90 DAYS LEFT: Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027 – Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

Heads up, fellow Windows Server administrators! There are now just THREE MONTHS remaining before Windows Server 2016 reaches end of support, so now is the time to finalize any migrations for workloads hosted on this platform. Mainstream support ended on January 11, 2022, and Windows Server 2016 has since remained in extended support. However, extended support ends on January 12, 2027. After that date, Microsoft will no longer provide security updates or technical support, increasing the risk of running production workloads due to exposure to newly discovered vulnerabilities and exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is February 3-5, 2027. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t risk running unsupported workloads in 2027! Complete your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

REMINDER: Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027 – Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

With just over six months remaining before Windows Server 2016 reaches end of support, now is the time to begin planning migrations for workloads hosted on this platform. Mainstream support ended on January 11, 2022, and Windows Server 2016 has since remained in extended support. However, extended support ends on January 12, 2027. After that date, Microsoft will no longer provide security updates or technical support, increasing the risk of running production workloads due to exposure to newly discovered vulnerabilities and exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is September 1-3, 2026. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t leave these mission-critical infrastructure services to the last minute! Begin planning your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Windows Server 2016 End of Life January 2027: Plan Your AD CS Migration Now

Happy New Year, everyone! As the calendar rolls over to 2026, it’s time to start planning the migration of workloads hosted on Windows Server 2016. Mainstream support ended for Windows Server 2016 on January 11, 2022, after which it entered extended support. However, extended support for Windows Server 2016 ends on January 12, 2027, at which point it will be end of life and no longer supported. Running production workloads on Windows Server 2016 beyond this date exposes organizations to significant security risk, as it no longer receives security updates, leaving these systems vulnerable to exploits.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Many organizations are still running critical infrastructure on Windows Server 2016. Administrators often delay upgrading Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) due to its complexity. However, a well-planned AD CS migration not only reduces risk but also provides an opportunity to modernize cryptography, certificate templates, and operational practices.

Certificate Authorities

Administrators must carefully migrate Certificate Authorities (CAs) running on Windows Server 2016 to minimize downtime. In environments where ongoing CA maintenance has been limited, migrating the CA database can be especially challenging. If the CA is installed on a domain controller, now is a good time to consider separating these services to ensure reliable operation. Also, it’s a good idea to evaluate the CA’s configuration and security posture during migration to enhance security and improve service resilience.

NDES Servers

Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Services (NDES) servers, commonly deployed to facilitate certificate enrollment via Microsoft Intune, pose a unique challenge during migration. Unfortunately, configuring NDES is exceedingly complex and error-prone. NDES relies on a delicate combination of specialized IIS configuration, AD service accounts, custom certificate templates, and CA permissions, making even minor changes risky without proper planning. Not surprisingly, administrators are often hesitant to touch these systems as they are notoriously difficult to troubleshoot when problems arise.

Pro Tip: We spend an entire day covering NDES configuration in the Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course. The next session is March 10-12, 2026. Register now!

Intune Certificate Connectors

Don’t overlook Windows Server 2016 servers with the Intune Certificate Connector installed. Fortunately, this is one of the more manageable workloads to migrate. All that’s required is to install new connectors on supported servers and delete the old ones.

Summary

With extended support for Windows Server 2016 ending on January 12, 2027, organizations running production workloads—especially critical infrastructure such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Certificate Authorities (CAs), and NDES servers—face significant security risks from unpatched vulnerabilities once the OS reaches end-of-life. Careful migration planning to newer versions such as Windows Server 2022 or 2025 is essential to minimize downtime, improve security posture, and ensure long-term resilience.

Start Planning Now

Don’t leave these mission-critical infrastructure services to the last minute! Begin planning your migration today. If you’d like expert guidance, I have many years of experience migrating these workloads. I have developed specialized tools and techniques to ensure a smooth, secure, and successful transition. Fill out the form below to schedule a free one-hour consultation to assess your Windows Server 2016 AD CS workloads, identify migration risks, and outline next steps.

Additional Information

Windows Server 2016 Lifecycle Policy

PKI Fundamentals with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Online Training Course

Mastering Enterprise PKI Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training Course

Configure DHCP Option 108 on Windows DHCP Server for IPv6-Mostly

IPv6

While enterprise adoption of IPv6 has been slow, it is still moving forward. For example, the U.S. federal government has mandated [M-21-07 – PDF] the transition to IPv6 to modernize its networks and enhance security, scalability, and interoperability. During the migration to IPv6, most systems will be configured with both IPv4 and IPv6, a configuration referred to as dual stack. Ultimately, the goal is the elimination of IPv4 entirely and the use of IPv6 exclusively. However, IPv6-only presents some unique challenges.

