{ Name = $PdcGpo.DisplayName; Server = $Pdc }
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\Parameters" -ValueName 'Type' -Type String -Value 'NTP' | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\Parameters" -ValueName 'NtpServer' -Type String -Value $NtpServer | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue @Gpo -Key "$PolicyKey\Config" -ValueName 'AnnounceFlags' -Type DWord -Value 5 | Out-Null
# Assign the WMI filter to DC Time Sync
$PdcGpoDn = "CN={$($PdcGpo.Id.ToString().ToUpper())},CN=Policies,CN=System,$DomainDn"
Set-ADObject -Server $Pdc -Identity $PdcGpoDn -Replace @{ gPCWQLFilter = "[$DomainFqdn;$WmiId;0]" }
# Domain Member Time Settings (all domain members)
$MemberGpo = New-GPO -Name 'Domain Member Time Settings' -Comment 'Disable the Hyper-V time provider so domain members follow the domain hierarchy' -Server $Pdc
$PrefParams = @{
Name = $MemberGpo.DisplayName
Server = $Pdc
Context = 'Computer'
Action = 'Update'
Key = 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\VMICTimeProvider'
ValueName = 'Enabled'
Type = 'DWord'
Value = 0
}
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue @PrefParams | Out-Null
# Link both DC GPOs (DC Time Sync takes precedence)
New-GPLink -Name 'DC Time Sync' -Target $DcOu -LinkEnabled Yes -Order 1 -Server $Pdc | Out-Null
New-GPLink -Name 'DC Time Settings' -Target $DcOu -LinkEnabled Yes -Order 2 -Server $Pdc | Out-Null
# Link the member GPO to the domain root
New-GPLink -Name 'Domain Member Time Settings' -Target $DomainDn -LinkEnabled Yes -Server $Pdc | Out-Null
Get-GPInheritance -Target $DcOu -Server $Pdc | Select-Object -ExpandProperty GpoLinks | Format-Table DisplayName, Order, Enabled
Get-GPInheritance -Target $DomainDn -Server $Pdc | Select-Object -ExpandProperty GpoLinks | Format-Table DisplayName, Order, Enabled

There are a few things worth noting about this script.

  • Everything targets the PDC emulator. The GroupPolicy cmdlets talk to the PDC emulator by default, but the ActiveDirectory cmdlets can pick any domain controller. Without -Server, Set-ADObject may land on a domain controller where the new GPO hasn’t replicated yet, and the script fails partway through. I hit this in the field, so the script now pins every call to the PDC emulator.
  • Only the required values are written. Enabling the Global Configuration Settings Administrative Template writes every value it contains, including some outdated clock discipline defaults. Setting individual registry values avoids that, and everything not set by policy keeps its default. The trade-off is that GPMC may show these under Extra Registry Settings instead of Windows Time Service. That’s cosmetic.
  • VMICTimeProvider is disabled with a preference, not a policy. There is no Administrative Template setting for it. The Group Policy Preference writes directly to the service key, so it persists even if the GPO stops applying, which is what you want for a domain controller.
  • The member GPO needs only the preference. Domain members already default to NT5DS, so VMICTimeProvider is the only thing keeping virtual machines off the domain hierarchy. Because it’s linked to the domain root, it also applies to domain controllers. That’s harmless, since DC Time Settings sets the same value and takes precedence.
  • The WMI filter is assigned directly. The GroupPolicy module has no cmdlet for creating or assigning WMI filters, so the script writes the gPCWQLFilter attribute itself.
  • Multi-domain forests. DomainRole = 5 matches the PDC emulator of any domain. Link DC Time Sync only in the forest root domain. Child domain PDC emulators should follow the domain hierarchy.
DC Time Sync and DC Time Settings GPOs linked to the Domain Controllers OU

GPOs applied to domain controllers.

DC Time Sync GPO with the PDC Emulator WMI filter applied

DC Time Sync GPO with WMI filtering applied to PDC emulator.

Applying the Policies

Force replication so every domain controller has the new GPOs, then apply them and restart the time service.

