All posts in category Windows 8

DirectAccess DNS Records Explained

After installing and configuring DirectAccess with Windows Server 2012 R2, several new host records appear automatically in the internal DNS (assuming dynamic DNS is supported, of course). One of them is directaccess-corpConnectivityHost and the other is directaccess-WebProbeHost. These DirectAccess DNS entries are used by Windows 8 and later clients for connectivity checks at various stages of DirectAccess connection establishment.

DirectAccess DNS Records Explained

Figure 1 – DirectAccess DNS records for IPv4-only network.

DirectAccess DNS Records Explained

Figure 2 – DirectAccess DNS records for dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 network.

Here is a detailed description for each of these DirectAccess DNS entries.

directaccess-corpConnectivityHost – This DNS host record includes both A and AAAA records when deployed on IPv4-only networks. Its A host record resolves to 127.0.0.1, which is the IPv4 loopback address. Its AAAA host record resolves to an IPv6 address that is a combination of the DirectAccess NAT64 IPv6 prefix and 7F00:1 (the hexadecimal equivalent of 127.0.0.1). When DirectAccess is configured on a network with native IPv6, the directaccess-corpConnectivityHost DNS record will only include a single AAAA record resolving to ::1.

This host record is used by the DirectAccess client to determine if name resolution for the corporate namespace is working after the IPv6 transition tunnel (6to4, Teredo, or IP-HTTPS) has been established. It does this by attempting to resolve the hostname directaccess-corpConnectivityHost.<corp_fqdn> (e.g. directaccess-corpConnectivityHost.corp.example.net) to an IPv6 address that it expects (the organization’s NAT64 prefix + 7F00:1 or ::1). If it does not resolve, or resolves to a different address, the client will assume that the transition tunnel was not established successfully and, if possible, fall back to another IPv6 transition protocol and repeat the process until it is successful.

Note: The DirectAccess client does not attempt to connect to the IP address resolved by directaccess-corpConnectivityHost. It simply compares the IP address returned by the query to the expected address (NAT64 prefix + 7F00:1 or ::1).

directaccess-WebProbeHost – This DNS host record includes only A records and resolves to the IPv4 address assigned to the internal network interface of the DirectAccess server. If load balancing is enabled, this host record will resolve to the virtual IP address (VIP) of the array. For multisite deployments there will be directaccess-WebProbeHost A host records for each entry point in the organization.

This host record is used by the DirectAccess client to verify end-to-end corporate network connectivity over the DirectAccess connection. The client will attempt to connect to the directaccess-WebProbeHost URL using HTTP. If successful, the DirectAccess connectivity status indicator will show Connected.

If any of these DirectAccess DNS records are missing or incorrect, a number of issues may arise. If the directaccess-corpConnectivityHost host record is missing or incorrect, DirectAccess IPv6 transition tunnel establishment may fail. If the directaccess-WebProbeHost record is missing or incorrect, the DirectAccess connectivity status indicator will perpetually show Connecting. This commonly occurs when an external load balancer is used and a virtual server isn’t created for the web probe host port (TCP 80). In addition, these DirectAccess DNS entries are not static and may be deleted if DNS scavenging of stale resource records is enabled on the DNS server.

67 Comments
by Richard M. Hicks on July 6, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in 6to4, DirectAccess, IP-HTTPS, IPv6, IPv6 Transition, Remote Access, Teredo, Windows 10, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2
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Posted by Richard M. Hicks on July 6, 2015

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2015/07/06/directaccess-dns-records-explained/

Provisioning DirectAccess Clients using Windows Offline Domain Join

DirectAccess on Microsoft WindowsOne of the many advantages DirectAccess has over traditional client-based VPN is the ease with which DirectAccess clients can be provisioned. DirectAccess does not require any special software to be installed on the client. Everything that DirectAccess needs is included as part of the operating system. This makes onboarding a client for DirectAccess is as simple as adding a computer account to the DirectAccess client security group in Active Directory. That’s it! As soon as the client restarts it will be configured for DirectAccess.

This process works great if the client computer is already joined to the domain and has access to the LAN (either directly connected or via client-based VPN). But what if the client is in a remote location and isn’t yet joined to the domain? Offline Domain Join (ODJ) can help. ODJ is a feature of the Windows operating system introduced with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 that allows an administrator to join a host to the domain without requiring the host to contact a domain controller. Beginning with Windows 8 and Server 2012, ODJ supports new command-line parameters that allow the administrator to configure the client machine to include DirectAccess certificates and policies.

