On October 19, 2026, Microsoft announced an update for the Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) client. This latest release, v2.34.222, adds support for a new sign-in option, updates Conditional Access sign-in frequency, improves diagnostics, and enhances local network bypass. It also improves Windows Firewall behavior off network, along with telemetry and accessibility improvements.
The GSA client now supports Web sign-in for Windows. This credential provider enables browser-based Windows sign-in using methods such as Microsoft Authenticator, Temporary Access Pass (TAP), or a SAML-P federated identity. Web sign-in requires a Microsoft Entra-joined device running Windows 11 version 22H2 with KB5030310 or later, plus internet connectivity.
Windows Firewall Profile
This release improves Windows Firewall profile selection when Private Access is enabled. When the device is not directly connected to the corporate network, Windows Firewall does not activate the Domain profile.
Traffic Forwarding Profile Details
The new GSA client features improved diagnostics. With this update, the Forwarding profile tab in the Advanced diagnostics section now displays the Traffic Forwarding Profile Name as it appears in the Entra admin center, along with the Traffic Forwarding Profile ID.
Traffic Forwarding Profile Name and ID
Conditional Access
GSA client v2.34.222 now includes support for Conditional Access sign-in frequency for Private Access applications. This feature is part of a phased rollout and might not be available in all tenants immediately.
Prefer Local Network Bypass
With this update, the Prefer local network option limits bypass to connections destined for IP addresses in common private network ranges. Microsoft documentation doesn’t elaborate on specifically which ‘common private network ranges’, but I suspect this means private IPv4 address ranges as defined in RFC 1918.
GSA Traceroute Changes
In GSA client v2.34.222, Microsoft has replaced the command-line version of the GSA traceroute tool (GsaTracert.exe) with a new GUI version. However, during my initial testing (and confirmed by others testing this feature), it appears to be broken at this time. When I launch GsaTracert.exe, the UI returns the following error message.
“Could not retrieve the forwarding profile from the registry. Ensure the Global Secure Access Client is installed and running.”
I will post an update as soon as Microsoft resolves this issue.
Additional Changes
In addition to the changes highlighted above, the new GSA client includes the following additional enhancements.
UDP tunneling improvements
Memory utilization improvements
New telemetry capabilities
Accessibility improvements
Bug fixes and other miscellaneous improvements
Summary
GSA client v2.34.222 introduces several useful enhancements for administrators and users. Organizations should validate the update against their existing configuration before broad deployment. My initial testing also identified an issue with the updated diagnostic tool, as described above.
Recently, I wrote about Microsoft Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access and how conditional access improves your organization’s security posture by making policy-based access decisions based on various signals such as user identity, location, device compliance, platform, sign-in risk, and more. In this post, I’ll provide step-by-step instructions for integrating Entra Conditional Access with existing Always On VPN deployments.
Requirements
To use Microsoft Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN you must have Entra ID P1 at a minimum. To use advanced features such as risk-based policy assessment, you must have Entra ID P2. In addition, all endpoints must be under Intune management; either native Entra ID joined, or hybrid Entra ID joined.
Enable VPN Support
To begin, open the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com/), navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access, and perform the following steps.
Click VPN Connectivity.
Click New certificate.
From the Select duration drop-down list, choose an appropriate certificate validity period.
Click Create.
Once complete, click Download certificate and copy the certificate file to a domain-joined system on-premises.
Publish Certificate
Next, administrators must publish the Entra VPN root certificate in Active Directory to support domain authentication. Open an elevated PowerShell or command window and run the following commands.
certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> RootCA
certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> NtAuthCA
Note: You must be a domain administrator to perform this task.
Conditional Access Policy
Navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access and click Policies, then perform the following steps to create a conditional access policy for VPN access.
Click New Policy.
Enter a descriptive name for the new policy.
Click the link in the Target resources section.
From the Select what this policy applies to drop-down list, select Resources (formerly cloud apps).
In the Include section, choose Select resources.
Click the link in the Select section.
Enter VPN in the search field.
Check the box next to VPN Server.
Click Select.
Click the link in the Grant section.
Select Grant access.
Check the box next to Require device to be marked as compliant.
Click Select.