Invoke-Command -ComputerName $Pdc -ScriptBlock { repadmin.exe /syncall /AdeP | Out-Null }
Start-Sleep -Seconds 60
Invoke-Command -ComputerName $DomainControllers -ScriptBlock {
gpupdate.exe /target:computer /force | Out-Null
Restart-Service -Name W32Time
w32tm.exe /resync /rediscover | Out-Null
}

Domain members pick up the new GPO at their next policy refresh. However, W32Time reads which providers are enabled only when the service starts, so a member VM keeps using VMICTimeProvider until W32Time restarts or the machine reboots. To switch a member over immediately, run the following commands on it.

gpupdate.exe /target:computer /force
Restart-Service -Name W32Time
w32tm.exe /resync /rediscover

Configuring the Workgroup Hyper-V Hosts

With the domain controllers fixed, the last piece is the Hyper-V hosts. In the customer’s environment, most of the domain ran on hosts that were workgroup members, and none had any time configuration. The VMs no longer take their time from the host continuously, but the host’s clock still sets each VM’s time at startup and after a restore from a saved state. Workgroup machines don’t participate in the domain hierarchy, so Group Policy can’t help here. Each host must be configured locally, and there are two reasonable options.

  • Sync directly from the public time service. This is what I did for the customer. The hosts don’t depend on a VM they’re running, which avoids a chicken-and-egg problem at boot. It does require allowing outbound UDP 123 from each host.
  • Sync from the PDC emulator. This keeps a single internal source of truth and needs no additional edge firewall rules, since domain controllers answer NTP requests by default. The downside is that the host boots before the PDC emulator VM and runs on its own clock until the domain controller is available.

Either way, everything traces back to the same UTC source. Run the following commands locally on each Hyper-V host.

# Sync from Cloudflare, with NIST as a fallback
# (0x1 = use SpecialPollInterval, 0x2 = fallback only, 0x8 = client mode)
w32tm.exe /config /manualpeerlist:"time.cloudflare.com,0x9 time.nist.gov,0xb" /syncfromflags:manual /update
# Poll every 1024 seconds (workgroup machines default to once a week)
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpClient' -Name SpecialPollInterval -Value 1024
Restart-Service -Name W32Time
w32tm.exe /resync /rediscover

Setting SpecialPollInterval is important. The workgroup default is 604,800 seconds, or one week, which is far too infrequent to keep a virtualization host accurate. The 0xb flag on time.nist.gov adds fallback only (0x2) to the same flags, so the hosts follow the same primary and fallback design as the PDC emulator. To sync from the PDC emulator instead, replace the peer list with the PDC emulator’s name or IP address, and optionally add another domain controller with the 0xb flag as a fallback. Use IP addresses if the hosts don’t use the domain’s DNS servers.

Domain Member Virtual Machines

VMICTimeProvider is enabled by default on every Hyper-V VM, not just domain controllers, so domain-joined member VMs take their time from the host instead of the domain hierarchy. With accurate hosts, that works, but it creates a second time root. Domain controllers follow the PDC emulator, while member VMs follow whichever host they run on. In my lab, a member VM was about 77 milliseconds off the PDC emulator, even though both its host and the PDC emulator synced with Cloudflare. If a host loses access to its time source, its VMs drift away from the domain controllers, which is the original problem in a new place. The Domain Member Time Settings GPO prevents this. It disables only the W32Time provider, not the Hyper-V time synchronization integration service, so VMs still get their clock set at startup and after a restore from a saved state.

Validating the Configuration

Once everything is in place, confirm each tier of the hierarchy is getting time from the right place, including the domain controllers, domain members, the Hyper-V hosts, and the domain as a whole.

Validating Domain Controllers

Run the following commands to check the time configuration and status of every domain controller.

Invoke-Command -ComputerName $DomainControllers -ScriptBlock {
Write-Output "=== $env:COMPUTERNAME ==="
w32tm.exe /query /configuration | Select-String 'Type:|NtpServer:|AnnounceFlags:' | ForEach-Object { $_.Line.Trim() }
w32tm.exe /query /status | Select-String 'Stratum:|Root Dispersion:|Source:' | ForEach-Object { $_.Line.Trim() }
Write-Output "VMICTimeProvider Enabled: $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\VMICTimeProvider' -Name Enabled)"
}
PowerShell output validating W32Time configuration on each domain controller

Validating domain controller time configuration settings.

The .Line.Trim() is there for a reason. Select-String results returned through Invoke-Command are deserialized objects that PowerShell can’t format, so without it you’ll see blank lines instead of the output. The following table shows what to look for on each type of server.

