Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificate Validity Period

With the recent announcement of drastically reduced certificate lifetimes for public TLS certificates, there has been much discussion about certificate lifetimes for private certification authorities (CAs) like Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). Most commonly, AD CS certificates are issued with a one-year validity period. However, as I’ve discussed in the past, there’s good reason to consider shorter lifetimes in many scenarios. Reducing certificate lifetimes is a growing trend to enhance security, but it poses challenges for private CAs like AD CS. This post explains how to manage shorter certificate lifetimes in Intune using PKCS and SCEP.

AD CS Template

With AD CS, the administrator defines the certificate lifetime by setting the validity period value when creating the certificate template in Active Directory (AD), as shown here.

All certificates issued using this template will be valid for one year from the date of issuance.

Note: The only exception would be if the issuing CA’s certificate were due to expire before the one-year expiration date. In that case, the certificate would be valid until the CA certificate expires.

Intune PKCS and SCEP

When issuing certificates with Intune using either PKCS or SCEP, administrators deploy an Intune enrollment certificate template in AD that Intune uses for user and device certificate enrollment. While the Intune enrollment certificate template defines the default validity period, Intune also allows administrators to specify a desired validity period in the PKCS or SCEP policy settings, as shown here.

Intune Validity Period and AD CS

Although Intune provides the ability to define the validity period on the PKCS or SCEP policy, AD CS does not honor this setting unless explicitly configured to do so. Instead, it defaults to the period defined in the certificate template. Using the example above, the administrator defined a validity period of 1 month. However, since the Intune enrollment certificate template’s validity period was set to one year, a certificate valid for one year will be issued.

Override Template Settings

Fortunately, there is a way to override this default behavior. On the issuing CA where the Intune enrollment certificate template is published, open an elevated PowerShell command window and run the following command.

certutil.exe -setreg Policy\EditFlags +EDITF_ATTRIBUTEENDDATE

Once complete, run the following PowerShell command to restart the CA service.

Restart-Service -Name CertSvc -PassThru

After making this change, administrators can define a shorter certificate validity period than specified on the template using Intune PKCS and SCEP policies.

Note: For security reasons, this setting only allows requests that are shorter than the template’s defined validity period. You cannot request a certificate with a validity period that is longer than the template allows.

Summary

By enabling the EDITF_ATTRIBUTEENDDATE flag on your issuing CA, you gain flexibility to tailor certificate validity periods per use case—while still enforcing a maximum validity via the AD Intune certificate enrollment template. Flexible certificate validity periods are especially valuable in environments that are moving toward short-lived certificates for improved security posture.

Additional Information

TLS Certificate Lifetimes Will Officially Reduce to 47 Days

Always On VPN SSTP and 47-Day TLS Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in Enterprise Environments

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune – Live Online Training

Intune SCEP Profile Changes for Public S/MIME Certificates

Recently, the CA/Browser Forum, which is a voluntary consortium made up of public CAs, browser vendors, and other industry stakeholders, introduced new requirements for S/MIME certificates issued by public certification authorities (CAs). For organizations using Microsoft Intune SCEP device configuration profiles to enroll for these certificates, administrators must update Intune settings to ensure uninterrupted enrollment once the changes take effect.

Subject Name Changes

Beginning July 16, 2025, all public CAs will enforce these new S/MIME Baseline Requirements, mandating “Given Name” and “Surname” attributes in the Subject Name field of S/MIME certificates. By default, Intune user certificate profiles include only the “UserName” attribute in the Subject Name field.

Intune Support

Intune recently completed the rollout of these new attributes in SCEP profiles. Administrators can now update their SCEP profiles for third-party public CAs to include these new attributes for S/MIME certificates using the following supported variables.

G={{GivenName}}
SN={{SurName}}

To align with current public CA standards, include these two fields along with any other information required in the Subject name format field. Multiple values must be separated by commas without spaces, as shown in the example below.

Private CAs

Private CAs, like Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) or Intune Cloud PKI, are unaffected. If you are enrolling for S/MIME certificates using these services, no changes are required.

Reenrollment

It’s important to note that modifying an existing Intune SCEP profile will trigger certificate reissuance for all users and devices within the policy’s scope, which could yield unexpected results. When making changes to Intune certificate policies, it is best to create a new policy to supersede the old one, allowing administrators to pilot the new policy before its broad deployment.

