Webinar: Certificate Automation in Practice – A Technical Deep Dive

If you manage Windows Server workloads that require public TLS certificates like Always On VPN, DirectAccess, Remote Desktop Gateway, Internet Information Services (IIS), and others, you know that certificate expirations don’t send friendly reminders. Certificates expire quietly. Too often, end users are the ones who sound the alarm—when resources are already unavailable. Of course, this never happens at a convenient time. It’s usually the middle of the night, on the weekend.

Missed the event? Watch the on-demand replay here.

Current State

Most Windows IT teams are still managing certificates the same way they did years ago, using spreadsheets, calendar reminders, and an assortment of renewal scripts. It usually works… until it suddenly doesn’t.

Free Webinar

I’m pleased to announce that I’ll be joining Todd Gardner from CertKit for a free live webinar on Tuesday, June 16, at 11:00 AM CDT, in which we will break down the following:

  • Why certificate mismanagement causes so much pain at scale
  • How to build real automation that works across your full environment, including internal services and vendor appliances
  • A live demonstration of CertKit showing end-to-end discovery, monitoring, and automated renewal

There will also be time for live Q&A, so bring your questions!

Join Us!

If you’re tired of patching the problem with fragile scripts and assorted reminders, join us to learn about a fully automated solution that can dramatically improve the situation. Register now and don’t miss this opportunity to reduce your TLS certificate management burden and end the need for 2 AM certificate renewal fire drills.

Webinar Details

Webinar: TLS Certificate Automation for Windows Infrastructure
Hosts: Todd Gardner (CertKit) and Richard Hicks (Richard M. Hicks Consulting, Inc.)
Date: Tuesday, June 16
Time: 11:00 AM CDT
Registration: Click here to register!

Recording

If you are unable to attend the live session, be sure to register to receive a link to the recorded session for on-demand viewing.

Microsoft AD CS Adds Post-Quantum Cryptography Support with ML-DSA

Despite predictions of its decline, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) continues to evolve. Following significant enhancements introduced in late 2025, including CRL partitioning and support for 16K database pages, the May 2026 update adds another important capability: support for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

ML-DSA

Specifically, the May 2026 update adds support for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 in Windows Server 2025 for AD CS. This enables administrators to begin evaluating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and assessing PQC readiness in enterprise PKI environments

Configuration

After applying the May 2026 update to an issuing Certification Authority (CA), administrators will find new PQC algorithms under the Algorithm name drop-down list, as shown here.

Certificate template Cryptography tab listing the ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 algorithms

Note: If you don’t see these new algorithms, ensure you have selected Key Storage Provider from the Provider Category drop-down list. In addition, ensure that you select Signature on the Request Handling tab.

Test Results

Initial testing across common enterprise certificate scenarios produced mixed results. While PQC works well in some scenarios, other workloads still show limitations.

Code Signing

Code signing with an ML-DSA-44 certificate issued by AD CS works perfectly. For example, I can use Set-AuthenticodeSignature to sign a PowerShell script, as shown here.

Set-AuthenticodeSignature signing a PowerShell script with an ML-DSA-44 certificate

Viewing the file’s properties shows that the encryption algorithm used to sign the file was ML-DSA-44, as expected.

File digital signature details showing the ML-DSA-44 signature algorithm

IIS

TLS-based workloads proved more challenging. Attempts to configure an HTTPS binding in IIS failed with the following error message.

There was an error while performing this operation. A specified logon session does not exist. It may already have been terminated. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x80070520).

IIS error binding an ML-DSA certificate to an HTTPS site: a specified logon session does not exist

RRAS and SSTP

Similar limitations occurred when testing remote-access VPN scenarios using RRAS and SSTP. Specifically, configuring a PQC TLS certificate for SSTP in RRAS failed. Although I was able to assign the certificate using Set-RemoteAccess, the RemoteAccess service failed to start.

RemoteAccess service failing after assigning an ML-DSA certificate for SSTP

Remote Desktop

Unfortunately, using PQC certificates for RDP also fails. Although I could assign the PQC certificate to the RDP listener, clients fail to connect using RDP and return the following error message.

This computer can’t connect to the remote computer. Try connecting again. If the problem continues, contact the owner of the remote computer or your network administrator.

Error code: 0x904
Extended error code: 0x7

Remote Desktop connection error 0x904 with extended error 0x7 when using an ML-DSA certificate

Summary

The May 2026 update marks an important milestone for AD CS by introducing initial support for PQC algorithms, allowing organizations to begin evaluating ML-DSA certificates in enterprise environments. Early testing shows promising results for signing scenarios such as code signing; however, broader infrastructure workloads, including TLS, VPN, and Remote Desktop, remain limited today. Although PQC support is still in its early stages, these updates demonstrate Microsoft’s ongoing investment in AD CS and provide administrators with an opportunity to begin preparing their PKI environments for the post-quantum future. Additional PQC enhancements, including ML-KEM support and broader ecosystem integration, are anticipated in future Windows updates.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Microsoft May 2026 Security Updates (KB5087539)

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the Enterprise: Timeline and Readiness

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): Enterprise Resources and Guidance

The Case for 6-Day Public TLS Certificates

In February 2025, Let’s Encrypt introduced the option to enroll for public TLS certificates with a 6-day validity period.  This represents a significant shift toward short-lived certificates and aligns with the broader industry trend of reducing certificate lifetimes to improve security. While this may seem aggressive at first glance, organizations that have embraced automation will find that extremely short-lived certificates offer compelling security and operational advantages in some scenarios.

Benefits

Extremely short-lived TLS certificates offer several important security and operational benefits, particularly for organizations that have already embraced automation for certificate lifecycle management. Key advantages include:

  • Minimized Risk of Key Compromise – 6-day certificates dramatically reduce the exposure window of private key compromise events, giving attackers a limited window of opportunity to exploit key access.
  • Automation Validation – Short-lived certificates force organizations to adopt and validate automated enrollment and renewal processes, ensuring that certificate lifecycle management is reliable and resilient.
  • IP Address Support – 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt support IP addresses, allowing administrators to secure workloads that do not have entries in DNS.

Use Cases

6-day TLS certificates are well-suited for a range of modern workloads, especially those that benefit from frequent key rotation, automation, and dynamic provisioning. 6-Day TLS certificates are well-suited for the following workloads:

  • High Value Resources – Using 6-day TLS certificates is beneficial for high-security or sensitive workloads where frequent key rotation is desired.
  • Test Labs – High-frequency certificate rotation allows for thorough testing of automation processes to ensure operational reliability of production deployments. Rapid iteration of 6-day TLS certificates allows administrators to identify potential issues and implement changes before long-term certificates expire.
  • Ephemeral Infrastructure – 6-day TLS certificates work well with dynamic workloads such as containers, where environments are rapidly provisioned and destroyed. These hosts might only live for a few hours or days, making short-lived certificates an ideal choice in this scenario.
  • Workload Bootstrapping – 6-day TLS certificates can be used where a certificate is required only to perform initial configuration. For example, an IP-based TLS certificate can be used to configure TLS services, then later migrated to a long-term certificate when DNS is configured and the service is placed into production.

Enterprise Usage

Administrators will find that 6-day public TLS certificates work well with many popular Windows Server workloads. Here are a few examples.

  • Always On VPN – Enterprise secure remote access is a popular target for attackers because the service is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates ensures frequent key rotation, reducing exposure to key compromise.
  • Remote Desktop Services – Many organizations continue to use Remote Desktop Gateway to provide access to on-premises applications, another workload that is exposed to the Internet. Using 6-day TLS certificates is equally effective in this scenario.

What About DirectAccess?

Although DirectAccess would be another ideal Windows Server workload for 6-day TLS certificates, my testing shows that it does not work. The root cause is that 6-day TLS certificates from Let’s Encrypt do NOT include subject information (the field is blank). Unfortunately, because of the way in which DirectAccess validates this certificate, it requires information in this field. More details can be found here.

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2026/03/16/directaccess-iphttps-and-lets-encrypt-6-day-certificates/

Summary

If you are automating certificate enrollment and renewal, it shouldn’t matter if the certificate is valid for 6 days or 60 days. In fact, shorter lifetimes can significantly improve your security posture by minimizing risk and enforcing operational discipline around certificate management. Organizations that invest in automation today will be well-positioned to adopt even shorter certificate lifetimes in the future, while those relying on manual processes will find it increasingly difficult to keep up.

Questions?

Do you have questions about certificate lifecycle automation in your environment? I’m happy to help you validate your approach and address any challenges you’re encountering. Fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more information.

Additional Information

Let’s Encrypt Issues First Six-Day Certificate

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in the Enterprise

Webinar: Certificate Automation for Windows Infrastructure

If you manage Windows Server workloads that require public TLS certificates like Always On VPN, DirectAccess, Remote Desktop Gateway, Internet Information Services (IIS), and others, you know that certificate expirations don’t send friendly reminders. Certificates expire quietly. Too often, end users are the ones who sound the alarm—when resources are already unavailable. Of course, this never happens at a convenient time. It’s usually the middle of the night, on the weekend.