ServerTypeAnnounceFlagsSourceStratumVMICTimeProvider
PDC emulatorNTP (Policy)5 (Policy)time.cloudflare.com,0x840
Other domain controllersNT5DS (Policy)10 (Policy)PDC emulator50
Hyper-V hostsNTP (Local)n/atime.cloudflare.com,0x94n/a

The (Policy) label confirms Group Policy is in control rather than local settings. Root Dispersion will be high immediately after the service restarts and should settle under a second within about 30 minutes. NtpServer lists both time services, but the source should show time.cloudflare.com. If it shows time.nist.gov, the PDC emulator can’t reach Cloudflare and has switched to the fallback.

Validating Domain Members

On a domain member VM, run the following commands to confirm it follows the domain hierarchy and agrees with the PDC emulator.

w32tm.exe /query /source
w32tm.exe /query /status | Select-String 'Stratum:|Source:|ReferenceId:'
w32tm.exe /stripchart /computer:$Pdc /samples:5 /dataonly
w32tm.exe output on a domain member VM synchronizing with the PDC emulator dc1

Domain member VM synchronizing with the PDC emulator.

The source should be a domain controller, not VM IC Time Synchronization Provider, and the stratum should be one or two levels below the PDC emulator. In my lab, a member VM went from about 77 milliseconds off the PDC emulator to under 10 milliseconds within minutes of switching to the domain hierarchy.

Validating Hyper-V Hosts

On the Hyper-V hosts, run the following commands locally.

w32tm.exe /query /source
w32tm.exe /query /status | Select-String 'Stratum:|Root Dispersion:|Last Successful Sync Time:'
w32tm.exe /query /peers
w32tm.exe output on a Hyper-V host synchronizing with time.cloudflare.com, with time.nist.gov as a fallback peer

Time synchronization settings on the Hyper-V host server.

Both time services are listed as peers. The State for time.cloudflare.com should be Active. A state of Pending that persists usually means the host can’t reach that time server. However, Pending is also normal for up to one polling interval after the service restarts, which is about 17 minutes with a SpecialPollInterval of 1024 seconds, because W32Time rebuilds its peer list and resets the peer statistics. To tell the difference, run w32tm.exe /query /peers /verbose and check LastSyncError. A value of 0x00000000 (Succeeded) means the last sync worked, and the peer will return to Active at its next poll.

Validating the Domain

After things have had time to settle, check the entire domain at once. Every domain controller should show a small offset relative to the PDC emulator, with no errors.

w32tm.exe /monitor /domain:$DomainFqdn
w32tm.exe /monitor output showing all domain controllers in sync with the PDC emulator

All domain controllers synchronizing with the PDC emulator.

You might notice an unusual IPv4 address listed for dc1, such as 36.113.118.130. That’s not dc1’s address, and it’s not a real IPv4 address at all. It’s the RefID, which identifies the server’s upstream time source. The NTP reference ID field is only 32 bits, so when the source is reached over IPv6, as time.cloudflare.com is here, the field contains the first 32 bits of the MD5 hash of the source’s IPv6 address, as defined in RFC 5905. It’s expected behavior and can safely be ignored. In my lab, the PDC emulator went from roughly 840 milliseconds off UTC to closely tracking UTC once it began syncing with Cloudflare. In the customer’s environment, the Kerberos anomalies stopped once all domain controllers and hosts converged on a single source.

Summary

Time synchronization is easy to overlook, especially in virtualized environments where Hyper-V quietly fills in the gaps. In this case, the symptoms showed up as Kerberos anomalies during an AD CS engagement, but the root cause was a domain with no single, authoritative time source. The fix came down to the following steps.

  1. Reset every domain controller to the default W32Time configuration.
  2. Configure the PDC emulator, and only the PDC emulator, to sync with a reliable public time service, plus a second as a fallback, using a WMI-filtered GPO.
  3. Configure all other domain controllers to follow the domain hierarchy and disable VMICTimeProvider on every domain controller with a second GPO.
  4. Disable VMICTimeProvider on domain members with a third GPO linked to the domain root, so virtual machines follow the domain hierarchy too.
  5. Allow outbound UDP 123 for the systems that sync externally.
  6. Explicitly configure any workgroup Hyper-V hosts, since they don’t participate in the domain hierarchy.

