Always On VPN and Multifactor Authentication

Requiring multifactor authentication (MFA) for remote access is one of the most important security controls an organization can implement. Exposing private corporate resources to the Internet with only a username and password places the organization at significant risk. However, integrating MFA with Always On VPN presents some unique challenges. This page explains the options and their trade-offs.

Last updated: November 9, 2026

The Always On Challenge

Always On VPN connections are established automatically and transparently, with no user interaction. That’s a great user experience, but it complicates traditional MFA in the following ways.

  • Users receive MFA prompts for connections they didn’t knowingly initiate. Asking users to approve unexpected prompts trains exactly the behavior that MFA fatigue attacks exploit.
  • Prompts can appear each time the user tunnel reconnects, such as after resuming from sleep or changing networks.
  • The device tunnel authenticates with a computer certificate before the user signs in, so interactive MFA doesn’t apply to it.

Option 1: NPS Extension for Microsoft Entra MFA

Administrators can add MFA to Always On VPN user tunnel connections with the NPS extension for Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication. The extension runs on the Network Policy Server (NPS) and requests a second factor from Microsoft Entra ID after primary authentication succeeds. Once installed, every authentication request processed by that NPS server requires MFA, so organizations often deploy dedicated NPS servers for VPN. The NPS extension requires Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 licensing.

Number Matching Limitation

Number matching is now enforced for Microsoft Authenticator push notifications, but NPS doesn’t support it. When number matching is enabled, current versions of the NPS extension prompt users for a time-based one-time passcode (TOTP) instead. The Windows VPN client doesn’t support TOTP. The documented workaround is to configure the NPS extension to fall back to Approve/Deny push notifications, which reintroduces the risk of MFA fatigue. Combined with the always-on prompt problem described above, this makes the NPS extension the least attractive option for Always On VPN today.

Option 2: Microsoft Entra Conditional Access

With Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for VPN connectivity, Entra ID evaluates Conditional Access policies and issues a short-lived certificate that the client uses to authenticate the VPN connection. Policies can require MFA, a compliant device, or other conditions, and they can be risk-based, so users are challenged only when necessary. This approach integrates Always On VPN with the same policy engine that protects Microsoft 365 and other cloud applications. For details, see the following articles.

Option 3: Certificates with TPM-Protected Keys

Certificates are an excellent alternative to traditional MFA for Always On VPN. Many organizations already have a public key infrastructure (PKI), such as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), or can use Cloud PKI for Intune. Certificate authentication is seamless for users and can’t be phished, because the private key never leaves the device.

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated hardware security chip that generates, stores, and uses cryptographic keys. Private keys stored in the TPM can’t be exported, even by a local administrator, and TPM 2.0 includes anti-hammering protection against brute-force attacks. A certificate with a TPM-protected private key is a strong possession factor that is highly resistant to theft.

On its own, however, a TPM-protected certificate is a single factor (something you have). The Windows sign-in password unlocks the user’s session, not the private key. The certificate becomes true multifactor authentication when the key itself requires a PIN or biometric to use, as with Windows Hello for Business or virtual smart cards. Learn more in Digital Certificates for Strong, Phishing-Resistant Authentication.

Recommendations

Based on my experience deploying Always On VPN for organizations worldwide, I recommend the following approach.

  • Use certificates with TPM-protected private keys for user authentication as a baseline. They’re seamless for users and resistant to theft and phishing.
  • Add Microsoft Entra Conditional Access when you need MFA or device compliance enforced at connection time.
  • Avoid the NPS extension with push notifications where possible. If you use it, understand the number matching limitation and its security trade-off.
  • Consider Microsoft Entra Private Access, which integrates natively with Conditional Access and supports phishing-resistant MFA, for scenarios where it fits.

Additional Information

Integrate VPN Infrastructure with Microsoft Entra MFA Using the NPS Extension (Microsoft Learn)

Number Matching in Multifactor Authentication Push Notifications (Microsoft Learn)

Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access

Configure Entra Conditional Access for Always On VPN

What is Multifactor Authentication (MFA)?

Digital Certificates for Strong, Phishing-Resistant Authentication

Always On VPN: Secure Remote Access for Windows

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