Did you miss the webinar? You can view it on demand here!

Current State

Most Windows IT teams are still managing certificates the same way they did years ago, using spreadsheets, calendar reminders, and an assortment of renewal scripts. It usually works… until it suddenly doesn’t.

Free Webinar

I’m pleased to announce that I’ll be joining Todd Gardner from CertKit for a free live webinar on Tuesday, May 26, at 11:00 AM CDT, in which we will break down the following:

  • Why certificate mismanagement causes so much pain at scale
  • How to build real automation that works across your full environment, including internal services and vendor appliances
  • A live demonstration of CertKit showing end-to-end discovery, monitoring, and automated renewal

There will also be time for live Q&A, so bring your questions!

Join Us!

If you’re tired of patching the problem with fragile scripts and assorted reminders, join us to learn about a fully automated solution that can dramatically improve the situation. Register now and don’t miss this opportunity to reduce your TLS certificate management burden and end the need for 2 AM certificate renewal fire drills.

Webinar Details

Webinar: TLS Certificate Automation for Windows Infrastructure
Hosts: Todd Gardner (CertKit) and Richard Hicks (Richard M. Hicks Consulting, Inc.)
Date: Tuesday, May 26
Time: 11:00 AM CDT
Registration: Click here to register!

Recording

If you missed the live event, you can view the on demand recording here!

IIS TLS Certificate Deployment with CertKit

With public TLS certificate lifetimes shrinking to just 47 days by 2029, administrators must find ways to automate certificate enrollment and renewal for workloads that require them. One of the most common is Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS). I’ve been using CertKit.io to handle this process for workloads like Always On VPN and DirectAccess, so it made sense to migrate my public-facing IIS servers to this solution as well. The migration went smoothly, but I encountered an unexpected issue when deploying a new IIS server using CertKit.

CertKit Agent

CertKit Agents make loading certificates on the server a breeze. The CertKit agent automatically detects installed software (e.g., Terminal Services, RRAS, DirectAccess, IIS, etc.) and handles the server-side process of assigning the TLS certificate to the application. For RRAS and DirectAccess, it works perfectly. For an IIS server with an HTTPS binding and TLS certificate already configured, it works without issue as well. However, I ran into a snag when I tried to deploy a certificate to a brand-new IIS server.

New Server

After installing the CertKit agent on an IIS server, it searches for existing HTTPS web bindings to identify the workload. However, on a freshly installed IIS server, no HTTPS bindings have been configured yet, so the agent doesn’t recognize the IIS workload.

Of course, you could create an HTTPS web binding before installing the agent, but you’ll need a TLS certificate first. This introduces the classic “chicken and egg” scenario. 🤪 Fortunately, there are a few ways to resolve the issue.

Windows Certificate Store

With this method, you configure the CertKit agent to download and install the certificate into the local computer certificate store on the IIS server. Once complete, you can create the HTTPS binding in the IIS Manager console or by using PowerShell. After that, restart the CertKit agent service by running the following PowerShell command.

Restart-Service -Name certkit-agent -PassThru

The IIS workload will now appear in the agent’s Software list. At that point, you can delete the Windows certificate store configuration and replace it with the IIS configuration.

Self-Signed Certificate

Using this method before installing the CertKit agent allows the agent to automatically discover IIS after installation, which can be helpful when deploying IIS servers programmatically. First, create a short-lived certificate (one day in this example) and configure the IIS site binding by running the following PowerShell commands.

$Hostname = 'www.example.net'
$Certificate = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName $Hostname -CertStoreLocation 'Cert:\LocalMachine\My' -KeyAlgorithm RSA -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm SHA256 -NotAfter (Get-Date).AddDays(1) -TextExtension @('2.5.29.37={text}1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1')
$Params = @{
    Name                 = 'Default Web Site'
    BindingInformation   = '*:443:'
    Protocol             = 'https'
    CertificateThumbPrint = $Certificate.Thumbprint
    CertStoreLocation    = 'Cert:\LocalMachine\My'
}
New-IISSiteBinding @Params

Once complete, run iisreset.exe to apply the changes. Now, when you install the CertKit agent, it will automatically detect IIS, and you can assign your public TLS certificate accordingly. You can delete the old self-signed certificate later if desired.

Summary

If you’re automating server builds, the self-signed certificate approach is typically the easiest because it enables IIS discovery immediately. For ad-hoc deployments, installing to the Windows certificate store first is usually the quickest option.