Additional Information

CA/Browser Forum S/MIME Baseline Requirements

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune Training August 2025

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in Enterprise Environments

Always On VPN SSTP and 47-Day TLS Certificates

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune August 2025

I’m excited to announce that I will be delivering another edition of the Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune course, hosted by ViaMonstra Online Academy. This is a three-day live online training course that takes place August 26-28, 2025. This course dives deep into issuing and managing certificates using Microsoft Intune, covering both on-premises and cloud-based solutions.

Course Overview

This interactive training equips IT professionals with the skills to provision and manage enterprise PKI certificates using Microsoft Intune. It explores Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune, and non-Microsoft solutions, with live demonstrations featuring real-world scenarios.

Key Learning Objectives

Those taking the online training course will learn the following.

  • Certificate Basics: Understand certificate roles and enterprise use cases.
  • Deployment Options: Master Intune certificate deployment (Intune policies, revocation, security) and Microsoft Cloud PKI (licensing, benefits, limitations, BYOCA).
  • Intune Deployment: Learn PKCS and SCEP deployment, security best practices, and troubleshooting.
  • High Availability: Explore strategies for reliable certificate management.

Course Highlights

Here are some key highlights for attendees of the training.

  • Expert-Led: Learn from a veteran IT professional, a Microsoft MVP, with deep PKI and Intune expertise.
  • Interactive Demonstrations: The course includes numerous practical exercises in real-world scenarios.
  • Resources: Access to security best practices and sample scripts for automated configuration.
  • Community: Join a private Facebook group for peer collaboration.
  • Live Q&A: Engage directly with the instructor for a clearer understanding.

Who Should Attend?

This training event is ideal for IT administrators, security professionals, and systems engineers working with Intune, AD CS, or Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune.

Prerequisites

Those attending the online training course should be familiar with the following.

  • Basic networking knowledge (TCP/IP, DNS).
  • Familiarity with Active Directory, Windows OS, and Intune.
  • Access to an AD CS setup and an Azure subscription with Intune Suite licenses.

Why It Matters

Certificates are vital for secure authentication and communication. This course bridges theory and practice, equipping you to deploy and manage digital certificates effectively in cloud-native environments.

Details

Here is some additional information about the training event.

  • When: August 26-28, 2025 (sessions begin at 9:00 AM CDT).
  • Where: Live online via ViaMonstra Online Academy.
  • Cost: $2,395.00 (Sold separately – not included in All-Access Pass).

Why ViaMonstra?

ViaMonstra delivers top-tier IT training from Microsoft MVPs, focusing on practical, up-to-date skills and fostering a collaborative community.

Take the Next Step

Ready to master certificate management with Microsoft Intune? Register at ViaMonstra Online Academy for the August 2025 Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune training course today!

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025

I’m very excited to announce that I will be attending the annual Techmentor Conference at the Microsoft HQ campus in Redmond, Washington, this year. The event takes place August 11-15, 2025. The Techmentor Conference is one of my favorite IT pro conferences because it offers unparalleled access to experts worldwide. I will deliver two presentations at this year’s event. I hope you’ll join me!

Entra Private Access

On Tuesday, August 12, 2025, I will be presenting a session on Zero Trust Network Access with Microsoft Entra Private Access. ZTNA is the future of remote access and provides many security and operational benefits over traditional client-based VPN technologies.

T11 – Zero Trust Network Access with Entra Private Access

Cloud PKI for Intune

On Wednesday, August 13, 2025, I’ll discuss Simplified Certificate Management with Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune. As organizations integrate cloud-native devices in their environments, administrators must solve the problem of issuing and managing certificates for users and devices that are not domain-joined. Cloud PKI for Intune is an excellent solution that provides deployment flexibility to address these unique and specific requirements.

W10 – Simplified Certificate Management with Cloud PKI for Intune

Register Now

Registration for the event is open now. Use the promo code HICKS and receive $500.00 off the price of admission. Don’t miss this excellent opportunity to learn from the best. Register today!