Note: ODJ will only provision DirectAccess certificates and policies for Windows 8.x and later clients. ODJ with Windows 7 clients is limited to joining the domain only. ODJ cannot provision Windows 7 clients for DirectAccess.

To use ODJ to provision a DirectAccess client, first create a computer account in Active Directory and then add the account to the DirectAccess client security group. Next, open an elevated Command Prompt window on the DirectAccess server and execute the following command.

djoin.exe /provision /machine <client_machine_name>
/domain <domain_name> /policynames
<DirectAccess_client_settings_ GPO_name>
/certtemplate <DirectAccess_certificate_template_name>
/savefile <filename> /reuse

For example:

djoin.exe /provision /machine client5
/domain lab.richardhicks.net
/policynames "DirectAccess Client Settings"
/certtemplate machine
/savefile c:\users\rhicks\desktop\provision.txt /reuse

Provisioning DirectAccess Clients using Windows Offline Domain Join

On the DirectAccess client, copy the ODJ provisioning file locally. Open an elevated Command Prompt window and execute the following command.

djoin.exe /requestodj /loadfile <filename>
/windowspath <Windows_directory> /localos

For example:

djoin.exe /requestodj /loadfile c:\users\setup\provision.txt
/windowspath C:\Windows /localos

Provisioning DirectAccess Clients using Windows Offline Domain Join

After a restart, the client will be joined to the domain and now be able to establish a DirectAccess connection to the corporate network. Users can now log on with their domain credentials.

24 Comments
by Richard M. Hicks on June 22, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in DirectAccess, Remote Access, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2
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Posted by Richard M. Hicks on June 22, 2015

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2015/06/22/provisioning-directaccess-clients-using-windows-offline-domain-join/

DirectAccess and the TLS Logjam Attack

Another critical flaw affecting Transport Layer Security (TLS) was discovered recently that could put some organizations at risk. The “Logjam” attack exploits a weakness in how the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used. An attacker, acting as a man-in-the-middle, can potentially force a downgrade of the TLS connection, resulting in the use of weak cryptography. The Qualys SSL Labs SSL Server Test has been updated to identify this vulnerability. When testing a DirectAccess server you will receive the following warning message.

“This server supports weak Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange parameters. Grade capped to B.”

DirectAccess and the Logjam Attack

DirectAccess leverages SSL and TLS as part of the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition protocol, which is used to tunnel IPv6 packets over the IPv4 Internet. These IPv6 packets are encrypted using IPsec. If an attacker were to break the SSL/TLS connection they would gain nothing. Because of this, a dedicated DirectAccess server is unaffected by the Logjam attack. Mitigating it would provide no additional protection, so you can safely ignore the warning about weak DH key exchange parameters being supported.

However, if DirectAccess has been configured to use one-time password (OTP) authentication, the client-based VPN role has been enabled and configured, or the Web Application Proxy (WAP) role has been installed on the DirectAccess server, then the Logjam attack represents a serious risk and should be mitigated. Also, in some cases it may be desirable to make this change on a dedicated DirectAccess server just to prevent an audit finding and avoid having to explain why the DirectAccess workload would be unaffected by this attack.

To mitigate this vulnerability it will be necessary to remove support for cipher suites that use the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol on the DirectAccess server. This is accomplished by opening the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) on the DirectAccess server and expanding Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, and Network. Select SSL Configuration Settings and then double-click SSL Cipher Suite Order. Select Enabled and then replace the default list of cipher suites with the following list.

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_P256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA

DirectAccess and the Logjam Attack

Once complete, restart the DirectAccess server. The Qualys SSL Labs server test should no longer give a warning about the use of weak Diffie-Hellman keys. In addition, this reordering and optimization of cipher suites will also improve the protocol support and key exchange scores, as shown here.

DirectAccess and the Logjam Attack

As a reminder, and overall rating of “F” is expected when testing a dedicated DirectAccess server. By design, DirectAccess provides support for null cipher suites to improve scalability and performance for Windows 8.x and later DirectAccess clients. More details here.

1 Comment
by Richard M. Hicks on June 1, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in DirectAccess, Encryption, IP-HTTPS, IPv6, IPv6 Transition, Remote Access, SSL and TLS, VPN, Web Application Proxy, Windows 10, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2
Tagged , , , , , , , , , ,

Posted by Richard M. Hicks on June 1, 2015

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2015/06/01/directaccess-and-the-tls-logjam-attack/

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