Delete A Cloud PKI for Intune Certificate Authority

Deleting an Always On VPN Device Tunnel

When Microsoft first introduced Cloud PKI for Intune, the solution did not allow administrators to delete a CA after it was created. As you are limited to just six Cloud PKI for Intune CAs, this was quite frustrating, especially during the testing and evaluation phase, where you may need to spin up a few instances before you decide on the features you need.

Are you interested in learning more about Cloud PKI for Intune? Register for my upcoming online training course, Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune. This three-day comprehensive, deep-dive course covers all aspects of issuing and managing certificates with Intune, including provisioning and managing Cloud PKI for Intune. Click here to learn more.

Delete Cloud PKI

Thankfully, Microsoft eventually realized this shortcoming and added this much needed feature a few months ago. However, removing an Intune Cloud PKI CA requires administrators to follow some specific steps to remove a CA successfully. Since Cloud PKI for Intune uses a two-tier deployment model, administrators must remove the issuing CA first and then the root CA if required.

Issuing CA

Follow the steps below to delete a Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Intune Policies

Be sure to delete any Intune device configuration policies relating to Cloud PKI for Intune before decommissioning a Cloud PKI for Intune CA. This includes trusted certificate policies, Wi-Fi policies, and VPN policies.

Pause CA

The first step of deleting a Cloud PKI for Intune CA is to pause the service. Pausing the service prevents new certificates from being issued while the administrator completes the remaining retirement tasks. Open the Intune portal (https://intune.microsoft.com), navigate to Tenant Administration > Cloud PKI, and click the CA to be deleted. Next, click Pause to pause the CA.

Revoke Certificates

Administrators must revoke all issued certificates before deleting the issuing CA. Click on any issued certificate to view its properties and then click the Revoke button, as shown here.

Complete this step for each certificate issued and active on the CA.

Note: It takes some time before the certificate status shows Revoked in the management console. Be patient!

Revoke CA Certificate

Once the administrator has revoked all issued certificates, click Revoke to revoke the issuing CA’s certificate.

Delete CA

Once the issuing CA certificate has been revoked the administrator will now have the option to delete the Cloud PKI for Intune issuing CA.

Root CA

After the administrator deletes the issuing CA, the root CA can be removed if necessary. Click on the root CA and click the Delete button.

Additional Information

Delete Microsoft Cloud PKI Certification Authority

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Certificate Templates

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune and Active Directory

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune SCEP URL

Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune on RunAs Radio

Strong Certificate Mapping for Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

With the October 2024 Intune update, Microsoft introduced support for strong certificate mapping for certificates issued by Intune via the Intune Certificate Connector. Enabling strong certificate mapping support in Intune is an important change for those organizations using Microsoft Intune to issue and manage certificates for their users and devices, as it resolves a critical implementation blocker.

Note: This post was updated to clarify that adding the {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} for PKCS certificates is not required. This variable is only used for SCEP certificates.

Background

In May 2022, Microsoft released security update KB5014754, which added functionality to domain controllers and enterprise issuing certification authority (CA) servers, allowing the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) to enforce strong certificate mapping. Specifically, with KB5014754 installed, issuing CAs now add the requesting principal’s Security Identifier (SID) to the certificate in a new certificate extension. Domain controllers can be configured to reject authentication requests using certificates that do not include this information.

Today, DCs with KB5014754 installed will still allow authentication without strong certificate mapping. However, Microsoft has stated they will begin enforcing strong certificate mapping in February 2025, with an option to disable it via the registry. Starting in September 2025, full enforcement will be mandatory.

Update: Full Enforcement mode has been mandatory since the September 9, 2025 Windows security update. The StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry setting is no longer supported, and domain controllers deny certificate-based authentication when a certificate cannot be strongly mapped. See Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement February 2025 for details.

Microsoft strong certificate mapping enforcement timeline from KB5014754

Reference: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16

Limitation

The initial changes in KB5014754 applied only to online certificate templates, meaning those that build the subject name from Active Directory. However, deploying certificates with Intune using either PKCS or SCEP requires using an offline certificate template that allows the requestor to supply the subject name in the request. When using offline templates, a certificate is issued but does not embed the SID in the certificate. Using offline templates presents unique challenges to organizations moving to modern management with Intune and Entra ID.

