Configure DHCP Option 108 on Windows DHCP Server for IPv6-Mostly

IPv6

While enterprise adoption of IPv6 has been slow, it is still moving forward. For example, the U.S. federal government has mandated [M-21-07 – PDF] the transition to IPv6 to modernize its networks and enhance security, scalability, and interoperability. During the migration to IPv6, most systems will be configured with both IPv4 and IPv6, a configuration referred to as dual stack. Ultimately, the goal is the elimination of IPv4 entirely and the use of IPv6 exclusively. However, IPv6-only presents some unique challenges.

Access to IPv4

Although an organization can successfully migrate to IPv6-only networks internally, it does not control networks outside its boundaries. In some cases, a host on an IPv6-only network may need to communicate with an IPv4 resource. Administrators must deploy an IPv6 transition technology to support this scenario.

464XLAT

464XLAT, defined in RFC 6877, is a network architecture that facilitates the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 by enabling IPv4 traffic to operate over an IPv6-only network. It combines two translation mechanisms: a customer-side translator (CLAT) on the user device, which converts IPv4 packets to IPv6, and a provider-side translator (PLAT) at the network edge, which converts the IPv6 packets back to IPv4 to communicate with IPv4-only internet services. This dual-translation approach allows devices in an IPv6-only environment to access both IPv6 and IPv4 resources without native IPv4 connectivity, making it an efficient solution for networks transitioning to IPv6 while maintaining compatibility with legacy IPv4 systems. On Windows, Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) provides the CLAT component.

CLAT for Windows

Windows has long included CLAT support for cellular network interfaces. Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) extends this support to Wi-Fi and Ethernet interfaces and is generally available on Windows 11 version 25H2, starting with build 26200.9550. WinCLAT is disabled by default on non-cellular interfaces and must be permitted before it can operate. Windows also honors DHCP option 108 only while WinCLAT is permitted. WinCLAT is not available on Windows Server. For configuration details, see Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration.

IPv6-Mostly

An IPv6-mostly network, as defined in RFC 8925, provides NAT64 alongside native IPv4 and allows IPv6-only, dual-stack, and IPv4-only devices to coexist on the same network segment. Devices that can operate without IPv4 forgo an IPv4 address, while devices that still require IPv4 continue to receive one. This approach reduces IPv4 address consumption and allows organizations to move toward IPv6-only incrementally, with 464XLAT providing IPv4 access for applications that still need it.

DHCP Option 108

DHCPv4 option 108, called IPv6-Only Preferred, allows an IPv6-mostly network to signal to capable clients that they can operate without a native IPv4 address. Only clients that can operate without IPv4, usually because they include a CLAT or because all of their applications work over IPv6, request the option. When the DHCP scope is configured for IPv6-mostly operation, the server includes option 108 in its response, along with a wait time. The client then stops DHCPv4 configuration for that period, or until it reconnects to a network, and relies on IPv6 and NAT64 for connectivity. Disabling the IPv4 stack entirely during that time is optional. Clients that do not request the option obtain an IPv4 address as usual.

Option 108 and Windows Server DHCP

Commercial DHCP appliances like Infoblox and many open source DHCP platforms natively support DHCP option 108. However, no supported version of Windows Server, including the latest release (Windows Server 2025), supports DHCP option 108 natively. To enable DHCP option 108 on Windows DHCP servers, administrators can create a custom predefined option.

Custom Predefined Option

To create a custom predefined option for DHCP option 108 on a Windows DHCP server, open the DHCP management console (dhcpmgmt.msc) and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click IPv4 and choose Set Predefined Options.
  2. Click Add.
  3. Enter IPv6 Only Preferred in the Name field.
  4. Select Long from the Data type drop-down list.
  5. Enter 108 in the Code field.
  6. Click Ok.
DHCP management console creating custom option 108 IPv6 Only Preferred with data type Long

Assigning DHCP Option 108

Once complete, perform the following steps to assign DHCP option 108 to a DHCP scope.