Additional Information

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025

Techmentor Conference at Microsoft HQ 2025 – Session List

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune

Arizona Systems Management User Group March 2025

I’m excited to announce that I’ll be speaking at the Arizona Systems Management User Group (AZSMUG) at their next user group meeting on Friday, March 7, at 9:00 AM MST. I am presenting on the topic of Certificate Deployment Strategies with Microsoft Intune.

Intune and Certificates

My session at AZSMUG will provide an overview of issuing and managing certificates with Microsoft Intune. We’ll begin by examining common scenarios for certificate authentication and explore various delivery methods, including PKCS and SCEP. Additionally, we’ll discuss supporting technologies such as the Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) and review deployment strategies and high availability options for the Intune Certificate Connector. The session will also cover Cloud PKI for Intune, integration with on-premises Active Directory, and best practices for securing certificate lifecycles and key management in enterprise environments.

Register Now

If you are in the Phoenix area and would like to attend the user group meeting on Friday, March 7, you will find the registration link here. Hope to see you there!

Additional Information

Arizona Systems Management User Group

Intune and Certificates Masterclass

Always On VPN Intermittent 13801 Error

Always On VPN error 13801 is common when establishing an IKEv2 VPN connection. Typically, the issue is related to a configuration error or a problem with certificate deployment. However, administrators may encounter the 13801, an IKE authentication error, intermittently. Configuration errors are binary. If there is a misconfiguration, IKEv2 never works at all. However, a configuration error seems unlikely since the connection works occasionally yet fails at other times.

Client Authentication

The minimum application policy (Enhanced Key Usage, or EKU) requirement for the device authentication certificate for IKEv2 is Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2). When intermittent 13801 errors occur, administrators may find multiple certificates in the local computer certificate store with the Client Authentication EKU issued by different certificate authorities. Commonly, Intune-managed Windows devices may include several certificates with Client Authentication.

Certificate Selection

When Windows attempts to establish an Always On VPN IKEv2 connection, and there are multiple certificates in the local computer certificate with Client Authentication defined, Windows must choose one certificate to use for the connection. If Windows chooses incorrectly, you will receive the 13801 IKE authentication failure error. If Windows selects the right one, the connection succeeds.

Resolution

There are several ways to resolve this issue. The best way is to update the Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy (EKU). When Windows encounters multiple client authentication certificates in the local computer certificate store, it will prefer any certificate with the IP security IKE intermediate application policy for IKEv2 VPN connections. Including the IP security IKE intermediate application policy on the Always On VPN device authentication certificate ensures proper certificate selection when multiple client authentication certificates are present.

Note: This change must be made to the Intune certificate enrollment template when using Intune with PKCS or SCEP.

Certificate Template

To update an existing Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy, open the certificate templates management console (certtmpl.msc) and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click the VPN device authentication certificate template and choose Properties.
  2. Select the Extensions tab.
  3. Click on Application Policies.
  4. Click Edit.
  5. Click Add.
  6. Select the IP security IKE intermediate application policy.
  7. Click Ok.
  8. Click Ok.
  9. Click Ok.

Once complete, any certificates issued after this change is applied will now include the IP security Ike intermediate application policy.

Force Renewal

Administrators may wish to update all certificates immediately rather than wait until they renew to receive the new setting. The course of action depends on how certificates are issued.

On-Premises

When issuing certificates using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on-premises, right-click the Always On VPN device authentication certificate template and choose Reenroll All Certificate Holders. This will force all domain-joined clients with Autoenroll permissions on the template to renew their certificate on their next enrollment cycle, regardless of the certificate’s lifetime.

Intune

Follow the steps below to force re-enrollment for all certificate holders when deploying certificates using Intune.

SCEP – Add the IP Security IKE Intermediate application policy to the Intune VPN policy. After this change is applied, Intune will reenroll all endpoints.

PKCS – A new Intune device configuration policy must be created that includes the IP security IKE intermediate application policy. Assign the new policy and remove the old one to replace all certificates.

PowerShell

It’s also possible to resolve this issue using PowerShell. Administrators can use the Set-VpnConnection PowerShell cmdlet to select a certificate based on the root certification authority (CA) or a specific custom application policy defined on the Always On VPN device authentication certificate. Be sure to add the -AllUserConnection switch when working with the device tunnel.

Root CA

Open a PowerShell command window and run the following command.