With Group Policy managing the domain controllers and domain members, the configuration is consistent, self-documenting, and follows the PDC emulator role automatically if it ever moves.

Additional Information

Windows Time Service Technical Reference

Windows Time Service Tools and Settings

Synchronizing Time on Virtualized AD DS Environments: VMICTimeProvider vs AD

Configure the Root PDC with an Authoritative Time Source and Avoid a Widespread Time Skew

Cloudflare Time Services

NTP Pool Project

NIST Internet Time Service (ITS)

Network Time Protocol Version 4 (RFC 5905)

Always On VPN Security Updates November 2026

Always On VPN security updates

Microsoft released the November 2026 security updates today, which include three vulnerabilities affecting Always On VPN deployments. This month’s release addresses issues in the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE). And for a change, there are NO vulnerabilities in the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) this month!

SSTP Vulnerabilities

SSTP is commonly used for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. Because SSTP is, by design, exposed directly to the Internet, vulnerabilities affecting this protocol deserve attention. This month’s updates address the following two SSTP vulnerabilities. Both are rated Important.

CVE-2026-105561 – Windows SSTP Denial of Service Vulnerability (CVSS 7.5)

CVE-2026-105510 – Windows SSTP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVSS 7.0)

IKE Vulnerability

The November 2026 security updates also address a spoofing vulnerability in the Windows IKE Extension. Always On VPN implementations that use the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel are affected. Microsoft rates this vulnerability as Important.

CVE-2026-122169 – Windows IKE Extension Spoofing Vulnerability (CVSS 7.5)

Not Using IKEv2?

If you are not using the device tunnel or IKEv2 for the user tunnel, ensure the following IKEv2 ports are blocked at the edge firewall.

  • Inbound UDP port 500 (IKE)
  • Inbound UDP port 4500 (IKE NAT-T)

In addition, consider disabling IKEv2 on the RRAS server entirely. Guidance for doing this is in my earlier post, Always On VPN IKEv2 Security Vulnerability April 2026.

No RRAS Vulnerabilities

RRAS has been a regular fixture in the monthly security updates, with several CVEs disclosed in most recent releases. September 2026 alone included eight RRAS CVEs, four of them rated Critical. It is refreshing to report that the November 2026 release includes no RRAS vulnerabilities at all.

Summary

This is a relatively light month for Always On VPN administrators. All three vulnerabilities are rated Important, and none are rated Critical. However, SSTP and IKE are both Internet-facing services in most Always On VPN deployments, so administrators should plan to deploy these updates during their next scheduled maintenance window and avoid unnecessary delays.

Additional Information

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

Microsoft November 2026 Security Updates

Always On VPN Security Updates September 2026

What’s New in Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0

Microsoft Entra Private Access

On November 9, 2026, Microsoft released an important update for the Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector. The Entra Private Network Connector is used to publish on-premises web applications to the internet. It is also used for Global Secure Access (GSA) with Entra Private Access, allowing GSA clients to access on-premises resources. Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0 includes new functionality to improve performance monitoring, name resolution, logging, and overall reliability and security.

New Features

This release introduces new capabilities for monitoring connector performance and resolving names in complex network environments, including the following.

Performance and Diagnostics

The Connector Diagnostics tool, available from the system tray, now includes a new Performance tab. Here, administrators can view up to 24 hours of resource history for the connector server, collected in one-minute aggregates. The Performance tab displays average and peak values for the following metrics.

  • Machine CPU: Total CPU usage across the machine.
  • Connector CPU: Share of total machine CPU used by the connector.
  • Connector resident memory: Physical memory used by the connector process.
  • Machine available memory: Physical memory still available to applications.

Administrators can use the Window drop-down list to display performance history for the last 1 hour, 6 hours, or 24 hours. This gives better visibility into resource consumption over time, which is helpful when sizing connector servers or investigating performance issues. In addition, this update improves the accuracy of connector health reporting.

Entra Private Network Connector Diagnostics Performance tab showing machine CPU, connector CPU, connector resident memory, and machine available memory charts

DNS Resolution

The connector now honors DNS suffixes and DNS servers configured on individual network interfaces in Windows. This update also improves the fallback behavior for DNS SRV record queries.

Improvements

In addition to new features, v1.5.5130.0 includes several improvements to logging, reliability, and security.