  1. Select an IPv4 DHCP scope.
  2. Right-click Scope Options and choose Configure Options.
  3. Select 108 IPv6 Only Preferred from the Available Options list.
  4. Enter a value in seconds, in hexadecimal format. This value is the period during which a client stops DHCPv4 configuration and operates without native IPv4. RFC 8925 sets a minimum of 300 seconds (clients treat lower values as 300) and a default of 1800 seconds. For example, 86,400 seconds (1 day) is 0x15180.
  5. Click Ok.
DHCP scope options with 108 IPv6 Only Preferred set to 0x15180

PowerShell

Custom predefined options can also be configured using PowerShell.

Custom Predefined Option

To create a custom predefined option for DHCP option 108, open an elevated PowerShell command on a Windows DHCP server and run the following command.

Add-DhcpServerv4OptionDefinition -Name 'IPv6 Only Preferred' -OptionId 108 -Type DWORD -PassThru
PowerShell output of Add-DhcpServerv4OptionDefinition creating DHCP option 108

Assigning DHCP Option 108

To assign the custom predefined DHCP option 108 to a DHCP scope, run the following PowerShell command.

Set-DhcpServerv4OptionValue -ScopeId 172.16.5.0 -OptionId 108 -Value 0x15180 -PassThru
PowerShell output of Set-DhcpServerv4OptionValue assigning option 108 to a DHCP scope

DHCP Offer

Once configured, if the client requests DHCP option 108 in its DHCP Discover, the DHCP server includes it in the DHCP Offer, as shown here. Windows DHCP Server does not send option 108 to clients that do not request it, as required by RFC 8925.

Packet capture of a DHCP Offer containing option 108 IPv6-Only Preferred

Learn More

If you are interested in learning more about IPv6-mostly and DHCP option 108, be sure to listen to the following episodes of the IPv6 Buzz Podcast.

Summary

As organizations continue their transition toward IPv6, DHCP option 108 provides administrators with a simple and effective way to reduce reliance on legacy IPv4 by signaling clients to prefer IPv6-only operation if they can support it. While Windows Server does not natively support this option, creating a custom predefined setting ensures administrators can take advantage of this important feature.

Additional Information

M-21-07 – Completing the Transition to IPv6 for U.S. Federal Government Agencies [PDF]

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Overview and Configuration

How Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Discovers the NAT64 Prefix

When Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Is Used on IPv6-Mostly and IPv6-Only Networks

What is 464XLAT? CLAT and PLAT Explained

What is an IPv6-Mostly Network?

464XLAT: Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation (RFC 6877)

IPv6-Only Preferred Option for DHCPv4 (RFC 8925)

IPv6 Buzz Podcast on PacketPushers.Net

Windows CLAT (WinCLAT) Resources

Microsoft DirectAccess Formally Deprecated

Today, Microsoft has announced the formal deprecation of DirectAccess. Microsoft DirectAccess is a widely deployed enterprise secure remote access solution that provides seamless, transparent, always-on remote network connectivity for managed (domain-joined) Windows clients. First introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2, it’s been a popular solution with many advantages over ordinary VPN technologies of the past.

Windows Server 2012

DirectAccess was almost entirely rewritten in Windows Server 2012. Many of the features and enhancements offered for DirectAccess with the Unified Access Gateway (UAG – a separate product with additional costs) were built into the operating system directly. In addition, Microsoft introduced integrated load balancing and geographic redundancy features.

Demise of DirectAccess

DirectAccess relies heavily on classic on-premises technologies like Active Directory. All DirectAccess servers and clients must be joined to a domain. In addition, all DirectAccess clients must be running the Enterprise edition of Windows. With organizations rapidly adopting cloud services such as Azure and Entra ID, Microsoft began to develop an alternative solution that better integrated with the cloud. That solution is Always On VPN. With that, Microsoft stopped developing DirectAccess after the release of Windows Server 2012 R2. No new features or capabilities have been added to DirectAccess since that time.

Deprecation

We’ve been speculating about the end of life for DirectAccess for quite some time now. However, this formal deprecation announcement from Microsoft is official. It is the end of the road for this technology. To be clear, though, DirectAccess is available today in Windows Server 2022 and Windows 11. DirectAccess will be included in the upcoming release of Windows Server 2025. However, formal deprecation from Microsoft means they will remove DirectAccess components from the next release of the operating system.

What Happens Now?

Organizations should begin formal planning efforts to migrate away from DirectAccess. Here are a few popular solutions to consider.

