TLS and Microsoft SQL Server 2022

Transport Layer Security (TLS) for SQL Server 2022 has numerous benefits. TLS enhances SQL Server security by providing authentication, encrypting data in transit, ensuring regulatory compliance, and following security best practices. It helps prevent unauthorized access, protects sensitive information, and mitigates interception attacks, making it a critical component of a secure database environment.

Self-Signed Certificates

When installing Microsoft SQL Server 2022 on-premises, a self-signed certificate is automatically created to support Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections to the database. From a security perspective, using unmanaged, self-signed certificates is never a good idea.

Risk

Self-signed certificates are insecure because they are not issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA), making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the server. This lack of trust enables attackers to intercept and manipulate data through interception attacks. Additionally, since operating systems do not automatically trust self-signed certificates, users may ignore security warnings, increasing the risk of connecting to malicious or compromised servers.

Enterprise PKI Certificates

For production workloads, security best practices dictate using enterprise PKI-issued and managed certificates, which provide many security benefits.

Authentication

TLS with managed certificates provides a mechanism for server authentication, ensuring that clients connect to a legitimate server and not an impostor. TLS authentication helps mitigate interception attacks where an attacker could potentially impersonate the server. Managed TLS certificates can also be revoked in the event of key compromise.

Data Encryption

Microsoft SQL Server 2022 database servers often store sensitive data, including personal details, financial records, and other confidential business information. TLS ensures that data in transit between the client and the server is encrypted using modern cryptography, which enhances privacy and confidentiality while preventing unauthorized interception and eavesdropping.

Compliance Requirements

Many regulatory frameworks and compliance standards, such as GDPR, HIPAA, or PCI-DSS, require or strongly recommend encrypting data in transit. Enabling TLS on SQL Server helps meet these compliance standards, strengthens internal security protections, and avoids potential penalties.

Security Best Practice

Implementing TLS is considered a fundamental security best practice in network and data communication. It reduces the risk of data breaches and enhances the overall network security posture in the enterprise.

TLS and SQL Server 2022

Microsoft SQL Server 2022 includes critical new options for administrators. The “Force Encryption” and “Force Strict Encryption” flags control how encryption is enforced for client connections, but their behavior and compatibility requirements differ.

Force Encryption

When this setting is enabled, the SQL server will encrypt communication between the client and server using TLS. However, contrary to what the name of the setting implies, it is possible for the server to accept unencrypted connections in some cases. If the client does not support encryption, the connection may still succeed without encryption. Enabling Force Encryption prioritizes encryption but does not strictly enforce it, meaning older clients that do not support encryption can still connect. Administrators can use this setting to ensure backward compatibility for applications that may not support strict encryption policies. However, upgrading applications to support encryption is strongly advised.

Force Strict Encryption

This setting is subtly different than the previous setting. It also ensures that all communication between the client and the server is encrypted without exception. If a client does not support encryption, the connection will be rejected. In addition, this setting enforces enhanced security parameters for the connection, such as certificate validation, more secure TLS cipher suites, and the use of TLS 1.3* when available. Force Strict Encryption is designed for modern security compliance. It is the preferred setting and should be used when all clients are known to support encryption.

* Note: TLS 1.3 is supported with SQL Server 2022 cumulative update 1 or later installed.

Key Differences

The following table summarizes the key differences between Force Encryption and Force Strict Encryption.

Force EncryptionEncourages but does not require encryption. Unencrypted connections may still be allowed.
Force Strict EncryptionRequires encryption for all connections. Clients that do not support encryption will be rejected.

Summary

By securing your Microsoft SQL Server with TLS, you significantly enhance the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of your data management systems. In the next post, I’ll provide detailed step-by-step guidance for enabling and configuring TLS on Microsoft SQL Server 2022 using best security practices.

Additional Information

Step-by-Step Guide: Enable TLS in Microsoft SQL Server 2022

VIDEO: Enable TLS in Microsoft SQL Server 2022

Microsoft SQL Server 2022

Configure Entra Conditional Access for Always On VPN

Recently, I wrote about Microsoft Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access and how conditional access improves your organization’s security posture by making policy-based access decisions based on various signals such as user identity, location, device compliance, platform, sign-in risk, and more. In this post, I’ll provide step-by-step instructions for integrating Entra Conditional Access with existing Always On VPN deployments.

