DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler

Note: For information about configuring the F5 BIG-IP to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication, click hereFor information about configuring Windows Server 2012 R2 or Windows Server 2016 to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication natively, click here.

Introduction

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScalerIP-HTTPS is an IPv6 transition technology used by DirectAccess. It enables DirectAccess clients to communicate with the DirectAccess server using IPv6 over the public IPv4 Internet by encapsulating IPv6 packets in HTTP and authenticating (and optionally encrypting) them using SSL/TLS. IP-HTTPS is supported for all DirectAccess network deployment configurations and is enabled by default.

When a DirectAccess client connection is established, only the server is authenticated by the client. The client is not authenticated by the server. The DirectAccess server will thus accept IP-HTTPS connections from any client, valid or not.

IP-HTTPS Connection

Once a client has established an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel, it will go through the standard IPv6 neighbor discovery process to identify routers and obtain an IPv6 prefix for the link. It will use this information to build its own IPv6 address, which it uses to communicate with the DirectAccess server and begin establishing IPsec security associations for DirectAccess.

ICMP and IPsec

By design, ICMP is exempt from DirectAccess IPsec policy processing. If an unauthorized client were to establish an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel, even without authentication (Kerberos Proxy or certificate) it would be able to ping the DirectAccess server tunnel endpoint IPv6 addresses, the DNS64 IPv6 address, and any intranet hosts (assuming host firewalls allow this access).

Security Risk

This default posture opens up the DirectAccess server and intranet to unauthorized remote network reconnaissance and some IPv6-related Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. These were demonstrated by security researcher Ali Hardudi at the recent Troopers16 security conference. You can view his very informative session here.

Note: DirectAccess IPsec data connections are unaffected and are completely secure. Data is never exposed at any time with the default configuration.

IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScalerTo mitigate these risks, it is recommended that an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) such as the Citrix NetScaler be configured to preauthenticate DirectAccess clients prior to establishing the IP-HTTPS transition tunnel.

Note: To configure the F5 BIG-IP to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication, click here.

Citrix NetScaler Configuration

To perform DirectAccess preauthentication, it will be necessary to configure the Citrix NetScaler to perform SSL termination for IP-HTTPS. The virtual server on the NetScaler must use the SSL protocol. In addition, a CA certificate must be bound to the virtual server. Also, Client Authentication must be enabled under SSL Parameters and be set to Mandatory.

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler

Once configured, the NetScaler appliance will ensure that the DirectAccess IPsec certificate is present on the client before establishing the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition tunnel. This will prevent unauthorized connections to the DirectAccess server.

Important Considerations

Performing IP-HTTPS preauthentication on the Citrix NetScaler is formally unsupported by Microsoft. In addition, terminating IP-HTTPS on the NetScaler appliance breaks OTP authentication.

Summary

The default security posture of DirectAccess leaves the internal network open to unauthorized network reconnaissance, and exposes the DirectAccess infrastructure to potential denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. To mitigate these security risks, implement the Citrix NetScaler ADC and enable client certificate authentication.

References

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess [Overview] – https://www.insinuator.net/2016/04/security-assessment-of-microsoft-directaccess/

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess [Full Document] – https://www.ernw.de/newsfeed/newsletter-53-may-2016-security-assessment-of-microsoft-directaccess/index.html

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess Troopers16 Presentation by Ali Hardudi [Video] – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wW1x7ow0V9w

Chiron IPv6 Penetration Testing Framework – https://www.insinuator.net/2014/10/chiron-an-all-in-one-ipv6-penetration-testing-framework/

IP-HTTPS specification on MSDN – https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd358571.aspx

Configure F5 BIG-IP to Perform IP-HTTPS Preauthentication – https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/05/23/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication-using-f5-big-ip/

Configure Windows Server 2012 R2  and Windows Server 2016 to Perform IP-HTTPS Preauthentication – https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/06/13/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication/

Microsoft Security Update MS13-064 and DirectAccess

With the August security update release cycle, Microsoft issued security bulletin MS13-064 to address a vulnerability in the Windows NAT driver that could result in a denial of service. The vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker who sends a specially crafted ICMP packet to the server running the Windows NAT Driver service. The vulnerability exists only on Windows Server 2012 and the affected driver, winnat.sys, is present when the DirectAccess role is installed. This vulnerability only affects only full installations of Windows Server 2012. Windows Server 2012 Core is not affected. If you are running DirectAccess on a full installation of Windows Server 2012, make sure you install this update as soon as possible to be protected from potential denial of service attacks. For more information about this update, click here. For a comprehensive list of updates that apply to DirectAccess on Windows Server 2012 as well as previous versions, please refer to Jason Jones’ DirectAccess hotfix summary page.

Windows Server 2012 DirectAccess Network Location Server Not Working Properly

After configuring a Windows Server 2012 DirectAccess server to use an intranet-based Network Location Server (NLS), you may notice that the operations status in the remote access management console indicates a critical problem with NLS, when in fact you can browse the NLS server from the DirectAccess server.

DirectAccess Network Location Server Issue

The issue here is that the DirectAccess server, in addition to being able to successfully connect to the NLS using an HTTP GET, must also be able to ping the NLS server. However, inbound ICMP is often blocked on web servers which results in the DirectAccess server marking the service as failed. The issue can be quickly resolved by modifying the host firewall policy to allow inbound ICMPv4 echo requests. For example, in my test lab I’m using a Microsoft Windows Server 2012 server with Internet Information Services (IIS) installed. A new access rule can be added to the Windows Firewall with Advanced Security (WFAS) by executing the following PowerShell command:

New-NetFirewallRule -Name “Allow Inbound ICMPv4 Echo Request” -DisplayName “Allow Inbound ICMPv4 Echo Request” -Protocol ICMPv4 -IcmpType 8 -RemoteAddress 172.16.1.241, 172.16.1.242 -Profile Domain -Action Allow -Enabled True

Note that my lab server is domain joined, so I’ve specified the WFAS profile to be the Domain profile. In addition I’ve included the IPv4 addresses assigned to the internal network interfaces of my two DirectAccess servers. You’ll need change the command as required to work in your environment.

Manage Out Fails for Non-ICMP Traffic with UAG DirectAccess

You may encounter a scenario in which the ability to manage out fails for DirectAccess clients using Forefront UAG 2010. You may also receive the following error:

4984 “An IPsec extended mode negotiation failed”

This can happen when custom security policies are applied to the DirectAccess client, specifically altering the settings for “Access this computer from the network“.

For more information regarding this error and how to resolve it, please refer to Microsoft Knowledge Base article 2663354.

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