What’s New in Entra Global Secure Access Client for Windows v2.34.222

On October 19, 2026, Microsoft announced an update for the Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) client. This latest release, v2.34.222, adds support for a new sign-in option, updates Conditional Access sign-in frequency, improves diagnostics, and enhances local network bypass. It also improves Windows Firewall behavior off network, along with telemetry and accessibility improvements.

Changes in v2.34.222

GSA client v2.34.222 includes the following new features and enhancements.

Web Sign-In

The GSA client now supports Web sign-in for Windows. This credential provider enables browser-based Windows sign-in using methods such as Microsoft Authenticator, Temporary Access Pass (TAP), or a SAML-P federated identity. Web sign-in requires a Microsoft Entra-joined device running Windows 11 version 22H2 with KB5030310 or later, plus internet connectivity.

Windows Firewall Profile

This release improves Windows Firewall profile selection when Private Access is enabled. When the device is not directly connected to the corporate network, Windows Firewall does not activate the Domain profile.

Traffic Forwarding Profile Details

The new GSA client features improved diagnostics. With this update, the Forwarding profile tab in the Advanced diagnostics section now displays the Traffic Forwarding Profile Name as it appears in the Entra admin center, along with the Traffic Forwarding Profile ID.

Traffic Forwarding Profile Name and ID

Conditional Access

GSA client v2.34.222 now includes support for Conditional Access sign-in frequency for Private Access applications. This feature is part of a phased rollout and might not be available in all tenants immediately.

Prefer Local Network Bypass

With this update, the Prefer local network option limits bypass to connections destined for IP addresses in common private network ranges. Microsoft documentation doesn’t elaborate on specifically which ‘common private network ranges’, but I suspect this means private IPv4 address ranges as defined in RFC 1918.

GSA Traceroute Changes

In GSA client v2.34.222, Microsoft has replaced the command-line version of the GSA traceroute tool (GsaTracert.exe) with a new GUI version. However, during my initial testing (and confirmed by others testing this feature), it appears to be broken at this time. When I launch GsaTracert.exe, the UI returns the following error message.

“Could not retrieve the forwarding profile from the registry. Ensure the Global Secure Access Client is installed and running.”

I will post an update as soon as Microsoft resolves this issue.

Additional Changes

In addition to the changes highlighted above, the new GSA client includes the following additional enhancements.

  • UDP tunneling improvements
  • Memory utilization improvements
  • New telemetry capabilities
  • Accessibility improvements
  • Bug fixes and other miscellaneous improvements

Summary

GSA client v2.34.222 introduces several useful enhancements for administrators and users. Organizations should validate the update against their existing configuration before broad deployment. My initial testing also identified an issue with the updated diagnostic tool, as described above.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Global Secure Access Client v2.34.222

Microsoft Entra Global Secure Access (GSA)

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Microsoft Entra Internet Access

Entra Private Access and VPN Migration Strategies on Entra.News

Entra Internet Access TLS Inspection Fails with ERR_CERT_INVALID

Microsoft Entra Internet Access is a powerful cloud-based Secure Web Gateway (SWG) feature within the Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) Security Service Edge (SSE) solution. Entra Internet Access provides Zero Trust, identity-aware access to internet resources, private web-based applications, and Microsoft 365, with full integration with Entra Conditional Access.

TLS Inspection

Entra Internet Access includes an optional TLS Inspection feature that allows the GSA client to decrypt HTTPS traffic, inspect for threats, identify policy violations, and enforce Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies. Importantly, enabling TLS inspection for GSA allows administrators to apply prompt injection protection policies to control the usage of generative AI applications.

TLS Inspection Certificate

Before enabling TLS inspection for Entra Internet Access, administrators must first create a TLS inspection certificate. This certificate must be signed by a trusted certification authority (CA). The process is simple and straightforward, and well-documented here.

Invalid Certificate Error

After enabling Entra Internet Access TLS inspection, administrators may find that all websites subject to TLS inspection are inaccessible. The browser displays the following error message:

Your connection isn’t private
Attackers might be trying to steal your information from <website> (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards.)

NET:ERR_CERT_INVALID

Clicking on the Advanced button shows the following additional information:

<website> uses encryption to protect your information. When Microsoft Edge tried to connect to <website> this time, the website sent back unusual and incorrect credentials. This may happen when an attacker is trying to pretend to be <website>, or a Wi-Fi sign-in screen has interrupted the connection. Your information is still secure because Microsoft Edge stopped the connection before any data was exchanged.

