Considerations for Always On VPN with Azure VPN Gateway and Virtual WAN

Always On VPN Device Tunnel and Custom Cryptography Native Support Now in Intune

Organizations migrating on-premises applications, data, and infrastructure to the cloud may also consider terminating Always On VPN connections there. Using one of the native Azure VPN services might be compelling at first glance. After all, having an Azure-managed VPN gateway service sounds intuitive. However, some severe limitations exist for using Azure VPN services for Always On VPN deployments.

Azure VPN Gateway

The following are limitations for Always On VPN with Azure VPN gateway.

Authentication Methods

Azure VPN gateway supports both EAP and machine certificate authentication. However, it can only support one authentication method at a time. With only EAP or certificate authentication, administrators must choose between a device or user tunnel. A single Azure VPN gateway cannot support both at the same time. For native Entra ID joined devices, this is not a problem. However, for native on-premises Active Directory or hybrid Entra ID joined devices, this is a problem, as the device tunnel is essential in these scenarios.

Note: Technically speaking, administrators could deploy another Azure VPN gateway to work around this limitation. However, Azure limits VPN gateway deployments to one per virtual network. This requires administrators to deploy a second VPN gateway in a separate virtual network, which then requires virtual network peering to be enabled, complicating the configuration greatly.

SSTP

Although the Azure VPN gateway supports SSTP, it is, unfortunately, a second-class citizen. Today, all SKUs of the Azure VPN gateway are limited to just 128 SSTP connections (256 in active/active mode). There is currently no way to increase this. If more than 256 connections are required, you must use IKEv2.

RADIUS

In addition, there is currently no option to change the default timeout value (30 seconds) for RADIUS authentication requests. This short timeout value presents a challenge when using MFA with the NPS extension or with Azure Conditional Access, as users may be unable to respond to the push notification before the timeout expires, resulting in failed authentication attempts.

In addition, Azure does not support routing traffic to on-premises RADIUS servers over ExpressRoute connections. In this scenario, administrators must route RADIUS traffic to on-premises servers over a site-to-site connection.

Geographic Redundancy

Geographic redundancy using Azure Traffic Manager (or another global server load balancer) with two or more gateways is not supported when using the Azure VPN gateway. Azure manages the certificate used on the gateway, which includes a certificate with the subject name of the individual gateway. There is no option to supply a custom certificate with a global hostname in the subject, which is required to support geographic redundancy. With that, administrators are limited to the redundancy provided natively by the Azure VPN gateway.

IPv6

Azure does not support Azure VPN gateway in a virtual network that includes IPv6 addressing.

Azure Virtual WAN

Azure Virtual WAN includes many of the same limitations as the Azure VPN gateway, in addition to the following.

SSTP

Unlike the Azure VPN gateway, there is no support for SSTP in Azure Virtual WAN.

IPv6

IPv6 is not currently supported at all in Azure Virtual WAN.

Summary

Intuitively, it seems that leveraging native Azure VPN gateway services would be ideal. However, due to the limitations outlined in this article, administrators must decide carefully if any of these prevent adoption in their environment. Although not formally supported, many organizations deploy Windows Server Routing and Remote Access (RRAS) servers in Azure to address these limitations.

Additional Information

Always On VPN Options for Azure Deployments

Always On VPN with Azure Gateway

Always On VPN Device Tunnel with Azure VPN Gateway

Always On VPN and RRAS in Azure

What is Azure VPN Gateway?

What is Azure Virtual WAN?

Always On VPN and VpnStrategy

NetMotion Mobility for DirectAccess Administrators – Split vs. Force Tunneling

Always On VPN supports a variety of VPN protocols for the user tunnel. Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) and Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) are the most common. I wrote about the advantages and disadvantages of each in this post. To summarize, IKEv2 provides the highest security options but suffers from operational limitations. SSTP offers excellent security and is generally more reliable.

VpnStrategy

Always On VPN administrators must choose between IKEv2 and SSTP when configuring the Always On VPN user tunnel. Some administrators may prefer to use IKEv2 when available but then fall back to SSTP if it is not. To accomplish this requires editing the rasphone.pbk file and setting the value of VpnStrategy to 8, as described here.