Always On VPN

Always On VPN is the direct replacement for DirectAccess. It was designed to provide feature parity for DirectAccess, with seamless, transparent, always-on remote network connectivity. However, Always On VPN better integrates with Entra ID and supports conditional access. It does not require domain-joined devices or servers and works well with cloud-native endpoints. Always On VPN is a good choice for organizations that employ hybrid Entra-joined devices.

Entra Private Access

Entra Private Access, part of the Entra Global Secure Access suite, is an identity-centric zero-trust network access (ZTNA) solution from Microsoft. It is in public preview now and has some compelling advantages over traditional VPNs. However, Entra Private Access is not feature complete today. In addition, it is best suited to cloud-native (Entra-joined only) endpoints.

Absolute Secure Access

Absolute Secure Access (formerly NetMotion Mobility) is a premium enterprise remote access solution with many advanced options. It is by far the best solution on the market today. Absolute Secure Access is a software solution that supports zero-trust configuration and includes many features to improve and enhance security, performance, and visibility. In addition, it provides cross-platform support, including Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android operating systems.

Learn More

We have several decades of experience working with secure remote access technologies. We can help you and your organization find the best solution for your needs. Fill out the form below for a free one-hour consultation to discuss your DirectAccess migration strategy today.

Additional Information

Deprecated Features for Windows Client

10 PowerShell Commands Always On VPN Administrators Should Know

Managing a secure and reliable VPN infrastructure is critical for supporting today’s highly mobile workforce. For Always On VPN administrators, PowerShell is an indispensable tool for achieving this goal. Not only can PowerShell be used to automate the installation and configuration of Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) server, but it can also be used to audit configuration and monitor system health and user activity as well. In addition, it is highly recommended that the RRAS role be installed on Server Core for optimum security and performance. Administrators must be familiar with these PowerShell commands and more to support RRAS on Windows Server Core in their environment.

RemoteAccess Module

The RemoteAccess PowerShell module should be installed when the RRAS server is configured. There are 122 commands in this module, but only a subset of those pertain to the VPN server role. Here are ten popular commands for monitoring and managing an Always On VPN RRAS server.

Configuration Review

The following PowerShell commands are useful for reviewing the current RRAS server configuration.

Get-RemoteAccess – Displays the current configuration of the VPN server. Details include installation status, TLS certificate configuration, VPN client IP address assignment method, IPv4 and IPv6 addressing information (if using the static address assignment method), authentication type, and configured RADIUS servers.

Get-VpnAuthProtocol – Displays authentication configuration details such as accepted authentication types for both user and device connections, root certification authority (CA) certificate restrictions (if enabled), and certificate advertisement and EKU restrictions if enabled.

Get-VpnServerConfiguration – Displays additional VPN server configuration information, such as the IPsec configuration for IKEv2, the number of VPN ports configured, and more.

System Health

Get-RemoteAccessHealth – Displays the current health status of various VPN server services. The command’s default output is a little noisy. I recommend filtering it as follows:

Get-RemoteAccessHealth | Where-Object HealthState -NotMatch Disabled | Format-Table -AutoSize

User Activity

The following PowerShell commands can be used to view current and historical user activity details.

Get-RemoteAccessConnectionStatistics – Displays all active VPN connections on the server.

Get-RemoteAccessConnectionStatisticsSummary – Displays cumulative information about VPN connections on the server since the last service restart or reboot, such as the total number of connections, the number of unique users, the maximum number of concurrent connections, and the amount of data transferred.

Get-RemoteAccessUserActivity – Displays all active VPN connections for a specific user or device.

Management

The following PowerShell commands are helpful for reviewing authentication and logging settings.

Get-RemoteAccessRadius – Allows the administrator to view the currently configured RADIUS servers on the VPN server.

Get-RemoteAccessAccounting – Allows the administrator to view the current accounting repository (RADIUS or inbox) on the VPN server.

Clear-RemoteAccessInboxAccountingStore – Allows the administrator to remove log data from the Inbox Accounting database. Removing log data from the database can be helpful when transitioning a test server to production or to free up disk space by reducing the size of the logging database.

Additional Modules

In addition to the PowerShell commands above, Always On VPN administrators can leverage my custom PowerShell modules for advanced server and client configuration. These modules are published in the PowerShell Gallery.