Access to IPv4

Although an organization can successfully migrate to IPv6-only networks internally, it does not control networks outside its boundaries. In some cases, a host on an IPv6-only network may need to communicate with an IPv4 resource. Administrators must deploy an IPv6 transition technology to support this scenario.

464XLAT

464XLAT, defined in RFC 6877, is a network architecture that facilitates the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 by enabling IPv4 traffic to operate over an IPv6-only network. It combines two translation mechanisms: a customer-side translator (CLAT) on the user device, which converts IPv4 packets to IPv6, and a provider-side translator (PLAT) at the network edge, which converts the IPv6 packets back to IPv4 to communicate with IPv4-only internet services. This dual-translation approach allows devices in an IPv6-only environment to access both IPv6 and IPv4 resources without native IPv4 connectivity, making it an efficient solution for networks transitioning to IPv6 while maintaining compatibility with legacy IPv4 systems. On Windows, Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) provides the CLAT component.

CLAT for Windows

Windows has long included CLAT support for cellular network interfaces. Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) extends this support to Wi-Fi and Ethernet interfaces and is generally available on Windows 11 version 25H2, starting with build 26200.9550. WinCLAT is disabled by default on non-cellular interfaces and must be permitted before it can operate. Windows also honors DHCP option 108 only while WinCLAT is permitted. WinCLAT is not available on Windows Server. For configuration details, see Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration.

IPv6-Mostly

An IPv6-mostly network, as defined in RFC 8925, provides NAT64 alongside native IPv4 and allows IPv6-only, dual-stack, and IPv4-only devices to coexist on the same network segment. Devices that can operate without IPv4 forgo an IPv4 address, while devices that still require IPv4 continue to receive one. This approach reduces IPv4 address consumption and allows organizations to move toward IPv6-only incrementally, with 464XLAT providing IPv4 access for applications that still need it.

DHCP Option 108

DHCPv4 option 108, called IPv6-Only Preferred, allows an IPv6-mostly network to signal to capable clients that they can operate without a native IPv4 address. Only clients that can operate without IPv4, usually because they include a CLAT or because all of their applications work over IPv6, request the option. When the DHCP scope is configured for IPv6-mostly operation, the server includes option 108 in its response, along with a wait time. The client then stops DHCPv4 configuration for that period, or until it reconnects to a network, and relies on IPv6 and NAT64 for connectivity. Disabling the IPv4 stack entirely during that time is optional. Clients that do not request the option obtain an IPv4 address as usual.

Option 108 and Windows Server DHCP

Commercial DHCP appliances like Infoblox and many open source DHCP platforms natively support DHCP option 108. However, no supported version of Windows Server, including the latest release (Windows Server 2025), supports DHCP option 108 natively. To enable DHCP option 108 on Windows DHCP servers, administrators can create a custom predefined option.

Custom Predefined Option

To create a custom predefined option for DHCP option 108 on a Windows DHCP server, open the DHCP management console (dhcpmgmt.msc) and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click IPv4 and choose Set Predefined Options.
  2. Click Add.
  3. Enter IPv6 Only Preferred in the Name field.
  4. Select Long from the Data type drop-down list.
  5. Enter 108 in the Code field.
  6. Click Ok.
DHCP management console creating custom option 108 IPv6 Only Preferred with data type Long

Assigning DHCP Option 108

Once complete, perform the following steps to assign DHCP option 108 to a DHCP scope.

  1. Select an IPv4 DHCP scope.
  2. Right-click Scope Options and choose Configure Options.
  3. Select 108 IPv6 Only Preferred from the Available Options list.
  4. Enter a value in seconds, in hexadecimal format. This value is the period during which a client stops DHCPv4 configuration and operates without native IPv4. RFC 8925 sets a minimum of 300 seconds (clients treat lower values as 300) and a default of 1800 seconds. For example, 86,400 seconds (1 day) is 0x15180.
  5. Click Ok.
DHCP scope options with 108 IPv6 Only Preferred set to 0x15180

PowerShell

Custom predefined options can also be configured using PowerShell.

Custom Predefined Option

To create a custom predefined option for DHCP option 108, open an elevated PowerShell command on a Windows DHCP server and run the following command.