$RootCA = Get-Child-Item -Path Cert:\LocalMachine\My\<thumbprint of root CA certificate>
Set-VpnConnection -Name <name of VPN profile> -MachineCertificateIssuerFilter $RootCA

Application Policy

Open a PowerShell command window and run the following command.

Set-VpnConnection -Name <name of VPN profile> -MachineCertificateEKUFilter <OID>

Note: When using a custom application policy Windows will return a warning message stating the EKU could not be validated. You can safely disregard this warning.

Intune Remediation

While running PowerShell commands locally might be helpful for troubleshooting and targeted evaluation testing, deploying settings via PowerShell at scale is challenging. For those organizations managing their devices using Microsoft Intune, I’ve published a few detection and remediation scripts on GitHub to perform these tasks.

Summary

The intermittent Always On VPN 13801 IKE authentication credentials are unacceptable error message is best resolved by updating the Always On VPN device authentication certificate to include the IP security IKE intermediate application policy (EKU). Although using PowerShell also works, it doesn’t scale effectively. SCCM or Intune remediations can help, but I’d encourage you to update the certificate template as best practice instead.

Additional Information

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13801

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13806

Troubleshooting Always On VPN Error 13868

Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025

Are you ready? In just a few short weeks(!) Microsoft will release the February 2025 security updates. This is a critical update because Microsoft plans to enable full enforcement of strong certificate mapping on Active Directory Domain Controllers (DCs) with this release. Administrators unprepared for this may incur outages for workloads using certificate-based authentication such as Always On VPN, Wi-Fi, and others.

Reminder: There’s still space available in my Certificates and Intune Masterclass. Register now!

KB5014754

Microsoft introduced strong certificate mapping with the May 2022 update KB5014754 to address vulnerabilities identified with certificate-based authentication. The update makes changes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certification authorities (CAs) to embed the principal’s Security Identifier (SID) on issued certificates with a new certificate extension. The update also changes domain controller behavior to monitor and optionally enforce strong certificate mapping for authentication.

Enforcement Mode

When first introduced, the update is configured in compatibility mode. If a certificate that isn’t strongly mapped is presented for authentication, an event is recorded in the event log indicating that. Microsoft has been planning for years to enable full enforcement. After many delays, that time is now upon us. Specifically, full enforcement for strong certificate mapping will be enabled by default on DCs after applying the February 2025 security updates.

Note: Administrators can switch back to compatibility mode for now. See below for more details.

Limitations

Initially, the strong certificate mapping update was applied only to online certificate templates. Specifically, those templates are configured to build the subject name from Active Directory information. However, offline templates, where the subject name is supplied in the request, do not include this information by default. Crucially, any certificate issued with Microsoft Intune with PKCS or SCEP uses offline templates and is not strongly mapped. The lack of strong certificate mapping options for Intune-issued certificates forced Microsoft to delay its full enforcement deadline until these limitations were resolved.

Updates

In October 2024, Microsoft Intune announced support for strong certificate mapping for PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators can now configure these certificates to include strong certificate mapping. However, administrators must take action to affect this change.

PKCS

To enable strong certificate mapping for PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure that the certificate connector is running at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, the following registry key must be configured on the connector server.

Key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector
Name: EnableSidSecurityExtension
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

The Intune Certificate Connector server must be restarted for this change to take effect. No changes are required on the PKCS certificate policy in Intune.

SCEP

To enable strong certificate mapping for SCEP certificates, administrators must add the following attribute/value pair to the Subject alternative name settings on their existing Intune SCEP certificate policy.

Attribute: URI
Value: {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}

Intune SCEP profile subject alternative name with the URI attribute OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

Preparation

Administrators using certificate-based authentication against on-premises Active Directory should ensure all user and device authentication certificates include embedded SID information. For certificates issued on-premises, with Intune using PKCS or certificates issued by Entra Conditional Access, the certificate should now have the extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, including the principal’s SID.

Certificate with the SID extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2


SCEP certificates issued using Intune will include the following information in the Subject Alternative Name field.

URL=tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-24:sid:<sid>

Certificate subject alternative name with the tag:microsoft.com SID URL


Note: This applies to certificates issued using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune as those certificates are deployed using a SCEP device configuration policy.

Opt-Out

With the February 2025 security update, all domain controllers will be switched to full enforcement mode. Authentication requests using certificates without strong mapping will be denied in this configuration.