AovpnTools – PowerShell module to configure and optimize Windows RRAS servers to support Always On VPN.

Install-Module -Name AovpnTools

InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement – PowerShell module to configure and manage the Inbox Accounting database for logging system information and user activity on the VPN server.

Install-Module -Name InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement

Additional Information

Always On VPN and RRAS on Windows Server Core

Inbox Accounting Database Management

AovpnTools PowerShell Module on GitHub

Inbox Accounting Database Module on GitHub

Always On VPN October 2023 Security Updates

Once again, it’s time to patch! After several quiet months, there are a few crucial updates Always On VPN administrators will want to get deployed soon. Thankfully, the impact of the security updates related to Always On VPN is low this time, as there is only one Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, and it’s for a legacy protocol that should be in limited use today.

IKEv2

CVE-2023-36726 addresses a security vulnerability in Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) that can lead to privilege escalation. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can elevate privileges to that of the local SYSTEM.

L2TP

This month’s update discloses several Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) vulnerabilities. The following CVEs all address a vulnerability where an attacker can send a specially crafted protocol message to a Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) server, which could lead to remote code execution on the server.

Mitigation

The impact of the L2TP security vulnerabilities should be minimal in most organizations. L2TP is a legacy VPN protocol not commonly used for Always On VPN. However, misconfiguration can leave vulnerable RRAS servers exposed. Administrators must ensure that inbound UDP port 1723 is not open from the Internet. In addition, L2TP should be disabled on the RRAS server if not in use. See the article on the May 2023 security updates for details.

Additional Information

October 2023 Security Updates

Always On VPN and RRAS on Windows Server Core

Windows Server Core is a refactored version of the full Windows Server operating system. Server Core does not include a Graphical User Interface (GUI) and must be managed via the command line or with PowerShell. The Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) is a supported workload on all supported versions of Windows Server including Windows Server 2022. Always On VPN administrators should consider installing and configuring RRAS on Windows Server Core to ensure their VPN infrastructure’s best security and performance.

Server Core Benefits

Windows Server Core is a minimal installation option of the Windows Server operating system that provides numerous benefits, particularly for environments where security, resource efficiency, and reduced maintenance overhead are essential. Here are some of the key benefits of using Windows Server Core.

Minimized Attack Surface – Windows Server Core has a smaller footprint compared to the full GUI version, which means fewer components and services are installed by default. This reduces the potential attack surface and minimizes security vulnerabilities.

Enhanced Security – With fewer components and a reduced attack surface, there are fewer potential vectors for malware or unauthorized access. This makes Windows Server Core a more secure choice for critical server roles like RRAS.

Reduced Maintenance – Since there are fewer components to update, patching and maintaining a Windows Server Core system is quicker and requires less effort. This is especially beneficial in large-scale server deployments.

Improved Stability – By removing the graphical user interface (GUI), Windows Server Core has fewer processes running in the background, leading to a more stable and predictable server environment.

Simplified Management – Windows Server Core is designed for remote administration. It allows the administrator to manage it using command-line tools, PowerShell, or remote management tools like the Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) and Windows Admin Center. This makes it easier to manage multiple servers from a single location.

Faster Reboots – Windows Servers require periodic reboots. With Windows Server Core, reboot times are considerably faster, resulting in less downtime during maintenance periods.

RSAT

The Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) can be installed on Windows clients and servers to enable remote administration using the familiar Routing and Remote Access Management console (rrasmgmt.msc) and Remote Access Management console (ramgmtui.exe) GUI tools.

Windows Client

To install the Remote Access Management tools on Windows client operating systems, navigate to Settings > Apps > Optional Features. Click Add a feature, select RSAT: Remote Access Management Tools, then click Install.

Optionally the Remote Access Management tools can be installed by running the following PowerShell command.

Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name Rsat.RemoteAccess.Management.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0

Windows Server

To install the Remote Access Management tools on Windows Server run the following PowerShell command.

Install-WindowsFeature -Name RSAT-RemoteAccess

Windows Admin Center

The Windows Admin Center is a free remote management tool from Microsoft for managing Windows Server (core and GUI) remotely. It is especially helpful for Server Core management as it provides a GUI for many common administrative tasks.