Additional Information

CertKit.io

CerKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS TLS Certificates

DirectAccess IPHTTPS and Let’s Encrypt 6-Day Certificates

I’ve written extensively about how public TLS certificate lifetimes will drop to just 47 days by March 2029. Before then, we’ll see certificate lifetimes gradually drop from the current 398 days to 200 days on March 15, 2026, and then to 100 days on March 15, 2027. In preparation for this, I’ve been working with many customers to deploy automated certificate enrollment and renewal solutions to eliminate the need for manual intervention. Interestingly, Let’s Encrypt now offers extremely short-lived certificates that are good for just 6 days! While they work just fine for Always On VPN, I discovered they will not work for DirectAccess.

6-Day Certificate

After successfully enrolling for a 6-day TLS certificate from Let’s Encrypt (I used CertKit, BTW!), I encountered an error when trying to assign the short-lived certificate to the IP-HTTPS listener in the DirectAccess configuration. Specifically, when running the Set-RemoteAccess PowerShell command, I received the following error.

Set-RemoteAccess: The parameter is incorrect.

Further investigation showed that I could install other public TLS certificates just fine. For some reason, though, DirectAccess did not like this new 6-day certificate.

Missing Subject Name

After digging a bit deeper, I realized the Subject field of the new 6-day Let’s Encrypt certificate was empty.

Subject vs. SAN in Modern TLS

Modern TLS clients rely entirely on the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field for identity validation, and the older practice of matching against the certificate’s Subject field has been phased out for many years. Many certificate authorities, including Let’s Encrypt, now leave the Subject field empty because it no longer serves a functional purpose in current TLS implementations. DirectAccess still expects this field to contain data and does not properly fall back to SAN‑only validation. As a result, any certificate with an empty Subject field, such as the new 6‑day certificates from Let’s Encrypt, will fail when applied to the DirectAccess IP‑HTTPS listener.

Workaround

Admittedly, using 6-Day public TLS certificates for DirectAccess is extreme and likely overkill for this workload. The good news is that DirectAccess still works perfectly with 90-day Let’s Encrypt certificates, so the lack of 6-day certificate support should not be impactful.

CertKit

Have you heard about CertKit? CertKit, an online service for automating Let’s Encrypt certificate enrollment and renewal, has added support for Always On VPN and DirectAccess. Find details on leveraging it for public TLS certificates for these solutions here.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Always On VPN and 47-Day Public TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in Enterprise Environments

CertKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS TLS Certificates

CertKit Agent Support for Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS TLS Certificates

With public TLS certificate lifetimes set to drop to 200 days soon (next week!), Always On VPN and DirectAccess administrators face an increased risk of service disruption if certificates aren’t renewed on time. These shorter certificate lifetimes require more frequent renewals, substantially increasing management overhead. Although 200 days equate to roughly a twice-a-year renewal, lifetimes will decrease further to 100 days next year and eventually to just 47 days in 2029. SSTP and IP-HTTPS are TLS-based tunneling protocols used by Always On VPN and DirectAccess, respectively, tying their certificate health directly to remote access availability. Now is the time to automate the enrollment and renewal of Always On VPN SSTP and DirectAccess IP-HTTPS/TLS certificates to ensure reliable operation in the future.

Always On VPN

Previously, I wrote about using CertKit.io to automate the enrollment and renewal of public TLS certificates for Always On VPN. CertKit is an online service that administrators can use to delegate the task of enrolling for short-lived certificates from Let’s Encrypt. In that post, I shared some sample code to retrieve the certificate from CertKit and assign it to the SSTP listener for the Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS). However, CertKit added new features to its solution, eliminating the need for additional code.

CertKit Agents

Recently, CertKit introduced CertKit Agents. These lightweight software agents are installed on Windows Servers (other operating systems are supported as well) to automate the process of downloading CertKit certificates and installing them in the local computer certificate store. Importantly, they now specifically support both the Always On VPN (SSTP) and DirectAccess (IP-HTTPS) workloads natively.

Always On VPN

The CertKit agent automatically detects the Routing and Remote Access (RRAS) workload and updates the certificate binding for the SSTP listener accordingly. Since this process requires a service restart, which terminates all current VPN connections, CertKit allows you to select an outage window for certificate updates.

Here, administrators can define the day(s) and time window during which the agent is authorized to restart the RemoteAccess service when updating the TLS certificate for SSTP. The day and time are based on the server’s configured time zone settings.