Add-DhcpServerv4OptionDefinition -Name 'IPv6 Only Preferred' -OptionId 108 -Type DWORD -PassThru
PowerShell output of Add-DhcpServerv4OptionDefinition creating DHCP option 108

Assigning DHCP Option 108

To assign the custom predefined DHCP option 108 to a DHCP scope, run the following PowerShell command.

Set-DhcpServerv4OptionValue -ScopeId 172.16.5.0 -OptionId 108 -Value 0x15180 -PassThru
PowerShell output of Set-DhcpServerv4OptionValue assigning option 108 to a DHCP scope

DHCP Offer

Once configured, if the client requests DHCP option 108 in its DHCP Discover, the DHCP server includes it in the DHCP Offer, as shown here. Windows DHCP Server does not send option 108 to clients that do not request it, as required by RFC 8925.

Packet capture of a DHCP Offer containing option 108 IPv6-Only Preferred

Learn More

If you are interested in learning more about IPv6-mostly and DHCP option 108, be sure to listen to the following episodes of the IPv6 Buzz Podcast.

Summary

As organizations continue their transition toward IPv6, DHCP option 108 provides administrators with a simple and effective way to reduce reliance on legacy IPv4 by signaling clients to prefer IPv6-only operation if they can support it. While Windows Server does not natively support this option, creating a custom predefined setting ensures administrators can take advantage of this important feature.

Additional Information

M-21-07 – Completing the Transition to IPv6 for U.S. Federal Government Agencies [PDF]

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration

How Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Discovers the NAT64 Prefix

When Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Is Used on IPv6-Mostly and IPv6-Only Networks

What is 464XLAT? CLAT and PLAT Explained

What is an IPv6-Mostly Network?

464XLAT: Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation (RFC 6877)

IPv6-Only Preferred Option for DHCPv4 (RFC 8925)

IPv6 Buzz Podcast on PacketPushers.Net

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Resources

10 PowerShell Commands Always On VPN Administrators Should Know

Managing a secure and reliable VPN infrastructure is critical for supporting today’s highly mobile workforce. For Always On VPN administrators, PowerShell is an indispensable tool for achieving this goal. Not only can PowerShell be used to automate the installation and configuration of Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) server, but it can also be used to audit configuration and monitor system health and user activity as well. In addition, it is highly recommended that the RRAS role be installed on Server Core for optimum security and performance. Administrators must be familiar with these PowerShell commands and more to support RRAS on Windows Server Core in their environment.

RemoteAccess Module

The RemoteAccess PowerShell module should be installed when the RRAS server is configured. There are 122 commands in this module, but only a subset of those pertain to the VPN server role. Here are ten popular commands for monitoring and managing an Always On VPN RRAS server.

Configuration Review

The following PowerShell commands are useful for reviewing the current RRAS server configuration.

Get-RemoteAccess – Displays the current configuration of the VPN server. Details include installation status, TLS certificate configuration, VPN client IP address assignment method, IPv4 and IPv6 addressing information (if using the static address assignment method), authentication type, and configured RADIUS servers.

Get-VpnAuthProtocol – Displays authentication configuration details such as accepted authentication types for both user and device connections, root certification authority (CA) certificate restrictions (if enabled), and certificate advertisement and EKU restrictions if enabled.

Get-VpnServerConfiguration – Displays additional VPN server configuration information, such as the IPsec configuration for IKEv2, the number of VPN ports configured, and more.

System Health

Get-RemoteAccessHealth – Displays the current health status of various VPN server services. The command’s default output is a little noisy. I recommend filtering it as follows:

Get-RemoteAccessHealth | Where-Object HealthState -NotMatch Disabled | Format-Table -AutoSize

User Activity

The following PowerShell commands can be used to view current and historical user activity details.

Get-RemoteAccessConnectionStatistics – Displays all active VPN connections on the server.

Get-RemoteAccessConnectionStatisticsSummary – Displays cumulative information about VPN connections on the server since the last service restart or reboot, such as the total number of connections, the number of unique users, the maximum number of concurrent connections, and the amount of data transferred.

Get-RemoteAccessUserActivity – Displays all active VPN connections for a specific user or device.

Management

The following PowerShell commands are helpful for reviewing authentication and logging settings.

Get-RemoteAccessRadius – Allows the administrator to view the currently configured RADIUS servers on the VPN server.

Get-RemoteAccessAccounting – Allows the administrator to view the current accounting repository (RADIUS or inbox) on the VPN server.

