Always On VPN NPS and PEAP Vulnerabilities

The February 2023 security updates for Windows Server address multiple vulnerabilities that affect Microsoft Always On VPN administrators. This latest update addresses multiple critical and important vulnerabilities in the Network Policy Server (NPS), commonly used to perform RADIUS authentication for Always On VPN servers. Specifically, there are several Remote Code Execution (RCE) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities with Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP). PEAP with user authentication certificates is the authentication protocol of choice for Always On VPN user tunnel authentication.

Vulnerabilities

The following is a list of vulnerabilities in PEAP addressed in the February 2023 security update.

  • CVE-2023-21689Microsoft PEAP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (critical)
  • CVE-2023-21690Microsoft PEAP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (critical)
  • CVE-2023-21691Microsoft PEAP Information Disclosure vulnerability (important)
  • CVE-2023-21692Microsoft PEAP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (critical)
  • CVE-2023-21695Microsoft PEAP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (important)
  • CVE-2023-21701Microsoft PEAP Denial of Service Vulnerability (important)

Mitigation

Unauthenticated attackers can exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in PEAP on Microsoft Windows NPS servers. However, NPS servers should not be exposed directly to the Internet and would require an attacker to have access to the internal network already. However, administrators are advised to apply this update to their NPS servers as soon as possible. In addition, organizations that deploy the NPS role on enterprise domain controllers should update immediately.

Additional Information

February 2023 Update for Windows Server 2022 (KB5022842)

February 2023 Update for Windows Server 2019 (KB022840)

February 2023 Update for Windows Server 2016 (KB5022838)

Always On VPN Authentication Failed Reason Code 16

Strong authentication is essential for remote access to on-premises resources over the public Internet. Using the Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) in combination with user certificates issued by the organization’s internal certification authority (CA) provides high assurance for remote user authentication. It includes the added benefit of making the Always On VPN connection completely seamless for the user, as their certificate is presented to the authentication server transparently during VPN connection establishment. Using PEAP with user certificates is the recommended authentication method for Always On VPN deployments.

Reason Code 16

When configuring Always On VPN to use PEAP with client authentication certificates, administrators may encounter a scenario in which a user has a valid certificate. Yet, their authentication request is rejected by the Network Policy Server (NPS) server when attempting to connect remotely. Looking at the Security event log on the NPS server, administrators will find a corresponding event ID 6273 in the Network Policy Server task category from the Microsoft Windows security auditing event source. In the Authentication Details section, you’ll find that the reason code for the failed request is Reason Code 16, with the following reason specified.

“Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect”.

Password Incorrect?

The reason code indicates the user may have entered an incorrect password. However, the user does not enter their password when using PEAP with client authentication certificates, so there’s no chance the password was entered incorrectly.

TPM

I have increasingly encountered this scenario with many customers deploying Always On VPN over the last year or so. This error is often caused by a known issue with older TPM models. Specifically, those with a TPM specification sub-version of 1.16 and earlier. You can view these TPM details by opening the Windows Settings app and entering ‘security processor’ in the search field.

Workaround

These older TPM models seem to have an issue with RSA-PSS signature algorithms, as described here. If possible, administrators should upgrade devices with older TPM versions to ensure the highest level of security and assurance for their remote users. However, in cases where that is not feasible, administrators can remove RSA-PSS signature algorithms from the registry, which forces the use of a different signature algorithm and seems to restore functionality.

To do this, open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and navigate to the following registry key.

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Cryptography\
Configuration\Local\SSL\00010003\

Double-click the Functions entry and remove the following algorithms from the Value data section.

  • RSAE-PSS/SHA256
  • RSAE-PSS/SHA384
  • RSAE-PSS/SHA512

Once complete, reboot the device and test authentication once again.

Intune Proactive Remediation

Administrators using Intune Proactive Remediation will find detection and remediation scripts to make these changes published on GitHub.

Detect-RsaePss.ps1

Remediate-RsaePss.ps1

Additional Information

Windows TPM 2.0 Client Authentication in TLS 1.2 with RSA PSS

Always On VPN NPS Auditing and Logging

Always On VPN NPS RADIUS Configuration Missing

Always On VPN NPS Load Balancing

Always On VPN Authentication Failure with Azure Conditional Access

Always On VPN Clients Prompted for Authentication when Accessing Internal Resources

Integrating Microsoft Azure Conditional Access with Windows 10 Always On VPN has several important benefits. The most important is that it allows administrators to improve their security posture by enforcing access polices that can be dynamically applied. For example, requiring multifactor authentication (MFA) for privileged users (e.g., administrators) or sign-ins that appear to be risky, the type of device they are connecting with, the health of the endpoint, and much more.

Authentication Failure

When configuring Always On VPN to support Azure Conditional Access, administrators may expeirence a failed authentication during preliminary testing. Specifically, an event ID 20227 from the RasClient source may be encountered with the following error message.

“The user <username> dialed a connection named <connection name> which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 812.”

Looking at the event logs on the Network Policy Server (NPS) server reveals an event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source with Reason Code 258 and the following Reason.

“The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.”

Root Cause

When Azure Conditional Access is configured for Always On VPN, a short-lived certificate (1 hour lifetime) is provisioned by Azure. This certificate does not include revocation information because, by design, a short-lived certificate does not need to be revoked. However, by default NPS always checks revocation when client authentication certificates are used for authentication. Since the certificate does not include this information, certificate revocation fails.

Resolution

The way to resolve this issue is to disable certificate revocation checking for Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) authentication requests. To do this, open an elevated PowerShell window on the NPS server and run the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13\’ -Name IgnoreNoRevocationCheck -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the NPS server for the changes to take effect.

Additional Information

Windows 10 Always On VPN Network Policy Server (NPS) Load Balancing

Windows 10 Always On VPN Network Policy Server (NPS) Server 2019 Bug

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