What’s New in Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0

Microsoft Entra Private Access

On November 9, 2026, Microsoft released an important update for the Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector. The Entra Private Network Connector is used to publish on-premises web applications to the internet. It is also used for Global Secure Access (GSA) with Entra Private Access, allowing GSA clients to access on-premises resources. Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0 includes new functionality to improve performance monitoring, name resolution, logging, and overall reliability and security.

New Features

This release introduces new capabilities for monitoring connector performance and resolving names in complex network environments, including the following.

Performance and Diagnostics

The Connector Diagnostics tool, available from the system tray, now includes a new Performance tab. Here, administrators can view up to 24 hours of resource history for the connector server, collected in one-minute aggregates. The Performance tab displays average and peak values for the following metrics.

  • Machine CPU: Total CPU usage across the machine.
  • Connector CPU: Share of total machine CPU used by the connector.
  • Connector resident memory: Physical memory used by the connector process.
  • Machine available memory: Physical memory still available to applications.

Administrators can use the Window drop-down list to display performance history for the last 1 hour, 6 hours, or 24 hours. This gives better visibility into resource consumption over time, which is helpful when sizing connector servers or investigating performance issues. In addition, this update improves the accuracy of connector health reporting.

Entra Private Network Connector Diagnostics Performance tab showing machine CPU, connector CPU, connector resident memory, and machine available memory charts

DNS Resolution

The connector now honors DNS suffixes and DNS servers configured on individual network interfaces in Windows. This update also improves the fallback behavior for DNS SRV record queries.

Improvements

In addition to new features, v1.5.5130.0 includes several improvements to logging, reliability, and security.

Logging and Observability

This update includes the following changes to connector logging.

  • Trace file rotation is now supported.
  • The default capacity for the Session event log has been increased to 3 GB.
  • Error messages for connectivity and backend failures have been improved to streamline troubleshooting.

Note: With the larger default Session event log size, administrators should ensure the connector server has sufficient free disk space on the system drive.

Reliability and Security

This update also includes the following reliability and security enhancements.

  • TCP keepalive has been added to reduce idle connection resets.
  • Memory management during request processing has been improved.
  • Security for local log files and other connector files has been enhanced.

Updating to v1.5.5130.0

Existing Entra Private Network Connector installations will not automatically receive this update. Administrators must manually download the connector from the Microsoft Entra admin center and apply the update themselves to take advantage of these new features and capabilities.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector v1.5.5130.0

Microsoft Entra Private Network Connector Overview and Deployment Strategies

Preventing Port Exhaustion on Entra Private Network Connector Servers

Entra Private Network Connector Session Persistence

The Case for 6-Day Public TLS Certificates

In February 2025, Let’s Encrypt introduced the option to enroll for public TLS certificates with a 6-day validity period.  This represents a significant shift toward short-lived certificates and aligns with the broader industry trend of reducing certificate lifetimes to improve security. While this may seem aggressive at first glance, organizations that have embraced automation will find that extremely short-lived certificates offer compelling security and operational advantages in some scenarios.

Benefits

Extremely short-lived TLS certificates offer several important security and operational benefits, particularly for organizations that have already embraced automation for certificate lifecycle management. Key advantages include:

  • Minimized Risk of Key Compromise – 6-day certificates dramatically reduce the exposure window of private key compromise events, giving attackers a limited window of opportunity to exploit key access.
  • Automation Validation – Short-lived certificates force organizations to adopt and validate automated enrollment and renewal processes, ensuring that certificate lifecycle management is reliable and resilient.
  • IP Address Support – 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt support IP addresses, allowing administrators to secure workloads that do not have entries in DNS.

Use Cases

6-day TLS certificates are well-suited for a range of modern workloads, especially those that benefit from frequent key rotation, automation, and dynamic provisioning. 6-Day TLS certificates are well-suited for the following workloads:

  • High Value Resources – Using 6-day TLS certificates is beneficial for high-security or sensitive workloads where frequent key rotation is desired.
  • Test Labs – High-frequency certificate rotation allows for thorough testing of automation processes to ensure operational reliability of production deployments. Rapid iteration of 6-day TLS certificates allows administrators to identify potential issues and implement changes before long-term certificates expire.
  • Ephemeral Infrastructure – 6-day TLS certificates work well with dynamic workloads such as containers, where environments are rapidly provisioned and destroyed. These hosts might only live for a few hours or days, making short-lived certificates an ideal choice in this scenario.
  • Workload Bootstrapping – 6-day TLS certificates can be used where a certificate is required only to perform initial configuration. For example, an IP-based TLS certificate can be used to configure TLS services, then later migrated to a long-term certificate when DNS is configured and the service is placed into production.

Enterprise Usage

Administrators will find that 6-day public TLS certificates work well with many popular Windows Server workloads. Here are a few examples.

  • Always On VPN – Enterprise secure remote access is a popular target for attackers because the service is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates ensures frequent key rotation, reducing exposure to key compromise.
  • Remote Desktop Services – Many organizations continue to use Remote Desktop Gateway to provide access to on-premises applications, another workload that is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates is equally effective in this scenario.