On the Enable policy slider, select On.
Click Create.
NPS
Changes to Network Policy Server (NPS) policy and configuration are required to support Always On VPN with Entra Conditional Access.
NPS Policy
To update the Always On VPN network policy to support Entra Conditional Access, open the NPS management console (nps.msc), expand Policies, then select Network Policies and perform the following steps.
Right-click on the Always On VPN policy and choose Properties.
Select the Settings tab.
Select Vendor Specific in the RADIUS Attributes section.
Click Add.
Select the Allowed-Certificate-OID attribute.
Click Add.
Click Add.
Enter 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.87 in the Attribute value field.
Click Ok.
Click Ok.
Click Close.
Click Ok.
Important Note: This change will block new Always On VPN user tunnel connections until you update the client configuration. When integrating an existing Always On VPN implementation with Entra Conditional Access, consider creating a new NPS policy and corresponding security group to migrate users to conditional access seamlessly.
NPS Configuration
By default, NPS will perform revocation checks for certificates used for domain authentication. However, Entra Conditional Access uses short-lived certificates (one-hour lifetime) that do not include CRL Distribution Point (CDP) information. Therefore, administrators must change the NPS server configuration to disable revocation checking for certificates lacking this information.
To do this, open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and create a new registry key with the following settings.
Once complete, the server must be rebooted for the change to take effect.
Client Configuration
After making all required changes to the supporting infrastructure, you must also update the Always On VPN client configuration to leverage Entra Conditional Access. Changes to client configuration vary depending on the method used to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings.
Intune
When using Microsoft Intune and the native VPN policy type to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings, perform the following steps to update the VPN configuration to include Entra Conditional Access support.
Click Enable next to Conditional access for this VPN connection.
Click Enable next to Single sign-on (SSO) with alternate certificate.
Enter Client Authentication in the Name field.
Enter 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 in the Object Identifier field.
Enter the organization’s root certification authority (CA) certificate thumbprint in the Issuer hash field.
XML
When using a custom XML configuration file for Always On VPN client configuration settings deployed using Intune or PowerShell, edit the XML file, remove the existing <TLSExtensions></TLSExtensions> section, and replace it with the following.
In addition, add the following code between the <VPNProfile></VPNProfile> tags after <TrustedNetworkDetection>.
Note: You will find a sample XML configuration file you can copy and paste from on GitHub here.
DPC
When using Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC) for managing Always On VPN client configuration settings, open the DPC group policy and navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > DPC Client > User Tunnel Settings > Advanced and perform the following steps.
Following the guidance in this post to integrate Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN can significantly improve your organization’s security posture. In the example above, the conditional access policy is a basic one. Yet, it dramatically reduces the attack surface for your remote access infrastructure by ensuring only compliant devices can establish a VPN connection.
Administrators can use advanced conditional access policy settings to strengthen the VPN’s security further by performing additional checks, such as requiring strong, phishing-resistant credentials and requesting multifactor authentication (MFA) for risky sign-ins.
Microsoft recently introduced Entra Private Access, an identity-centric Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution to provide secure remote access to on-premises resources. With Entra Private Access, administrators can leverage Entra Conditional Access to enforce policy-based access control for network access. However, Entra Private Access isn’t for everyone. It does not provide full feature parity with Always On VPN, and there are also licensing considerations. However, for those organizations using Always On VPN, the good news is that you can integrate Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN today to gain some of the security benefits it provides.
Conditional Access
Microsoft Entra Conditional Access is a security feature that enables administrators to create and enforce policies that specify how users can access resources. In the specific case of Always On VPN, conditional access is critical to ensuring legitimate access to authenticated users on authorized devices.
Signals
Conditional access policies use a wide variety of signals for policy enforcement, such as:
User Identity: Who is making this access request?
User Properties: Is this user a member of a specific group?
Location: Where is this access request originating?
Device Management: Is this device joined to Entra ID?
Device State: Is this device compliant with security policies?
Device Platform: Is this a Windows device?
Risk Level: Is this login considered risky?