Challenges

Unfortunately, setting the VpnStrategy value to 8 poses some challenges. Updating rasphone.pbk requires editing a text file on each endpoint post-deployment. Updating rasphone.pbk can be automated using the Update-Rasphone.ps1 script or Microsoft Intune proactive remediation.

Limitations

By default, Windows will overwrite the VpnStrategy setting in rasphone.pbk when fallback occurs. For example, setting VpnStrategy to prefer IKEv2 over SSTP will be reset to use SSTP first if a connection with IKEv2 fails. There’s a registry setting available that’s supposed to prevent this, but it doesn’t always work as expected.

Windows 11

There’s good news for administrators deploying Always On VPN on Windows 11. Microsoft recently introduced support for additional NativeProtocol types in XML. Specifically, VPN protocol preference can now be defined using the ProtocolList native protocol type. When using the ProtocolList native protocol type, each supported VPN protocol is listed in order of preference using the syntax shown below.

In addition, the RetryTimeInHours value defines the time Windows will try the last successful connection protocol. Setting this value to 0 overrides this and ensures the preferred protocol (the first protocol in the list) will always be attempted first.

SSTP Only

Previously the VPNv2CSP only supported IKEv2 or Automatic as values for the native protocol type. Windows 11 now supports SSTP as a native protocol type. Administrators configuring Always On VPN user tunnel connections using SSTP exclusively can now use this option.

Caveats

While the settings above are supported in both Windows 11 21H2 and 22H2, there are some known issues when enabling these settings. Specifically, when administrators define the ProtocolList value for the native protocol type, IKEv2 is always shown as the active protocol, even when an SSTP connection is established.

Also, if ProtocolList is used, the VPN connection cannot be managed using PowerShell. The VPN profile will not be displayed when running Get-VpnConnection at the time of this writing. Hopefully Microsoft will fix this soon.

Additional Information

Always On VPN CSP Updates

Always On VPN IKEv2 and SSTP Fallback

Always On VPN and Intune Proactive Remediation

Always On VPN Protocol Recommendations for Windows Server RRAS

Always On VPN IKEv2 Features and Limitations

Always On VPN May 2023 Security Updates

Hey, Always On VPN administrators! It’s the second Tuesday of the month, which means security updates for Windows have been released. This month’s batch includes an update to address a critical vulnerability likely to affect many Always On VPN implementations using Windows Server.

SSTP Vulnerability

CVE-2023-24903 documents a vulnerability on Windows Servers with the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) configured to support Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) for VPN connections. This is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that can be exploited when an attacker sends a specifically crafted malicious packet to the server. Administrators are encouraged to update as soon as possible.

Mitigation

SSTP is commonly used for Always On VPN user tunnels. However, if administrators have configured user tunnels using IKEv2, or are using the device tunnel only, consider blocking inbound TCP 443 at the edge firewall to prevent attacks from the Internet. In addition, if SSTP is not in use, consider disabling support for SSTP by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following commands.

netsh.exe RAS set wanports device = “WAN Miniport (SSTP)” rasinonly = disabled ddinout = disabled ddoutonly = disabled maxports = 0

Restart-Service RemoteAccess -PassThru

Alternatively, SSTP can be disabled in the RRAS management console by following the steps below.

  1. Open the RRAS management console (rrasmgmt.msc).
  2. Expand the server.
  3. Right-click Ports.
  4. Choose Properties.
  5. Highlight WAN Miniport (SSTP).
  6. Click Configure.
  7. Uncheck Remote access connections (inbound only).
  8. Uncheck Demand-dial routing connections (inbound and outbound).
  9. Enter 0 in the Maximum ports field.
  10. Click Ok.

Additional Information

Windows SSTP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2023-24903)

May 2023 Security Updates for Windows Server 2016 (KB5026363)

May 2023 Security Updates for Windows Server 2019 (KB5026362)

May 2023 Security Updates for Windows Server 2022 (KB5026370)

Always On VPN April 2023 Security Updates

Heads up, Always On VPN administrators! This month’s patch Tuesday includes fixes for critical security vulnerabilities affecting Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS). Crucially there are remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) (CVE-2023-28232), the Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) (CVE-2023-28219, CVE-2023-28220), the Point-to-Point over Ethernet (PPPoE) protocol (CVE-2023-28224), and the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol (CVE-2023-28238). The vulnerabilities in PPTP and L2TP are especially urgent as they allow an unauthenticated attacker to exploit them. There is also a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability (CVE-2023-28234) in the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) protocol.