What About DirectAccess?

Although DirectAccess would be another ideal Windows Server workload for 6-day TLS certificates, my testing shows that it does not work. The root cause is that 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt do NOT include subject information (the field is blank). Unfortunately, because of the way in which DirectAccess validates this certificate, it requires information in this field. More details can be found here.

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2026/03/16/directaccess-iphttps-and-lets-encrypt-6-day-certificates/

Summary

If you are automating certificate enrollment and renewal, it shouldn’t matter if the certificate is valid for 6 days or 60 days. In fact, shorter lifetimes can significantly improve your security posture by minimizing risk and enforcing operational discipline around certificate management. Organizations that invest in automation today will be well-positioned to adopt even shorter certificate lifetimes in the future, while those relying on manual processes will find it increasingly difficult to keep up.

Questions?

Do you have questions about certificate lifecycle automation in your environment? I’m happy to help you validate your approach and address any challenges you’re encountering. Fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more information.

Additional Information

Let’s Encrypt Issues First Six-Day Certificate

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in the Enterprise

Entra Private Access Intelligent Local Access

Microsoft Entra Private Access, part of the Microsoft Global Secure Access (GSA) Security Service Edge (SSE), is a compelling new cloud-based Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution that offers enhanced security compared to traditional VPNs. Until recently, traffic for all defined applications flowed through the GSA tunnel regardless of the client’s location. This resulted in sub-optimal traffic flow when the client is on the same network as resources defined in Quick Access or Enterprise applications. Fortunately, Microsoft has introduced a new feature to address this crucial limitation.

Intelligent Local Access

Historically, DirectAccess used the Network Location Server (NLS) to determine network location. Always On VPN used Trusted Network Detection (TND) to accomplish this same task. GSA has lacked this critical feature since its initial release. Thankfully, Microsoft recently added Intelligent Local Access (ILA). This feature allows GSA to identify a trusted private network and bypass the client, routing traffic directly to the local resource.

How It Works

With GSA ILA, administrators define a Private Network in their GSA configuration. Administrators define a resource by FQDN along with DNS servers to use for name resolution. When the client resolves this FQDN to a matching IP address (CIDR or IP address range is accepted as well), the client will then bypass GSA for target resources defined in the policy.

Note: Authentication is still performed for access to GSA applications even when ILA indicates the client is on a private network. However, after successful authentication and the client satisfies any conditional access policies, traffic is forwarded directly to the resource rather than routed through the GSA tunnel.

Configure ILA

To configure ILA, open the Microsoft Entra admin center and follow these steps.

  1. Navigate to Global Secure Access > Connect > Private Networks.
  2. Select Add Private Network.
  3. Enter a name for the trusted network in the Name field.
  4. Enter the IPv4 address(es) of any DNS server(s) used for this network in the DNS servers field.
  5. Enter the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of a resource on this network for name resolution in the Fully qualified domain name field (see below for additional information).
  6. Select an option from the Resolved to IP address type drop-down list. Options include IP address, IP address range (CIDR), and IP address range (IP to IP).
  7. Enter the expected name resolution result in the Resolved to IP address value field.
  8. Click Select applications below Target resource to exclude from GSA processing when on this network.
  9. Click Create.

ILA FQDN Recommendation

Technically speaking, the FQDN used by GSA for ILA can be any internal resource, even those included in Quick Access or Enterprise applications. Since the GSA client only attempts to resolve this name and doesn’t connect to it, administrators should configure a dedicated static DNS record with a dummy IP address for this purpose. A static DNS record ensures it won’t be overwritten, scavenged, or accidentally deleted. For example, administrators can create a DNS A record named ‘ILA’ that resolves to any IP address they choose, as long as it matches the IP address defined in the Private network configuration for GSA.

Troubleshooting

When confirming GSA client traffic bypass, using standard network troubleshooting tools isn’t sufficient. Here are a few examples.

Resolve-DnsName

Although the client is on a private network, Resolve-DnsName shows the IP address of the GSA address range of 6.6.x.x.

Ping (ICMP)

Interestingly, if you try to ping the FQDN, you’ll see that traffic bypasses the GSA client, as the response comes from the destination’s address.

By contrast, attempts to ping the FQDN outside the private network fail as the GSA client does not pass ICMP.

Advanced Diagnostics

The best way to confirm GSA client traffic bypass for private network resources is to use the Advanced diagnostics tool included with the GSA client. Click the GSA client icon in the notification area, then follow these steps to validate GSA client bypass when ILA is detected.

  1. Select the Troubleshooting tab in the navigation tree.
  2. Click Run Tool in the Advanced diagnostics tool section.
  3. Select the Traffic tab.
  4. Remove the Action == Tunnel filter.
  5. Click Start collecting.
  6. Initiate traffic to a Quick Access or Enterprise application configured for bypass when ILA detects a private network.
  7. Click Stop collecting.
  8. Review the log and note the Connection status for the traffic generated previously. It should indicate Bypassed when ILA detects a private network, as shown here.