DirectAccess

Beginning with CertKit agent v1.6.2, the agent automatically detects whether DirectAccess is configured, enabling IP-HTTPS TLS certificates to be automatically enrolled and renewed. However, additional configuration is required. The following changes must be made to support CertKit for DirectAccess.

  • Service Account – Administrators must configure a service account in Active Directory for the CertKit agent. A Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) is preferred, but a standard domain service account is also supported.
  • GPO Delegation – CertKit service account must be delegated the ‘Edit settings, delete, and modify security’ permission on the DirectAccess server and client settings GPOs.
  • Log On as a Service – When using a domain service account, administrators must grant the CertKit service the ‘Log on as a service’ right on the DirectAccess server. However, when using gMSA, the ‘Log on as a service’ right is not required.
  • Local Administrator – Administrators must also add the CertKit agent service account to the Local Administrators group on the server.

Configuration Script

I have published a PowerShell script to simplify configuring the CertKit agent on DirectAccess servers. The script automatically performs all required tasks for the CertKit agent to work with DirectAccess. You will find the Enable-DACertKit.ps1 PowerShell script on GitHub. Alternatively, you can install the script directly from the PowerShell Gallery.

Install-Script -Name Enable-DACertKit -Scope CurrentUser

After installing the CertKit agent, run the PowerShell script to complete the configuration. Next, authorize the agent in the CertKit management portal and assign a certificate. Once complete, CertKit can fully manage the IP-HTTPS TLS certificate for DirectAccess.

Note: Like Always On VPN, changes to the DirectAccess IP-HTTPS certificate require a service restart, which is disruptive. Be sure to define a maintenance window (as shown previously) to ensure the change is made during non-peak times.

Summary

As TLS certificate lifecycles continue to shrink, automating certificate enrollment and renewal has become essential for both Always On VPN and DirectAccess environments. CertKit agents streamline this process by automatically retrieving, installing, and binding certificates for SSTP and IP-HTTPS, all while supporting scheduled outage windows to minimize disruption. With these new capabilities, administrators can significantly reduce operational overhead and ensure consistent, reliable remote access services without manual intervention. Visit CertKit.io to get started today.

More Information

If you would like to learn more about CertKit or see a demonstration with Always On VPN or DirectAccess, fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more details.

Additional Information

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Automation with CertKit

CertKit Agents

Enable-DACertKit.ps1 on GitHub

Enable Group Managed Service Accounts

The Myth of the Publish Certificate in Active Directory Setting

Certificate templates in Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) provide powerful, preconfigured settings that enable administrators to issue certificates tailored for specific purposes. For example, a certificate template could allow a user to authenticate to a Wi-Fi network or VPN gateway. Another template might control policies for enrolling for web server certificates in the enterprise. Templates define settings such as cryptographic parameters (key algorithm and length), validity period, application policies, enrollment requirements, and more. While there are myriad settings to choose from, one in particular is often enabled unnecessarily. And while it works without issue, there can be some hidden downsides to enabling this setting.

Publish Certificate in Active Directory

When creating a certificate template, there’s an option on the General tab called Publish certificate in Active Directory. From experience, this is one of the most misunderstood settings for certificate templates.

Certificate template General tab with the Publish certificate in Active Directory option

Intuitively, it would make sense to check this box on all published certificate templates. After all, I want the users or devices targeted by this certificate template to find them in Active Directory (AD) so they can enroll. Many administrators believe that enabling this setting is required to ‘see’ the published certificate template on the endpoint, as shown here.

Active Directory Users and Computers Published Certificates tab listing certificates published for a user

However, enabling the Publish certificate in Active Directory option is not required for enrollment. To ‘see’ certificates available for enrollment, the user or device must only have the Enroll permission on the template.

What Is It For?

So, what does the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting do? When this option is enabled, the issuing CA adds the certificate to the requesting principal’s Active Directory account. There are two common scenarios where this is required.

S/MIME

Adding a user’s certificate to their AD account makes the public key centrally discoverable, allowing Outlook and other S/MIME-enabled clients to automatically find recipients’ certificates for secure email encryption and signature validation. Without the certificate published in AD, users must manually exchange certificates, breaking seamless S/MIME encryption in most enterprise environments.

Encrypting File System (EFS)

Publishing a user’s EFS certificate to their Active Directory account allows Windows to locate the correct public key automatically when encrypting files. It ensures recovery agents and key archival processes function properly. Without the certificate in AD, EFS can fail to encrypt data consistently across machines or prevent access to encrypted files when users roam or recover profiles.