You can’t visit <website> right now because the website sent scrambled credentials that Microsoft Edge can’t process. Network errors and attacks are usually temporary, so this page will probably work later.

Root Cause (Pun Intended!)

This issue can be caused by restrictions placed on the root CA. Specifically, if the root CA certificate includes a policy that restricts the CA path length (the number of subordinate CAs allowed downstream), the Microsoft Global Secure Access Intermediate CA, which issues certificates for TLS-inspected websites, cannot be validated successfully.

In this example, the root CA certificate includes a basic constraint that defines a maximum of 1 intermediate CA in the chain. Crucially, the extension is marked as Critical, so it must be enforced.

Because the root CA enforces a path length constraint of 1, the TLS inspection subordinate CA can exist beneath it, but no additional subordinate CA certificates are permitted. As a result, the Microsoft Global Secure Access Intermediate CA exceeds the allowed chain depth, causing certificate validation to fail.

Resolution

The fix for this issue is simple, yet complex. The root CA certificate must be renewed, this time without enforcing the CA path length policy. To do this, open an elevated command window on the root CA and run the following command.

certutil.exe -setreg policy\capathlength 0xffffffff

Important: If your CA hierarchy uses CAPolicy.inf to define the CAPathLength setting, update the file before renewing the CA certificate.

Next, restart the CA service for the change to take effect.

Restart-Service CertSvc -PassThru

Finally, renew the CA certificate.

certutil.exe -f -renewcert ReuseKeys

Restart the CA service once more for the change to take effect.

Restart-Service CertSvc -PassThru

Once complete, distribute the new root CA certificate to Active Directory and to Intune-managed endpoints using a Trusted Certificate device configuration policy.

Finally, configure a new Entra TLS inspection certificate in the Entra admin center to replace the old one, signed with the updated root CA certificate. Once the certificate has been uploaded, ensure it is enabled.

Important: Renewing a root CA certificate can be highly disruptive. Proceed with caution in production environments. Ensure that all enterprise assets receive the new root CA certificate in a timely manner. Alternatively, to reduce the chance of disruption, consider deploying a new root CA dedicated to Entra TLS inspection.

Result

Once these changes are made, the certificate chain will allow the Microsoft Global Secure Access Intermediate CA to exist beneath the TLS inspection CA, resulting in a valid certificate chain for TLS-inspected websites. Browsers will once again trust the dynamically generated certificates, eliminating the ERR_CERT_INVALID error.

The following certificate chain shows the corrected configuration after renewing the root CA certificate and recreating the TLS inspection certificate.

Summary

Entra Internet Access TLS inspection relies on a certificate chain that includes the Microsoft Global Secure Access Intermediate CA. If the root CA that signs the TLS inspection certificate enforces a restrictive path length constraint, certificate validation can fail, causing browsers to display ERR_CERT_INVALID errors for all TLS-inspected websites. Reviewing the certificate chain and understanding how basic constraints affect subordinate CAs can help quickly identify and resolve this issue. When deploying TLS inspection, ensure that CA hierarchy restrictions are compatible with this deployment scenario. Consider using a dedicated PKI hierarchy to minimize operational impact.

Additional Information

Tutorial: Enable Entra Internet Access TLS Inspection

Protect Enterprise Generative AI Applications with Prompt Injection Protection

Entra Private Access and VPN Migration Strategies on Entra.News

I recently had the opportunity to connect with Merill Fernando from Microsoft as a guest on his popular Entra.News podcast to discuss Microsoft Entra Private Access, which is part of the Entra Global Secure Access Security Service Edge (SSE) service. We spent the hour talking about the similarities and differences between classic VPN technologies and zero-trust network access (ZTNA). In addition, we discussed some technical aspects of Entra Private Access, and I shared migration and coexistence strategies to help ease the transition to zero trust. Also, we discussed the importance of integrating Entra Conditional Access and the shift from network to application access. You’ll find the interview at Entra.News and also on YouTube. Enjoy!