Intune Changes

The October 2024 Intune update addresses this limitation by providing a method to include SID information in certificates using either SCEP or PKCS.

SCEP

To include the SID information in SCEP certificates, create or edit an existing SCEP device configuration policy and define a URI Subject Alternative Name (SAN) attribute with the value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}} as shown here.

Intune SCEP profile with a URI subject alternative name set to OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier

PKCS

To include SID information in PKCS certificates, administrators must ensure the Intune Certificate Connector is updated to at least version 6.2406.0.1001. In addition, a registry setting must be enabled on the Intune Certificate Connector server.

On the server where the Intune Certificate Connector is installed, open the registry editor, navigate to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector, and change the value of EnableSidSecurityExtension to 1.

Registry editor showing EnableSidSecurityExtension set to 1 on the Intune Certificate Connector server

Optionally, administrators can update this setting at the command line by running the following PowerShell command.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector’ -Name EnableSidSecurityExtension -Value 1 -Force

Once complete, restart the Intune Certificate Connector server for the changes to take effect.

Certificates

SID information is added to certificates differently depending on which Intune device configuration policy type is used.

PKCS

PKCS certificates have the SID embedded in the certificate extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2, as shown here.

PKCS certificate showing the SID in the 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 certificate extension

SCEP

SCEP certificates have the SID embedded in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field in the format “tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:<SID>” as shown here.

SCEP certificate showing the SID in the subject alternative name field

Migration

When making these changes to embed the SID in Intune-issued certificates in an existing Intune PKCS or SCEP configuration policy, the change will only affect certificates issued after the change is made. To update all certificate holders, you must create and deploy a new device configuration policy to targeted users or devices. Deleting the old profile (or ensuring it no longer applies) will remove the old certificate from the endpoint. If you’ve configured your Intune Certificate Connector to support revocation, the old certificate will also be revoked.

Entra Conditional Access

Entra Conditional Access certificates have included SID information since July 2023. More details here.

Cloud PKI for Intune

The changes above will also work with certificates issued by Cloud PKI for Intune.

Other Cloud PKI Providers

Many other Cloud PKI providers, such as SCEPman and KEYTOS, already include the embedded SID in their certificates. Other cloud PKI providers may also include embedded SID. Consult your provider to confirm.

Additional Information

Microsoft Intune October 2024 Strong Certificate Mapping Update

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Strong Certificate Mapping Update for PKCS

Entra ID Conditional Access Certificates with SID Information Now Available

Implementing Strong Certificate Mapping in Microsoft Intune PKCS and SCEP Certificates

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Troubleshooting Intune Failed PKCS Request

Always On VPN administrators deploying on-premises enterprise PKI certificates using Microsoft Intune with PKCS may encounter a scenario where a certificate fails to be issued to a user or device. In this post, I’ll share some things to investigate when troubleshooting this issue.

Event 1001

To begin, open the Event Log and navigate to Applications and Services > Microsoft > Intune > CertificateConnectors > Admin. You will likely find an event ID 1001 from the CertificateConnectors source with the following error message.

Failed to process PKCS request.

Prerequisites

Validate the following prerequisites have been met on the issuing Certification Authority (CA) server.

Certificate Template

Ensure the certificate template used for PKCS has the correct permissions and is published on an issuing CA server. Open the Certificate Templates management console (certtmpl.msc), right-click the certificate template, choose Properties, and then click on the Security tab. The certificate template must grant the Intune Certificate connector server’s computer account (or the PKCS connector’s service account if running as a service and not SYSTEM) the Read and Enroll permissions on the template.

CA Permissions

In addition to the permissions on the certificate template, ensure the correct permissions have been configured on the issuing CA itself. Right-click on the CA in the Certification Authority management console (certsrv.msc) and choose Security. Ensure the Intune Certificate connector server’s computer account (or the PKCS connector’s service account, if running as a service and not SYSTEM) is granted The Issue and Manage Certificates and Request Certificates permissions.

Intune Policy

Ensure the Intune device configuration policy is configured correctly. These three fields are critical and can result in failed PKCS certificate deployment if misconfigured.