Clear-RemoteAccessInboxAccountingStore – Allows the administrator to remove log data from the Inbox Accounting database. Removing log data from the database can be helpful when transitioning a test server to production or to free up disk space by reducing the size of the logging database.

Additional Modules

In addition to the PowerShell commands above, Always On VPN administrators can leverage my custom PowerShell modules for advanced server and client configuration. These modules are published in the PowerShell Gallery.

AovpnTools – PowerShell module to configure and optimize Windows RRAS servers to support Always On VPN.

Install-Module -Name AovpnTools

InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement – PowerShell module to configure and manage the Inbox Accounting database for logging system information and user activity on the VPN server.

Install-Module -Name InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement

Additional Information

Always On VPN and RRAS on Windows Server Core

Inbox Accounting Database Management

AovpnTools PowerShell Module on GitHub

Inbox Accounting Database Module on GitHub

Always On VPN October 2023 Security Updates

Once again, it’s time to patch! After several quiet months, there are a few crucial updates Always On VPN administrators will want to get deployed soon. Thankfully, the impact of the security updates related to Always On VPN is low this time, as there is only one Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, and it’s for a legacy protocol that should be in limited use today.

IKEv2

CVE-2023-36726 addresses a security vulnerability in Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) that can lead to privilege escalation. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can elevate privileges to that of the local SYSTEM.

L2TP

This month’s update discloses several Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) vulnerabilities. The following CVEs all address a vulnerability where an attacker can send a specially crafted protocol message to a Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) server, which could lead to remote code execution on the server.

Mitigation

The impact of the L2TP security vulnerabilities should be minimal in most organizations. L2TP is a legacy VPN protocol not commonly used for Always On VPN. However, misconfiguration can leave vulnerable RRAS servers exposed. Administrators must ensure that inbound UDP port 1723 is not open from the Internet. In addition, L2TP should be disabled on the RRAS server if not in use. See the article on the May 2023 security updates for details.

Additional Information

October 2023 Security Updates

Always On VPN July 2023 Security Updates

Hello, Always On VPN administrators! It’s the second Tuesday of the month, so you know what that means. Yes, it’s Patch Tuesday! This month’s security updates include several fixes for vulnerabilities potentially affecting Microsoft Always On VPN deployments.

RRAS Vulnerabilities

Microsoft’s July 2023 security updates include fixes affecting Windows Servers with the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) role installed. Security vulnerabilities CVE-2023-35365, CVE-2023-35366, and CVE-2023-35367 are all Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities with a Critical security rating and a CVSS score of 9.8. These security vulnerabilities in Windows Server RRAS are particularly troublesome due to the nature of the workload. RRAS servers are, by design, exposed to the public Internet. Although there are no known exploits in the wild at this time, this attack requires no special privileges other than network access. Administrators running Windows Server with RRAS installed are encouraged to update as soon as possible.

AD CS Vulnerabilities

Most Always On VPN implementations leverage enterprise PKI certificates for user and device authentication. Administrators commonly deploy Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) to support this. This month there are two security vulnerabilities in AD CS marked as Important. CVE-2023-35350 and CVE-2023-35351 address RCE vulnerabilities that exploit a race condition on the server. However, AD CS servers are not exposed to untrusted networks. In addition, attackers would require administrative rights on the server to exploit these vulnerabilities.

Network Load Balancing

Finally, of importance to Always On VPN administrators using Windows Network Load Balancing (NLB) to provide load balancing for their RRAS servers, there is a vulnerability in the NLB service. CVE-2023-33163 addresses an RCE vulnerability in NLB identified as Important.

Additional Information

Microsoft July 2023 Security Updates

Windows Server 2022 KB5028171 (Build 20348.1850)

Windows Server 2019 KB5028168 (Build 17763.4645)

Windows Server 2016 KB 5028169 (Build 14393.6085)

Windows 11 22H2 KB8028185 (Build 22621.1992)

Windows 11 21H2 KB5028182 (Build 22000.2176)

NetMotion Mobility Is Now Absolute Secure Access

NetMotion Mobility is a premium enterprise mobility and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution that delivers unrivaled capabilities and performance. It includes many features unavailable in any other secure remote access solution. It is software-based, running on Windows Server, and does not require dedicated or proprietary hardware. It also features broad client support, including Windows (Professional and Enterprise), macOS, iOS (iPhone and iPad), and Android phones and tablets.