Additional Information

How to Migrate from Legacy VPN to Entra Private Access – Entra.News

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Always On VPN vs. Entra Private Access

Microsoft Entra Private Access Network Connector Overview and Deployment Strategies

Microsoft Entra Private Access Intelligent Local Access

Entra Private Access and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)

Microsoft Entra Private Access is a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution that provides secure access to private enterprise resources. With the release of Global Secure Access (GSA) client version 2.26.108, Microsoft has addressed a crucial functionality gap by adding support for Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), enabling secure access from non-managed endpoints.

BYOD Support in Global Secure Access

Microsoft introduced BYOD support for Entra Private Access with the release of the GSA client version 2.26.108. This update allows the GSA client to be installed on Microsoft Entra-registered devices that are not domain-joined or managed by the organization, enabling secure access to private resources from personal or unmanaged endpoints.

Use Cases

BYOD support in GSA and Entra Private Access enables several common scenarios where network access from managed devices is impractical or unavailable, including:

  • Vendor or contractor access
  • IT incident response from unmanaged endpoints
  • Temporary or seasonal staffing
  • Collaboration with external partners

Replacing Legacy VPN for Ad Hoc Access

Historically, legacy VPN solutions were the primary option for providing ad hoc access to private resources from unmanaged devices. With the introduction of BYOD support in the GSA client, organizations can now extend Entra Private Access to these scenarios without deploying or maintaining a separate VPN infrastructure.

Additional Changes

In addition to adding BYOD support, GSA client v2.26.108 includes the following new enhancements.

  • Improved Intelligent Local Access (ILA) detection
  • Join Type displayed in the client interface
  • GSA traceroute enhancements, including a 50M MB speed test between the client and edge service.

Summary

BYOD support removes a key barrier to adopting Microsoft Entra Private Access. Organizations can now securely provide access to private resources using Zero Trust policies, even when users connect from unmanaged or personal devices, and without relying on legacy VPN solutions.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Private Access Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)

Microsoft Global Secure Access Client for Windows v2.26.108

Microsoft Entra Private Access Intelligent Local Access

Always On VPN vs. Entra Private Access

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025

I’m very excited to announce that I will be attending the annual Techmentor Conference at the Microsoft HQ campus in Redmond, Washington, this year. The event takes place August 11-15, 2025. The Techmentor Conference is one of my favorite IT pro conferences because it offers unparalleled access to experts worldwide. I will deliver two presentations at this year’s event. I hope you’ll join me!

Entra Private Access

On Tuesday, August 12, 2025, I will be presenting a session on Zero Trust Network Access with Microsoft Entra Private Access. ZTNA is the future of remote access and provides many security and operational benefits over traditional client-based VPN technologies.

T11 – Zero Trust Network Access with Entra Private Access

Cloud PKI for Intune

On Wednesday, August 13, 2025, I’ll discuss Simplified Certificate Management with Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune. As organizations integrate cloud-native devices in their environments, administrators must solve the problem of issuing and managing certificates for users and devices that are not domain-joined. Cloud PKI for Intune is an excellent solution that provides deployment flexibility to address these unique and specific requirements.

W10 – Simplified Certificate Management with Cloud PKI for Intune

Register Now

Registration for the event is open now. Use the promo code HICKS and receive $500.00 off the price of admission. Don’t miss this excellent opportunity to learn from the best. Register today!

Additional Information

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025 – Session List

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune

Configure Entra Conditional Access for Always On VPN

Recently, I wrote about Microsoft Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access and how conditional access improves your organization’s security posture by making policy-based access decisions based on various signals such as user identity, location, device compliance, platform, sign-in risk, and more. In this post, I’ll provide step-by-step instructions for integrating Entra Conditional Access with existing Always On VPN deployments.

Requirements

To use Microsoft Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN you must have Entra ID P1 at a minimum. To use advanced features such as risk-based policy assessment, you must have Entra ID P2. In addition, all endpoints must be under Intune management; either native Entra ID joined, or hybrid Entra ID joined.

Enable VPN Support

To begin, open the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com/), navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access, and perform the following steps.

  1. Click VPN Connectivity.
  2. Click New certificate.
  3. From the Select duration drop-down list, choose an appropriate certificate validity period.
  4. Click Create.
Entra admin center VPN connectivity page with a new VPN root certificate created

Once complete, click Download certificate and copy the certificate file to a domain-joined system on-premises.