Summary

With Intelligent Local Access now a feature of the Global Secure Access client, administrators can configure the client to bypass the GSA tunnel and access Quick Access and Enterprise applications directly for better performance, while still enforcing authentication and Conditional Access.

Additional Information

Enable Intelligent Local Access in Microsoft Entra Private Access

Entra Private Access Channels are Unreachable

Always On VPN vs. Entra Private Access: Choosing the Right Access Model for Your Organization

Configure Windows Server DNS64 for IPv6-Mostly and IPv6-Only

IPv4 to IPv6 transition

Many organizations are modernizing their networks by migrating from legacy IPv4 to IPv6. The goal is to replace IPv4 with IPv6 entirely. However, even though an organization can successfully migrate to IPv6-only networks internally, it does not control networks outside its boundaries. In some cases, a host on an IPv6-only or IPv6-mostly network may need to communicate with an IPv4 resource. Administrators must deploy an IPv6 transition technology to support this scenario. A common solution to address this need is DNS64 and NAT64.

Last updated: November 8, 2026

What are DNS64 and NAT64?

DNS64 and NAT64, defined in RFCs 6147 and 6146, respectively, work together to ensure endpoints on an IPv6-only network can still communicate with IPv4-only resources. DNS64 enables IPv6-only clients to communicate with IPv4-only servers by synthesizing AAAA DNS records from A records. When an IPv6-only client queries a domain with only an IPv4 address (A record), the DNS64 server creates a synthetic IPv6 address by embedding the IPv4 address within an administrator-defined NAT64 IPv6 prefix. The default (referred to as ‘well known’) prefix is 64:ff9b::/96. In the example below, the IPv4-only resource ipv4.test-ipv6.com is resolved using the Cloudflare public DNS64 resolver.

Resolve-DnsName query for the IPv4-only resource ipv4.test-ipv6.com using the Cloudflare public DNS64 resolver, returning a synthesized AAAA record

Using the synthetic DNS64 address allows the client to send IPv6 packets to a NAT64 gateway, which translates them to IPv4 for the destination server. DNS64 ensures seamless address resolution for IPv6-only networks accessing IPv4 resources without requiring actual IPv6 addresses for the target.

Caveat

While DNS64 is great for ensuring IPv4 access on IPv6-only networks, it has one critical limitation. The client must connect to a resource using a hostname or a fully qualified domain name. If a client attempts to connect to an IPv4 resource directly (e.g., https://172.16.21.12 or \\10.21.12.83\data), the resource will be unreachable. To address this limitation, the 464XLAT IPv6 transition technology must be used. For more information about 464XLAT, see my previous article, Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration.

Enterprise DNS64

While there are public DNS64 resolvers from Cloudflare, Google, and others, they aren’t helpful when trying to resolve internal hostnames in the enterprise. Organizations must deploy their own private DNS64 services in this scenario.

Windows Server and DNS64

Today, Windows Server does not natively support DNS64. Organizations are advised to use an enterprise DNS solution such as Infoblox or BlueCat for DNS64 services. Alternatively, administrators can deploy BIND DNS on the Linux platform of their choice. DNS64 is supported in BIND 9.8.0 and later.

DNS64 Proxy

To support testing and evaluation (and perhaps production deployment for smaller organizations), it is possible to configure any supported version of Windows Server to serve as a DNS64 proxy. In this scenario, a Windows Server is configured as a DNS64 server, but the server itself is not an actual DNS server. It does not have a DNS database or zone file; it is not authoritative for any zones and can’t perform conditional forwarding. It simply forwards DNS queries to the servers defined on its own network interface.

Windows Server DNS64 Configuration

The DNS64 service must be installed using PowerShell and the Set-NetDnsTransitionConfiguration command. Administrators will define some variables, configure DNS64, and create firewall rules to allow DNS traffic inbound to the server.

Configure DNS64

On a Windows Server member server (domain-join is optional), open an elevated PowerShell command window and run the following commands.

# Define variables
$AcceptInterface = 'Ethernet' # The interface name or alias that will accept DNS64 traffic
$SendInterface = 'Ethernet' # The interface name or alias that will send DNS64 traffic
$Nat64Prefix = '64:ff9b::/96' # The NAT64 prefix

# Configure DNS64
Set-NetDnsTransitionConfiguration -State Enabled -AcceptInterface $AcceptInterface -SendInterface $SendInterface -PrefixMapping "$Nat64Prefix,0.0.0.0/0" -PassThru
PowerShell output of Set-NetDnsTransitionConfiguration enabling DNS64 on Windows Server

Configure Windows Firewall

Run the following PowerShell commands to configure the Windows Firewall to allow inbound DNS requests.

# Create firewall rules to allow DNS64 traffic inbound
New-NetFirewallRule -Name 'DNSSrv-DNS-UDP-In' -DisplayName 'DNS (UDP, Incoming)' -Description 'Inbound rule to allow remote UDP access to the DNS64 service.' -Group 'DNS64 Service' -Protocol UDP -LocalPort 53 -Direction Inbound -Profile Any -Action Allow -Enabled True

New-NetFirewallRule -Name 'DNSSrv-DNS-TCP-In' -DisplayName 'DNS (TCP, Incoming)' -Description 'Inbound rule to allow remote TCP access to the DNS64 service.' -Group 'DNS64 Service' -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 53 -Direction Inbound -Profile Any -Action Allow -Enabled True
PowerShell output creating Windows Firewall rules to allow inbound DNS64 traffic on TCP and UDP port 53

GitHub

For reference, I’ve posted the relevant commands for configuring DNS64 on Windows Server on GitHub here.