Absolute Software

Last year NetMotion Software was acquired by Absolute Software, makers of persistent, self-healing security software. Beginning with release 12.70, NetMotion Mobility has been rebranded as Absolute Secure Access. In addition, NetMotion Mobile IQ, a comprehensive visibility and reporting tool that integrates with Mobility is now Absolute Insights for Network.

What’s New in 12.70

Absolute Secure Access v12.70 has been completely rebranded, and the management user interface (UI) has a new look and feel. The UI and endpoint agent also includes new icons. In addition, Absolute Secure Access 12.70 includes the following new features.

  • Formal support for Windows Server 2022
  • Enhanced data warehouse security controls
  • Faster Network Access Control (NAC) checks
  • Improved user and device authentication certificate selection – no more user prompts!
  • Support for iOS 16

Migration Path

Migrating from NetMotion Mobility 12.5x to Absolute Secure Access 12.70 is straightforward. However. Migrating from NetMotion Mobility releases before 12.5x will prove more challenging. Specifically, the 12.5x release introduced some significant architectural changes which prevent in-place upgrades to 12.70. With NetMotion Mobility releases before 12.5x, it is recommended to implement new infrastructure running 12.70 and migrate users to the new infrastructure.

Additional Information

Absolute Enterprise VPN and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)

VIDEO: Introduction to Absolute Secure Access Enterprise VPN and ZTNA

What’s New in Absolute Secure Access 12.70

Absolute Secure Access Purpose-Built Enterprise VPN

Absolute Secure Access Purpose-Built Enterprise VPN Advanced Features In Depth

Always On VPN and Split DNS

Cloudflare Public DNS Resolver Now Available

Split DNS, sometimes called ‘split brain’ DNS, is when an organization uses the same DNS namespace internally and externally. For example, the internal Active Directory domain name is example.com, so internal resources are accessed using a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) like dc1.example.com. Additionally, external properties such as mail and web services use the same namespace so that a public web server might have a name like www.example.com. Internal resources will resolve to internal, private IP addresses, whereas public services resolve to external, public IP addresses.

Complications

Things get complicated when the same resource (FQDN) is available internally and externally, especially for Always On VPN clients. For example, accessing app.example.com on the internal network resolves to a private address, but accessing the same resource on the Internet resolves to a public IP address. Often there are different authentication requirements for internal and external resources, which can yield unexpected results.

Name Resolution

Always On VPN administrators might prefer app.example.com to be accessed via the Internet when connected with Always On VPN. However, VPN clients will attempt to connect via the internal network using their default configuration. Solving this challenge requires internal DNS server changes.

NRPT?

It might be tempting for administrators to use the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) to solve name resolution issues for Always On VPN. However, the NRPT has some limitations and may not always produce the desired results. For example, the NRPT only directs DNS queries. It does not define which resource records are returned by DNS. Also, some applications ignore the NRPT, which limits its usefulness. A better solution is to use DNS Policies in Windows Server.

DNS Policies

Microsoft introduced DNS policies with Windows Server 2016. DNS policies are a powerful tool administrators can use to fine-tune name resolution based on many factors. In the case of split DNS, administrators can configure internal DNS to return an IP address for a resource based on the source IP address of the name resolution query. VPN clients receive one IP address for a given DNS query, while all other clients receive a different IP address. DNS policies ensure that remote clients connected to the VPN will receive the proper IP address for the resource requested, as defined by the administrator.

Caveats

DNS policies are powerful and flexible, but there are some potential drawbacks. All enterprise DNS servers used by Always On VPN clients must be running Windows Server 2016 or later. Also, administrators must use PowerShell to configure DNS policies exclusively. There is no GUI interface to configure DNS policies. DNS policies do not appear in the DNS management interface, which could confuse an administrator unaware that DNS policies are in place. In addition, DNS client subnets and query resolution policies do not replicate across DNS servers. Administrators must manually configure these on each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients. However, zone scopes and resource records in those scopes do replicate automatically.

Scenario

For demonstration purposes, let’s assume that an Always On VPN client needs to access foo.example.com. It resolves to a private IP address on the internal network and a public IP address on the Internet. By default, foo.example.com will resolve to the internal private IP address of the server when connected with Always On VPN. However, the desire is to have foo.example.com resolve to the public IP address when connected with Always On VPN. To accomplish this, we’ll create a DNS policy to ensure that connected Always On VPN clients can resolve foo.example.com to the public IP address when resolving this name over the VPN tunnel.