Drawbacks

There are very few scenarios outside of S/MIME and EFS that require the Publish certificate in Active Directory option to be enabled. However, enabling it doesn’t necessarily break anything, and this setting is often enabled by default (or carried over from the source template when duplicating), so administrators may miss this option. Issuing certificates in this way introduces some potential problems.

AD Database Bloat

Adding a certificate to each principal’s AD object increases the size of each object, thereby increasing the total size of the AD database. For organizations with large directories with hundreds of thousands or even millions of accounts, adding unnecessary data to each account can be very expensive in terms of database size, replication traffic, backup storage, and overall domain performance. Making matters worse, certificates published to AD live perpetually. They are not removed automatically when certificates are revoked or expire.

Service Accounts

Service accounts used for certificate enrollment, such as the Microsoft Intune Certificate connector, can be especially challenging. Here, if the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting is enabled on the Intune certificate template, the CA will add a certificate to the service account for every certificate it issues. While you can have many certificates associated with a single account, there is an upper limit, approximately 1250, based on my testing. After that, certificates will continue to be issued, but adding them to AD will fail.

Remediation

The following recommendations can help administrators correct this misconfiguration and limit its impact in their environment.

Disable Unnecessary Certificate Publishing

Administrators should clear the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting on all certificate templates that do not explicitly require it, such as those used for S/MIME or Encrypting File System (EFS). This prevents new certificates from being written to user or computer objects and does not require certificates to be reissued.

Remove Published Certificates

Administrators can remove unnecessary certificates from user, computer, and service account objects in AD to reduce object and overall AD database sizes. Perform the following steps to remove unneeded certificates.

  1. Open the Active Directory Users and Computers management console (dsa.msc) and double-click the target principal.
  2. Select the Published Certificates tab.
  3. Select a certificate (or all certificates) and click Remove.
Removing published certificates from the Published Certificates tab in Active Directory Users and Computers

Important Note: Use extreme caution when deleting certificates! Do not delete any certificates unless you are certain they are not required.

Managed Service Accounts

Managed Service Accounts in AD do not have a Published Certificates tab. Administrators can use the Attribute Editor to remove individual certificates from the userCertificate attribute on the account.

Attribute Editor for a managed service account showing the userCertificate attribute

Managed Service Account Attribute Editor

userCertificate attribute entries for a managed service account

Managed Service Account userCertificate Entries

Unfortunately, there is no option to view the certificate in the UI for Managed Service Accounts. To view detailed certificate information, see the PowerShell section below.

Existing Certificates Are Not Removed Automatically

Disabling the Publish certificate in Active Directory setting only stops future certificates from being published in AD. Certificates already written to Active Directory are never removed automatically, even after they expire or are revoked. In environments where this setting has been enabled for an extended period, large numbers of stale certificates often accumulate and continue to increase the AD database size.

Intune Certificate Connector Considerations

This issue is especially problematic for high-volume enrollment scenarios that use service accounts, such as the Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector. When publishing is enabled for Intune certificate templates, certificates issued on behalf of users are added to the service account, quickly leading to excessive certificate accumulation and potential attribute limits.

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module

Manually performing this cleanup at scale is impractical. To assist administrators with cleaning up unnecessarily published certificates, I’ve created the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module. This module includes functions to enumerate AD accounts that include certificates, show and optionally export certificates for AD accounts, and remove published certificates. The module also includes a function to enumerate published certificate templates that include the Publish certificate in Active Directory option enabled. You can install the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module from the PowerShell gallery by running the following command.

Install-Module -Name ADPrincipalCertificate -Scope CurrentUser

See the ADPrincipalCertificate GitHub repository for detailed usage information.

Summary

While the Publish certificate in Active Directory option is helpful for S/MIME and EFS deployments, it is unnecessary for most other scenarios and is often enabled when it isn’t needed. This results in the unnecessary addition of certificates to AD accounts, causing individual objects and the entire AD database to grow without benefit. Sadly, many vendor guides indicate that this setting is required when it often isn’t, so many environments suffer from this misconfiguration. Administrators should review the certificate template configuration and disable this setting when it isn’t needed. Additionally, use the ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell module to perform cleanup, if required.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module on GitHub

ADPrincipalCertificate PowerShell Module in the PowerShell Gallery

Always On VPN SSTP Certificate Automation with CertKit

With public TLS certificates moving to significantly shorter certificate lifetimes, eventually just 47 days, Always On VPN administrators supporting Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) connections must prepare to address this eventuality. The first milestone for shortened public TLS certificate lifetimes is a few months, on March 15, 2026, when public TLS certificate lifetimes will be reduced from a maximum of 398 days to 200 days. One year later, on March 15, 2027, they will be reduced to just 100 days. Now is the time to begin planning an automated certificate enrollment solution to reduce administrative overhead and ensure uninterrupted connectivity for remote users.