If your organization is not prepared to move to full enforcement mode, the February 2025 update allows administrators to opt out and switch back to compatibility mode by enabling the following registry key on all domain controllers.

Key: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc
Name: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can implement this change by opening an elevated PowerShell command window and running the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc’ -Name ‘StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement’ -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

September 2025

Administrators are strongly encouraged to update all user and device authentication certificates before September 2025. With the September 2025 security update, Microsoft will no longer honor the opt-out registry settings and strictly enforce strong certificate mapping for all certificate-based authentication requests.

Troubleshooting

Certificate authentication is commonly used for Always On VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. If full enforcement mode is enabled on domain controllers and a certificate is presented for authentication that is not strongly mapped, administrators may see the following event log information recorded on the Network Policy Server (NPS).

Network Policy Server denied access to a user.

NPS event stating Network Policy Server denied access to a user

The details of the event include the following.

Reason Code: 16
Reason: Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.

NPS event details with reason code 16, authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch

Obviously, the user does not enter their password when using certificates for authentication. However, the indication of a credential mismatch can be caused by missing strong certificate mapping information when the DC is in full enforcement mode.

Note: There are other causes for reason code 16 failures on NPS. Further investigation may be required to determine the root cause.

Additional Information

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Training: Certificates and Intune Masterclass

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Entra Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS

KB5014754: Certificate-Based Authentication Changes on Windows Domain Controllers

Always On VPN and Cloud PKI for Intune Error 853

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune is a PKI-as-a-Service offering that allows organizations to issue and manage digital certificates without on-premises infrastructure. Certificates are excellent phishing-resistant credentials that are well-suited for applications requiring strong authentication, such as secure remote access with Always On VPN. However, administrators may encounter errors when attempting to authenticate users or devices using certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Error 853

After publishing certificates with Cloud PKI for Intune and configuring the on-premises Always On VPN infrastructure to support this, administrators will find that the Always On VPN connection fails to connect. Attempts to manually start the connection result in the following error message.

“The remote access connection completed, but authentication failed because the certificate that authenticates the client to the server is not valid. Ensure the certificate used for authentication is valid.”

In the event log on the Windows client, you’ll find an event ID 20227 from the RasClient source that includes the following error message.

“The user <domain>\<user> dialed a connection named <VPN connection name> which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 853.”

Error 853 (ERROR_EAP_USER_CERT_INVALID) indicates the user certificate is invalid.

Certificate

Upon further investigation, the certificate shows no issues, is valid, is trusted, and has a private key.

NPS

Looking at the event log on the Network Policy Server (NPS), you’ll find a corresponding event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source that includes the following error message.

“Network Policy Server denied access to a user.”

Looking at the authentication details section of this event log entry yields the following important clue.

Reason Code: 258
Reason: The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.

Failed Revocation Check

Since the NPS server indicates that it rejected the authentication request because it could not perform a revocation check, let’s bring the user authentication certificate to the NPS server and perform some tests.

Export Certificate

Open the user certificate store (certmgr.msc) on the client and expand Personal > Certificates. Right-click on the certificate in question and choose All Tasks > Export. Export the certificate only (not the private key) and copy the file to the NPS server.

Verify Certificate

Open a PowerShell or command window on the NPS server and run the following command to validate the certificate.

certutil.exe -verify -urlfetch <path to exported certificate>

For example.

certutil.exe -verify -urlfecth .\rdeckard.cer

The command generates a lot of output, but if you look at the very end of the data stream, you’ll see two interesting items.

  • Revocation check skipped – no revocation information available
  • Leaf certificate revocation check passed

Based on this information the user certificate (the leaf certificate) passed a revocation check. However, it would appear that another certificate in the chain does not include revocation information. Since there is only a root and issuing CA in the chain, and root certificates don’t include revocation information because they are the self-signed root of trust, it would appear that revocation information is missing from the issuing CA certificate.

We can confirm this by scrolling up in the previous command’s output to where the verification of the issuing CA certificate takes place. Here, you’ll see that the issuing CA certificate is missing CDP (CRL Distribution Point) information.

When NPS attempts to validate the certificate and the certificate chain, it expects to find CDP information, which it will use to check if the issuing CA certificate has been revoked. The revocation check fails without this information, and the authentication request is rejected.