Publish Certificate

Next, administrators must publish the Entra VPN root certificate in Active Directory to support domain authentication. Open an elevated PowerShell or command window and run the following commands.

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> RootCA

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> NtAuthCA

certutil commands publishing the Entra VPN root certificate to the RootCA and NTAuth stores in Active Directory

Note: You must be a domain administrator to perform this task.

Conditional Access Policy

Navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access and click Policies, then perform the following steps to create a conditional access policy for VPN access.

  1. Click New Policy.
  2. Enter a descriptive name for the new policy.
  3. Click the link in the Target resources section.
  4. From the Select what this policy applies to drop-down list, select Resources (formerly cloud apps).
  5. In the Include section, choose Select resources.
  6. Click the link in the Select section.
  7. Enter VPN in the search field.
  8. Check the box next to VPN Server.
  9. Click Select.
  10. Click the link in the Grant section.
  11. Select Grant access.
  12. Check the box next to Require device to be marked as compliant.
  13. Click Select.
  14. On the Enable policy slider, select On.
  15. Click Create.
Entra Conditional Access policy for the VPN server application with the policy enabled

NPS

Changes to Network Policy Server (NPS) policy and configuration are required to support Always On VPN with Entra Conditional Access.

NPS Policy

To update the Always On VPN network policy to support Entra Conditional Access, open the NPS management console (nps.msc), expand Policies, then select Network Policies and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click on the Always On VPN policy and choose Properties.
  2. Select the Settings tab.
  3. Select Vendor Specific in the RADIUS Attributes section.
  4. Click Add.
  5. Select the Allowed-Certificate-OID attribute.
  6. Click Add.
  7. Click Add.
  8. Enter 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.87 in the Attribute value field.
  9. Click Ok.
  10. Click Ok.
  11. Click Close.
  12. Click Ok.
NPS network policy EAP settings for Entra Conditional Access certificates

Important Note: This change will block new Always On VPN user tunnel connections until you update the client configuration. When integrating an existing Always On VPN implementation with Entra Conditional Access, consider creating a new NPS policy and corresponding security group to migrate users to conditional access seamlessly.

NPS Configuration

By default, NPS will perform revocation checks for certificates used for domain authentication. However, Entra Conditional Access uses short-lived certificates (one-hour lifetime) that do not include CRL Distribution Point (CDP) information. Therefore, administrators must change the NPS server configuration to disable revocation checking for certificates lacking this information.

To do this, open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and create a new registry key with the following settings.

Key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13
Name: IgnoreNoRevocationCheck
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can also run the following PowerShell command to implement this change.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13\’ -Name IgnoreNoRevocationCheck -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, the server must be rebooted for the change to take effect.

Client Configuration

After making all required changes to the supporting infrastructure, you must also update the  Always On VPN client configuration to leverage Entra Conditional Access. Changes to client configuration vary depending on the method used to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings.

Intune

When using Microsoft Intune and the native VPN policy type to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings, perform the following steps to update the VPN configuration to include Entra Conditional Access support.

  1. Open the Microsoft Intune admin center (https://intune.microsoft.com/) and navigate to Devices > Configuration.
  2. Click on the Always On VPN policy.
  3. Click Edit next to Configuration settings.
  4. Expand the Conditional Access section.
  5. Click Enable next to Conditional access for this VPN connection.
  6. Click Enable next to Single sign-on (SSO) with alternate certificate.
  7. Enter Client Authentication in the Name field.
  8. Enter 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 in the Object Identifier field.
  9. Enter the organization’s root certification authority (CA) certificate thumbprint in the Issuer hash field.
EAP certificate selection settings with the Client Authentication EKU and the root CA issuer hash

XML

When using a custom XML configuration file for Always On VPN client configuration settings deployed using Intune or PowerShell, edit the XML file, remove the existing <TLSExtensions></TLSExtensions> section, and replace it with the following.

Always On VPN ProfileXML TLSExtensions section for Entra Conditional Access certificates

In addition, add the following code between the <VPNProfile></VPNProfile> tags after <TrustedNetworkDetection>.

Always On VPN ProfileXML DeviceCompliance section enabling Entra Conditional Access

Note: You will find a sample XML configuration file you can copy and paste from on GitHub here.

DPC

When using Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC) for managing Always On VPN client configuration settings, open the DPC group policy and navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > DPC Client > User Tunnel Settings > Advanced and perform the following steps.