Previous Approaches: PowerShell and Posh-ACME

In the past, I’ve written about using Let’s Encrypt Certificates for Always On VPN using the Posh-ACME PowerShell module. I’ve also posted some sample code to demonstrate how to integrate with a DNS provider to automate publishing the ACME challenge to public DNS for certificate enrollment verification. However, this assumes your DNS provider supports this option. Some do not. In addition, granting write permissions to public DNS via an API key introduces significant security risks. So, if direct ACME DNS automation isn’t viable in your environment, CertKit is an excellent alternative.

CertKit: Automated Certificate Issuance, Monitoring, and Alerting

To address these limitations, administrators can use the CertKit service. With CertKit, you delegate the Let’s Encrypt certificate enrollment process to them by simply creating a CNAME record in your public DNS. Once complete, CertKit handles the entire process transparently.

Issuance

Today, CertKit supports issuing certificates using Let’s Encrypt. In the future, support for additional certificate providers such as Google Trust and ZeroSSL will be added. CertKit supports Let’s Encrypt certificates using RSA (2048-bit) and Elliptic Curve (recommended). Certificates can be issued for an individual resource, a group of resources (multi-SAN), and a domain wildcard (e.g., *.example.net).

Monitoring

In addition to certificate issuance and management, CertKit offers domain TLS certificate monitoring to track your public assets. You can monitor your CertKit-managed certificates easily, but you can also add other services using TLS and track them on the same console. In this example, I’m using CertKit to manage certificates for two VPN servers (indicated by solid green dots) and to monitor my public websites, for which certificate management is handled by their respective hosting providers.

Alerts and Notifications

CertKit will automatically send emails to let you know when a certificate is expiring and if a CertKit-managed certificate has been renewed.

Pending certificate expiration.

Successful certificate renewal.

Certificate Retrieval

Once CertKit completes the enrollment process on your behalf, it stores all certificate files (.PFX, .PEM, and .KEY) in a secure S3-compatible storage bucket. While an administrator could easily retrieve and install them manually, automation will help reduce administrative overhead, especially as public TLS certificate lifetimes are further reduced. You can download certificate files programmatically in several ways.

PowerShell

The first way to download the certificate files from CertKit is to use the AWSPowerShell module. However, the AWSPowerShell is relatively heavy and is overkill for this specific use case. A better alternative is to use the MinIO client.

MinIO

The MinIO client (mc.exe) is an open-source command-line tool developed by MinIO. It provides access to any S3-compatible storage, which CertKit uses in its environment. MinIO is a single, portable executable installer that’s easy to use and well-documented.

Sample Code

I’ve published some sample code to demonstrate how to use the MinIO client to retrieve certificates from CertKit and install them on a Windows Server Routing and Remote Access (RRAS) server. You can find the sample code on GitHub here.

https://github.com/richardhicks/aovpn/blob/master/Install-SstpLetsEncryptCertificate-Certkit.ps1

Note: This sample code demonstrates how to download a .PFX file from CertKit and install it on the RRAS server. It is designed to run as a scheduled task in Windows during non-peak times. The code includes robust checks for service viability and will reboot the server if they fail. As such, this sample code could cause service disruptions, so use it with caution.

Cost

Today, CertKit is in beta and is free for everyone to use. In the future, there will be both free and paid tiers. You can learn more about their pricing models and sign up for the service at CertKit.io.

Learn More

If you’d like to learn more about CertKit and how you can leverage it for Always On VPN and other workloads in your environment, or you’d like to see a demonstration of CertKit, fill out the form below, and I’ll provide you with more information.

Additional Information

CertKit

Install-SstpLetsEncryptCertificate-Certkit.ps1 on GitHub

Always On VPN SSTP and 47-Day TLS Certificates

Always On VPN SSTP with Let’s Encrypt Certificates

Windows Secure Boot UEFI Certificates Expiring June 2026

For IT administrators responsible for managing Windows devices, a crucial certificate update milestone is coming in June 2026 that could result in degraded security for systems that are not updated. Specifically, the Microsoft certificates that manage UEFI Secure Boot trust will expire, potentially allowing untrusted or malicious software to load on affected machines during system boot.