You can download Windows Admin Center here.

Additional Information

Windows Server Core Installation Option

Windows Server Core vs. Desktop

PowerShell Remote Server Administration

Windows Admin Center

Always On VPN July 2023 Security Updates

Hello, Always On VPN administrators! It’s the second Tuesday of the month, so you know what that means. Yes, it’s Patch Tuesday! This month’s security updates include several fixes for vulnerabilities potentially affecting Microsoft Always On VPN deployments.

RRAS Vulnerabilities

Microsoft’s July 2023 security updates include fixes affecting Windows Servers with the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) role installed. Security vulnerabilities CVE-2023-35365, CVE-2023-35366, and CVE-2023-35367 are all Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities with a Critical security rating and a CVSS score of 9.8. These security vulnerabilities in Windows Server RRAS are particularly troublesome due to the nature of the workload. RRAS servers are, by design, exposed to the public Internet. Although there are no known exploits in the wild at this time, this attack requires no special privileges other than network access. Administrators running Windows Server with RRAS installed are encouraged to update as soon as possible.

AD CS Vulnerabilities

Most Always On VPN implementations leverage enterprise PKI certificates for user and device authentication. Administrators commonly deploy Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) to support this. This month there are two security vulnerabilities in AD CS marked as Important. CVE-2023-35350 and CVE-2023-35351 address RCE vulnerabilities that exploit a race condition on the server. However, AD CS servers are not exposed to untrusted networks. In addition, attackers would require administrative rights on the server to exploit these vulnerabilities.

Network Load Balancing

Finally, of importance to Always On VPN administrators using Windows Network Load Balancing (NLB) to provide load balancing for their RRAS servers, there is a vulnerability in the NLB service. CVE-2023-33163 addresses an RCE vulnerability in NLB identified as Important.

Additional Information

Microsoft July 2023 Security Updates

Windows Server 2022 KB5028171 (Build 20348.1850)

Windows Server 2019 KB5028168 (Build 17763.4645)

Windows Server 2016 KB 5028169 (Build 14393.6085)

Windows 11 22H2 KB8028185 (Build 22621.1992)

Windows 11 21H2 KB5028182 (Build 22000.2176)

Always On VPN RRAS and Stale Connections

Always On VPN Updates for RRAS and IKEv2

Always On VPN administrators may be familiar with an issue that affects Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) servers, where many stale VPN connections appear in the list of active connections. The issue is most prevalent when using IKEv2, either for the Always On VPN device tunnel or the user tunnel. Typically, this does not cause problems, but some administrators have reported issues related to port exhaustion or failed IKEv2 connections when many stale connections are present. Stale connections happen so frequently that I created a PowerShell script to clean them up on the RRAS server. Restarting the RemoteAccess service or rebooting the server also clears stale connections.

Microsoft Fix

Thankfully, Microsoft has addressed these issues in Windows Server 2019 and Windows Server 2022 this month. An update is now available in the March 2023 security update that resolves this problem.

You can find more information about the updates here.

The update was not made available for Windows Server 2016, however. Organizations are encouraged to upgrade to Windows Server 2019 or later to address this problem.

Additional Information

Always On VPN Updates for RRAS and IKEv2

Always On VPN IKEv2 Load Balancing and NAT

Always On VPN and IKEv2 Fragmentation

Always On VPN and Split DNS

Cloudflare Public DNS Resolver Now Available

Split DNS, sometimes called ‘split brain’ DNS, is when an organization uses the same DNS namespace internally and externally. For example, the internal Active Directory domain name is example.com, so internal resources are accessed using a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) like dc1.example.com. Additionally, external properties such as mail and web services use the same namespace so that a public web server might have a name like www.example.com. Internal resources will resolve to internal, private IP addresses, whereas public services resolve to external, public IP addresses.

Complications

Things get complicated when the same resource (FQDN) is available internally and externally, especially for Always On VPN clients. For example, accessing app.example.com on the internal network resolves to a private address, but accessing the same resource on the Internet resolves to a public IP address. Often there are different authentication requirements for internal and external resources, which can yield unexpected results.

Name Resolution

Always On VPN administrators might prefer app.example.com to be accessed via the Internet when connected with Always On VPN. However, VPN clients will attempt to connect via the internal network using their default configuration. Solving this challenge requires internal DNS server changes.