Exposure and Risk

The RCEs in PPTP, L2TP, and PPPoE should present limited risk as these protocols aren’t commonly used for Always On VPN (PPPoE and PPTP aren’t supported for Always On VPN, in fact). However, organizations may be using these protocols for other purposes. In addition, improperly configured edge firewalls could allow these connections even though administrators may not be actively using them. An attacker could also exploit these vulnerabilities with access to the RRAS server from the internal network.

Attack Surface Reduction

Always On VPN administrators are advised to ensure that only protocols and ports for VPN protocols in use are allowed through the edge firewall. Also, administrators should disable any unused protocols and services in RRAS to reduce the attack surface on their RRAS servers. To do this, open an elevated PowerShell command window on the RRAS server and run the following commands to disable support for the PPTP, L2TP, and PPPoE protocols.

netsh.exe ras set wanports device = “WAN Miniport (L2TP)” rasinonly = disabled ddinout = disabled ddoutonly = disabled maxports = 0

netsh.exe ras set wanports device = “WAN Miniport (PPTP)” rasinonly = disabled ddinout = disabled ddoutonly = disabled maxports = 1

netsh.exe ras set wanports device = “WAN Miniport (PPPOE)” ddoutonly = disabled

Restart-Service RemoteAccess -PassThru

Additional Vulnerabilities

This month’s update also includes fixes for other vulnerabilities that may impact Always On VPN deployments. Specifically, there are RCEs in Windows Network Address Translation (NAT) (CVE-2023-28217) and Windows Network Load Balancing (NLB) (CVE-2023-28240), and a DoS vulnerability in Windows Transport Layer Security (TLS) (CVE-2023-28234).

Update Now

Administrators should patch their RRAS servers as soon as possible to avoid potential compromise of the RRAS server in their environments.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Always On VPN SSTP and HSTS

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a feature commonly used by websites to protect against protocol downgrade attacks, where an attacker forces the use of insecure HTTP instead of HTTPS. If successful, the attacker can intercept unencrypted communication between the client and the web server. This is undesirable for obvious reasons. As such, web server administrators implement an HTTP response header named Strict-Transport-Security with some additional settings that instruct the user agent, in this case, a web browser, to only use secure HTTPS when communicating with the web server. Attempts to use HTTP will not work.

VPN and SSTP

As security is always a top concern when building an Always On VPN infrastructure, careful attention must be paid to VPN protocol configuration to ensure optimal security. Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) is a popular VPN protocol for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. SSTP uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encryption, so administrators are encouraged to implement recommended security configurations, such as disabling insecure protocols like TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and optimizing TLS cipher suites as described here.

SSTP with HSTS

It would seem that enabling HSTS on a Windows RRAS VPN server would be ideal for improving SSTP security. However, that’s not the case. HSTS prevents protocol downgrade attacks from HTTPS to HTTP, but SSTP already uses HTTPS exclusively, making the use of HSTS irrelevant. If an attacker attempted a protocol downgrade attack on an SSTP VPN connection, it would fail because the service does not support HTTP between the client and the VPN gateway. Additionally, even if it were possible to configure RRAS to send an HSTS response header, it would be ignored by the client because the user agent is not a web browser.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Always On VPN SSTP and TLS 1.3

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Renewal

Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

SSL and TLS Training for Always On VPN Administrators

Always On VPN Error -2146762495

DirectAccess Troubleshooting and the Windows 10 Network Connectivity Assistant

Always On VPN Administrators may encounter a scenario where Always On VPN connections suddenly stop working for all clients using the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) VPN protocol. IKEv2 VPN connections continue to work, however.

Event Log

Reviewing the event log on a client machine reveals an error event ID 20227 from the RasClient source. The error message states the following.

“The user [username] dialed a connection named [connection name] which has failed. The error code returned on failure is -2146762495.”

Error -2146762495?

Always On VPN administrators will be familiar with error codes such as 809, 691 and 812, 853, 858, and even 13801, 13806, and 13868. However, this error code seems to be formatted much differently. As it turns out, this message is in decimal format. Thankfully it’s pretty easy to convert it to something more meaningful, like hexadecimal. To do this, open the Windows calculator (calc.exe) and switch to programmer mode. Highlight DEC and enter -2146762495. The hexadecimal value will be displayed in the HEX field, as shown here.