Requirements

To use Microsoft Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN you must have Entra ID P1 at a minimum. To use advanced features such as risk-based policy assessment, you must have Entra ID P2. In addition, all endpoints must be under Intune management; either native Entra ID joined, or hybrid Entra ID joined.

Enable VPN Support

To begin, open the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com/), navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access, and perform the following steps.

  1. Click VPN Connectivity.
  2. Click New certificate.
  3. From the Select duration drop-down list, choose an appropriate certificate validity period.
  4. Click Create.

Once complete, click Download certificate and copy the certificate file to a domain-joined system on-premises.

Publish Certificate

Next, administrators must publish the Entra VPN root certificate in Active Directory to support domain authentication. Open an elevated PowerShell or command window and run the following commands.

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> RootCA

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to certificate file> NtAuthCA

Note: You must be a domain administrator to perform this task.

Conditional Access Policy

Navigate to Identity > Protection > Conditional Access and click Policies, then perform the following steps to create a conditional access policy for VPN access.

  1. Click New Policy.
  2. Enter a descriptive name for the new policy.
  3. Click the link in the Target resources section.
  4. From the Select what this policy applies to drop-down list, select Resources (formerly cloud apps).
  5. In the Include section, choose Select resources.
  6. Click the link in the Select section.
  7. Enter VPN in the search field.
  8. Check the box next to VPN Server.
  9. Click Select.
  10. Click the link in the Grant section.
  11. Select Grant access.
  12. Check the box next to Require device to be marked as compliant.
  13. Click Select.
  14. On the Enable policy slider, select On.
  15. Click Create.

NPS

Changes to Network Policy Server (NPS) policy and configuration are required to support Always On VPN with Entra Conditional Access.

NPS Policy

To update the Always On VPN network policy to support Entra Conditional Access, open the NPS management console (nps.msc), expand Policies, then select Network Policies and perform the following steps.

  1. Right-click on the Always On VPN policy and choose Properties.
  2. Select the Settings tab.
  3. Select Vendor Specific in the RADIUS Attributes section.
  4. Click Add.
  5. Select the Allowed-Certificate-OID attribute.
  6. Click Add.
  7. Click Add.
  8. Enter 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.87 in the Attribute value field.
  9. Click Ok.
  10. Click Ok.
  11. Click Close.
  12. Click Ok.

Important Note: This change will block new Always On VPN user tunnel connections until you update the client configuration. When integrating an existing Always On VPN implementation with Entra Conditional Access, consider creating a new NPS policy and corresponding security group to migrate users to conditional access seamlessly.

NPS Configuration

By default, NPS will perform revocation checks for certificates used for domain authentication. However, Entra Conditional Access uses short-lived certificates (one-hour lifetime) that do not include CRL Distribution Point (CDP) information. Therefore, administrators must change the NPS server configuration to disable revocation checking for certificates lacking this information.

To do this, open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and create a new registry key with the following settings.

Key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13
Name: IgnoreNoRevocationCheck
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

You can also run the following PowerShell command to implement this change.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\PPP\EAP\13\’ -Name IgnoreNoRevocationCheck -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, the server must be rebooted for the change to take effect.

Client Configuration

After making all required changes to the supporting infrastructure, you must also update the  Always On VPN client configuration to leverage Entra Conditional Access. Changes to client configuration vary depending on the method used to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings.

Intune

When using Microsoft Intune and the native VPN policy type to deploy and manage Always On VPN client configuration settings, perform the following steps to update the VPN configuration to include Entra Conditional Access support.

  1. Open the Microsoft Intune admin center (https://intune.microsoft.com/) and navigate to Devices > Configuration.
  2. Click on the Always On VPN policy.
  3. Click Edit next to Configuration settings.
  4. Expand the Conditional Access section.
  5. Click Enable next to Conditional access for this VPN connection.
  6. Click Enable next to Single sign-on (SSO) with alternate certificate.
  7. Enter Client Authentication in the Name field.
  8. Enter 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 in the Object Identifier field.
  9. Enter the organization’s root certification authority (CA) certificate thumbprint in the Issuer hash field.

XML

When using a custom XML configuration file for Always On VPN client configuration settings deployed using Intune or PowerShell, edit the XML file, remove the existing <TLSExtensions></TLSExtensions> section, and replace it with the following.