Certification Authority

Enter the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the on-premises issuing CA server in this field.

Certification Authority Name

Enter the common name of the issuing CA in this field. You will find this information by running the following command on any domain-joined Windows system.

certutil.exe -dump

Certificate Template Name

Enter the name of the certificate template in Active Directory. Be aware that the template name and template display name are two different things. The template name is usually the template display name without spaces. However, that’s not a guarantee. On the General tab of the certificate template, look at the template name field on the certificate template to confirm.

Summary

This article is not a comprehensive troubleshooting guide for problems associated with failed PKCS certificate deployment using the Microsoft Intune Certificate connector and PKCS. However, it covers some of the more common problems administrators will likely encounter. If you cannot provision PKCS certificates correctly, drop me a note and I’ll provide further guidance.

Additional Information

Troubleshooting Failed Intune Certificate Connector Configuration – Part 1

Troubleshooting Failed Intune Certificate Connector Configuration – Part 2

Intune Certificate Connector Service Account and PKCS

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and Certificate Templates

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and Active Directory

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and Certificate Templates

Microsoft recently announced the general availability of its new PKI-as-a-Service platform called Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI. With Intune Cloud PKI, administrators create certification authorities (CAs) to issue and manage user and device authentication certificates for Intune-managed endpoints. Cloud PKI also provides hosted Authority Information Access (AIA) and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Distribution Point (CDP) services, in addition to Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) service, so administrators do not have to deploy on-premises infrastructure to take advantage of certificate-based authentication.

Certificate Templates

After deploying your Intune Cloud PKI root and issuing CAs, you may wonder where to find the associated certificate templates. If you are familiar with traditional on-premises Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) implementations, this is how you define the purpose, key policy, security parameters, and lifetime of the certificate issued using that template. However, Intune Cloud PKI does not use certificate templates in the traditional way many administrators are familiar with.

Note: Microsoft may introduce support for certificate templates for Intune Cloud PKI in the future. However, it is not supported at the time of this writing.

SCEP Profile

Administrators define certificate policies and security parameters using Intune’s SCEP device configuration profile instead of certificate templates. In essence, the SCEP profile functions as the certificate template. With the Intune device configuration profile, administrators can define the following settings.

Certificate Type

The certificate type can be either a user or a device. Intune Cloud PKI can issue certificates for either or both, as required.

Subject Name (User)

The subject name is unimportant for user authentication certificates because the User Principal Name (UPN) defined in the Subject Alternative Name field is used to authenticate the user. In this field, the administrator can use whatever they like. However, it’s common to use the username here. Avoid using the email attribute here because there’s no guarantee that every user will have this defined on the Active Directory (AD) user object.

Subject Name (Device)

Administrators should supply the device’s fully qualified domain name (FQDN) for device authentication certificates in the subject name field. For hybrid Entra joined devices, administrators can use the {{FullyQualifiedDomainName}} variable. For native Entra-joined devices, you can use {{DeviceName}} and append your DNS suffix, for example, {{DeviceName}}.corp.example.net.

Note: Intune supports numerous variables to populate fields for certificates. You can find a list of supported variables in the following locations.

User Certificate Variables: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/certificates-profile-scep#create-a-scep-certificate-profile:~:text=Manager%20blog%20post.-,User%20certificate%20type,-Use%20the%20text

Device Certificate Variables: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/certificates-profile-scep#create-a-scep-certificate-profile:~:text=on%20the%20device.-,Device%20certificate%20type,-Format%20options%20for

Subject Alternative Name (User)

The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field for user authentication certificates should be populated with the User Principal Name (UPN) value. Ensure this value is appropriately configured internally and supports sign-in to AD.

Subject Alternative Name (Device)

The SAN field for device authentication certificates should be populated with the device’s FQDN. Follow the guidance for device subject names covered previously.

Certificate Validity Period

This field allows the administrator to define the certificate’s validity period. The best practice is to limit the lifetime to no more than one year. A shorter lifetime is recommended for certificates not backed by a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

Key Storage Provider

This value is critical to ensuring integrity for issued user and device authentication certificates. The best practice is to select Enroll to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) KSP, otherwise fail. However, if you must issue certificates to endpoints without a TPM (e.g., legacy devices, virtual machines, etc.), consider a separate profile with a shorter certificate lifetime to limit exposure.