Error 0x800B0101

After converting the error message from decimal to hex, use the Microsoft Error Lookup tool (err.exe) to translate the hex value of this error. As shown here, 0x800B0101 translates to CERT_E_EXPIRED.

Expired TLS Certificate

Once again, an expired certificate is to blame! In this case, the TLS certificate installed on the VPN server has expired and is no longer valid.

Resolution

The problem is simple enough to resolve, of course. Obtain a new TLS certificate from your certification authority (CA) of choice and update your VPN server configuration. You can find detailed guidance for updating the RRAS VPN server’s TLS certificate here. You will also find a video demonstration of the RRAS SSL/TLS certificate renewal process here.

Additional Information

Installing or Renewing an SSL/TLS Certificate on Windows Server RRAS for Always On VPN and SSTP

VIDEO: Installing or Renewing an SSL/TLS certificate on Windows Server RRAS for Always On VPN and SSTP

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSL/TLS Certificate Requirements for SSTP

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Renewal

Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) is popular for Always On VPN deployments because it supports the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP). The SSTP VPN protocol is recommended for use with the Always On VPN user tunnel because it is firewall friendly. Installing a TLS certificate on the VPN server is necessary to support SSTP VPN connections. Administrators should use a TLS certificate signed by a public certification authority (CA) for optimal reliability and performance.

Click here to view a video demonstration of the procedures outlined in this article.

Certificate Expiration

Of course, all certificates expire, and the TLS certificate used for SSTP is no exception. When using a public TLS certificate, the certificate lifetime is typically no more than one year, which means Always On VPN administrators will be renewing this certificate regularly.

Certificate Renewal

The process of “renewing” an SSTP TLS certificate is essentially the same as installing a new one, as it is best to create a new public/private key pair when renewing a certificate. The following outlines the steps required to generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), import the certificate, then assign the certificate to the SSTP listener on the VPN server.

Note: The guidance provided here assumes using an ECC certificate, which is best for optimal security and performance. More details here.

Certificate Request

Open the local computer certificate store (certlm.msc) on the VPN server and perform the following steps to generate a new CSR.

  1. Expand Certificates – Local Computer > Personal.
  2. Right-click the Certificates folder and choose All Tasks > Advanced Operations > Create Custom Request.
  3. Click Next.
  4. Highlight Proceed without enrollment policy.
  5. Click Next.
    1. Select (No template) CNG key from the Template drop-down list.
    2. Select PKCS #10 in the Request format section.
    3. Click Next.
  6. Click on the down arrow next to Details.
    Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP
  7. Click on the Properties button.
  8. Select the General tab.
    1. Enter the public hostname for the certificate in the Friendly name field.
  9. Select the Subject tab.
    1. Select Common name from the Type drop-down list in the Subject name section.
    2. Enter the public hostname for the certificate in the Value field.
    3. Click Add.
    4. In the Alternative name section, select DNS from the Type drop-down list.
    5. Enter the public hostname for the certificate in the Value field.
    6. Click Add.
      Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP
  10. Select the Extensions tab.
    1. Expand the Extended Key Usage section.
    2. Select Server Authentication from the Available options section.
    3. Click Add.
      Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP
  11. Select the Private Key tab.
    1. Expand the Cryptographic Service Provider section.
      1. Uncheck the box next to RSA,Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider.
      2. Check the box next to ECDSA_P256,Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider.
    2. Expand the Key options section.
      1. Check the box next to Make private key exportable.
        Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP
  12. Click Ok.
  13. Click Next.
  14. Enter a name for the file in the File Name field.
  15. Select Base 64 in the File format section.
  16. Click Finish.

Import Certificate

Once complete, submit the file created to a public CA for signing. When the CA returns the signed certificate, perform the following steps to import it to the local compute certificate store.

  1. Right-click the Certificates folder and choose All Tasks > Import.
  2. Click Next.
  3. Enter the name of the certificate file returned by the public CA in the File name field.
  4. Click Next.
  5. Select Place all certificates in the following store and ensure that Personal is listed in the Certificate store field.
  6. Click Next.
  7. Click Finish.
  8. Click Ok.