In addition, add the following code between the <VPNProfile></VPNProfile> tags after <TrustedNetworkDetection>.

Note: You will find a sample XML configuration file you can copy and paste from on GitHub here.

DPC

When using Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC) for managing Always On VPN client configuration settings, open the DPC group policy and navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > DPC Client > User Tunnel Settings > Advanced and perform the following steps.

  1. Double-click Optional – Device Compliance Settings.
  2. Select Enabled.
  3. Enter 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 in the Certificate EKU OID field.
  4. Enter the organization’s root certification authority (CA) certificate thumbprint in the Certificate Issuer Hash field.
  5. Click Ok.

Not using DPC? You’re missing out! Learn more about Always On VPN DPC here.

Video

I’ve published a demonstration video for enabling Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access with Always On VPN on YouTube. You can find the video here.

Summary

Following the guidance in this post to integrate Entra Conditional Access with Always On VPN can significantly improve your organization’s security posture. In the example above, the conditional access policy is a basic one. Yet, it dramatically reduces the attack surface for your remote access infrastructure by ensuring only compliant devices can establish a VPN connection.

Administrators can use advanced conditional access policy settings to strengthen the VPN’s security further by performing additional checks, such as requiring strong, phishing-resistant credentials and requesting multifactor authentication (MFA) for risky sign-ins.

Additional Information

Always On VPN and Entra Conditional Access

Drawback of Multifactor Authentication

Understanding Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Digital Certificates for Strong Authentication

Always On VPN Dynamic Profile Configurator (DPC)

Always On VPN DPC Open Source

Always On VPN Authentication Failure After February 2025 Security Update

Microsoft introduced changes to Windows domain controllers in the February 2025 security update that may result in authentication failures for Always On VPN user tunnel connections. If you suddenly find that all your Always On VPN user tunnel connections fail, additional changes may be required to resolve the issue.

Authentication Failure

Administrators may find that Always On VPN connections fail after applying the February 2025 Microsoft security updates. Specifically, users may receive the following warning message.

“The remote access connection completed, but authentication failed because the certificate that authenticates the client to the server is not valid. Ensure that the certificate used for authentication is valid.”

Error 853

Administrators will also find a corresponding event log entry with event ID 20227 from the RasClient source with the following error message.

“The user <username> dialed a connection named <connection name> which has failed. The error code returned on failure is 853.”

NPS Events

The event log on the NPS server will also record event ID 6273 from the Microsoft Windows security auditing source with the following error message.

“Network Policy Server denied access to a user.”

The authentication details of the event include Reason Code 16 with the following reason.

“Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.”

DC Events

If the issue is related to changes implemented to domain controllers in the February 2025 security update, administrators will also find a corresponding event log entry on a domain controller with event ID 39 from the Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center source with the following error message.

“The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a secure way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID). Such certificates should either be replaced or mapped directly to the user via explicit mapping.”

Root Cause

The above conditions indicate that a user attempted to authenticate to the VPN with a certificate that was not strongly mapped. Most likely, the certificate was issued using Microsoft Intune with SCEP or PKCS. This results from changes made to domain controllers in the February 2025 security update that requires certificates used for Active Directory authentication to be strongly mapped. Until now, domain controllers allowed access and only logged an event in the event log when a certificate did not include strong certificate mapping. The February 2025 security update now enforces strong certificate mapping, and authentication requests will fail without it.

Resolution

Administrators must issue new certificates that are strongly mapped to resolve this issue. For certificates issued with PKCS, changes are required on the Intune Certificate Connector server before re-issuing. For certificates issued with SCEP, changes to the device configuration policy are required. See the post Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates for more details.

Workaround

Re-issuing certificates takes time. To restore connectivity immediately, administrators can implement the following registry settings on all domain controllers to switch back to audit mode and allow authentication without strong certificate mapping.

Key: HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc
Name: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
Type: DWORD
Value: 1

I recommend deploying this setting via GPO assigned to the Domain Controllers OU. However, you can also implement this change using PowerShell if necessary.

New-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc’ -Name ‘StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement’ -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force

Additional Information

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Intune Strong Certificate Mapping Error

Strong Certificate Mapping Error with PKCS