Access Control
Based on these signals, administrators can design a conditional access policy to enforce granular access control, such as:
Enforce specific authentication types (e.g., phishing-resistant credentials)
Allow access only from specific device platforms (e.g., Windows only)
Require Entra hybrid-joined device
Block access when a device is not compliant with security policies
Always On VPN
Entra Conditional Access works with Always On VPN by issuing a special, short-lived user authentication certificate once the user has been authorized. The Always On VPN infrastructure can be configured to use this certificate to grant access to the VPN. Integrating conditional access with Always On VPN can significantly improve the security posture of organizations using this feature.
Are you ready? In just a few short weeks(!) Microsoft will release the February 2025 security updates. This is a critical update because Microsoft plans to enable full enforcement of strong certificate mapping on Active Directory Domain Controllers (DCs) with this release. Administrators unprepared for this may incur outages for workloads using certificate-based authentication such as Always On VPN, Wi-Fi, and others.
Microsoft introduced strong certificate mapping with the May 2022 update KB5014754 to address vulnerabilities identified with certificate-based authentication. The update makes changes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certification authorities (CAs) to embed the principal’s Security Identifier (SID) on issued certificates with a new certificate extension. The update also changes domain controller behavior to monitor and optionally enforce strong certificate mapping for authentication.
Enforcement Mode
When first introduced, the update is configured in compatibility mode. If a certificate that isn’t strongly mapped is presented for authentication, an event is recorded in the event log indicating that. Microsoft has been planning for years to enable full enforcement. After many delays, that time is now upon us. Specifically, full enforcement for strong certificate mapping will be enabled by default on DCs after applying the February 2025 security updates.
Note: Administrators can switch back to compatibility mode for now. See below for more details.
Limitations
Initially, the strong certificate mapping update was applied only to online certificate templates. Specifically, those templates are configured to build the subject name from Active Directory information. However, offline templates, where the subject name is supplied in the request, do not include this information by default. Crucially, any certificate issued with Microsoft Intune with PKCS or SCEP uses offline templates and is not strongly mapped. The lack of strong certificate mapping options for Intune-issued certificates forced Microsoft to delay its full enforcement deadline until these limitations were resolved.
Updates
In October 2024, Microsoft Intune announced support for strong certificate mapping for PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators can now configure these certificates to include strong certificate mapping. However, administrators must take action to affect this change.
PKCS
To enable strong certificate mapping for PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure that the certificate connector is running at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, the following registry key must be configured on the connector server.
The Intune Certificate Connector server must be restarted for this change to take effect. No changes are required on the PKCS certificate policy in Intune.
SCEP
To enable strong certificate mapping for SCEP certificates, administrators must add the following attribute/value pair to the Subject alternative name settings on their existing Intune SCEP certificate policy.
Attribute: URI Value: {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}
Preparation
Administrators using certificate-based authentication against on-premises Active Directory should ensure all user and device authentication certificates include embedded SID information. For certificates issued on-premises, with Intune using PKCS or certificates issued by Entra Conditional Access, the certificate should now have the extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, including the principal’s SID.
SCEP certificates issued using Intune will include the following information in the Subject Alternative Name field.
URL=tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-24:sid:<sid>
Note: This applies to certificates issued using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune as those certificates are deployed using a SCEP device configuration policy.
Opt-Out
With the February 2025 security update, all domain controllers will be switched to full enforcement mode. Authentication requests using certificates without strong mapping will be denied in this configuration.
If your organization is not prepared to move to full enforcement mode, the February 2025 update allows administrators to opt out and switch back to compatibility mode by enabling the following registry key on all domain controllers.
Administrators are strongly encouraged to update all user and device authentication certificates before September 2025. With the September 2025 security update, Microsoft will no longer honor the opt-out registry settings and strictly enforce strong certificate mapping for all certificate-based authentication requests.
Troubleshooting
Certificate authentication is commonly used for Always On VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. If full enforcement mode is enabled on domain controllers and a certificate is presented for authentication that is not strongly mapped, administrators may see the following event log information recorded on the Network Policy Server (NPS).
Network Policy Server denied access to a user.
The details of the event include the following.
Reason Code: 16 Reason: Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.
Obviously, the user does not enter their password when using certificates for authentication. However, the indication of a credential mismatch can be caused by missing strong certificate mapping information when the DC is in full enforcement mode.