DNS64 Testing

Once DNS64 is configured on the Windows Server, administrators can test operation by sending a DNS query for an IPv4-only resource to the DNS64 server using the following PowerShell command.

Resolve-DnsName -Name ipv4.test-ipv6.com -Server <DNS64 server IPv6 address>

For example.

Resolve-DnsName -Name ipv4.test-ipv6.com -Server 2001:db8::64
Resolve-DnsName query to the Windows Server DNS64 proxy returning the native IPv4 address and a synthesized IPv6 address

The DNS64 server returns the native IPv4 address (A record) along with the synthesized IPv6 address (AAAA record). If the target resource already has a native AAAA record, the DNS64 server returns that record and does not synthesize one, as shown below.

Resolve-DnsName query through the Windows Server DNS64 proxy for a resource with a native IPv6 address
Resolve-DnsName query through the Windows Server DNS64 proxy for a dual-stack resource returning its native IPv4 and IPv6 addresses

DNS64 and Windows CLAT (WinCLAT)

DNS64 also supports Windows CLAT (WinCLAT), which allows IPv4-dependent applications to work on IPv6-only and IPv6-mostly networks using 464XLAT. To translate IPv4 traffic, WinCLAT must discover the network’s NAT64 prefix. One way it does this is by querying a DNS64 server for AAAA records for ipv4only.arpa (RFC 7050) and extracting the prefix from the synthesized response. The Windows Server DNS64 proxy answers these queries, so it can provide DNS-based NAT64 prefix discovery for WinCLAT clients. To verify, run the following PowerShell command.

Resolve-DnsName -Name ipv4only.arpa -Type AAAA -Server <DNS64 server IPv6 address>

With the well-known prefix, the response includes 64:ff9b::c000:aa and 64:ff9b::c000:ab, which embed the ipv4only.arpa addresses 192.0.0.170 and 192.0.0.171 in hexadecimal. The PREF64 option in IPv6 router advertisements is the preferred discovery method, with DNS64 serving as a fallback. For more information, see How Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Discovers the NAT64 Prefix.

Summary

DNS64 and NAT64 are essential tools for enabling communication between IPv6-only networks and IPv4 resources. While public resolvers exist, enterprises often need their own DNS64 service for internal hostname resolution. Windows Server does not natively support DNS64, but administrators can configure it as a DNS64 proxy for testing and smaller deployments. In this scenario, Windows Server can provide DNS64 functionality, helping organizations transition toward IPv6-only networks while maintaining access to legacy IPv4 systems. The Windows Server DNS64 proxy also answers ipv4only.arpa queries, allowing WinCLAT clients to discover the NAT64 prefix using DNS.

Additional Information

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration

How Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Discovers the NAT64 Prefix

Configure DHCP Option 108 on Windows DHCP Server for IPv6-Mostly

What is 464XLAT? CLAT and PLAT Explained

What is an IPv6-Mostly Network?

IPv6 Transition Technology Options – IPv6 Buzz Podcast

Set-NetDnsTransitionConfiguration

Stateful NAT64 (RFC 6146)

DNS64 (RFC 6147)

464XLAT: Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation (RFC 6877)

Discovery of the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis (RFC 7050)

What is IPv6?

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Resources

Microsoft Security Service Edge Now Generally Available

A few weeks ago, Microsoft announced the general availability of its Security Service Edge (SSE) offering, Global Secure Access (GSA). GSA encompasses Entra Internet Access, a cloud-based Secure Web Gateway, and Entra Private Access, a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution for accessing private data and applications on-premises.

ZTNA vs. VPN

Entra Private Access will be a compelling alternative to traditional VPN solutions such as Windows Always On VPN. Where traditional VPNs grant the endpoint an IP address on the internal network, Entra Private Access provides more granular access and does not require the device to be directly connected to the network.

GSA Client

Administrators must install the GSA client on all endpoints using Entra Internet Access or Entra Private Access. Today, the client is available for Windows and Android devices. iOS and macOS clients are forthcoming.

Private Network Connector

The Entra Private Access solution relies on the Entra Private Network Connector. The Entra Private Network Connector is a software component installed on-premises that provides remote access connectivity. Previously, it was called the Azure AD Application Proxy. Essentially, it is the same technology extended to support TCP and UDP network access in addition to HTTP.

Limitations

Entra Private Access is the way of the future for secure remote access. However, today, there are still some important limitations associated with this technology.

Private DNS

Although Microsoft announced general availability for Entra Private Access, it still lacks the private DNS feature many organizations require to provide feature parity with their existing VPN. This feature is still in private preview at the time of this writing. Hopefully, Microsoft will release this feature soon.