DNS Policy Configuration

Open an elevated PowerShell command on a DNS server and perform the following steps to create a DNS policy for VPN clients.

Client Subnet

Run the Add-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command to create a client subnet in DNS that includes all IP networks assigned to VPN clients. Summarize IP prefixes if there are multiple VPN servers in the organization.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet ‘172.16.100.0/22’ -IPv6Subnet ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1000::/60’

If summarizing IP prefixes for multiple servers isn’t possible, multiple subnets can be added to a DNS client subnet using the following command.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet @(‘172.16.100.0/24’, ‘172.16.101.0/24’, ‘172.16.102.0/24’, ‘172.16.103.0/24’) -IPv6Subnet @(‘2001:db8:fcd2:1001::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1002::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1003::/64’)

To make changes to an existing DNS client subnet, use the Set-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command.

Note: Client Subnets do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Zone Scope

Create a Zone Scope that includes the DNS records to be returned to VPN clients. The default zone scope is the DNS zone itself. Configure an additional zone scope for the DNS zone by using the Add-DnsServerZoneScope PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerZoneScope -ZoneName example.com -Name VPN

Resource Records

Next, add DNS records to the new zone scope using the Add-DnsServerResourceRecord PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -A -Name foo -IPv4Address 203.0.113.12 -ZoneScope VPN

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -AAAA -Name foo -IPv6Address 2001:db8:21::12 -ZoneScope VPN

DNS Policy

Finally, create a DNS query resolution policy that ties everything together. Run the Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy command to create the DNS query resolution policy. Once configured, when the DNS server receives a DNS query, the policy will recognize that the query originates from a VPN client subnet and will return the resource record from the VPN zone scope with the public IP address defined previously.

Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy -Name VPN -Action ALLOW -ClientSubnet ‘EQ,VPN’ -FQDN ‘EQ,foo.example.com’ -ZoneScope ‘VPN,1’ -ZoneName example.com

Note: DNS query resolution policies do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Results

Once complete, the hostname ‘foo’ in our example above resolves to different IP addresses based on the client’s IP address.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from internal client.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from VPN client.

Summary

There are many scenarios where Windows Server DNS policies can be used to fine-tune name resolution for Always On VPN clients. Hopefully, this example gives you an idea of how DNS policies work, and you can use them to solve your unique name resolution challenges with Always On VPN.

Additional Information

Windows Server DNS Policies Overview

Always On VPN Short Name Access Failure

Always On VPN Client DNS Server Configuration

Always On VPN RADIUS Configuration Missing

Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) is a popular choice for administrators deploying Always On VPN. It is easy to configure and scales out easily. Most commonly, RRAS servers are configured to use RADIUS authentication to provide user authentication for Always On VPN client connections. The RADIUS server can be Microsoft Network Policy and Access Server (NPAS, or simply NPS) or a third-party RADIUS solution. It is best to have the RADIUS service running on a server separate from the RRAS server.

RADIUS Authentication

Administrators can configure RADIUS authentication by opening the Routing and Remote Access management console (rrasmgmt.msc), right-clicking the VPN server, then choosing Properties > Security. Click the Configure button to configure authentication and accounting providers accordingly.

RADIUS Options Missing

In some cases, the administrator will notice that the option to configure RADIUS authentication and accounting servers is missing. In its place is the following error message.

“Because Network Policy Server (NPS) is installed, you must use it to configure authentication and accounting providers. To configure authentication and accounting providers, create or modify connection request policies.”

Configuration Options

It might be tempting for administrators to follow this guidance when presented with this message by opening the Network Policy management console (nps.msc) to configure it. However, that is not recommended or necessary. This message results from a common configuration error that should be corrected.

NPS Role Installed

The error message above occurs when an administrator mistakenly installs the NPAS role on the RRAS server itself. Again, this is not recommended or required. To resolve this issue, uninstall the NPS role by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Uninstall-WindowsFeature NPAS

Configuration Corrupted

After removing the NPAS role from the RRAS server, administrators may encounter the following error message when configuring RADIUS authentication and accounting servers in RRAS.

“The connection request policy used for authentication and accounting configuration is corrupted. Either install Network Policy Server (NPS) and restore the connection request policy manually, or click Repair Settings to restore the connection request policy by using Windows Accounting and Windows Authentication.”

Repair Settings

To resolve this issue, click the Repair Settings button. Once complete, RADIUS authentication and accounting configuration should work as expected.

Additional Information

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