NRPT?

It might be tempting for administrators to use the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) to solve name resolution issues for Always On VPN. However, the NRPT has some limitations and may not always produce the desired results. For example, the NRPT only directs DNS queries. It does not define which resource records are returned by DNS. Also, some applications ignore the NRPT, which limits its usefulness. A better solution is to use DNS Policies in Windows Server.

DNS Policies

Microsoft introduced DNS policies with Windows Server 2016. DNS policies are a powerful tool administrators can use to fine-tune name resolution based on many factors. In the case of split DNS, administrators can configure internal DNS to return an IP address for a resource based on the source IP address of the name resolution query. VPN clients receive one IP address for a given DNS query, while all other clients receive a different IP address. DNS policies ensure that remote clients connected to the VPN will receive the proper IP address for the resource requested, as defined by the administrator.

Caveats

DNS policies are powerful and flexible, but there are some potential drawbacks. All enterprise DNS servers used by Always On VPN clients must be running Windows Server 2016 or later. Also, administrators must use PowerShell to configure DNS policies exclusively. There is no GUI interface to configure DNS policies. DNS policies do not appear in the DNS management interface, which could confuse an administrator unaware that DNS policies are in place. In addition, DNS client subnets and query resolution policies do not replicate across DNS servers. Administrators must manually configure these on each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients. However, zone scopes and resource records in those scopes do replicate automatically.

Scenario

For demonstration purposes, let’s assume that an Always On VPN client needs to access foo.example.com. It resolves to a private IP address on the internal network and a public IP address on the Internet. By default, foo.example.com will resolve to the internal private IP address of the server when connected with Always On VPN. However, the desire is to have foo.example.com resolve to the public IP address when connected with Always On VPN. To accomplish this, we’ll create a DNS policy to ensure that connected Always On VPN clients can resolve foo.example.com to the public IP address when resolving this name over the VPN tunnel.

DNS Policy Configuration

Open an elevated PowerShell command on a DNS server and perform the following steps to create a DNS policy for VPN clients.

Client Subnet

Run the Add-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command to create a client subnet in DNS that includes all IP networks assigned to VPN clients. Summarize IP prefixes if there are multiple VPN servers in the organization.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet ‘172.16.100.0/22’ -IPv6Subnet ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1000::/60’

If summarizing IP prefixes for multiple servers isn’t possible, multiple subnets can be added to a DNS client subnet using the following command.

Add-DnsServerClientSubnet -Name VPN -IPv4Subnet @(‘172.16.100.0/24’, ‘172.16.101.0/24’, ‘172.16.102.0/24’, ‘172.16.103.0/24’) -IPv6Subnet @(‘2001:db8:fcd2:1001::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1002::/64’, ‘2001:db8:fcd2:1003::/64’)

To make changes to an existing DNS client subnet, use the Set-DnsServerClientSubnet PowerShell command.

Note: Client Subnets do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Zone Scope

Create a Zone Scope that includes the DNS records to be returned to VPN clients. The default zone scope is the DNS zone itself. Configure an additional zone scope for the DNS zone by using the Add-DnsServerZoneScope PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerZoneScope -ZoneName example.com -Name VPN

Resource Records

Next, add DNS records to the new zone scope using the Add-DnsServerResourceRecord PowerShell command.

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -A -Name foo -IPv4Address 203.0.113.12 -ZoneScope VPN

Add-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com -AAAA -Name foo -IPv6Address 2001:db8:21::12 -ZoneScope VPN

DNS Policy

Finally, create a DNS query resolution policy that ties everything together. Run the Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy command to create the DNS query resolution policy. Once configured, when the DNS server receives a DNS query, the policy will recognize that the query originates from a VPN client subnet and will return the resource record from the VPN zone scope with the public IP address defined previously.

Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy -Name VPN -Action ALLOW -ClientSubnet ‘EQ,VPN’ -FQDN ‘EQ,foo.example.com’ -ZoneScope ‘VPN,1’ -ZoneName example.com

Note: DNS query resolution policies do not replicate across domain controllers. Run the command above on all DNS servers or each DNS server used by Always On VPN clients.