Device Connection

Entra Private Access does not support device-based connections. This limits its capabilities for domain-joined devices. If your organization uses hybrid Entra join today, consider sticking with Always On VPN until you move to native Entra joined endpoints.

Licensing

Global Secure Access (Entra Private Access and Entra Internet Access) are included in the Microsoft Entra Suite license. More information about Entra licensing can be found here.

Additional Information

Microsoft Global Secure Access Now Generally Available

Microsoft Entra Global Secure Access (GSA) Overview

Microsoft Entra Security Service Edge (SSE) on the RunAs Radio Podcast

Microsoft Entra Plans & Pricing

Always On VPN and Interface Metrics

Always On VPN DNS Registration Update Available

In Windows, each network interface identified by the operating system is assigned a metric value. Interface metrics are settings that determine the priority or preference of network interfaces when there are multiple active network connections. The Windows networking stack uses these metrics to determine which network interface should be used for routing traffic when multiple network interfaces are available. Network interface metrics are critical for Always On VPN administrators to understand because they can impact how name resolution requests are processed when an Always On VPN connection is established.

Metric Values

By default, Windows automatically assigns metric values to network interfaces (including VPN interfaces) based on various factors, including the connection speed, link state, and interface type. It tries to select the most suitable interface for general internet connectivity.

Metrics and DNS

Windows will also use the network interface with the lowest metric value as the preferred interface for sending DNS queries by default. This means that DNS queries will be routed through the network interface with the lowest metric value, assuming it is available and connected. When an Always On VPN connection is established, DNS queries may fail or return unexpected results if the network interface metrics are not configured optimally.

Split DNS and Wired Ethernet

Split DNS (sometimes called ‘split brain DNS’) is when the DNS namespace is the same internally and externally. The most common scenario where interface metric settings interfere with DNS operation is when using split DNS and the endpoint is connected to the Internet with a wired Ethernet connection. In this scenario, the Ethernet interface will be assigned the same or lower interface metric value as the Always On VPN interface, which can yield unexpected results.

Viewing Metrics

Always On VPN administrators can view currently assigned interface metric values by running the following PowerShell command.

Get-NetIpInterface

Get-NetIpInterface output showing interface metrics

Assigning Metrics

Most Always On VPN administrators will never have to change interface metric settings. However, if your implementation uses split DNS and some of your endpoints connect using wired Ethernet connections, you may need to update the interface metric settings to ensure proper DNS operation. Choose a setting for the interface metric value that is lower than the wired Ethernet interface. I’ve used a value of ‘3’ without issue for many years. Use one of the following methods to update the interface metric for Always On VPN connections.

PowerShell

Updating interface metric settings in Windows can be accomplished by running the Set-NetIpInterface PowerShell command.

Set-NetIpInterface -InterfaceAlias <connection name> -InterfaceMetric 3

Set-NetIpInterface assigning interface metric 3 to the VPN connection

Note: Using PowerShell to assign the interface metric is not persistent! While this method is suitable for local validation testing, you should use one of the following methods to implement this change permanently.

Rasphone.pbk

To assign the interface metric permanently, Always On VPN administrators can edit the following settings in the rasphone.pbk configuration file.

IpInterfaceMetric=3

Ipv6InterfaceMetric=3

Administrators can automate updating this setting using the Update-Rasphone.ps1 PowerShell script. In addition, the following scripts can be used with Microsoft Intune remediation.

Detect-DeviceIpv4InterfaceMetric.ps1

Remediate-DeviceIpv4InterfaceMetric.ps1

Detect-DeviceIpv6InterfaceMetric.ps1

Remediate-DeviceIpv6InterfaceMetric.ps1

Detect-Ipv4InterfaceMetric.ps1

Remediate-Ipv4InterfaceMetric.ps1

Detect-Ipv6InterfaceMetric.ps1

Remediate-Ipv6InterfaceMetric.ps1

DPC

Organizations using Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC) to manage Always On VPN client configuration settings with Active Directory and group policy or Microsoft Intune can enable the VPN Tunnel Metric setting.

Always On VPN DPC VPN tunnel metric setting

Additional Information

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

Get-NetIpInterface PowerShell Command

Set-NetIpInterface PowerShell Command

Managing Always On VPN Client Settings with DPC

Always On VPN DPC with Microsoft Intune

Always On VPN DPC Advanced Features

Always On VPN DPC Video Demonstration

Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC)

Always On VPN and Split DNS

Cloudflare Public DNS Resolver Now Available

Split DNS, sometimes called ‘split brain’ DNS, is when an organization uses the same DNS namespace internally and externally. For example, the internal Active Directory domain name is example.com, so internal resources are accessed using a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) like dc1.example.com. Additionally, external properties such as mail and web services use the same namespace so that a public web server might have a name like www.example.com. Internal resources will resolve to internal, private IP addresses, whereas public services resolve to external, public IP addresses.

Complications

Things get complicated when the same resource (FQDN) is available internally and externally, especially for Always On VPN clients. For example, accessing app.example.com on the internal network resolves to a private address, but accessing the same resource on the Internet resolves to a public IP address. Often there are different authentication requirements for internal and external resources, which can yield unexpected results.