Design Error?

Missing CDP information is not unusual for end-entity (leaf) certificates when they are short-lived. An example is Entra ID conditional access certificates, which do not include CDP information by design. However, I expect this information to be listed on an issuing CA certificate. Why it’s not there, I’m not sure. I’ll investigate this in more depth and report on anything I learn that’s new.

Workaround

To move forward using Cloud PKI for Intune certificates with Always On VPN, administrators must implement the following registry setting on all NPS servers handling authentication requests for Always On VPN servers.

Key = HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13
Name = IgnoreNoRevocationCheck
Type = DWORD
Value = 1

To implement this change using PowerShell, open an elevated PowerShell command window and run the following command.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13\’ -Name IgnoreNoRevocationCheck -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the NPS server for the changes to take effect.

Additional Information

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune and Active Directory

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune and Certificate Templates

Strong Certificate Mapping for Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Troubleshooting Intune Failed PKCS Request

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune SCEP URL

Delete A Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune Certificate Authority

Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune on RunAs Radio Podcast

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune Online Training

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS

Microsoft recently announced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates Intune PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators are encouraged to update their Intune Certificate Connector servers and SCEP device configuration policies to support this capability as soon as possible.

PKCS

Organizations that use PKCS device configuration policies to deploy certificates to Intune-managed endpoints may have encountered the following error message in the event log on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

System.NullReferenceException: CertEnroll::CX509Extension::Initialize: Invalid pointer 0x80004003 (-2147467261 E_POINTER) at CERTENROLLLib.IX509Extension.Initialize(CObjectId pObjectId, EncodingType Encoding, String strEncodedData)

Known Issue

The above error is a known issue that has been resolved with the November security updates. If you encounter this error, install the latest Microsoft security update from November 2024.

Additional Information

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Delete A Cloud PKI for Intune Certificate Authority

Deleting an Always On VPN Device Tunnel

When Microsoft first introduced Cloud PKI for Intune, the solution did not allow administrators to delete a CA after it was created. As you are limited to just six Cloud PKI for Intune CAs, this was quite frustrating, especially during the testing and evaluation phase, where you may need to spin up a few instances before you decide on the features you need.

Are you interested in learning more about Cloud PKI for Intune? Register for my upcoming online training course, Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune. This three-day comprehensive, deep-dive course covers all aspects of issuing and managing certificates with Intune, including provisioning and managing Cloud PKI for Intune. Click here to learn more.

Delete Cloud PKI

Thankfully, Microsoft eventually realized this shortcoming and added this much needed feature a few months ago. However, removing an Intune Cloud PKI CA requires administrators to follow some specific steps to remove a CA successfully. Since Cloud PKI for Intune uses a two-tier deployment model, administrators must remove the issuing CA first and then the root CA if required.

Issuing CA

Follow the steps below to delete a Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Intune Policies

Be sure to delete any Intune device configuration policies relating to Cloud PKI for Intune before decommissioning a Cloud PKI for Intune CA. This includes trusted certificate policies, Wi-Fi policies, and VPN policies.

Pause CA

The first step of deleting a Cloud PKI for Intune CA is to pause the service. Pausing the service prevents new certificates from being issued while the administrator completes the remaining retirement tasks. Open the Intune portal (https://intune.microsoft.com), navigate to Tenant Administration > Cloud PKI, and click the CA to be deleted. Next, click Pause to pause the CA.

Revoke Certificates

Administrators must revoke all issued certificates before deleting the issuing CA. Click on any issued certificate to view its properties and then click the Revoke button, as shown here.

Complete this step for each certificate issued and active on the CA.

Note: It takes some time before the certificate status shows Revoked in the management console. Be patient!

Revoke CA Certificate

Once the administrator has revoked all issued certificates, click Revoke to revoke the issuing CA’s certificate.

Delete CA

Once the issuing CA certificate has been revoked the administrator will now have the option to delete the Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Root CA

After the administrator deletes the issuing CA, the root CA can be removed if necessary. Click on the root CA and click the Delete button.

Additional Information

Delete Microsoft Cloud PKI Certification Authority

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Certificate Templates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Active Directory

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune SCEP URL

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune on RunAs Radio