Assign Certificate

After importing the new TLS certificate in the local computer’s certificate store, open the Routing and Remote Access management console (rrasmgmt.msc) and perform the following steps to assign the TLS certificate to the SSTP listener.

  1. Right-click the VPN server and choose Properties.
  2. Select the Security tab.
    1. Select the new TLS certificate from the Certificate drop-down list in the SSL Certificate Binding section. When replacing an existing certificate, you may see a certificate with the same name more than once. Click the View button and ensure the new certificate is selected.
    2. Click Ok.
    3. Click Yes to restart the RemoteAccess service.

Demonstration Video

A recorded video demonstration of this process can be found here. The video recording also includes guidance for making these changes on Windows Server Core servers.

Additional Information

Installing or Renewing an SSL/TLS Certificate on Windows Server for Always On VPN and SSTP.

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSL Certificate Requirements for SSTP

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN ECDSA TLS Certificate Request for SSTP

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

When using Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) to terminate Always On VPN client connections, administrators can leverage the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) VPN protocol for client-based VPN connections. SSTP is a Microsoft proprietary VPN protocol that uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure connections between the client and the VPN gateway. SSTP provides some crucial advantages over IKEv2 in terms of operational reliability. It uses the TCP port 443, the standard HTTPS port, which is universally available and ensures Always On VPN connectivity even behind highly restrictive firewalls.

TLS Certificate

When configuring SSTP, the first thing to consider is the certificate installed on the server. A certificate with an RSA key is most common, but for SSTP, provisioning a certificate with an ECDSA key is recommended for optimal security and performance. See the following two articles regarding SSTP certificate requirements and ECDSA Certificate Signing Request (CSR) creation.

Always On VPN SSL Certificate Requirements for SSTP

Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP

TLS Configuration

Much like IKEv2, the default TLS security settings for SSTP are less than optimal. However, SSTP can provide excellent security with some additional configuration.

TLS Protocols

There are several deprecated TLS protocols enabled by default in Windows Server. These include SSLv3.0, TLS 1.0, and TLS 1.1. They should be disabled to improve security for TLS. To do this, open an elevated PowerShell window on the VPN server and run the following commands.

New-Item -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\SSL 3.0\Server\’ -Force

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\SSL 3.0\Server\’ -Name Enabled -PropertyType DWORD -Value ‘0’

New-Item -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.0\Server\’ -Force

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.0\Server\’ -Name Enabled -PropertyType DWORD -Value ‘0’

New-Item -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.1\Server\’ -Force

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.1\Server\’ -Name Enabled -PropertyType DWORD -Value ‘0’

Cipher Suites

Many weak TLS cipher suites and enabled by default in Windows Server. To further enhance security and performance, they can be optimized using a tool such as IIS Crypto. For example, consider prioritizing cipher suites that use ECDHE and GCM with ECDSA to improve security. Also, remove ciphers that use AES-256 to enhance scalability and performance.

Note: AES-256 does not provide any additional practical security over AES-128. Details here.

PowerShell Script

I have published a PowerShell script on GitHub that performs security hardening and TLS cipher suite optimization to streamline the configuration TLS on Windows Server RRAS servers. You can download the script here.

Validation Testing

After running the script and restarting the server, visit the SSL Labs Server Test site to validate the configuration. You should receive an “A” rating, as shown here.

Note: An “A” rating is not achievable on Windows Server 2012 or Windows Server 2012 R2 when using an RSA TLS certificate. A TLS certificate using ECDSA is required to receive an “A” rating on these platforms.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSL/TLS Certificate Requirements for SSTP

Always On VPN ECDSA SSL Certificate Request for SSTP

Qualys SSL Labs Server Test Site

Always On VPN Protocol Recommendations for Windows Server RRAS

Microsoft SSTP Specification on MSDN

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding ErrorWhen configuring a Windows Server with the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) role to support Windows 10 Always On VPN connections, the administrator may encounter the following error message when installing or updating the TLS certificate used for Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) connections.

“The thumbprint (cert hash) of the certificate used for Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) is different than the certificate bound to the Web listener (HTTP.sys). Configure SSTP to use the default certificate or the certificate bound to SSL. You can configure web server applications to use the same certificate used by SSTP.”