Name Resolution

Always On VPN administrators might prefer app.example.com to be accessed via the Internet when connected with Always On VPN. However, VPN clients will attempt to connect via the internal network using their default configuration. Solving this challenge requires internal DNS server changes.

NRPT?

It might be tempting for administrators to use the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) to solve name resolution issues for Always On VPN. However, the NRPT has some limitations and may not always produce the desired results. For example, the NRPT only directs DNS queries. It does not define which resource records are returned by DNS. Also, some applications ignore the NRPT, which limits its usefulness. A better solution is to use DNS Policies in Windows Server.

DNS Policies

Microsoft introduced DNS policies with Windows Server 2016. DNS policies are a powerful tool administrators can use to fine-tune name resolution based on many factors. In the case of split DNS, administrators can configure internal DNS to return an IP address for a resource based on the source IP address of the name resolution query. VPN clients receive one IP address for a given DNS query, while all other clients receive a different IP address. DNS policies ensure that remote clients connected to the VPN will receive the proper IP address for the resource requested, as defined by the administrator.

Caveats

DNS policies are powerful and flexible, but there are some potential drawbacks. All enterprise DNS servers used by Always On VPN clients must be running Windows Server 2016 or later. Also, administrators must use PowerShell to configure DNS policies exclusively. There is no GUI interface to configure DNS policies. DNS policies do not appear in the DNS management interface, which could confuse an administrator unaware that DNS policies are in place. In addition, DNS client subnets and query resolution policies do not replicate across DNS servers. Administrators must manually configure these on each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients. However, zone scopes and resource records in those scopes do replicate automatically.

Scenario

For demonstration purposes, let’s assume that an Always On VPN client needs to access foo.example.com. It resolves to a private IP address on the internal network and a public IP address on the Internet. By default, foo.example.com will resolve to the internal private IP address of the server when connected with Always On VPN. However, the desire is to have foo.example.com resolve to the public IP address when connected with Always On VPN. To accomplish this, we’ll create a DNS policy to ensure that connected Always On VPN clients can resolve foo.example.com to the public IP address when resolving this name over the VPN tunnel.

DNS Policy Configuration

Open an elevated PowerShell command on a DNS server and perform the following steps to create a DNS policy for VPN clients.

Client Subnet

Run the Add-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command to create a client subnet in DNS that includes all IP networks assigned to VPN clients. Summarize IP prefixes if there are multiple VPN servers in the organization.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet ‘172.16.100.0/22’ -IPv6Subnet ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1000::/60’

If summarizing IP prefixes for multiple servers isn’t possible, multiple subnets can be added to a DNS client subnet using the following command.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet @(‘172.16.100.0/24’, ‘172.16.101.0/24’, ‘172.16.102.0/24’, ‘172.16.103.0/24’) -IPv6Subnet @(‘2001:db8:fcd2:1001::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1002::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1003::/64’)

To make changes to an existing DNS client subnet, use the Set-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command.

Note: Client Subnets do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Zone Scope

Create a Zone Scope that includes the DNS records to be returned to VPN clients. The default zone scope is the DNS zone itself. Configure an additional zone scope for the DNS zone by using the Add-DnsServerZoneScope PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerZoneScope -ZoneName example.com -Name VPN

Resource Records

Next, add DNS records to the new zone scope using the Add-DnsServerResourceRecord PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -A -Name foo -IPv4Address 203.0.113.12 -ZoneScope VPN

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -AAAA -Name foo -IPv6Address 2001:db8:21::12 -ZoneScope VPN

DNS Policy

Finally, create a DNS query resolution policy that ties everything together. Run the Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy command to create the DNS query resolution policy. Once configured, when the DNS server receives a DNS query, the policy will recognize that the query originates from a VPN client subnet and will return the resource record from the VPN zone scope with the public IP address defined previously.

Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy -Name VPN -Action ALLOW -ClientSubnet ‘EQ,VPN’ -FQDN ‘EQ,foo.example.com’ -ZoneScope ‘VPN,1’ -ZoneName example.com

Note: DNS query resolution policies do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Results

Once complete, the hostname ‘foo’ in our example above resolves to different IP addresses based on the client’s IP address.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from internal client.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from VPN client.

Summary

There are many scenarios where Windows Server DNS policies can be used to fine-tune name resolution for Always On VPN clients. Hopefully, this example gives you an idea of how DNS policies work, and you can use them to solve your unique name resolution challenges with Always On VPN.

Additional Information

Windows Server DNS Policies Overview

Always On VPN Short Name Access Failure

Always On VPN Client DNS Server Configuration

Always On VPN Short Name Access Failure

Using Microsoft Endpoint Manager (Intune), administrators can provision Always On VPN to devices that are Azure AD joined only. Users accessing on-premises resources from these devices can still use seamless single sign-on, making this deployment option popular for organizations moving to the cloud.

Short Names

After deploying Always On VPN to Windows 10 devices that are Azure AD joined only and configured to use client certificate authentication, administrators may find that users cannot access on-premises resources by their short name, such as \\app1. The connection fails and returns the following error message.

