KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer Certificate Format Invalid

When implementing a KEMP LoadMaster load balancer, one of the first configuration tasks performed is importing root and intermediate Certification Authority (CA) certificates. When doing this, it is not uncommon to encounter the following error message.

Certificate Format Invalid.

KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer Certificate Invalid

To resolve this issue, .CER files must first be converted to .PEM format before being imported in to the LoadMaster. Using OpenSSL, .CER files can quickly be converted to .PEM with the following command.

openssl x509 -inform der -in example.cer -out example.pem

Optionally, .CER files can be converted to .PEM online here.

If the root and/or intermediate certificates are from an internal PKI, export the certificates using the Base-64 encoded x.509 (.CER) option. Certificates exported using this format can be imported directly in to the LoadMaster without first having to be converted to .PEM.

KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer Certificate Format Invalid

Pro tip: When entering the Certificate Name, it is not necessary to enter a file extension. The name will be appended with .PEM automatically upon import.

KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer Certificate Format Invalid

KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer Certificate Format Invalid

Additional Resources

DirectAccess Deployment Guide for KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancers

Maximize Your Investment in Windows 10 with KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancers

DirectAccess and the FREE KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer

Configure KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer for DirectAccess Network Location Server (NLS)

Planning and Implementing DirectAccess Video Training Course on Pluralsight

Implementing DirectAccess with Windows Server 2016 Book

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error Code 0x800b0109

A Windows 7 or Windows 8.x/10 client may fail to establish a DirectAccess connection using the IP-HTTPS IPv6transition technology. When troubleshooting this issue, running ipconfig.exe show that the media state for the tunnel adapter iphttpsinterface is Media disconnected.

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error 0x80090326

Running the Get-NetIPHttpsState PowerShell command on Windows 8.x/10 clients or the netsh interface httpstunnel show interface command on Windows 7 clients returns an error code of 0x800b0109 with an interface status Failed to connect to the IPHTTPS server; waiting to reconnect.

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error 0x80090326

Error code 0x800b0109 translates to CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT, indicating the client was unable to establish an IP-HTTPS connection because the certificate presented during the SSL handshake was issued by a certification authority that was not trusted. This commonly occurs when the DirectAccess server is configured with an SSL certificate issued by the internal PKI and DirectAccess clients are provisioned using offline domain join without using the /rootcacerts switch.

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error 0x800b0109

To resolve IP-HTTPS error code 0x800b0109, obtain the root certificate for the certificate authority that issued the SSL certificate used for IP-HTTPS and import it in to the DirectAccess client’s Trusted Root Certification Authorities local computer certificate store. Once complete, restart the IP helper service to reinitiate an IP-HTTPS connection.

Additional Information

Provisioning DirectAccess Clients using Windows Offline Domain Join

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error Code 0x90320

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error 0x2af9

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Implementing DirectAccess with Windows Server 2016

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error Code 0x90320

A Windows 7 or Windows 8.x/10 client may fail to establish a DirectAccess connection using the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology. When troubleshooting this issue, running ipconfig.exe shows that the media state for the tunnel adapter iphttpsinterface is Media disconnected.

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error Code 0x90320

Running the Get-NetIPHttpsState PowerShell command on Windows 8.x/10 clients or the netsh interface httpstunnel show interface command on Windows 7 clients returns an error code of 0x90320, with an interface status Failed to connect to the IPHTTPS server; waiting to reconnect.

Troubleshooting DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Error Code 0x90320

Error code 0x90320 translates to SEC_I_INCOMPLETE_CREDENTIALS, indicating the client was unable to authenticate to the DirectAccess server during the TLS handshake when establishing the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition tunnel. This occurs when the DirectAccess server or an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) is configured to perform client certificate authentication for IP-HTTPS connections. The client may fail to authenticate if it does not have a valid certificate issued by the organization’s internal certification authority (CA) or if the DirectAccess server or ADC is configured to perform IP-HTTPS client authentication incorrectly.

To resolve this issue, ensure that a valid certificate is installed on the DirectAccess client. In addition, ensure that the DirectAccess server or ADC is configured to use the correct CA when authenticating clients establishing IP-HTTPS connections.

Additional Information

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication 

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler

DirectAccess SSL Offload and IP-HTTPS preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler 

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS preauthentication using F5 BIG-IP 

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Introduction

DirectAccess is an IPv6 only solution, at least from the perspective of the client. When the DirectAccess client is remote, it communicates with the DirectAccess server using IPv6 exclusively. IPv6 transition technologies are used to enable this connectivity when the DirectAccess server and/or client are on the pubic IPv4 Internet.