Key Usage

Digital signature and Key encipherment are required for user and device authentication certificates.

Key Size

The 2048-bit key size is the minimum recommended value for certificates with RSA keys. Using 4096-bit is not recommended for end-entity certificates and can potentially cause conflicts in some cases. Intune Cloud PKI does not support the 1024-bit key size.

Hash Algorithm

SHA-2 is the best practice for the hash algorithm. SHA-1 has been deprecated and should not be used.

Root Certificate

Select the Cloud PKI root CA certificate.

Extended Key Usage

The minimum requirement for user and device authentication certificates is Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2).

Renewal Threshold

This value specifies at what point the certificate can be renewed. 20% is commonly used for certificates with a one-year lifetime.

SCEP Server URLs

This value can be found on the configuration properties page of your Cloud PKI issuing CA. The URI will include a variable in the URL. The variable is there by design. Copy and paste this URL exactly as displayed in the SCEP URL field.

Training

Are you interested in learning more about issuing and managing certificates with Microsoft Intune? Would you like to know how to securely and optimally implement PKCS and SCEP infrastructure on-premises? Do you want more details about deploying and managing Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI? Register now for my upcoming three-day live Certificates and Intune Masterclass training event at the ViaMonstra online training academy. We’ll deep-dive into all aspects of certificate management using Intune with on-premises AD CS and Intune Cloud PKI. I’ll be sharing many advanced techniques for adequately securing your certificate infrastructure. Space is limited, so register now!

Additional Information

Mastering Certificates with Intune Training Course

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI Overview

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and Active Directory

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Failure

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Configuration Failed

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Configuration Failure

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Service Account and PKCS

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI

Recently, Microsoft introduced the general availability of its new PKI-as-a-service solution called Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI. Cloud PKI allows administrators to issue and manage user and device authentication certificates for Intune-managed endpoints without deploying Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on-premises. Cloud PKI frees administrators from the burdens of deploying and managing AD CS, including the complicated Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) server configuration required for Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) certificate deployment with Intune.

Advantages

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI offers many significant advantages over traditional on-premises AD CS deployments.

No Infrastructure

The most obvious advantage of using Cloud PKI is that you do not have to deploy and manage your own Certification Authority (CA). Although implementing AD CS isn’t that difficult, managing and operating a CA infrastructure securely can be quite challenging. In addition, a high-security AD CS deployment utilizes hardware secure modules (HSMs) to protect CA private keys, which are quite expensive and sometimes difficult to support.

Cloud-Hosted SCEP

Removing the requirement to configure and deploy your own NDES server to support SCEP certificates is certainly a welcome advantage. NDES is notoriously difficult to configure, secure, and troubleshoot when it doesn’t work correctly. Cloud PKI includes cloud hosted SCEP services that are highly available and redundant within the Microsoft Azure infrastructure.

Automatic Revocation

Cloud PKI automates the deployment of certificates to Intune-managed users and devices and automatically revokes certificates when they fall out of scope. Administrators can also manually revoke certificates using the Intune management console.

Reporting

Administrators can easily view the status of Cloud PKI-issued certificates in Intune. The UI shows the active, expired, and revoked certificates for the issuing CA.

Clicking View all certificates shows a detailed list of all certificates.

BYOCA

Another compelling feature of Cloud PKI is Bring Your Own CA (BYOCA). This feature enables administrators to deploy a cloud-hosted CA that is chained to their existing on-premises AD CS root CA. This is helpful for scenarios where AD CS is already in place and used to issue and manage certificates to existing domain-joined clients and servers. BYOCA effectively allows you to extend your existing CA infrastructure to the cloud and use Cloud PKI to issue and manage certificates for your Intune-managed endpoints while maintaining the full functionality and feature set of on-premises AD CS for non-Intune-managed devices.

Limitations

Although there are many advantages to Cloud PKI, there are some limiting factors to consider.

RSA Only

Today, Cloud PKI is limited to RSA keys only. Administrators can create CAs using RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit keys. Elliptic Curve (EC) keys are not currently supported in Cloud PKI.