“Windows can’t find <servername/sharename>. Check the spelling and try again.”

FQDN

Interestingly, on-premises resources are accessible using their fully qualified domain name (FQDN), such as \\app1.corp.example.net.

Troubleshooting

Testing name resolution using the short name works as expected, and the resource is reachable at the network layer, as shown here.

Workaround

This issue is related to how Windows performs authentication when connected via VPN. To resolve this issue, edit the rasphone.pbk file and change the value of UseRasCredentials to 0. Rasphone.pbk can be found in the $env:AppData\Microsoft\Network\Connections\Pbk folder.

After updating this setting, restart the VPN connection for the change to take effect.

Proactive Remediations

While helpful for testing, editing rasphone.pbk manually obviously does not scale well. To address this, consider using Intune Proactive Remediations. Intune Proactive Remediations allows administrators to deploy detection and remediation PowerShell scripts to monitor specific settings and update them if or when they change. Proactive Remediations will ensure the setting is applied consistently across all managed endpoints.

GitHub Repository

I have created a new GitHub repository dedicated to PowerShell scripts for Endpoint Manager Proactive Remediations for Always On VPN. There you will find detection and remediation scripts for the UseRasCredentials settings change described in this article.

PowerShell

Administrators can also implement this setting by running the following PowerShell command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa’ -Name DisableDomainCreds -Value 1

Group Policy

Another option for implementing this setting is by enabling the following Active Directory Group Policy setting.

Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords and credentials for network authentication

Additional Information

Always On VPN Endpoint Manager Proactive Remediation Scripts on GitHub

Endpoint Manager Proactive Remediations Tutorial

Always On VPN Proxy Server Configuration

Always On VPN Proxy Server Configuration

Web proxy servers are not as common today as they once were, but a few organizations still leverage them to provide secure Internet access for their employees. Commonly they are used to inspect and control Internet traffic and to enforce acceptable use policies. Some organizations may wish to extend this protection to Always On VPN clients in the field by enabling force tunneling. Administrators can define a web proxy server for Always On VPN connections globally for web traffic or individual websites or domains.

VPN Proxy

A VPN web proxy server can be defined when the Always On VPN user tunnel connection uses force tunneling. Although you can still configure a VPN web proxy server with split tunneling enabled, it will not work. It is only functional when force tunneling is in use.

Administrators can configure a VPN web proxy server using the Microsoft Endpoint Manager UI or custom XML deployed with Endpoint Manager or PowerShell. Administrators can define a VPN web proxy server explicitly, or a proxy automatic configuration (PAC) file can be specified.

Note: VPN proxy server settings only work when force tunneling is enabled. Force tunneling is an unsupported configuration for the device tunnel, making the global proxy server setting for the device tunnel unsupported.

Proxy Autoconfiguration

Perform the following steps to configure a VPN web proxy server with a PAC file in Endpoint Manager.

  1. Expand the Proxy section in the Configuration settings of the Always On VPN configuration profile.
  2. Enter the URL for the PAC file in the Automatic configuration script field. Be sure to include the port number in the URL when using a non-standard port.
  3. Leave the Address and Port number fields blank.
  4. Choose Enable or Disable from the Bypass proxy for local addresses drop-down list.

To configure a VPN web proxy server with a PAC file using custom XML, include the following code between the <VPNProfile> and </VPNProfile> tags in the Always On VPN XML configuration file.

Explicit Proxy

Perform the following steps to configure an explicit VPN web proxy server in Endpoint Manager.

  1. Enter the IP address, hostname, or fully qualified domain name (recommended) in the Address field.
  2. Enter the port number in the Port number field.
  3. Choose Enable or Disable from the Bypass proxy for local addresses drop-down list.

To configure an explicit VPN web proxy server using custom XML, include the following code between the <VPNProfile> and </VPNProfile> tags in the Always On VPN XML configuration file.

Namespace Proxy

Administrators can also define VPN web proxy servers on a per-namespace or per-hostname basis. Namespace VPN proxy servers can be helpful for scenarios where routing public websites over the Always On VPN connection is required. Most commonly, this is necessary because the public website restricts access to the IP address of the on-premises Internet gateway.

A namespace VPN proxy server is implemented using a Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) rule. At the time of this writing, a bug in Microsoft Endpoint Manager prevents administrators from deploying this option using the UI.

As you can see here, administrators can specify a proxy server as part of an NRPT rule in the Endpoint Manager UI. Notice this section of the UI validates the proxy FQDN correctly.

Always On VPN Proxy Server Configuration

However, when you try to save the configuration profile, Endpoint Manager returns the following error.

“Unable to save due to invalid data. Update your data then try again: ProxyServerUri must be a valid URL or be empty.”

Interestingly, when entering a URL such as http://proxy.lab.richardhicks.net:8080/ in the Proxy field, the Endpoint Manager UI accepts it and successfully validates. But according to the VPNv2 Configuration Service Provider (CSP) reference, the value must be entered as an IP address. A hostname or FQDN also works based on my testing. Entering a URL as shown in the example above will not work at all.