IP-HTTPS

One of the IPv6 transition technologies used by DirectAccess is IP-HTTPS. With IP-HTTPS, IPv6 traffic is encapsulated in HTTP and delivered to the DirectAccess server using IPv4. IP-HTTPS is used exclusively when the DirectAccess server is located behind an edge firewall performing network address translation.

SSL Certificate

To support IP-HTTPS, an SSL certificate is installed on each DirectAccess server. The SSL certificate is commonly issued by a public certification authority, but it can also be issued by an internal PKI. The SSL certificate used for IP-HTTPS can and does expire, and when it does it will prevent any DirectAccess connection from being established using this transition technology.

Troubleshooting

When troubleshooting DirectAccess connectivity via IP-HTTPS, the first thing the administrator will notice is that the media state for the DirectAccess client’s IP-HTTPS tunnel adapter interface is shown as disconnected.

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

In addition, the Get-NetIPHttpsState PowerShell command returns an error code 0x800b0101 indicating Failed to connect to the IP-HTTPS server; waiting to reconnect.

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Err.exe translates this error to CERT_E_EXPIRED, indicating that the SSL certificate is no longer valid.

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Viewing the IP-HTTPS SSL certificate is not possible using a web browser. Instead, use Nmap and the ssl-cert script to view the certificate.

nmap.exe -n -Pn -p443 [FQDN] –script ssl-cert

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

In the Operations Status window of the Remote Access Management console on the DirectAccess server, the IP-HTTPS status is listed as Critical. Details show IP-HTTPS not working properly, with an error stating the IP-HTTPS certificate is not valid, and clearly indicating that the certificate is expired.

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

The IP-HTTPS status can also be viewed at the command line by issuing the following command in an elevated PowerShell command window.

Get-RemoteAccessHealth | Where-Object Component -eq IP-Https | Format-List

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Updating the Certificate

Simply renewing the SSL certificate is not sufficient to restore IP-HTTPS connectivity for remote DirectAccess clients. The DirectAccess configuration must also be updated to use the new certificate. In the Remote Access Management console, highlight DirectAccess and VPN under Configuration and then click Edit on Step 2 (for load-balanced or multisite DirectAccess deployments, first highlight the individual server and then click Configure Server Settings). Click Network Adapters, click Browse, and then select the new SSL certificate.

DirectAccess Expired IP-HTTPS Certificate and Error 0x800b0101

Click Ok, Next, and then Finish twice and Apply. Repeat these steps for each server in the load-balanced cluster, and for all servers in all entry points in the enterprise.

Alternatively, the IP-HTTPS certificate can be updated in the DirectAccess configuration by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and entering the following commands.

$cert = Get-ChildItem -Path cert:\localmachine\my | Where-Object Thumbprint -eq [cert_thumbprint]
Set-RemoteAccess -SslCertificate $cert -Verbose

For example…

$cert = Get-ChildItem -Path cert:\localmachine\my | Where-Object Thumbprint -eq 2BFD1BC5805EBBF8ACB584DA025AD75B341A8B33
Set-RemoteAccess -SslCertificate $cert -Verbose


Important Note: Be sure to execute these commands on each DirectAccess server in the load-balanced cluster, and for all servers in all entry points in the enterprise.


Self-Signed Certificates

When DirectAccess is deployed using the Getting Started Wizard (GSW), also known as a “simplified deployment“, a self-signed certificate is used for IP-HTTPS. By default, this certificate expires 5 years after it is created. The expiration of a self-signed certificate presentsa unique challenge. Although the self-signed certificate can’t be renewed, it can be re-created or cloned using the New-SelfSignedCertificate PowerShell command. However, DirectAccess clients will not trust this new certificate until they receive the updated client settings via group policy. DirectAccess clients outside the network will not be able to establish IP-HTTPS connections until they receive these new policies. When they attempt to connect to the DirectAccess server without first updating group policy, the IP-HTTPS status will indicate an error code 0x800b0109 which translates to CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT.

If the expired self-signed certificate is replaced with another self-signed certificate (not recommended), DirectAccess clients will have to come back to the internal network or connect remotely via client-based VPN to update group policy and receive the new DirectAccess client settings. A better alternative is to replace the expired self-signed certificate with a public SSL certificate that matches the existing public hostname. This will allow remote clients to reestablish DirectAccess connectivity without the need to udpate group policy first.