  1. Double-click Optional – Device Compliance Settings.
  2. Select Enabled.
  3. Enter 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 in the Certificate EKU OID field.
  4. Enter the organization’s root certification authority (CA) certificate thumbprint in the Certificate Issuer Hash field.
  5. Click Ok.
DPC settings with the Client Authentication EKU OID and certificate issuer hash

Not using DPC? You’re missing out! Learn more about Always On VPN DPC here.

Video

I’ve published a demonstration video for enabling Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access with Always On VPN on YouTube. You can find the video here.

Summary

Following the guidance in this post to integrate Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN can significantly improve your organization’s security posture. In the example above, the conditional access policy is a basic one. Yet, it dramatically reduces the attack surface for your remote access infrastructure by ensuring only compliant devices can establish a VPN connection.

Administrators can use advanced conditional access policy settings to strengthen the VPN’s security further by performing additional checks, such as requiring strong, phishing-resistant credentials and requesting multifactor authentication (MFA) for risky sign-ins.

Additional Information

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access

Drawbacks of Multifactor Authentication

Understanding Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Digital Certificates for Strong Authentication

Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC)

Always On VPN DPC Open Source

Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access

Microsoft recently introduced Entra Private Access, an identity-centric Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution to provide secure remote access to on-premises resources. With Entra Private Access, administrators can leverage Entra Conditional Access to enforce policy-based access control for network access. However, Entra Private Access isn’t for everyone. It does not provide full feature parity with Always On VPN, and there are also licensing considerations. However, for those organizations using Always On VPN, the good news is that you can integrate Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN today to gain some of the security benefits it provides.

Conditional Access

Microsoft Entra Conditional Access is a security feature that enables administrators to create and enforce policies that specify how users can access resources. In the specific case of Always On VPN, conditional access is critical to ensuring legitimate access to authenticated users on authorized devices.

Signals

Conditional access policies use a wide variety of signals for policy enforcement, such as:

  • User Identity: Who is making this access request?
  • User Properties: Is this user a member of a specific group?
  • Location: Where is this access request originating?
  • Device Management: Is this device joined to Entra ID?
  • Device State: Is this device compliant with security policies?
  • Device Platform: Is this a Windows device?
  • Risk Level: Is this login considered risky?

Access Control

Based on these signals, administrators can design a conditional access policy to enforce granular access control, such as:

  • Grant access only from managed devices
  • Deny access from untrusted locations
  • Require additional context-based authentication (e.g., multifactor authentication)
  • Enforce specific authentication types (e.g., phishing-resistant credentials)
  • Allow access only from specific device platforms (e.g., Windows only)
  • Require Entra hybrid-joined device
  • Block access when a device is not compliant with security policies

Always On VPN

Entra Conditional Access works with Always On VPN by issuing a special, short-lived user authentication certificate once the user has been authorized. The Always On VPN infrastructure can be configured to use this certificate to grant access to the VPN. Integrating conditional access with Always On VPN can significantly improve the security posture of organizations using this feature.

Deployment Guide

I’ve published a detailed, step-by-step deployment guide to configure Entra conditional access for Always On VPN. In addition, I have posted a demonstration video for enabling Entra conditional access with Aways On VPN on YouTube.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Conditional Access Overview

Configure Entra Conditional Access for Always On VPN

Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025

Are you ready? In just a few short weeks(!) Microsoft will release the February 2025 security updates. This is a critical update because Microsoft plans to enable full enforcement of strong certificate mapping on Active Directory Domain Controllers (DCs) with this release. Administrators unprepared for this may incur outages for workloads using certificate-based authentication such as Always On VPN, Wi-Fi, and others.

Reminder: There’s still space available in my Certificates and Intune Masterclass. Register now!

KB5014754

Microsoft introduced strong certificate mapping with the May 2022 update KB5014754 to address vulnerabilities identified with certificate-based authentication. The update makes changes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certification authorities (CAs) to embed the principal’s Security Identifier (SID) on issued certificates with a new certificate extension. The update also changes domain controller behavior to monitor and optionally enforce strong certificate mapping for authentication.