Results

Once complete, the hostname ‘foo’ in our example above resolves to different IP addresses based on the client’s IP address.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from internal client.

DNS query for ‘foo’ from VPN client.

Summary

There are many scenarios where Windows Server DNS policies can be used to fine-tune name resolution for Always On VPN clients. Hopefully, this example gives you an idea of how DNS policies work, and you can use them to solve your unique name resolution challenges with Always On VPN.

Additional Information

Windows Server DNS Policies Overview

Always On VPN Short Name Access Failure

Always On VPN Client DNS Server Configuration

Always On VPN RADIUS Configuration Missing

Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) is a popular choice for administrators deploying Always On VPN. It is easy to configure and scales out easily. Most commonly, RRAS servers are configured to use RADIUS authentication to provide user authentication for Always On VPN client connections. The RADIUS server can be Microsoft Network Policy and Access Server (NPAS, or simply NPS) or a third-party RADIUS solution. It is best to have the RADIUS service running on a server separate from the RRAS server.

RADIUS Authentication

Administrators can configure RADIUS authentication by opening the Routing and Remote Access management console (rrasmgmt.msc), right-clicking the VPN server, then choosing Properties > Security. Click the Configure button to configure authentication and accounting providers accordingly.

RADIUS Options Missing

In some cases, the administrator will notice that the option to configure RADIUS authentication and accounting servers is missing. In its place is the following error message.

“Because Network Policy Server (NPS) is installed, you must use it to configure authentication and accounting providers. To configure authentication and accounting providers, create or modify connection request policies.”

Configuration Options

It might be tempting for administrators to follow this guidance when presented with this message by opening the Network Policy management console (nps.msc) to configure it. However, that is not recommended or necessary. This message results from a common configuration error that should be corrected.

NPS Role Installed

The error message above occurs when an administrator mistakenly installs the NPAS role on the RRAS server itself. Again, this is not recommended or required. To resolve this issue, uninstall the NPS role by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Uninstall-WindowsFeature NPAS

Configuration Corrupted

After removing the NPAS role from the RRAS server, administrators may encounter the following error message when configuring RADIUS authentication and accounting servers in RRAS.

“The connection request policy used for authentication and accounting configuration is corrupted. Either install Network Policy Server (NPS) and restore the connection request policy manually, or click Repair Settings to restore the connection request policy by using Windows Accounting and Windows Authentication.”

Repair Settings

To resolve this issue, click the Repair Settings button. Once complete, RADIUS authentication and accounting configuration should work as expected.

Additional Information

Always On VPN Network Policy Server (NPS) Auditing and Logging

Always On VPN Network Policy Server (NPS) Load Balancing

Always On VPN and Windows Server 2019 Network Policy Server (NPS) Bug

Always On VPN SSTP and HSTS

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a feature commonly used by websites to protect against protocol downgrade attacks, where an attacker forces the use of insecure HTTP instead of HTTPS. If successful, the attacker can intercept unencrypted communication between the client and the web server. This is undesirable for obvious reasons. As such, web server administrators implement an HTTP response header named Strict-Transport-Security with some additional settings that instruct the user agent, in this case, a web browser, to only use secure HTTPS when communicating with the web server. Attempts to use HTTP will not work.

VPN and SSTP

As security is always a top concern when building an Always On VPN infrastructure, careful attention must be paid to VPN protocol configuration to ensure optimal security. Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) is a popular VPN protocol for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. SSTP uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encryption, so administrators are encouraged to implement recommended security configurations, such as disabling insecure protocols like TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and optimizing TLS cipher suites as described here.

SSTP with HSTS

It would seem that enabling HSTS on a Windows RRAS VPN server would be ideal for improving SSTP security. However, that’s not the case. HSTS prevents protocol downgrade attacks from HTTPS to HTTP, but SSTP already uses HTTPS exclusively, making the use of HSTS irrelevant. If an attacker attempted a protocol downgrade attack on an SSTP VPN connection, it would fail because the service does not support HTTP between the client and the VPN gateway. Additionally, even if it were possible to configure RRAS to send an HSTS response header, it would be ignored by the client because the user agent is not a web browser.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP Security Configuration

Always On VPN SSTP and TLS 1.3

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Renewal

Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Binding Error

SSL and TLS Training for Always On VPN Administrators