Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Always On VPN LockDown Mode

With the October 2024 Intune update, Microsoft introduced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates issued by Intune via the Intune Certificate Connector. Enabling strong certificate mapping support in Intune is an important change for those organizations using Microsoft Intune to issue and manage certificates for their users and devices, as it resolves a critical implementation blocker.

Note: This post was updated to clarify that adding the {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} for PKCS certificates is not required. This variable is only used for SCEP certificates.

Background

In May 2022, Microsoft released security update KB5014754, which added functionality to domain controllers and enterprise issuing certification authority (CA) servers, allowing the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) to enforce strong certificate mapping. Specifically, with KB5014754 installed, issuing CAs now add the requesting principal’s Security Identifier (SID) to the certificate in a new certificate extension. Domain controllers can be configured to reject authentication requests using certificates that do not include this information.

Today, DCs with KB5014754 installed will still allow authentication without strong certificate mapping. However, Microsoft has stated they will begin enforcing strong certificate mapping in February 2025, with an option to disable it via the registry. Starting in September 2025, full enforcement will be mandatory.

Reference: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16

Limitation

The initial changes in KB5014754 applied only to online certificate templates, meaning those that build the subject name from Active Directory. However, deploying certificates with Intune using either PKCS or SCEP requires using an offline certificate template that allows the requestor to supply the subject name in the request. When using offline templates, a certificate is issued but does not embed the SID in the certificate. Using offline templates presents unique challenges to organizations moving to modern management with Intune and Entra ID.

Intune Changes

The October 2024 Intune update addresses this limitation by providing a method to include SID information in certificates using either SCEP or PKCS.

SCEP

To include the SID information in SCEP certificates, create or edit an existing SCEP device configuration policy and define a URI Subject Alternative Name (SAN) attribute with the value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} as shown here.

PKCS

To include SID information in PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure the Intune Certificate Connector is updated to at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, a registry setting must be enabled on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

On the server where the Intune Certificate Connector is installed, open the registry editor, navigate to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector, and change the value of EnableSidSecurityExtension to 1.

Optionally, administrators can update this setting at the command line by running the following PowerShell command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the Intune Certificate Connector server for the changes to take effect.

Certificates

SID information is added to certificates differently depending on which Intune device configuration policy type is used.

PCKS

PKCS certificates have the SID embedded in the certificate extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, as shown here.

SCEP

SCEP certificates have the SID embedded in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field in the format “tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:<SID>” as shown here.

Migration

When making these changes to embed the SID in Intune-issued certificates in an existing Intune PKCS or SCEP configuration policy, the change will only affect certificates issued after the change is made. To update all certificate holders, you must create and deploy a new device configuration policy to targeted users or devices. Deleting the old profile (or ensuring it no longer applies) will remove the old certificate from the endpoint. If you’ve configured your Intune Certificate Connector to support revocation, the old certificate will also be revoked.

Entra Conditional Access

Entra Conditional Access certificates have included SID information since July 2023. More details here.

Intune Cloud PKI

The changes above will also work with certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Other Cloud PKI Providers

Many other Cloud PKI providers, such as SCEPman and KEYTOS, already include the embedded SID in their certificates. Other cloud PKI providers may also include embedded SID. Consult your provider to confirm.

Additional Information

Microsoft Intune October 2024 Strong Certificate Mapping Update

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Strong Certificate Mapping Update for PKCS

Entra ID Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Implementing Strong Certificate Mapping in Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Always On VPN Security Updates October 2024

Microsoft has released the October 2024 security updates, and numerous issues may impact Always On VPN administrators. Although many CVEs affect Always On VPN-related services that are Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, none are critical this cycle.

RRAS Updates

This month, Microsoft has provided 12 updates for the Windows Server Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS), commonly deployed to support Always On VPN deployments. Most of these CVEs involve overflow vulnerabilities (heap and stack), input validation weaknesses, and buffer over-read and overflow vulnerabilities. All are rated important, and there are no known exploits currently.