Enforcement Mode

When first introduced, the update is configured in compatibility mode. If a certificate that isn’t strongly mapped is presented for authentication, an event is recorded in the event log indicating that. Microsoft has been planning for years to enable full enforcement. After many delays, that time is now upon us. Specifically, full enforcement for strong certificate mapping will be enabled by default on DCs after applying the February 2025 security updates.

Note: Administrators can switch back to compatibility mode for now. See below for more details.

Limitations

Initially, the strong certificate mapping update was applied only to online certificate templates. Specifically, those templates are configured to build the subject name from Active Directory information. However, offline templates, where the subject name is supplied in the request, do not include this information by default. Crucially, any certificate issued with Microsoft Intune with PKCS or SCEP uses offline templates and is not strongly mapped. The lack of strong certificate mapping options for Intune-issued certificates forced Microsoft to delay its full enforcement deadline until these limitations were resolved.

Updates

In October 2024, Microsoft Intune announced support for strong certificate mapping for PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators can now configure these certificates to include strong certificate mapping. However, administrators must take action to affect this change.

PKCS

To enable strong certificate mapping for PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure that the certificate connector is running at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, the following registry key must be configured on the connector server.

Key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector
Name: EnableSidSecurityExtension
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

The Intune Certificate Connector server must be restarted for this change to take effect. No changes are required on the PKCS certificate policy in Intune.

SCEP

To enable strong certificate mapping for SCEP certificates, administrators must add the following attribute/value pair to the Subject alternative name settings on their existing Intune SCEP certificate policy.

Attribute: URI
Value: {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}

Intune SCEP profile subject alternative name with the URI attribute OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

Preparation

Administrators using certificate-based authentication against on-premises Active Directory should ensure all user and device authentication certificates include embedded SID information. For certificates issued on-premises, with Intune using PKCS or certificates issued by Entra Conditional Access, the certificate should now have the extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, including the principal’s SID.

Certificate with the SID extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2


SCEP certificates issued using Intune will include the following information in the Subject Alternative Name field.

URL=tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-24:sid:<sid>

Certificate subject alternative name with the tag:microsoft.com SID URL


Note: This applies to certificates issued using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune as those certificates are deployed using a SCEP device configuration policy.

Opt-Out

With the February 2025 security update, all domain controllers will be switched to full enforcement mode. Authentication requests using certificates without strong mapping will be denied in this configuration.

If your organization is not prepared to move to full enforcement mode, the February 2025 update allows administrators to opt out and switch back to compatibility mode by enabling the following registry key on all domain controllers.

Key: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc
Name: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc’ -Name ‘StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement’ -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

September 2025

Administrators are strongly encouraged to update all user and device authentication certificates before September 2025. With the September 2025 security update, Microsoft will no longer honor the opt-out registry settings and strictly enforce strong certificate mapping for all certificate-based authentication requests.

Troubleshooting

Certificate authentication is commonly used for Always On VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. If full enforcement mode is enabled on domain controllers and a certificate is presented for authentication that is not strongly mapped, administrators may see the following event log information recorded on the Network Policy Server (NPS).

Network Policy Server denied access to a user.

NPS event stating Network Policy Server denied access to a user

The details of the event include the following.

Reason Code: 16
Reason: Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.

NPS event details with reason code 16, authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch

Obviously, the user does not enter their password when using certificates for authentication. However, the indication of a credential mismatch can be caused by missing strong certificate mapping information when the DC is in full enforcement mode.

Note: There are other causes for reason code 16 failures on NPS. Further investigation may be required to determine the root cause.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Training: Certificates and Intune Masterclass

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Entra Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS

KB5014754: Certificate-Based Authentication Changes on Windows Domain Controllers

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

With the October 2024 Intune update, Microsoft introduced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates issued by Intune via the Intune Certificate Connector. Enabling strong certificate mapping support in Intune is an important change for those organizations using Microsoft Intune to issue and manage certificates for their users and devices, as it resolves a critical implementation blocker.

Note: This post was updated to clarify that adding the {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} for PKCS certificates is not required. This variable is only used for SCEP certificates.

Background

In May 2022, Microsoft released security update KB5014754, which added functionality to domain controllers and enterprise issuing certification authority (CA) servers, allowing the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) to enforce strong certificate mapping. Specifically, with KB5014754 installed, issuing CAs now add the requesting principal’s Security Identifier (SID) to the certificate in a new certificate extension. Domain controllers can be configured to reject authentication requests using certificates that do not include this information.