Logging and Observability

This update includes the following changes to connector logging.

  • Trace file rotation is now supported.
  • The default capacity for the Session event log has been increased to 3 GB.
  • Error messages for connectivity and backend failures have been improved to streamline troubleshooting.

Note: With the larger default Session event log size, administrators should ensure the connector server has sufficient free disk space on the system drive.

Reliability and Security

This update also includes the following reliability and security enhancements.

  • TCP keepalive has been added to reduce idle connection resets.
  • Memory management during request processing has been improved.
  • Security for local log files and other connector files has been enhanced.

Updating to v1.5.5130.0

Existing Entra Private Network Connector installations will not automatically receive this update. Administrators must manually download the connector from the Microsoft Entra admin center and apply the update themselves to take advantage of these new features and capabilities.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector Overview and Deployment Strategies

Preventing Port Exhaustion on Entra Private Network Connector Servers

Entra Private Network Connector Session Persistence

Intranet Certificate Monitoring with CertKit

CertKit is a cloud-based solution that automates the issuance and management of public TLS certificates. It also provides certificate monitoring and alerting for public-facing workloads. However, many organizations have internal (non-public-facing) services that also use TLS. CertKit agent v1.13.0, currently in preview, closes this gap by providing visibility into TLS certificates used by intranet resources. After installing the latest release of the agent, CertKit can now provide visibility into the status of TLS certificates for internal resources.

Intranet Monitoring

After installing or updating the CertKit agent to v1.13.0, administrators can select an internal TLS service to monitor. Follow the steps below to enable this feature.

Certificate Collection

I recommend creating a separate Certificate Collection to support intranet monitoring. In the CertKit management console, click Add Collection, enter a unique, descriptive name, and click Add Collection.

Install the Agent

Once the new collection is created, navigate to the Agents tab, select your platform, then download, install, and register the agent.

Monitor New Host

After the agent is installed and registered, navigate to the Monitoring tab and click Monitor New Host. Enter the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the resource and specify its TLS port. Under Host Visibility, select Internal, and then choose the agent to monitor the host from. When finished, click Monitor Host.

Note: The server running the CertKit agent does not require a TLS certificate of its own to monitor internal resources.

Monitored Hosts

CertKit can track certificates for any internal workload that uses TLS. In this example, the monitored resources include web applications, security appliances, load balancers, and HTTP CRL distribution points. The list also includes LDAPS on the domain controllers and the RDP and WinRM HTTPS services on the management workstation.

The circle next to each resource indicates its certificate status. Green indicates a healthy certificate, yellow indicates one approaching expiration, and red indicates an expired certificate or another detected issue.

Note: The RDP certificate on the management workstation appears red because it contains only the Remote Desktop Authentication EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.54.1.2). It intentionally does not include Server Authentication, which CertKit currently expects when validating the service. CertKit is aware of this limitation and plans to address it in a future release.

Host Discovery

CertKit provides robust discovery for public websites but does not currently offer equivalent functionality for intranet resources. Administrators can identify internal systems listening on a specific port by using Nmap.

nmap.exe -Pn -p [port] --open [internal subnet]

For example:

nmap.exe -Pn -p 443 --open 172.16.0.0/24

Alternatively, add the -oX switch to save the output in XML format.

nmap.exe -Pn -p 443 --open 172.16.0.0/24 -oX scan.xml

The resulting Nmap XML file output can be converted to CSV format using this PowerShell code.

Summary

CertKit agent v1.13.0 extends certificate monitoring to internal TLS services, giving administrators greater visibility into certificates that were previously difficult to track. Although intranet host discovery remains a manual process, tools such as Nmap and PowerShell can help identify resources to add to the monitoring platform

Getting Started with CertKit

Need help improving certificate visibility and management across your organization? Want to automate public TLS certificate enrollment for workloads such as DirectAccess, Always On VPN, IIS, SQL, and more? I can help you assess your certificate environment, identify monitoring gaps, and develop a strategy for managing certificates across internal and public-facing workloads. Fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more information.

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Thank you for your response. ✨

Additional Information

CertKit Website

What Is CertKit?

CerKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IPHTTPS TLS Certificates

IIS TLS Certificate Deployment with CertKit

The Case for 6-Day Public TLS Certificates

DirectAccess IPHTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day TLS Certificates

Always On VPN Security Updates July 2026

Microsoft released the July 2026 Windows security updates today, including several fixes that directly affect Always On VPN deployments. This month’s release addresses vulnerabilities in the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP), Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS), making it an important update for organizations using Always On VPN.

SSTP Remote Code Execution

The highest-priority issue for Always On VPN administrators is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP). SSTP is commonly used for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. Because SSTP is, by design, exposed directly to the Internet, vulnerabilities affecting this protocol deserve immediate attention. Microsoft rates this vulnerability as Critical with a CVSS base score of 8.1.

CVE-2026-50694 – Windows SSTP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

IKE Vulnerabilities

These vulnerabilities primarily affect IKE-based VPN connections and could allow an attacker to disrupt VPN connectivity using specially crafted packets. While Microsoft rates these vulnerabilities as Important rather than Critical, organizations should still plan to deploy these updates promptly.

CVE-2026-50721 – IKEv1 Denial of Service via RSA-SHA1 authentication payload

CVE-2026-50722 – IKEv2 Denial of Service via RSA-SHA1 authentication payload

CVE-2026-12413 – IKEv2 Denial of Service via malformed fragmentation

CVE-2026-50696 – IKE Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

RRAS Vulnerabilities

The July 2026 security updates also address several vulnerabilities in the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS). All are rated Important by Microsoft.

CVE-2026-57096 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2026-49791 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2026-50451 – Windows RRAS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Summary

The SSTP RCE vulnerability is particularly concerning because the service is typically exposed to the Internet and could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute code remotely. Organizations should prioritize deployment of this update. The IKE and RRAS vulnerabilities are rated Important and can generally be addressed during the next scheduled maintenance window, although administrators should avoid unnecessary delays in applying these updates.

What’s New in Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.4892.0

An important update is available for the Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector. The Entra Private Network Connector is used to publish on-premises web applications to the internet. It is also used for Global Secure Access (GSA) with Entra Private Access, allowing GSA clients to access on-premises resources. Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.4892.0 includes important new functionality to streamline troubleshooting and improve stability and performance.

New Features

The Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.4892.0 now includes a diagnostic tool on the system tray. This gives administrators a visual indicator of connector status and provides quick access to diagnostics and log files.

Diagnostics

Right-clicking the connector and choosing ‘Connector diagnostics’ launches the Connector Diagnostics window. Here you’ll find three tabs: Overview, Health Check, and Advanced Logs.

Overview

The Overview tab provides details about the connector, such as the Tenant ID, Connector ID, version, supported TLS versions, the connector server’s IPv4 address (IPv6 information is not displayed), the server’s hostname, and the operating system version.

Health Check

Clicking on the Health Check tab will perform a comprehensive system health check. Status information for each check is provided, indicating whether it is Passed or Failed. Optionally, administrators can export the report in text, HTML, or JSON format for further analysis. Each health check can be expanded to reveal additional information about the individual check.

Advanced Logs

Clicking the Advanced Logs tab allows administrators to retrieve detailed log information. Session channel logging is enabled by default but can optionally be disabled if needed. You can choose specific start and end dates and times to collect logs, then click Retrieve Logs to collect them.

Once complete, it’s not immediately obvious where to find these logs. Clicking the Logs Retrieved button prompts the administrator to select a location in which to save the log files.

Improvements

This update improves the reliability of name resolution by filtering invalid DNS responses. In addition, the update improves connector logging to the Windows Event Log and fixes various issues and bugs.

Updating to v1.5.4892.0

Existing Entra Private Network Connector installations will not automatically receive this update. Administrators must manually download the connector from the Microsoft Entra admin center and apply the update themselves to take advantage of these new features and capabilities.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.4892.0

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector Overview and Deployment Strategies

Preventing Port Exhaustion on Entra Private Network Connector Servers

Windows Server Inside Out Book Updated for Windows Server 2025

Orin Thomas, a Principal Hybrid Cloud Advocate at Microsoft, is a prolific technical author who has written more than 45 books for Microsoft Press since the early 2000’s. His latest work is an update to the popular Windows Server Inside Out series, now covering the latest release of the operating system, Windows Server 2025. With Windows Server 2016 rapidly approaching end of support in January 2027, now is the time to start migrating workloads to Windows Server 2025. No doubt this book will make deploying and managing this new operating system much easier.

