Recently, the CA/Browser Forum, which is a voluntary consortium made up of public CAs, browser vendors, and other industry stakeholders, introduced new requirements for S/MIME certificates issued by public certification authorities (CAs). For organizations using Microsoft Intune SCEP device configuration profiles to enroll for these certificates, administrators must update Intune settings to ensure uninterrupted enrollment once the changes take effect.
Subject Name Changes
Beginning July 16, 2025, all publicCAs will enforce these new S/MIME Baseline Requirements, mandating “Given Name” and “Surname” attributes in the Subject Name field of S/MIME certificates. By default, Intune user certificate profiles include only the “UserName” attribute in the Subject Name field.
Intune Support
Intune recently completed the rollout of these new attributes in SCEP profiles. Administrators can now update their SCEP profiles for third-party public CAs to include these new attributes for S/MIME certificates using the following supported variables.
G={{GivenName}} SN={{SurName}}
To align with current public CA standards, include these two fields along with any other information required in the Subject name format field. Multiple values must be separated by commas without spaces, as shown in the example below.
Private CAs
Private CAs, like Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) or Intune Cloud PKI, are unaffected. If you are enrolling for S/MIME certificates using these services, no changes are required.
Reenrollment
It’s important to note that modifying an existing Intune SCEP profile will trigger certificate reissuance for all users and devices within the policy’s scope, which could yield unexpected results. When making changes to Intune certificate policies, it is best to create a new policy to supersede the old one, allowing administrators to pilot the new policy before its broad deployment.
The Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) VPN protocol uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption and HTTP transport over TCP port 443. SSTP is easy to configure and firewall-friendly, making it an excellent choice for the Always On VPN user tunnel. Security best practices dictate using a TLS certificate issued by a public Certification Authority (CA). Today, the maximum lifetime of a public TLS certificate is 398 days (approximately 1 year). Always On VPN administrators using SSTP are familiar with the process of renewing their SSTP certificate annually. However, that’s about to change.
47 Days
In April of this year, the CA/Browser Forum, a voluntary consortium of public CAs, browser vendors, and other industry stakeholders that develop and promote security standards and best practices for digital certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), adopted a measure reducing the current maximum lifetime of public TLS certificates to 47 days. This means Always On VPN administrators using public TLS certificates must eventually update their TLS certificates monthly.
Automation
Of course, no administrator in their right mind would want to renew SSTP certificates every month. Automating this process will be crucial to ensuring reliability and reducing management overhead. I’ll provide more details later in this post.
Why Is This Happening?
The industry has been trending toward shorter certificate lifetimes for a while now. In the old days, you could purchase a certificate valid for 5 years or more. Today, a one-year certificate is all you can get. Let’s Encrypt, a public CA that issues certificates for free, issues only 90-day lifetime certificates.
Advantages
The advantage of using short-lived certificates for public TLS certificates is that they improve security and provide agility for future changes. Public TLS certificates become less secure and trustworthy over time. The longer a certificate is valid, the less trustworthy it becomes and the longer the opportunity for an attacker to leverage a certificate for which the private key has been compromised.
Why 47 Days?
A 47-day maximum certificate lifetime allows administrators to rotate their certificates monthly (a maximum of 31 days plus some margin to resolve issues).
Not So Fast
The good news for Always On VPN administrators using SSTP with public TLS certificates is that they won’t have to worry about this immediately. The reduction in maximum certificate lifetime to 47 days takes place gradually over a few years.
Today, the maximum public TLS certificate lifetime is 398 days
On March 15, 2026, the maximum public TLS certificate lifetime will be reduced to 200 days
On March 15, 2027, the maximum public TLS certificate lifetime will be reduced to 100 days
On March 15, 2029, the maximum public TLS certificate lifetime will be reduced to 47 days
Let’s Encrypt
Over the years, I’ve deployed Always On VPN with SSTP for several customers using Let’s Encrypt TLS certificates. Let’s Encrypt is a pubic CA that issues certificates with a maximum lifetime of 90 days, so automating this task is essential. Let’s Encrypt supports ACME, a standard protocol for automating the issuance and renewal of TLS certificates, which makes automating TLS certificate installation and renewal a breeze.
Sample Script
I’ve published a sample PowerShell script demonstrating how to automate the enrollment process for Let’s Encrypt TLS certificates. It leverages the Posh-ACME PowerShell module and my AOVPNTools module to enroll and automatically install a TLS certificate for SSTP. This script will also work for DirectAccess. You can find the sample script here.
Note: My sample script demonstrates using the Cloudflare DNS plugin for Posh-ACME. Posh-ACME has plugins for many public DNS providers, which can be found here. Feel free to customize my script to meet your specific needs.
Act Now
Always On VPN administrators are advised to consider solutions to automate TLS certificate enrollment and renewal as soon as possible. If your public CA of choice doesn’t support some form of certificate automation like ACME, it’s time to find another provider.
Summary
Starting in March 2026, the maximum lifetime for public TLS certificates will be reduced gradually, reaching just 47 days by March 2029. Automation will no longer be optional for Always On VPN administrators using SSTP—it will be essential. Tools like the Posh-ACME PowerShell module provide a reliable solution to streamline certificate management and ensure uninterrupted connectivity. Now is the time to prepare for this industry shift by implementing automated certificate renewal solutions. If you’d like professional assistance with this task or simply want to learn more about your options, drop me a note via the contact page, and I’ll respond with more information.
Are you ready? In just a few short weeks(!) Microsoft will release the February 2025 security updates. This is a critical update because Microsoft plans to enable full enforcement of strong certificate mapping on Active Directory Domain Controllers (DCs) with this release. Administrators unprepared for this may incur outages for workloads using certificate-based authentication such as Always On VPN, Wi-Fi, and others.
Microsoft introduced strong certificate mapping with the May 2022 update KB5014754 to address vulnerabilities identified with certificate-based authentication. The update makes changes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certification authorities (CAs) to embed the principal’s Security Identifier (SID) on issued certificates with a new certificate extension. The update also changes domain controller behavior to monitor and optionally enforce strong certificate mapping for authentication.
Enforcement Mode
When first introduced, the update is configured in compatibility mode. If a certificate that isn’t strongly mapped is presented for authentication, an event is recorded in the event log indicating that. Microsoft has been planning for years to enable full enforcement. After many delays, that time is now upon us. Specifically, full enforcement for strong certificate mapping will be enabled by default on DCs after applying the February 2025 security updates.
Note: Administrators can switch back to compatibility mode for now. See below for more details.
Limitations
Initially, the strong certificate mapping update was applied only to online certificate templates. Specifically, those templates are configured to build the subject name from Active Directory information. However, offline templates, where the subject name is supplied in the request, do not include this information by default. Crucially, any certificate issued with Microsoft Intune with PKCS or SCEP uses offline templates and is not strongly mapped. The lack of strong certificate mapping options for Intune-issued certificates forced Microsoft to delay its full enforcement deadline until these limitations were resolved.
Updates
In October 2024, Microsoft Intune announced support for strong certificate mapping for PKCS and SCEP certificates. Administrators can now configure these certificates to include strong certificate mapping. However, administrators must take action to affect this change.
PKCS
To enable strong certificate mapping for PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure that the certificate connector is running at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, the following registry key must be configured on the connector server.
The Intune Certificate Connector server must be restarted for this change to take effect. No changes are required on the PKCS certificate policy in Intune.
SCEP
To enable strong certificate mapping for SCEP certificates, administrators must add the following attribute/value pair to the Subject alternative name settings on their existing Intune SCEP certificate policy.
Attribute: URI Value: {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}
Preparation
Administrators using certificate-based authentication against on-premises Active Directory should ensure all user and device authentication certificates include embedded SID information. For certificates issued on-premises, with Intune using PKCS or certificates issued by Entra Conditional Access, the certificate should now have the extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, including the principal’s SID.
SCEP certificates issued using Intune will include the following information in the Subject Alternative Name field.
URL=tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-24:sid:<sid>
Note: This applies to certificates issued using Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune as those certificates are deployed using a SCEP device configuration policy.
Opt-Out
With the February 2025 security update, all domain controllers will be switched to full enforcement mode. Authentication requests using certificates without strong mapping will be denied in this configuration.
If your organization is not prepared to move to full enforcement mode, the February 2025 update allows administrators to opt out and switch back to compatibility mode by enabling the following registry key on all domain controllers.
Administrators are strongly encouraged to update all user and device authentication certificates before September 2025. With the September 2025 security update, Microsoft will no longer honor the opt-out registry settings and strictly enforce strong certificate mapping for all certificate-based authentication requests.
Troubleshooting
Certificate authentication is commonly used for Always On VPN and Wi-Fi authentication. If full enforcement mode is enabled on domain controllers and a certificate is presented for authentication that is not strongly mapped, administrators may see the following event log information recorded on the Network Policy Server (NPS).
Network Policy Server denied access to a user.
The details of the event include the following.
Reason Code: 16 Reason: Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.
Obviously, the user does not enter their password when using certificates for authentication. However, the indication of a credential mismatch can be caused by missing strong certificate mapping information when the DC is in full enforcement mode.
Note: There are other causes for reason code 16 failures on NPS. Further investigation may be required to determine the root cause.
