Always On VPN IKEv2 Connection Failure Error Code 800

Always On VPN administrators may encounter a scenario in which Windows 10 clients are unable to establish an IKEv2 VPN connection to a Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) server or a third-party VPN device under the following conditions.

  1. The VPN connection is configured using ProfileXML.
  2. ProfileXML includes the <CryptographySuite> element.
  3. The VPN server is configured to use a custom IPsec policy.
  4. The VPN server supports only IKEv2.
  5. The <NativeProtocolType> in ProfileXML is set to Automatic.

When these specific conditions are met, the client will be unable to connect to the VPN server using IKEv2. The error message states:

The remote connection was not made because the attempted VPN tunnels failed. The VPN server might be unreachable. If this connection is attempting to use an L2TP/IPsec tunnel, the security parameters required for IPsec negotiation might not be configured properly.

Always On VPN IKEv2 VPN Connection Failure Error Code 800

In addition, the event log will include an error message from the RasClient source with event ID 20227 that includes the following error message.

The user [username] dialed a connection named [connection name] which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 800.

Always On VPN IKEv2 VPN Connection Failure Error Code 800

A manually configured VPN connection using IKEv2 will connect successfully under these same conditions, however.

IKEv2 Error Code 800

Error code 800 translates to ERROR_AUTOMATIC_VPN_FAILED, which is somewhat ambiguous. The error description is:

Unable to establish the VPN connection. The VPN server may be unreachable, or security parameters may not be configured properly for this connection.

Digging Deeper

A network trace of the IKEv2 VPN connection reveals the true source of the problem, which is a failure of the client and server to successfully negotiate an IKEv2 security association (SA). During the SA initiation process, the parameters offered by the client are unacceptable to the server, resulting in a NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification being returned by the server.

Always On VPN IKEv2 VPN Connection Failure Error Code 800

Custom Cryptography Settings Ignored

It appears that the Always On VPN connection ignores the custom cryptography settings defined in the CryptographySuite element in ProfileXML. However, this only occurs when the NativeProtocolType is set to Automatic. Presumably, this is a bug. 🙂

Workaround

As a workaround, set the NativeProtocolType to IKEv2. When NativeProtocolType is set to IKEv2, the VPN connection recognizes the IKEv2 parameters defined in the CryptographySuite element and the VPN connection will be established successfully.

Additional Information

Always On VPN IKEv2 Security Configuration

Always On VPN Certificate Requirements for IKEv2

Always On VPN IKEv2 Load Balancing with the KEMP LoadMaster Load Balancer

DirectAccess Reporting Fails and Schannel Event ID 36871 after Disabling TLS 1.0

IMPORTANT NOTE: The guidance in this post will disable support for null SSL/TLS cipher suites on the DirectAccess server. This will result in reduced scalability and performance for all clients, including Windows 8.x and Windows 10. It is recommended that TLS 1.0 not be disabled on the DirectAccess server if at all possible.

When performing security hardening on the DirectAccess server it is not uncommon to disable weak cipher suites or insecure protocols such as SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. However, after disabling SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 you will find that it is no longer possible generate reports. Clicking the Generate Report link in the Remote Access Management console returns no data.

DirectAccess Reporting Fails after Disabling TLS 1.0

In addition, the System event log indicates Schannel errors with Event ID 36871. The error message states that “A fatal error occurred while creating a TLS client credential. The internal error state is 10013.”

DirectAccess Reporting Fails after Disabling TLS 1.0

To resolve this issue and restore DirectAccess reporting functionality you must enable the use of FIPS compliant encryption algorithms on the DirectAccess server. This change can be made locally or via Active Directory group policy. Open the Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc) for Active Directory GPO, or the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) on the DirectAccess server and navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options. Double-click System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing and select Enabled.

DirectAccess Reporting Fails after Disabling TLS 1.0

If using Active Directory GPO, ensure that the GPO is applied all DirectAccess servers in the organization. A restart is not required for this setting to take effect. Once this change has been made, reporting should work as expected.

Additional Resources

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS SSL and TLS Insecure Cipher Suites
DirectAccess Video Training Courses on Pluralsight
Implementing DirectAccess with Windows Server 2016 Book on Amazon.com

Monitoring DirectAccess Machine and User Activity with Windows Component Event Logging

Monitoring DirectAccess Machine and User Activity with Component Event LoggingThe monitoring of DirectAccess machine and user activity presents some unique challenges for security administrators. All DirectAccess client communication destined for the internal corporate network is translated by the DirectAccess server and appears to originate from the DirectAccess server’s internal IPv4 address. Also, the public IPv4 address for DirectAccess clients using the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition protocol is not visible using the native reporting tools. In addition, vital information such as source ports used by the DirectAccess server for internal connections and source ports used by DirectAccess clients is not available. This lack of granular connection logging creates a serious blind spot for administrators conducting forensic investigations.

As veteran Microsoft Premier Field Engineer (PFE) Martin Solis described in detail in a recent blog post, all of these details are in fact logged. However, gathering this information is not exactly intuitive. To collect this essential information it will be necessary to leverage Windows component event logging. By searching the IPHLPSVC, Base Filtering Engine Connections, Base Filtering Resource Flows, and WinNAT operational logs, it is possible to gather all of the information necessary for uniquely identifying DirectAccess corporate network communication.

Be sure to read Martin’s excellent article about using Windows component event logging to monitor DirectAccess machine and user activity, which can be found here.

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