Intune Devices Only

Cloud PKI is limited to issuing certificates to Intune-managed devices only. Endpoints must be Entra-joined, or hybrid Entra-joined to enroll for certificates using Cloud PKI.

Inflexible Configuration

The Cloud PKI root and issuing CAs cannot be reconfigured after deployment. Since Cloud PKI root and issuing CAs don’t support the Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0), all EKUs must be defined when the CA is created. If, in the future, an administrator requires an EKU that was not present when the CA was deployed, an entirely new hierarchy (root and issuing CA) must be deployed.

Cost

There’s been much discussion about the cost associated with Cloud PKI. Cloud PKI can be licensed as part of the Intune Suite, which is $10.00 per user per month. Cloud PKI licenses will also be available as a standalone add-on for $2.00 per user per month. For large organizations, this might be cost-prohibitive.

Summary

Overall, Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI is a welcome addition to the Microsoft suite of cloud services. Certificates are excellent phishing-resistant credentials that can be used to improve security for organizations of all sizes. However, managing a CA can be tedious and time-consuming. Leveraging the cloud for PKI and certificate management will be helpful in many scenarios. However, Cloud PKI has some potential drawbacks, and many may not fit everyone.

More Information

Want to learn more about Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and how it can benefit your organization? Take the first step towards streamlined certificate management and enhanced security for your organization. Fill out the form below, and I’ll provide more information about using Intune Cloud PKI to safeguard your digital assets confidently.

← Back

Thank you for your response. ✨

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI and Active Directory

Recently, Microsoft introduced a new PKI-as-a-Service offering called Cloud PKI. This cloud-based PKI can issue and manage certificates to Intune-managed endpoints. Administrators can now deploy user and device authentication certificates using Intune Cloud PKI without deploying Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on-premises. Numerous blog posts and YouTube videos show how to configure and deploy Intune Cloud PKI, so I won’t reinvent the wheel with a complete configuration guide here. This article will focus instead on integrating Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI with on-premises Active Directory (AD).

Note: Administrators must deploy certificates to all enterprise domain controllers and RADIUS servers to support certificate-based authentication with AD. However, Cloud PKI for Intune can only issue certificates to Intune-managed endpoints today. It cannot issue certificates to servers. Administrators must use another CA (AD CS or another Cloud PKI solution) to issue and manage domain controller and RADIUS server certificates on-premises to support this scenario.

AD Integration

While Intune Cloud PKI eliminates the need for on-premises AD CS infrastructure, there will be times when Cloud PKI-issued certificates will be used to authenticate to on-premises AD, either through a RADIUS server such as Windows Network Policy Server (NPS), which is common for VPN and Wi-Fi deployments, or other methods. Additional configuration is required to support this scenario.

Publish Root/Issuing CA Certificates

The Intune Cloud PKI root and issuing CA certificates must be published in AD to support on-premises AD authentication using Intune Cloud PKI-issued certificates. Follow the steps below to complete this task.

Note: Arguably, you could skip publishing the Intune Cloud PKI root and issuing CA certificates in on-premises AD because Cloud-PKI certificates can only be issued to Intune-managed endpoints, in which case you are likely already deploying the Cloud PKI root and issuing CA certificates using Intune. I’m including these steps for completeness. However, publishing the Intune Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate in the NtAuthCA certificate store in AD is required to support on-premises AD authentication using Intune Cloud PKI-issued certificates, so that step is mandatory.

RootCA Store

On a domain-joined computer on-premises, open an elevated PowerShell or command window and run the following command to publish the Intune Cloud PKI root CA certificate to the RootCA certificate store in AD.

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to Cloud PKI root CA certificate> RootCA

certutil publishing the Cloud PKI root CA certificate to the Active Directory RootCA store

SubCA Store

Next, run the following command to publish the Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the SubCA certificate store in AD.

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate> SubCA

certutil publishing the Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the Active Directory SubCA store

NtAuthCA Store

Finally, run the following command to publish the Intune Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the NtAuthCA certificate store in AD. Publishing the Intune Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate in the NtAuthCA store in AD allows certificates issued by Intune Cloud PKI to be used to authenticate on-premises AD if required. Be sure to run this command even if you did not run the previous commands to publish the Intune Cloud PKI root and issuing CA certificates in AD.

certutil.exe -dspublish -f <path to Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate> NtAuthCa

certutil publishing the Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the Active Directory NTAuthCA store

GUI

If you have an existing on-premises AD CS deployment, you can use the Enterprise PKI management console to publish the Intune Cloud PKI certificates in AD as an alternative to the command line. First, open the Enterprise PKI tool (pkiview.msc) on an existing on-premises Certification Authority (CA) server. Right-click the Enterprise PKI root node and choose Manage AD Containers. Add the Intune Cloud PKI root CA certificate to the Certification Authorities container. Next, add the Intune Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the Enrollment Services container. Finally, add the Intune Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate to the NTAuthCertificatesContainer.

Enterprise PKI console with the Cloud PKI issuing CA certificate published to Active Directory

Summary

Administrators can use the Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI solution to issue and manage user and device authentication certificates for their Intune-managed endpoints. Using the commands above, administrators can also integrate their Intune Cloud PKI with on-premises Active Directory to support user and device authentication for common workloads such as Wi-Fi and VPN. Critically, when integrating Cloud PKI with on-premises Active Directory, your Intune administrators should be considered Tier-0 administrators, and appropriate security controls should be enforced.

Additional Information

What is Cloud PKI for Intune?

Enterprise PKI with Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Microsoft Intune Cloud PKI

Mastering Certificates with Microsoft Intune Training Course – May 14-16, 2024

Mastering Certificates with Intune Training Course

I’m excited to announce I’ll present a three-day LIVE online training event covering all things Microsoft Intune and certificates. This training event takes place on the ViaMonstra online academy January 28-30, 2025.

Course Material

This training course comprehensively examines all aspects of delivering certificates using Microsoft Intune, including common deployment scenarios, PKCS and SCEP configuration, Intune certificate connector configuration, high availability strategies, implementation and security best practices, and troubleshooting.

Cloud PKI

Cloud PKI, a new cloud-based PKI-as-a-Service solution from Microsoft, will also be covered in depth. I’ll provide an overview of the service and discuss the advantages and limitations of Cloud PKI. We’ll also cover different configuration and deployment scenarios, including Bring Your Own CA (BYOCA). In addition, I’ll share security best practices for Microsoft Cloud PKI deployments.

Register Now

Space is limited, so don’t miss out on this excellent opportunity to learn about these critically essential technologies. Reserve your spot in this training class today!

Additional Information

Mastering Certificates and Microsoft Intune

Microsoft Cloud PKI

ViaMonstra Online Academy

Always On VPN and the PSPKI PowerShell Module

Certificates are a crucial part of a secure Always On VPN implementation. Certificates are phishing-resistant forms of authentication that, when configured correctly, provide robust and multifactor authentication for remote access users and devices.

AD CS

Most commonly, certificates are issued by an on-premises Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) server. Administrators configure and deploy a Certification Authority infrastructure to issue and manage user and device authentication certificates in their organization. CA certificates are also required on the VPN server to support Always On VPN device tunnel connections and IKEv2 user tunnel connections. The NPS server also requires an enterprise CA certificate. Of course, the CA can issue certificates for other purposes, including Wi-Fi authentication, document signing, and code signing, just to name a few.

PSPKI

PSPKI is a PowerShell module available in the PowerShell Gallery for configuring, managing, and troubleshooting Microsoft AD CS. Created by Vadims Podans of PKI Solutions, PSPKI includes over 100 functions for various AD CS and certificate-related tasks. Always On VPN administrators will find this PowerShell module helpful when configuring and troubleshooting certificate-related issues for their Always On VPN deployments.

Note: The AD CS remote server administration tools (RSAT) must be installed to access all of the PSPKI module’s functionality.

Installation

Run the following PowerShell command to install the PSPKI PowerShell module.

Install-Module -Name PSPKI

Always On VPN and PSPKI

Always On VPN Administrators will immediately find a few PSPKI functions helpful when implementing and supporting Always On VPN.

Test-WebServerSSL – This function will connect to a remote web server and display details about the TLS certificate included in the response. This can be especially helpful when troubleshooting SSTP VPN connections.