CVE-2024-38212

CVE-2024-38261

CVE-2024-38265

CVE-2024-43453

CVE-2024-43549

CVE-2024-43564

CVE-2024-43589

CVE-2024-43592

CVE-2024-43593

CVE-2024-43607

CVE-2024-43608

CVE-2024-43611

Related Updates

In addition to the updates above, Microsoft also released fixes for security vulnerabilities in various related services that are important to Always On VPN administrators.

Windows Network Address Translation (NAT)

The following CVEs address denial of service vulnerabilities in the Network Address Translation (NAT) service.

CVE-2024-43562

CVE-2024-43565

Certificate Services

Always On VPN administrators will also find updates for CVEs affecting various certificate services-related components.

CVE-2024-43545OCSP Denial of Service Vulnerability

CVE-2024-43541Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) Denial of Service Vulnerability

CVE-2024-43544Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) Denial of Service Vulnerability

Recommendations

Always On VPN administrators are encouraged to update systems as soon as possible. However, since none of the CVEs is rated Critical, updates can be applied during standard update windows.

Additional Information

Microsoft October 2024 Security Updates

DirectAccess and CVE-2024-38063

With the August 2024 Windows security updates, Microsoft released a fix to address a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the Windows TCP/IP stack (CVE-2024-38063). Critically, this vulnerability affects IPv6 only and does not require authentication or user interaction to exploit. An attacker would only need to send specially crafted IPv6 packets to a Windows host, which could allow them to run arbitrary code on the server. This vulnerability presents some unique challenges for organizations that have deployed DirectAccess.

Exposure

DirectAccess servers are deployed to provide secure remote access and are, necessarily, exposed to the public Internet. Sometimes, this is a direct connection (not recommended) or behind an edge firewall or load balancer. In either case, anyone can establish a TCP connection from the Internet to the DirectAccess server by default. If the DirectAccess server has a global unicast IPv6 address assigned to its external interface, that presents a worst-case scenario for exposure. Administrators should update their DirectAccess servers immediately. There are some other mitigation options, though. See below for more details.

IPv6 Transition

DirectAccess servers are usually reachable on the public Internet via IPv4 only. The lack of direct IPv6 connectivity significantly reduces the attack vector for this vulnerability. However, DirectAccess servers use various IPv6 transition technologies that could present additional risks.

Tunnel Establishment

Clients on the Internet can establish an IPv6 transition tunnel to the DirectAccess server without authentication. Once the tunnel is established, the client will receive a router advertisement (RA) and establish an IPv6 address on link. However, communication over the link requires IPsec. Although an attacker can obtain an IPv6 address, they require authentication to send TCP and UDP traffic inside the tunnel.

ICMP

It’s important to know that ICMP traffic inside the DirectAccess IPv6 transition tunnel is exempt from IPsec policy processing, by default. It is unclear whether the “specially crafted packets” an attacker must send to exploit this vulnerability can be ICMP packets. If that’s the case, this introduces significant risks and increases exposure exponentially. I will update this post if I learn anything more about this specifically.

Mitigation

The best and most obvious way to mitigate this attack is to immediately apply the Microsoft security updates. However, some additional controls can be effective in mitigating this risk.

Authentication

As mentioned, DirectAccess allows IPv6 transition tunnels to be established by default without authentication. However, it is possible to update the DirectAccess configuration to support authentication, as described here.

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/06/13/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication/

Note: Updating the DirectAccess configuration can be impactful for remote users. Be sure to test this change in a lab environment before implementing in production.

Load Balancers

If the DirectAccess server is behind a load balancer, it can be configured to require authentication for DirectAccess IPv6 transition tunnels. Below is published guidance for configuring popular load balancers to support this.

F5 BIG-IP

Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler)

Additional Information

Microsoft Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using F5 BIG-IP

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler)