All posts in category IPv6 Transition

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler

Note: For information about configuring the F5 BIG-IP to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication, click here. For information about configuring Windows Server 2012 R2 or Windows Server 2016 to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication natively, click here.

Introduction

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScalerIP-HTTPS is an IPv6 transition technology used by DirectAccess. It enables DirectAccess clients to communicate with the DirectAccess server using IPv6 over the public IPv4 Internet by encapsulating IPv6 packets in HTTP and authenticating (and optionally encrypting) them using SSL/TLS. IP-HTTPS is supported for all DirectAccess network deployment configurations and is enabled by default.

When a DirectAccess client connection is established, only the server is authenticated by the client. The client is not authenticated by the server. The DirectAccess server will thus accept IP-HTTPS connections from any client, valid or not.

IP-HTTPS Connection

Once a client has established an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel, it will go through the standard IPv6 neighbor discovery process to identify routers and obtain an IPv6 prefix for the link. It will use this information to build its own IPv6 address, which it uses to communicate with the DirectAccess server and begin establishing IPsec security associations for DirectAccess.

ICMP and IPsec

By design, ICMP is exempt from DirectAccess IPsec policy processing. If an unauthorized client were to establish an IP-HTTPS transition tunnel, even without authentication (Kerberos Proxy or certificate) it would be able to ping the DirectAccess server tunnel endpoint IPv6 addresses, the DNS64 IPv6 address, and any intranet hosts (assuming host firewalls allow this access).

Security Risk

This default posture opens up the DirectAccess server and intranet to unauthorized remote network reconnaissance and some IPv6-related Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. These were demonstrated by security researcher Ali Hardudi at the recent Troopers16 security conference. You can view his very informative session here.

Note: DirectAccess IPsec data connections are unaffected and are completely secure. Data is never exposed at any time with the default configuration.

IP-HTTPS Preauthentication

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScalerTo mitigate these risks, it is recommended that an Application Delivery Controller (ADC) such as the Citrix NetScaler be configured to preauthenticate DirectAccess clients prior to establishing the IP-HTTPS transition tunnel.

Note: To configure the F5 BIG-IP to perform IP-HTTPS preauthentication, click here.

Citrix NetScaler Configuration

To perform DirectAccess preauthentication, it will be necessary to configure the Citrix NetScaler to perform SSL termination for IP-HTTPS. The virtual server on the NetScaler must use the SSL protocol. In addition, a CA certificate must be bound to the virtual server. Also, Client Authentication must be enabled under SSL Parameters and be set to Mandatory.

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Preauthentication using Citrix NetScaler

Once configured, the NetScaler appliance will ensure that the DirectAccess IPsec certificate is present on the client before establishing the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition tunnel. This will prevent unauthorized connections to the DirectAccess server.

Important Considerations

Performing IP-HTTPS preauthentication on the Citrix NetScaler is formally unsupported by Microsoft. In addition, terminating IP-HTTPS on the NetScaler appliance breaks OTP authentication.

Summary

The default security posture of DirectAccess leaves the internal network open to unauthorized network reconnaissance, and exposes the DirectAccess infrastructure to potential denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. To mitigate these security risks, implement the Citrix NetScaler ADC and enable client certificate authentication.

References

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess [Overview] – https://www.insinuator.net/2016/04/security-assessment-of-microsoft-directaccess/

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess [Full Document] – https://www.ernw.de/newsfeed/newsletter-53-may-2016-security-assessment-of-microsoft-directaccess/index.html

Security Assessment of Microsoft DirectAccess Troopers16 Presentation by Ali Hardudi [Video] – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wW1x7ow0V9w

Chiron IPv6 Penetration Testing Framework – https://www.insinuator.net/2014/10/chiron-an-all-in-one-ipv6-penetration-testing-framework/

IP-HTTPS specification on MSDN – https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd358571.aspx

Configure F5 BIG-IP to Perform IP-HTTPS Preauthentication – https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/05/23/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication-using-f5-big-ip/

Configure Windows Server 2012 R2  and Windows Server 2016 to Perform IP-HTTPS Preauthentication – https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/06/13/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication/

23 Comments
by Richard M. Hicks on May 10, 2016  •  Permalink
Posted in ADC, application delivery controller, DirectAccess, IP-HTTPS, IPv6, IPv6 Transition, Load Balancing, Netscaler, Remote Access, Security, SSL and TLS, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2016
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Posted by Richard M. Hicks on May 10, 2016

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/05/10/directaccess-ip-https-preauthentication-using-citrix-netscaler/

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Introduction

When preparing a DirectAccess server, an SSL certificate is required for the IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology. This certificate is often issued by a public Certification Authority (CA), but it can also be issued an organization’s internal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

SSL Certificate

Commonly an SSL certificate is issued for a single hostname, or subject. As long as the hostname matches the subject, everything works fine.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Multi-SAN SSL Certificate

To ease the management burden of using multiple certificates, or reduce the expense associated with using a wildcard certificate, organizations can request a multi-SAN (Subject Alternative Name) certificate, which matches more than one subject. The additional subjects are included in the Subject Alternative Name field on the SSL certificate.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS
A single multi-SAN certificate can be installed on multiple hosts and will work without issue as long as the hostname matches one of the SAN entries.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN Certificates

When implementing DirectAccess in a multisite configuration, each entry point in the organization will have a unique public hostname. Instinctively, using a multi-SAN SSL certificate in this scenario would seem ideal.

Unfortunately, support for multi-SAN SSL certificates with DirectAccess is limited. To use a multi-SAN certificate for DirectAccess IP-HTTPS, the public hostname must match the name listed in the Subject field. In the example above, the subject is da.richardhicks.net, with SAN entries for da-west.richardhicks.net and da-east.richardhicks.net.

In this scenario, only the public name da.richardhicks.net is supported for use with DirectAccess. It will not work for any of the SAN entries. For example, attempting to configure DirectAccess to use this certificate with the public hostname da-west.richardhicks.net will fail with the following error message.

The subject name of certificate CN=[certificate subject name] is invalid.
Select a certificate with a valid subject name.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Attempting to work around this issue by using the Set-DAServer PowerShell cmdlet also fails to recognize the SSL certificate correctly.

DirectAccess and Multi-SAN SSL Certificates for IP-HTTPS

Summary

Using a multi-SAN SSL certificate for the DirectAccess IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology is only supported when the public hostname matches the subject name of the certificate. Configuring DirectAccess with a public hostname listed in the SAN list is not supported. For multisite DirectAccess deployments, individual certificates must be issued for each entry point. Alternatively, a wildcard certificate can be used.

9 Comments
by Richard M. Hicks on March 28, 2016  •  Permalink
Posted in DirectAccess, IP-HTTPS, IPv6, IPv6 Transition, Remote Access, SSL and TLS, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2016
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Posted by Richard M. Hicks on March 28, 2016

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2016/03/28/directaccess-and-multi-san-ssl-certificates-for-ip-https/

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Discovery Script for Nmap

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Discovery Script for NmapWhen troubleshooting DirectAccess connectivity issues, the popular Nmap network mapping and discovery tool is an invaluable resource for verifying the communication path to the DirectAccess server from outside the network. However, just verifying that ports are open and listening often isn’t sufficient. In the case of IP-HTTPS, for example, the tried and true method of using telnet to verify that the port is open might be misleading. For instance, telnet might indicate that TCP port 443 is open and responding, but DirectAccess connectivity can still fail. This often happens as a result of a network configuration error that allows another network device other than the DirectAccess server to respond to HTTPS requests, which results in a false positive.

In an effort to conclusively determine that the DirectAccess server is responding, I’ve often relied on the SSL Labs Server Test site. Here I will enter the DirectAccess server’s public hostname and run the test, and from the results I can easily determine if indeed the DirectAccess server is responding by verifying that the HTTP server signature is Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0.

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Discovery Script for NMAP

This usually works well, but it takes a few minutes to run the test, and there are a few scenarios in which it doesn’t work. For example, I might be working with a customer to perform some initial testing by using a local HOSTS file entry for the public name before the DNS record has been created. Also, if the SSL certificate on the DirectAccess server uses an IP address instead of a hostname (not recommended, but it is supported!) the SSL Labs server test won’t work.

Fortunately, the latest release Nmap (v7.00) now includes a script that enables the detection of Microsoft DirectAccess responding on TCP port 443. With the IP-HTTPS discovery script, it is now possible to determine not only if the port is open, but if the DirectAccess server is actually the service responding. The syntax for conducting a port scan using the IP-HTTPS discovery script for NMAP is as follows:

nmap.exe –n –Pn –p443 [directaccess_public_fqdn] –script [path_to_nmap_iphttps_discovery_script]

Here’s an example:

nmap.exe –n –Pn –p443 da.richardhicks.net –script c:\tools\nmap\scripts\ip-https-discover.nse

DirectAccess IP-HTTPS Discovery Script for NMAP

Now it is possible, using just Nmap, to not only determine if the IP-HTTPS communication path is functioning, but to definitively determine that the DirectAccess server is the device responding.

Happy troubleshooting!

7 Comments
by Richard M. Hicks on November 30, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in DirectAccess, Encryption, IP-HTTPS, IPv6, IPv6 Transition, Remote Access, SSL and TLS, Windows Server 2012 R2
Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Posted by Richard M. Hicks on November 30, 2015

https://directaccess.richardhicks.com/2015/11/30/directaccess-ip-https-discovery-script-for-nmap/

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