Convert-PfxToPem – This is a handy utility for converting a PFX file to the PEM format. This is commonly required when importing CA certificates on non-Microsoft platforms, security devices, and load balancers.

Convert-PemToPfx – Occasionally, administrators must convert a certificate and private key in PEM format to PFX to install on a Windows server. This tool allows administrators to perform this task easily.

Get-CertificationAuthority – This function quickly enumerates all enterprise CA servers and displays information about their hostname, accessibility, service status, and type.

Ping-ICertInterface – This function helps troubleshoot CA connectivity issues. Administrators can quickly determine if a CA is reachable and capable of issuing a certificate using this command.

Get-CaTemplate – This command displays a list of certificate templates published on the specified target CA server. The certificate template’s display name and the minimum support CA version are provided. In addition, the output indicates if certificate autoenrollment is enabled on the template.

Much More

The PSPKI PowerShell module for AD CS has many tools for configuring and managing AD CS. PSPKI recently received a major update to version 4.0. Download and install PSPKI today. It will make your life easier, I can assure you!

Additional Information

PSPKI PowerShell Module – PowerShell Gallery

PSPKI PowerShell Module – GitHub

AOVPNTools PowerShell Module – PowerShell Gallery

AOVPNTools PowerShell Module – GitHub

InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement PowerShell Module

InboxAccontingDatabaseManagement – PowerShell Gallery

InboxAccountingDatabaseManagement – GitHub

Intune Certificate Connector Service Account and PKCS

Microsoft Always On VPN administrators have two choices when deploying enterprise PKI certificates using Intune; PKCS and SCEP. I prefer using PKCS because it is easier to configure and manage. Also, PKCS requires no inbound connectivity, simplifying the deployment and reducing the organization’s public attack surface. Provisioning certificates using Intune is inherently risky. However, there are some steps administrators can take to mitigate much of this risk.

Note: The techniques described in this article also apply to the NDES server when using SCEP certificate deployment in Intune, with one exception noted below.

PKCS Security

The service account is the most critical aspect of configuring the Intune Certificate Connector for PKCS securely. The service account has permission to enroll for an exceedingly dangerous published certificate template. Specifically, the PKCS certificate template has the deadly combination of supplying the subject information in the request, and the Client Authentication enhanced key usage (EKU). Further, the scenario does not allow administrative approval to be enabled on the certificate template. If an attacker were to gain access to this certificate template, they could enroll as any principal they chose, including a domain administrator, and their request would be processed automatically. Subsequently, they could authenticate to Active Directory using only the certificate without knowing the account’s password.

Service Account

Using a Group Managed Service Account (GMSA) would be ideal in this scenario. However, the Intune Certificate Connector does not support using GMSA when using PKCS. With that, administrators must use a regular domain service account instead, which introduces additional risk. To enhance the overall security of the solution, consider performing the following PKCS service account hardening tasks when using the Intune Certificate Connector to issue PKCS certificates with Intune.

Standard User

The service account should be a standard domain user with no special privileges. The service should be dedicated to PKCS and not shared with other services in the enterprise. Create the account from scratch (do not duplicate another account!), and use a long, complex password. Document this password securely. In addition, ensure the PKCS service account is not a member of any other security groups. Although the service account doesn’t require administrative access to operate, the account must be a member of the local administrator’s group to ensure the connector certificate is updated automatically.

Account Hardening

After creating the service account, click the Log On To button on the Account tab and ensure the account can only log on to the server(s) where you have installed the Intune Certificate Connector.

Next, check the box next to Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated in the Account options section.

In addition, select the option Deny access in the Network Access Permission section of the Dial-In properties page.

Finally, uncheck Enable remote control on the Remote control properties page.

Local Access Rights

Open the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) on each server where you installed the Intune Certificate Connector. Navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment. Enable the following policy settings for the PKCS service account.

  • Deny access to this computer from the network
  • Deny log on as a batch job
  • Deny log on locally
  • Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services

Optionally these settings can be enforced on the Intune Certificate Connector server using Active Directory group policy.

Important Note: When implementing these settings for hardening an NDES server do not specify the Deny log on as a batch job user rights assignment.