With that, the only way to implement a namespace VPN web proxy server is to use custom XML. To do this, include the following code between the <VPNProfile> and </VPNProfile> tags in the Always On VPN XML configuration file.

Include the leading “.” to specify the entire domain, as shown above. Omit the leading “.” to specify an individual host (for example, app.richardhicks.com). Repeat this section for each additional host or domain, as required.

Caveat

Unfortunately, the Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser is the only browser that functions with the namespace VPN web proxy server. All modern web browsers, including Microsoft Edge, ignore the namespace proxy setting entirely, which seriously limits this feature’s usefulness in most organizations today.

Workaround

If routing a public website over the Always On VPN tunnel is required, adding its IP address(es) to the Always On VPN connection’s routing table is needed. However, doing this presents some unique challenges, as public websites frequently have many IP addresses, which are often dynamically changing. Also, it is common for public websites to pull content from many different domains or use Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), making the problem of identifying which IP addresses to add to the Always On VPN connection’s routing table even more challenging. Further, administrators must update the client configuration each a public website’s IP address changes, adding significant management overhead.

Summary

Routing client Internet traffic through an on-premises web proxy server for Always On VPN clients works well when force tunneling is enabled. Administrators can explicitly define a web proxy server or use a proxy automatic configuration (PAC) file. All web browsers work without issue in this scenario. Using a namespace proxy is only effective when browsing with Microsoft Internet Explorer. All modern web browsers, including Microsoft Edge, ignore namespace proxy settings.

Additional Information

Windows 10 Always On VPN and the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT)

Windows 10 VPNv2 Configuration Service Provider (CSP) Reference

Windows 10 Always On VPN Client DNS Server Configuration

Always On VPN Trusted Network Detection

When deploying Always On VPN, administrators can configure Trusted Network Detection (TND) which enables clients to detect when they are on the internal network. With this option set, the client will only automatically establish a VPN connection when it is outside the trusted network. Trusted network detection can be configured on both device tunnel and user tunnel connections.

TND Operation

When trusted network detection is configured, the VPN client will evaluate the DNS suffix assigned to all physical (non-virtual or tunnel) adapters that are active. If any of them match the administrator-defined trusted network setting, the client is determined to be on the internal network and the VPN connection will not connect. If the DNS suffix is not present on any of these adapters, the client is determined to be outside the internal network and the VPN connection will establish automatically.

TND Configuration

Trusted network detection is defined in the Intune UI or in ProfileXML as a string that matches the DNS suffix assigned to clients on the internal network. In this example, the DNS suffix on the internal network is lab.richardhicks.net.

Internal network DNS suffix lab.richardhicks.net used for Trusted Network Detection

Note: Your organization might have more than one DNS suffix. Ensure that the trusted network detection configuration includes all DNS suffixes in use in the environment to ensure reliable operation.

Intune

Follow the steps below to configure trusted network detection in Microsoft Intune.

  1. Open the Microsoft Intune admin center (https://intune.microsoft.com/).
  2. Navigate to Devices > Configuration Profiles > [Profile Name] > Properties > Settings.
  3. Click on Trusted Network Detection.
  4. Enter the DNS suffix(es) used on the internal network.

Intune VPN profile Trusted Network Detection setting with the internal DNS suffix

ProfileXML

To define Trusted Network Detection in ProfileXML, add the TrustedNetworkDetection element as follows.

TrustedNetworkDetection element in Always On VPN ProfileXML

Caveats

In some instances, an Always On VPN client connection may persist, even if the client is connected to the internal network. A common scenario is when a client device connects to a Wi-Fi network that is not connected to the corporate network (for example guest Wi-Fi), then connects to the internal network with Ethernet via a docking station. If the Wi-Fi connection is still available, the Always On VPN connection will persist, even though the machine is connected to the internal network. This is expected and by design.

Workaround

To address this specific scenario, administrators can implement changes via group policy to the way Windows handles multiple connections to the same network. For example, beginning with Windows 10 1709 (and in all versions of Windows 11), group policy can be configured to ensure that Windows clients prefer wired Ethernet network connections over Wi-Fi, and to ensure that Wi-Fi connections disconnect when an Ethernet connection is detected.

GPO Configuration

Open the Group Policy management console (gpmc.msc) and perform the following steps to create the required group policy objects.

  1. Create a new Group Policy Object (GPO).
  2. Right-click the new GPO and choose Edit.
  3. Expand Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > Windows Connection Manager.
  4. Double-click the policy Minimize the number of simultaneous connections to the Internet or a Windows Domain.
  5. Select Enabled.
  6. From the Minimize Policy Options drop-down list choose 1 = Minimize simultaneous connections. Optionally you can choose to disable Wi-Fi whenever connected to Ethernet by choosing 3 = Prevent Wi-Fi when on Ethernet.
  7. Click Ok.Group Policy setting to minimize the number of simultaneous connections to the Internet or a Windows domain
  8. Double-click the policy Enable Windows to soft-disconnect a computer from a network.
  9. Select Disabled.
  10. Click Ok.Group Policy setting Enable Windows to soft-disconnect a computer from a network set to Disabled

Additional Information

Understanding and Configuring Windows Connection Manager