Order Now!

You will find Windows Server 2025 wherever you purchase your technical books, including Amazon.

Windows Server 2025 Inside Out – Paperback

Windows Server 2025 Inside Out – Kindle Edition

Troubleshooting NDES Error 0x80094800 Unsupported Cert Type on Windows Server 2025

With Windows Server 2016 fast approaching end of life (EOL – January 2027) I’ve been helping many customers get their existing Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) server upgraded to Windows Server 2025. In the past I’ve had few problems deploying NDES on Windows Server 2016, 2019, and 2022. However, NDES deployments on Windows Server 2025 have proven more challenging. Unlike previous releases, many installations fail during initial configuration with little indication of the underlying cause. The error described below is quite common, in my experience.

Unsupported Cert Type

When configuring the NDES role on Windows Server 2025, administrators may encounter an installation failure with the following error message.

Failed to enroll RA certificates. The requested certificate template is not supported by this CA. 0x80094800 (-2146875392 CERTSRV_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_TYPE)

Investigation

Inspection of the issuing CA confirmed that the required NDES certificate templates had been published successfully and were visible on the target issuing CA server.

After confirming the templates were published, I validated connectivity between the NDEs server and the issuing CA to rule out communication issues.

certutil.exe -config <servername\commonname> -ping

Root Cause

Although the precise root cause remains unclear, the issue appears related to timing or object availability during NDES configuration. In many cases it behaves like a delay in template publication visibility, Active Directory replication latency, or another dependency timing issue encountered during setup.

Note: This error can also occur if the administrator is not a member of the Enterprise Administrators group, or if the security permissions on these default templates has changed.

Recovery

Fortunately, if you encounter this issue you can usually just remove the configuration using PowerShell and run it again.

Uninstall-AdccsNetworkDeviceEnrollmentService -Force

However, in my experience running the installer again results in another error, usually the 0x80070003 ‘Path Not Found’ error. If that happens, see my published guidance for recovering from this error here.

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2026/05/26/troubleshooting-ndes-error-0x80070003-path-not-found-on-windows-server-2025

While recovery is usually straightforward, preventing the issue entirely is preferable.

Recommendation

I recommend publishing the required templates on the target issuing CA before proceeding with the NDES configuration. Publishing these templates manually before running NDES configuration ensures they are already visible and available to the CA, potentially avoiding timing-related enrollment failures during setup. The following default templates are required for NDES configuration.

  • IPsec (Offline request)
  • CEP Encryption
  • Exchange Enrollment Agent (Offline request)

Note: Best practice is to remove these templates after configuration because they are intended only for NDES registration authority enrollment and are not typically required for ongoing issuance.

Summary

When deploying NDES on Windows Server 2025, administrators may encounter the 0x80094800 CERTSRV_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_TYPE error even when the required templates appear correctly configured. Although the exact cause remains uncertain, the issue appears related to timing or template availability during setup. In most cases, removing and re-running the NDES configuration resolves the problem, while pre-publishing the default NDES templates before configuration can help prevent it entirely.

Additional Information

Troubleshooting NDES Error 0x80070003 Path Not Found on Windows Server 2025

Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificate Validity Period

TRAINING: Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune

Troubleshooting NDES Error 0x80070003 Path Not Found on Windows Server 2025

When deploying enterprise PKI certificates with Microsoft Intune using SCEP, administrators must deploy one or more on-premises Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) servers together with the Intune Certificate Connector. Installing and configuring NDES can be challenging because the solution includes multiple dependencies and has many moving parts. Troubleshooting installation failures can be difficult, particularly on Windows Server 2025 where I have observed installation issues more frequently than on earlier Windows Server releases.

Path Not Found

As I work with customers to migrate their existing NDES services to Windows Server 2025, I frequently encounter installation errors. Specifically, the ‘Path Not Found’ error is increasingly common. Using PowerShell or the Server Manager, administrators may encounter a failed NDES installation that returns the following error message.

CMSCEPSetup::Install: The system cannot find the path specified. 0x80070003 (WIN32: 3 ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)

NDES installation failing with error 0x80070003 ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND

Investigation

Reviewing the NDES installation log at C:\Windows\certocm.log yields an important clue.

Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services: Failed to add the web virtual directory. The system cannot find the path specified. 0x80070003 (WIN32: 3 ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND): The system cannot find the path specified. 0x80070003 (WIN32: 3 ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)

Root Cause

This error occurs after a failed installation attempt which corrupts the IIS configuration on the NDES server. This prevents the NDES installer from configuring applications in the default web site. Fortunately, the problem is easy to resolve.

Recovery Steps

To recover from this error, first uninstall the NDES service (not the role) by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Uninstall-AdcsNetworkDeviceEnrollmentService -Force

Next, remove the corrupt IIS configuration file.

Remove-Item C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config -Force

Copy a known-good IIS configuration file from the WinSxS folder.

$WinSxSConfig = Get-ChildItem C:\Windows\WinSxS -Recurse -Filter applicationHost.config -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Sort-Object LastWriteTime -Descending | Select-Object -First 1
Copy-Item -Path $WinSxSConfig.FullName "C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config" -Force

And finally, recreate the default website.

& "$env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe" add site /name:"Default Web Site" /bindings:http/*:80: /physicalPath:"%SystemDrive%\inetpub\wwwroot"

Once complete, proceed with the NDES configuration.

Pro Tip

Because this issue occurs frequently enough in my experience, I recommend backing up the IIS configuration immediately after installing the NDES role and before beginning configuration. You can backup the IIS configuration by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

& "$env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe" add backup 'Backup Name'

If the NDES configuration subsequently fails, uninstall the configuration, then restore the backup using the following command.

& "$env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe" restore backup 'Backup Name'

Once complete, proceed with the NDES configuration once again.

Summary

NDES installation failures on Windows Server 2025 can leave IIS in an inconsistent state and trigger 0x80070003 ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND errors during configuration. Restoring a known-good IIS configuration and recreating the default web site resolves the issue quickly. Backing up the IIS configuration before beginning NDES configuration can significantly reduce recovery time if installation problems occur.

Additional Information

Troubleshooting NDES Error 0x80094800 Unsupported Cert Type on Windows Server 2025

Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificate Validity Period

TRAINING: Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune

DirectAccess IPHTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day Certificates

I’ve written extensively about how public TLS certificate lifetimes will drop to just 47 days by March 2029. Before then, we’ll see certificate lifetimes gradually drop from the current 398 days to 200 days on March 15, 2026, and then to 100 days on March 15, 2027. In preparation for this, I’ve been working with many customers to deploy automated certificate enrollment and renewal solutions to eliminate the need for manual intervention. Interestingly, Let’s Encrypt now offers extremely short-lived certificates that are good for just 6 days! While they work just fine for Always On VPN, I discovered they will not work for DirectAccess.

6-Day Certificate

After successfully enrolling for a 6-day TLS certificate from Let’s Encrypt (I used CertKit, BTW!), I encountered an error when trying to assign the short-lived certificate to the IP-HTTPS listener in the DirectAccess configuration. Specifically, when running the Set-RemoteAccess PowerShell command, I received the following error.

Set-RemoteAccess: The parameter is incorrect.

Further investigation showed that I could install other public TLS certificates just fine. For some reason, though, DirectAccess did not like this new 6-day certificate.

Missing Subject Name

After digging a bit deeper, I realized the Subject field of the new 6-day Let’s Encrypt certificate was empty.

Subject vs. SAN in Modern TLS

Modern TLS clients rely entirely on the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field for identity validation, and the older practice of matching against the certificate’s Subject field has been phased out for many years. Many certificate authorities, including Let’s Encrypt, now leave the Subject field empty because it no longer serves a functional purpose in current TLS implementations. DirectAccess still expects this field to contain data and does not properly fall back to SAN‑only validation. As a result, any certificate with an empty Subject field, such as the new 6‑day certificates from Let’s Encrypt, will fail when applied to the DirectAccess IP‑HTTPS listener.

Workaround

Admittedly, using 6-Day public TLS certificates for DirectAccess is extreme and likely overkill for this workload. The good news is that DirectAccess still works perfectly with 90-day Let’s Encrypt certificates, so the lack of 6-day certificate support should not be impactful.

CertKit

Have you heard about CertKit? CertKit, an online service for automating Let’s Encrypt certificate enrollment and renewal, has added support for Always On VPN and DirectAccess. Find details on leveraging it for public TLS certificates for these solutions here.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN and 47-Day Public TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in Enterprise Environments

CertKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS TLS Certificates