Disclaimer

I am not an Active Directory security expert! The guidance provided here is based on my many years of Windows administrative experience, conversations with Identity and Access security professionals, and published guidance found on the Internet. If you have suggestions to further improve service account security, don’t hesitate to let me know! Please share in the comments, below.

Additional Information

Overview of the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune

Configure and use PKCS Certificates with Microsoft Intune

Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector Service Account Requirements

9 Tips for Preventing Active Directory Servie Accounts Misuse

How to Manage and Secure Service Accounts

Certificate-Based Authentication Changes and Always On VPN

Microsoft introduced important changes affecting certificate-based authentication on Windows domain controllers as part of the May 10, 2022 update KB5014754 that may affect Always On VPN deployments. The update addresses privilege escalation vulnerabilities when a domain controller is processing a certificate-based authentication request. The recommendation from Microsoft is that the update be applied to all Windows domain controllers and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) servers as soon as possible.

Updated 5/20/2022: An out-of-band update to address authentication issues reported with this update is now available. Updates are available for Windows Server 2022, Windows Server 20H2, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2008 SP2.

Certificate Services

After applying the update to certification authority (CA) servers, a non-critical extension with Object Identifier (OID) 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 is added to all issued certificates with the user or device security identifier (SID) included. Domain controllers with the update installed will use this information to validate the certificate used for authentication and ensure that it matches the information in Active Directory.

Domain Controllers

The update operates in Compatibility Mode, by default, when applied to domain controllers. Windows monitors authentication requests and records audit events for certificates presented for authentication under the following conditions.

No strong mapping (event ID 39) – The certificate has not been mapped explicitly to a domain account, and the certificate did not include the new SID extension.

Certificate predates account (event ID 40) – A certificate was issued before the user existed in Active Directory, and no explicit mapping could be found.

User’s SID does not match certificate (event ID 41) – A certificate contains the new SID extension, but it does not match the SID of the corresponding user account.

Certificate Mapping

Administrators can map certificates explicitly to accounts in Active Directory, but this results in a significant administrative burden in most environments. A better option is to reissue user and device authentication certificates after applying the KB5014754 update to all issuing CA servers.

Reenroll Certificates

Administrators should reissue user and device authentication certificates after applying the KB5014754 update. Open the Certificate Templates management console (certtmpl.msc), identify the user or device authentication certificate template, then right-click on the template and choose Reenroll All Certificate Holders.

Enforcement Mode

After applying update KB5014754, administrators should monitor domain controller event logs for event IDs 39, 40, and 41. Once all certificates have been updated, and none of these events have been recorded for 30 days, administrators can switch to Full Enforcement Mode by enabling it in the registry on all domain controllers.

Key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\KDC
Value: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
Type: DWORD
Data: 2

Updated 12/8/2022: Microsoft has pushed back the original enforcement date of May 9, 2023, to November 14, 2023 “or later”. Stay tuned!

Updated 11/29/2022: Microsoft now states that the full enforcmenet mode date is now February 11, 2025 “or later”. Once again, stay tuned!

Known Issues

There have been some reports of authentication issues after installing the KB5014754 update. Early indications are that device authentication certificates missing a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entry are to blame. Administrators are encouraged to update their device certificates to include the SAN entry. Optionally, but not recommended, administrators can place the update in disabled mode by editing the registry.

Note: An out-of-band update for these authentication issues is now available. See the reference links at the top of this article for more information.

Caveat

It’s important to understand that this new OID is added only to online templates. Online templates are those that build the subject information from Active Directory. Unfortunately, this new OID is NOT applied to offline templates (templates where the subject name is supplied in the request), such as those used for delivering certificates with Microsoft Endpoint Manager/Intune using PKCS or SCEP. It is impossible to move to enforcement mode when issuing user or device authentication certificates with Microsoft Endpoint Manager or Intune today. Microsoft is aware of this limitation and is working to address this issue as we speak. I expect a fix to be available sometime before the May 2023 deadline when Microsoft permanently switches on enforcement mode.

Additional Information

KB5014754 – Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN Users Prompted for Certificate

Microsoft Windows Always On VPN Clients Prompted for Authentication when Accessing Internal Resources