Update (November 2026): All three Microsoft 2011 Secure Boot certificates have now expired. The Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 expired on June 24, 2026, the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 on June 27, 2026, and the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 on October 19, 2026. Devices without the 2023 certificates continue to start normally and receive standard Windows updates, but they can no longer receive boot-related security updates, such as Secure Boot DB and DBX updates and Windows Boot Manager fixes. The steps below still apply to devices that have not yet been updated. See When Secure Boot certificates expire on Windows devices for details.

Secure Boot

Windows Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware security feature that ensures a computer boots only with trusted, digitally signed operating system loaders and drivers, preventing malicious code (such as rootkits or compromised bootloaders) from loading during startup. Introduced with Windows 8, it verifies the cryptographic signatures of boot components against a database of authorized keys, blocking unauthorized or tampered software to protect system integrity from the earliest stages of boot.

Chain of Trust

The UEFI Platform Key (PK) is the ultimate root of trust in Secure Boot. It is a single public key owned by the device manufacturer and stored in firmware. The PK certificate signs the Key Exchange Key (KEK) and grants authority to modify the other Secure Boot databases, such as the allowed database (DB) and the disallowed database (DBX). The DB and DBX contain certificates and signatures for authorized and unauthorized software, respectively.

Microsoft Secure Boot Certificate Expiration

Two crucial Microsoft Secure Boot certificates are set to expire in June 2026. They are:

  • Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 (stored in KEK)
  • Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (stored in DB)

In addition, another critical Microsoft Secure Boot certificate expires in October 2026.

  • Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 (stored in DB)

When these certificates expire, devices may fail to recognize trusted bootloaders, and future Secure Boot policies may not be applied. Updating the certificates ensures continued protection against malicious rootkits and ensures Windows firmware compliance

View Certificate Information

Ideally, administrators could use PowerShell to view these UEFI Secure Boot certificates. Sadly, the output of the Get-SecureBootUEFI PowerShell command is not particularly helpful and does not display any pertinent certificate details.

Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK

Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK output showing raw bytes without readable certificate details

PowerShell Script

To address this limitation, I’ve created a PowerShell script that allows administrators to view all UEFI certificates, including PK, KEK, and DB certificates, and optionally save them as base64-encoded files. The script is available on GitHub and in the PowerShell gallery.

Install-Script -Name Get-UEFICertificate -Scope CurrentUser

View UEFI Certificates

After downloading the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script, run the following command to view the KEK database.

Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK

Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK output listing the Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate

In this example, the only KEK certificate is the expiring Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate. Running the command and specifying the DB type shows only the expiring Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate.

Get-UEFICertificate -Type DB output listing the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate

Note: UEFI also includes hashes of specific executables in the DB and DBX databases. By default, this script focuses on UEFI certificates and omits hash calculations for brevity. Use the -IncludeHashes switch to view this information.

Updating Microsoft UEFI Certificates

With the October 2025 updates, Microsoft introduced new registry keys to enable and monitor the update status of these UEFI Secure Boot certificates.

Status

To begin, administrators can check the status of the update process by reading the value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key.

Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing\ -Name UEFICA2023Status | Select-Object UEFICA2023Status

PowerShell output showing the UEFICA2023Status registry value before the Secure Boot certificate update

Update

To initiate the update process, set the value of AvailableUpdates to 0x5944.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot’ -Name ‘AvailableUpdates’ -Value 0x5944

Next, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task.

Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName ‘\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update’

Once complete, the UEFICA2023Status indicates InProgress.

UEFICA2023Status registry value showing InProgress after starting the Secure-Boot-Update task

After a reboot, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task once more. The UEFICA2023Status should indicate that it has been updated (may require one more reboot!).

UEFICA2023Status registry value showing the Secure Boot certificate update completed after reboot

Updated Certificates

After the update process completes, run the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script to confirm that new certificates have been added to UEFI Secure Boot.

Get-UEFICertificate output showing the updated Microsoft KEK certificates

Updated Microsoft KEK Certificates

Get-UEFICertificate output showing the updated Microsoft DB certificates

Updated Microsoft DB Certificates

Summary

With multiple Microsoft Secure Boot CA certificates expiring in 2026, organizations need to ensure devices are updated to maintain a valid UEFI trust chain. This guide shows how to view existing firmware certificates, apply Microsoft’s Secure Boot CA 2023 updates, and confirm that new KEK and DB certificates have been installed. Completing this process now will ensure devices remain protected from tampered or malicious boot components as the 2026 expiration dates approach.

Additional Information

Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates

Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script on GitHub

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script in the PowerShell Gallery