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

IIS Binding

Most commonly this error can occur if an administrator mistakenly binds a TLS certificate directly in IIS. To resolve this problem, open the IIS management console (inetmgr.exe), navigate to the Default Web Site and click Bindings in the Actions section. Highlight the HTTPS binding and click Remove. Once complete, open an elevated command window and run the iisreset.exe command.

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

Netsh

In some instances, the administrator may find no certificate bindings in the IIS management console. However, a certificate binding may still be present. To confirm, open an elevated command window and run the following command.

netsh.exe http show sslcert

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

Remove existing certificate binding by running the following commands.

netsh.exe http delete sslcert ipport=0.0.0.0:443
netsh.exe http delete sslcert ipport=[::]:443

SSTP Configuration

When configuring SSTP in RRAS for Always On VPN, certificate assignment should always be performed using the Routing and Remote Access management console (rrasmgmt.msc). No changes are required to be made in the IIS management console for SSTP.

Additional Information

Windows 10 Always On VPN SSL Certificate Requirements for SSTP

Windows 10 Always On VPN SSTP Load Balancing with Citrix NetScaler ADC Load Balancer

Windows 10 Always On VPN SSTP Load Balancing with Kemp LoadMaster Load Balancer

Windows 10 Always On VPN SSTP Load Balancing with F5 BIG-IP Load Balancer

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 3

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2When implementing Windows 10 Always On VPN, administrators may encounter errors 691 or 812 when establishing a VPN connection. There are several different configuration issues that will result in these errors. For example they may occur when TLS 1.0 has been disabled on the RRAS server when installed on servers prior to Windows Server 2016. It can also happen if a user’s Active Directory account is configured to deny dial-in access and the NPS server is not configured to ignore user account dial-in properties. Another scenario that can result in 691/812 errors is when the Active Directory security groups are configured as conditions on the Network Policy Server (NPS) Network Policy. See below for more details.

SSTP and Error 691

When attempting to establish an Always On VPN connection using the Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP), administrators may encounter the following error message.

“The remote connection was denied because the user name and password combination you provided is not recognized, or the selected authentication protocol is not permitted on the remote access server.”

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2

In addition, an error 691 with event ID 20227 from the RasClient source can be found in the Application event log on the client.

“The user <domain\user> dialed a connection named which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 691.”

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2

IKEv2 and Error 812

When attempting to establish an Always On VPN connection using Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2), administrators may encounter the following error message.

“The connection as prevented because of a policy configured on your RAS/VPN server. Specifically, the authentication method used by the server to verify your username and password may not match the authentication method configured in your connection profile. Please contact the Administrator of the RAS server and notify them of this error.”

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2

In addition, an error 812 with event ID 20227 from the RasClient source can be found in the Application event log on the client.

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2

NPS Event Log

On the NPS server the administrator will find an entry in the application event log with event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source and the Network Policy Server task category indicating the network policy server denied access to the user. Looking closely at this event log message shows Reason Code 48 and the following reason.

“The connection request did not match any configured network policy.”

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2Group Membership

As stated earlier, another scenario in which administrators will encounter errors 691 and/or 812 is when the Network Policy on the NPS server is configured incorrectly. Specifically, and administrator may wish to grant access to more than one group but intend for access to be granted to users who are a member of any of them. Conversely, they may wish to require access in all specified groups to gain access to the VPN. Configuring each of these conditions is subtly different, however.

Open the NPS management console on the NPS server and follow the steps below to configure user group conditions correctly for the following scenarios.

Any Group

1. Right-click the Always On VPN network policy and choose Properties.
2. Click on the Conditions tab.
3. Click the Add button.
4. Click User Groups.
5. Click Add.
6. Click Add Groups.
7. Enter the name of the group you want to grant access to.
8. Click Ok.
9. Repeat the steps 6-8 above to specify additional groups.

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Errors 691 and 812

All Groups

1. Right-click the Always On VPN network policy and choose Properties.
2. Click on the Conditions tab.
3. Click the Add button.
4. Click User Groups.
5. Click Add.
6. Click Add Groups.
7. Enter the name of the group you want to grant access to.
8. Click Ok.
9. Repeat steps 3-8 above to specify additional groups (you must go back to the Add button on step 3!).

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Errors 691 and 812

Additional Information

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 1

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 691 and 812 – Part 2