Summary

Certificate expiration must be monitored closely to ensure the highest level of availability for the DirectAccess remote access solution. Certificate auto enrollment can be leveraged to ensure that IPsec certificates are automatically renewed prior to expiration. However, the IP-HTTPS certificate must be renewed manually and requires additional configuration after it has been updated.

Additional Resources

DirectAccess Computer Certificate Auto Enrollment

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Implementing DirectAccess with Windows Server 2016 book

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication


Introduction

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS PreauthenticationRecently I’ve written about the security challenges with DirectAccess, specifically around the use of the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology. In its default configuration, the DirectAccess server does not authenticate the client when an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel is established. This opens up the possibility of an unauthorized user launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and potentially performing network reconnaissance using ICMPv6. More details on this can be found here.

Mitigation

The best way to mitigate these security risks is to implement an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) such as the F5 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager or the Citrix NetScaler. I’ve documented how to configure those platforms here and here.

No ADC?

For those organizations that do not have a capable ADC deployed, it is possible to configure the IP-HTTPS listener on the Windows Server 2012 R2 server itself to perform preauthentication.

Important Note: Making the following changes on the DirectAccess server is not formally supported. Also, this change is incompatible with one-time passwords (OTP)  and should not be performed if strong user authentication is enabled. In addition, null cipher suites will be disabled, resulting in reduced scalability and degraded performance for Windows 8.x and Windows 10 clients. Making this change should only be done if a suitable ADC is not available.

Configure IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

To configure the DirectAccess server to perform preauthentication for IP-HTTPS connections, open an elevated PowerShell command window and enter the following command.

ls Cert:\LocalMachine\My

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

Copy the thumbprint that belongs to the SSL certificate assigned to the IP-HTTPS listener. Open an elevated command prompt window (not a PowerShell window!) and enter the following commands.

netsh http delete sslcert ipport=0.0.0.0:443
netsh http add sslcert ipport=0.0.0.0:443 certhash=[thumbprint]
appid={5d8e2743-ef20-4d38-8751-7e400f200e65}
dsmapperusage=enable clientcertnegotiation=enable

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

For load-balanced clusters and multisite deployments, repeat these steps on each DirectAccess server in the cluster and/or enterprise.

Summary

Once these changes have been made, only DirectAccess clients that have a computer certificate with a subject name that matches the name of its computer account in Active Directory will be allowed to establish an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel connection.

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using F5 BIG-IP

Note: For information about configuring the Citrix NetScaler to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication, click here. For information about configuring Windows Server 2012 R2 to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication natively, click here.

Introduction

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using F5 BIG-IPRecently I wrote about security challenges with DirectAccess and the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology. Specifically, IP-HTTPS transition tunnel connections are not authenticated by the DirectAccess server, only the client. This allows an unauthorized device to obtain an IPv6 address on the DirectAccess client network. With it, an attacker can perform network reconnaissance using ICMPv6 and potentially launch a variety of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. For more details, click here.

Note: DirectAccess IPsec data connections not at risk. Data is never exposed at any time with the default configuration.

Mitigation

To mitigate these issues, it is recommended that an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) be used to terminate SSL connections and enforce client certificate authentication. Doing this will ensure that only authorized connections will be accepted by the DirectAccess server. In addition, there are some scalability and performance benefits to implementing this configuration when supporting Windows 7 clients.

Important Considerations

Performing IP-HTTPS preauthentication on the F5 BIG-IP is formally unsupported by Microsoft. In addition, terminating IP-HTTPS on the F5 appliance breaks OTP authentication.

F5 BIG-IP Configuration

To configure the F5 BIG-IP to perform SSL offload for DirectAccess IP-HTTPS, follow the guidance documented here. In addition, to configure the F5 BIG-IP to perform preauthentication for DirectAccess clients, when creating the client SSL profile, click Custom above the Client Authentication section and choose Require from the Client Certificate drop-down list and Always from the Frequency drop-down list. In addition, choose your internal PKI’s root Certification Authority (CA) certificate from the Trusted Certificate Authorities drop-down list and from the Advertised Certificate Authorities drop-down list.