Today, DCs with KB5014754 installed will still allow authentication without strong certificate mapping. However, Microsoft has stated they will begin enforcing strong certificate mapping in February 2025, with an option to disable it via the registry. Starting in September 2025, full enforcement will be mandatory.

Update: Full Enforcement mode has been mandatory since the September 9, 2025 Windows security update. The StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry setting is no longer supported, and domain controllers deny certificate-based authentication when a certificate cannot be strongly mapped. See Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025 for details.

Microsoft strong certificate mapping enforcement timeline from KB5014754

Reference: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16

Limitation

The initial changes in KB5014754 applied only to online certificate templates, meaning those that build the subject name from Active Directory. However, deploying certificates with Intune using either PKCS or SCEP requires using an offline certificate template that allows the requestor to supply the subject name in the request. When using offline templates, a certificate is issued but does not embed the SID in the certificate. Using offline templates presents unique challenges to organizations moving to modern management with Intune and Entra ID.

Intune Changes

The October 2024 Intune update addresses this limitation by providing a method to include SID information in certificates using either SCEP or PKCS.

SCEP

To include the SID information in SCEP certificates, create or edit an existing SCEP device configuration policy and define a URI Subject Alternative Name (SAN) attribute with the value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} as shown here.

Intune SCEP profile with a URI subject alternative name set to OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

PKCS

To include SID information in PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure the Intune Certificate Connector is updated to at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, a registry setting must be enabled on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

On the server where the Intune Certificate Connector is installed, open the registry editor, navigate to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector, and change the value of EnableSidSecurityExtension to 1.

Registry editor showing EnableSidSecurityExtension set to 1 on the Intune Certificate Connector server

Optionally, administrators can update this setting at the command line by running the following PowerShell command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the Intune Certificate Connector server for the changes to take effect.

Certificates

SID information is added to certificates differently depending on which Intune device configuration policy type is used.

PKCS

PKCS certificates have the SID embedded in the certificate extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, as shown here.

PKCS certificate showing the SID in the 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 certificate extension

SCEP

SCEP certificates have the SID embedded in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field in the format “tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:<SID>” as shown here.

SCEP certificate showing the SID in the subject alternative name field

Migration

When making these changes to embed the SID in Intune-issued certificates in an existing Intune PKCS or SCEP configuration policy, the change will only affect certificates issued after the change is made. To update all certificate holders, you must create and deploy a new device configuration policy to targeted users or devices. Deleting the old profile (or ensuring it no longer applies) will remove the old certificate from the endpoint. If you’ve configured your Intune Certificate Connector to support revocation, the old certificate will also be revoked.

Entra Conditional Access

Entra Conditional Access certificates have included SID information since July 2023. More details here.

Cloud PKI for Intune

The changes above will also work with certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Other Cloud PKI Providers

Many other Cloud PKI providers, such as SCEPman and KEYTOS, already include the embedded SID in their certificates. Other cloud PKI providers may also include embedded SID. Consult your provider to confirm.

Additional Information

Microsoft Intune October 2024 Strong Certificate Mapping Update

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Strong Certificate Mapping Update for PKCS

Entra ID Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Implementing Strong Certificate Mapping in Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Free Entra Certificate-Based Authentication Training Course

I’m pleased to announce I’ll present a FREE online training course on Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication (CBA). The course will be delivered through the ViaMonstra Online Academy on Wednesday, November 6, beginning at 10:00 AM CST. Once again, this training course is entirely FREE, so don’t hesitate to register now! If you can’t attend the live session, you can always view the presentation recording later.

Course Highlights

Join me for this 90-minute live, online training session where you will learn:

  • How certificate-based authentication offers more robust protection than passwords alone and mitigates phishing and MFA bypass risks
  • How Entra CBA enables a seamless, passwordless user experience while maintaining high security and assurance
  • How Entra CBA eliminates the need for physical authentication devices such as FIDO keys or security tokens, reducing costs and complexity
  • How to configure and manage affinity binding and authentication strength policies for Entra CBA

When you attend the live event, you’ll have the opportunity to ask questions directly during the presentation, so be sure to register today and join us for this free training session!

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication (CBA)

Mini-Course – Microsoft Entra Certificate-Based Authentication