Note: There are other causes for reason code 16 failures on NPS. Further investigation may be required to determine the root cause.
Last week Microsoft introduced new Security Service Edge (SSE) capabilities as part of the Microsoft Entra suite of technologies. Included in these announcements, Microsoft introduced the public preview of two new secure remote access technologies – Microsoft Entra Internet Access and Microsoft Entra Private Access. The latter of these will particularly interest Microsoft Always On VPN administrators in some deployment scenarios.
Microsoft Entra Internet Access
Microsoft Entra Internet Access is a new Secure Web Gateway (SWG) cloud service solution designed to protect users from threats on the public Internet. Features include web content filtering, malware inspection, TLS inspection, and more. In addition, Entra Internet Access can protect Microsoft 365 applications. Azure Conditional Access policies can be enforced for Internet traffic. Network conditions are now included with Azure Conditional Access, which can further protect against attacks by requiring access from specific trusted or compliant networks. Today, the public preview is available for Microsoft 365 scenarios only. Internet traffic and other SaaS applications will be available later this year.
Microsoft Entra Private Access
Microsoft Entra Private Access is a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) cloud service solution that leverages the Azure Application Proxy access model. With Azure App Proxy, administrators can easily publish private, on-premises web applications by installing the connector on an on-premises server. Administrators can leverage Azure AD authentication and conditional access policies to ensure device compliance or enforce multifactor authentication (MFA), if required. Microsoft Entra Private Access extends the capabilities of the Azure Application Proxy to support TCP and UDP-based applications.
Private Access vs. Always On VPN
Microsoft Entra Private Access will be a compelling alternative to Always On VPN in the future. Specifically, organizations using native Azure AD join devices could benefit tremendously from this technology. Microsoft Entra Private Access is much simpler to implement than Always On VPN and requires no on-premises infrastructure other than the Azure Application Proxy connector. Using Microsoft Entra Private Access also means that no inbound access from the Internet is required, making the solution inherently more secure and reducing the public attack surface. For organizations using hybrid Azure AD join, Always On VPN continues to be the best Microsoft solution for these scenarios.
I’ve had the privilege of participating in the private preview for Microsoft Entra Internet Access and Private Access. If you’d like to learn more about these technologies and how they can help your organization, fill out the form below, and I’ll provide more information.
I recently wrote about changes to certificate-based authentication affecting Always On VPN implementations. These changes were introduced by Microsoft’s security update KB5014754. When the update is installed on domain controllers and enterprise Certification Authorities (CAs), administrators can perform strong user mapping for certificates used for Active Directory authentication. However, when first introduced, the update came with some serious limitations that prevented administrators from enabling full enforcement mode for certificate mapping.
Limitations
When KB5014754 is installed on an enterprise issuing CA, a new certificate extension (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2) is added to the issued certificate that includes the principal’s (user or device) Security Identifier (SID). However, this only occurs when an online template is used. An online template is one with the subject name built from Active Directory information. The SID is not embedded in certificates issued using an offline template. Offline templates are templates where the subject name is supplied in the request. There are two scenarios where this causes problems for Always On VPN.
Microsoft Intune
Certificates delivered with Microsoft Intune via the Intune Certificate Connector use an offline template. This applies to certificates using PKCS or SCEP. Today, the SID is not embedded by issuing CAs using offline templates.
Azure Conditional Access
The short-lived certificate issued by Azure when Conditional Access is configured for Always On VPN did not include the SID. However, that recently changed.
Recent Updates
Today we can scratch Azure Conditional Access off the list of limitations for Always On VPN. Microsoft recently introduced support for the new SID extension in Azure Conditional Access certificates, as shown here.
Now when an Azure Conditional Access certificate is issued to an on-premises user or device account that is synced with Azure Active Directory, Azure Conditional Access will include the SID information in the issued short-lived certificate.
Intune
Unfortunately, we’re still waiting for Microsoft to address the limitation with certificates delivered using Microsoft Intune. Hopefully we’ll see an update for that later this year.