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using F5 BIG-IP

Summary

Enabling client certificate authentication for IP-HTTPS connections ensures that only authorized DirectAccess clients can establish a connection to the DirectAccess server and obtain an IPv6 address. It also prevents an unauthorized user from performing network reconnaissance or launching IPv6 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Introduction

When preparing a DirectAccess server, an SSL certificate is required for the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology. This certificate is often issued by a public Certification Authority (CA), but it can also be issued an organization’s internal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

SSL Certificate

Commonly an SSL certificate is issued for a single hostname, or subject. As long as the hostname matches the subject, everything works fine.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Multi-SAN SSL Certificate

To ease the management burden of using multiple certificates, or reduce the expense associated with using a wildcard certificate, organizations can request a multi-SAN (Subject Alternative Name) certificate, which matches more than one subject. The additional subjects are included in the Subject Alternative Name field on the SSL certificate.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS
A single multi-SAN certificate can be installed on multiple hosts and will work without issue as long as the hostname matches one of the SAN entries.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN Certificates

When implementing DirectAccess in a multisite configuration, each entry point in the organization will have a unique public hostname. Instinctively, using a multi-SAN SSL certificate in this scenario would seem ideal.

Unfortunately, support for multi-SAN SSL certificates with DirectAccess is limited. To use a multi-SAN certificate for DirectAccess IP-HTTPS, the public hostname must match the name listed in the Subject field. In the example above, the subject is da.richardhicks.net, with SAN entries for da-west.richardhicks.net and da-east.richardhicks.net.

In this scenario, only the public name da.richardhicks.net is supported for use with DirectAccess. It will not work for any of the SAN entries. For example, attempting to configure DirectAccess to use this certificate with the public hostname da-west.richardhicks.net will fail with the following error message.

The subject name of certificate CN=[certificate subject name] is invalid.
Select a certificate with a valid subject name.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Attempting to work around this issue by using the Set-DAServer PowerShell cmdlet also fails to recognize the SSL certificate correctly.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Summary

Using a multi-SAN SSL certificate for the DirectAccess IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology is only supported when the public hostname matches the subject name of the certificate. Configuring DirectAccess with a public hostname listed in the SAN list is not supported. For multisite DirectAccess deployments, individual certificates must be issued for each entry point. Alternatively, a wildcard certificate can be used.

Configure F5 BIG-IP for DirectAccess NLS

Recently I wrote about the Network Location Server (NLS) and its importance for DirectAccess deployments. As I described previously, the NLS is nothing more than a web server with an SSL certificate installed. It should also be made highly available to prevent potential service disruption caused by planned or unplanned NLS server downtime. Any web server can serve as the NLS. In addition, if you have the F5 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM) in your environment, you can easily configure the LTM to serve as the NLS.

To accomplish this, import the SSL certificate for the NLS and create an SSL client profile using its certificate and private key. Next, create a new iRule that contains the following code.

when HTTP_REQUEST {
HTTP::respond 200 
}

Configure F5 BGIP for DirectAccess NLS

Finally, create a new virtual server listening on TCP port 443 and assign this iRule as a resource for the virtual server. Once NLS reachability has been verified, update the DirectAccess configuration using the Remote Access Management console or the Set-DANetworkLocationServer PowerShell cmdlet.

Configuration Guidance for DirectAccess Security Advisory KB2862152

Introduction

Since Microsoft released security advisory KB2862152, there has been much confusion surrounding where the associated update should be installed, in what deployment scenarios it needs to be installed, and what the best way to configure it is. Recently my colleague and good friend Jason Jones and I worked together to research and answer these questions.

Overview

Microsoft security advisory KB2862152 addresses a vulnerability in IPsec that could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by spoofing a DirectAccess server to intercept network traffic and potentially capture encrypted domain credentials. The associated update is designed to allow security administrators to configure DirectAccess clients to perform more rigorous validation checks when establishing the DirectAccess IPsec tunnels. It’s important to understand that without additional client-side configuration, this security update does nothing.

Windows 8 Clients

For DirectAccess deployments that use Kerberos authentication (Kerberos Proxy), the update needs to be installed on all Windows 8.x clients. No updates are required for Windows 7 clients as they are not supported using this deployment model. To enforce additional validation checks, configure the registry on the Windows 8.x DirectAccess clients with the IP addresses and Service Principal Name (SPN) of the DirectAccess server as outlined here.

Windows 7 Clients

For DirectAccess deployments that use certificate-based authentication, the update needs to be installed on all Windows 7 clients. No updates are required for Windows 8.x client using this deployment model. To enforce additional validation checks, configure the registry on the Windows 7 DirectAccess clients with the IP addresses and either the fully-qualified domain name (FQDN) of the DirectAccess server (not recommended) or the Object Identifier (OID) of the computer certificated used for IPsec authentication (recommended, with custom OID).

The choice between using FQDN or OID is a challenging one, however. Choosing to validate the DNS name is simple and straightforward, but this information may be known to an attacker, or perhaps discoverable, allowing them to spoof it. In addition, there is a limit of 10 DNS names supported using this method, which can be potentially limiting, especially in large, multi-site deployments. Using the certificate OID is even more problematic, because by default it uses a well-known Server Authentication EKU OID (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) common to many Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate templates which, of course, could be spoofed by an attacker even easier.

The most effective implementation of this security update for DirectAccess deployments that use certificate-based authentication is to use the OID option with a certificate configured with a custom OID. Custom OIDs are unique to your organization and will help prevent spoofing by using a unique value that is much harder to guess or determine. The remainder of this article will outline how to configure and deploy a certificate with a custom OID along with implementation details for configuring the appropriate client-side registry settings via group policy to enforce the additional validation checks.

Server Configuration

To implement this, it will require creating and deploying a new certificate template. In the Certificate Services management console, right-click Certificate Templates and choose Manage. Right-click the Computer certificate template and choose Duplicate Template. Select the General tab and give the template a descriptive name.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

Select the Extensions tab, highlight Application Policies and click Edit. Click Add and then New, and then provide a descriptive name. Leave the OID as is and click Ok to continue.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

Right-click once again on Certificate Templates and choose New and then Certificate Template to Issue. Select the certificate template you just created and click Ok.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

Once complete you can request a new certificate for each of your DirectAccess servers using this new template.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

After you have successfully installed the computer certificate using this new template, be sure to delete the old computer certificate on each DirectAccess server. No further changes are required on the DirectAccess server.

Note: If you are assigning a computer certificate to the DirectAccess server via group policy auto enrollment, the certificate will be reinstalled again after it is deleted, once group policy refreshes. To avoid this situation you will need to deny access to this GPO to ensure that only a single computer certificate with the custom OID is installed on the DirectAccess server.

Client Configuration

To instruct the client to validate the tunnel endpoint IPv6 address and the OID of the DirectAccess server certificate before initiating IPsec tunnels we’ll need to configure registry settings on our DirectAccess clients. Jason Jones’ article describes which settings need to be made and when, so I won’t duplicate his efforts here. However, it is recommended that you deploy these settings using group policy, which I will cover.

To create a Group Policy Object (GPO) to deploy these registry settings, open the Group Policy Management Console, expand the target domain, right-click Group Policy Objects and select New. Give the new GPO a descriptive name and click Ok. Right-click the newly created GPO and choose Edit. Expand Computer Configuration, Preferences, and Windows Settings. Right-click Registry and choose New and then Registry Item. Select Update for the action and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE for the hive. Enter

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IKEEXT\Parameters\IPsecTunnelConfig\AuthIP\Cert

for the Key Path and enter DTE1 for the value. Select REG_MULTI_SZ for the Value Type and in the Value Data enter the IPv6 address of the first DTE. On the next line enter EKU:<OID> and click Ok.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

Repeat this procedure for each tunnel endpoint. Finally, highlight the GPO and change the Security Filtering from Authenticated Users to the security group for your DirectAccess clients and link the GPO to the domain.

DirectAccess KB2862152 Implementation Guidance

Exercise extreme caution when creating and implementing these GPOs to enforce additional validation checks. If there’s a typo somewhere or you forget a DTE, you could potentially orphan your DirectAccess clients. I recommend testing your changes by manually adding the registry entries required and then copying/pasting those settings to the GPO in Active Directory when you’re ready to deploy globally. Also, don’t forget that you’ll need to update GPOs each time you add a cluster node or multisite entry point.

DirectAccess Clients and TPM

I’ve been frustrated recently with a number of articles and blog posts I’ve seen indicating Windows 8 DirectAccess clients connecting to a Windows Server 2012 DirectAccess server require a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and the use of smart cards for authentication. This is a myth, and nothing could be further from the truth. TPM and smart cards are indeed supported (TPM with Windows 8, smart cards with Windows 7 and Windows 8 DirectAccess clients) but they are not explicitly required. For the posts I’ve seen I have asked the authors to correct their statements, and to their credit some of them have. Others, unfortunately, have not. I’m not sure if they are simply misinformed or if they are deliberately misleading their readers to downplay DirectAccess in an effort to sell another VPN solution. Regardless, I am compelled to set the record straight here. So, to be perfectly clear:

TPM is NOT a requirement for DirectAccess clients.

There you have it. Now go out and deploy DirectAccess today!

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