Integrating Microsoft Azure Conditional Access with Windows 10 Always On VPN has several important benefits. The most important is that it allows administrators to improve their security posture by enforcing access polices that can be dynamically applied. For example, requiring multifactor authentication (MFA) for privileged users (e.g., administrators) or sign-ins that appear to be risky, the type of device they are connecting with, the health of the endpoint, and much more.
Authentication Failure
When configuring Always On VPN to support Azure Conditional Access, administrators may expeirence a failed authentication during preliminary testing. Specifically, an event ID 20227 from the RasClient source may be encountered with the following error message.
“The user <username> dialed a connection named <connection name> which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 812.”
Looking at the event logs on the Network Policy Server (NPS) server reveals an event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source with Reason Code 258 and the following Reason.
“The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.”
Root Cause
When Azure Conditional Access is configured for Always On VPN, a short-lived certificate (1 hour lifetime) is provisioned by Azure. This certificate does not include revocation information because, by design, a short-lived certificate does not need to be revoked. However, by default NPS always checks revocation when client authentication certificates are used for authentication. Since the certificate does not include this information, certificate revocation fails.
Resolution
The way to resolve this issue is to disable certificate revocation checking for Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) authentication requests. To do this, open an elevated PowerShell window on the NPS server and run the following command.
Windows 10 Always On VPN hands-on training classes now forming. Details here.
Since the introduction of Windows Server 2012 in September of 2012, no new features or functionality have been added to DirectAccess. In Windows Server 2016, the only real change aside from bug fixes for DirectAccess is the removal of Network Access Protection (NAP) integration support.
Figure 1. Remote Access Setup wizard with NAP integration option in Windows Server 2012/R2.
Figure 2. Remote Access Setup wizard without NAP integration option in Windows Server 2016.
DirectAccess Roadmap
It’s clear to see that Microsoft is no longer investing in DirectAccess, and in fact their field sales teams have been communicating this to customers for quite some time now. Microsoft has been actively encouraging organizations who are considering a DirectAccess solution to instead implement client-based VPN with Windows 10.
Always On VPN
New features introduced in the Windows 10 Anniversary Update allow IT administrators to configure automatic VPN connection profiles. This Always On VPN connection provides a DirectAccess-like experience using traditional remote access VPN protocols such as IKEv2, SSTP, and L2TP/IPsec. It comes with some additional benefits as well.
Conditional access and device compliance with system health checks
Windows Hello for Business and Azure multifactor authentication
Windows Information Protection (WIP) integration
Traffic filters to restrict VPN network access
Application-trigger VPN connections
DirectAccess Deprecated?
There has been rampant speculation that Microsoft plans to deprecate and retire DirectAccess. While that may in fact be true, Microsoft has yet to make a formal end-of-life announcement. There’s no reason DirectAccess and VPN couldn’t co-exist, so it’s not a certainty Microsoft will do this. However, there’s also no need to have multiple remote access solutions, and it is abundantly clear that the future for Microsoft remote access is Always On VPN and not DirectAccess.
Windows 10 Always On VPN has some important advantages over DirectAccess. It has some crucial limitations as well.
Advantages
Always On VPN supports non-Enterprise Windows 10 client SKUs (Windows 10 Home and Professional)
Always On VPN includes support for granular network access control
Always On VPN can use both IPv4 and IPv6
Always On VPN is infrastructure independent. In addition to supporting Windows RRAS, any third-party network device can be used such as Cisco, Checkpoint, Juniper, Palo Alto, SonicWALL, Fortinet, and many more
Disadvantages
Always On VPN works only with Windows 10. It is not supported for Windows 7
Always On VPN cannot be managed natively using Active Directory and group policy. It must be configured and managed using Microsoft Intune. Alternatively, Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or PowerShell can be used.
DirectAccess or Always On VPN?
Should you deploy DirectAccess today or implement Always On VPN with Windows 10 instead? That depends on a number of factors. It’s important to understand that DirectAccess will be fully supported through the lifecycle of Windows Server 2019. If DirectAccess meets your needs today, you can deploy it with confidence that it will still have a long support life. If you have reservations about the future viability of DirectAccess, and if you meet all of the requirements to support Always On VPN with Windows 10, then perhaps that’s a better choice. If you’d liketo discuss your remote access options in more detail, fill out the form below and I’ll get in touch with you.