Microsoft AD CS Adds Post-Quantum Cryptography Support with ML-DSA

Despite predictions of its decline, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) continues to evolve. Following significant enhancements introduced in late 2025, including CRL partitioning and support for 16K database pages, the May 2026 update adds another important capability: support for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

ML-DSA

Specifically, the May 2026 update adds support for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 in Windows Server 2025 for AD CS. This enables administrators to begin evaluating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and assessing PQC readiness in enterprise PKI environments

Configuration

After applying the May 2026 update to an issuing Certification Authority (CA), administrators will find new PQC algorithms under the Algorithm name drop-down list, as shown here.

Note: If you don’t see these new algorithms, ensure you have selected Key Storage Provider from the Provider Category drop-down list. In addition, ensure that you select Signature on the Request Handling tab.

Test Results

Initial testing across common enterprise certificate scenarios produced mixed results. While PQC works well in some scenarios, other workloads still show limitations.

Code Signing

Code signing with an ML-DSA-44 certificate issued by AD CS works perfectly. For example, I can use Set-AuthenticodeSignature to sign a PowerShell script, as shown here.

Viewing the file’s properties shows that the encryption algorithm used to sign the file was ML-DSA-44, as expected.

IIS

TLS-based workloads proved more challenging. Attempts to configure an HTTPS binding in IIS failed with the following error message.

There was an error while performing this operation. A specified logon session does not exist. It may already have been terminated. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x80070520).

RRAS and SSTP

Similar limitations occurred when testing remote-access VPN scenarios using RRAS and SSTP. Specifically, configuring a PQC TLS certificate for SSTP in RRAS failed. Although I was able to assign the certificate using Set-RemoteAccess, the RemoteAccess service failed to start.

Remote Desktop

Unfortunately, using PQC certificates for RDP also fails. Although I could assign the PQC certificate to the RDP listener, clients fail to connect using RDP and return the following error message.

This computer can’t connect to the remote computer. Try connecting again. If the problem continues, contact the owner of the remote computer or your network administrator.

Error code: 0x904
Extended error code: 0x7

Summary

The May 2026 update marks an important milestone for AD CS by introducing initial support for PQC algorithms, allowing organizations to begin evaluating ML-DSA certificates in enterprise environments. Early testing shows promising results for signing scenarios such as code signing; however, broader infrastructure workloads, including TLS, VPN, and Remote Desktop, remain limited today. Although PQC support is still in its early stages, these updates demonstrate Microsoft’s ongoing investment in AD CS and provide administrators with an opportunity to begin preparing their PKI environments for the post-quantum future. Additional PQC enhancements, including ML-KEM support and broader ecosystem integration, are anticipated in future Windows updates.

Additional Information

Microsoft May 2026 Security Updates (KB5087539)

Post Quantum Cryptography in the Enterprise

Always On VPN Authentication Failed Reason Code 16

Strong authentication is essential for remote access to on-premises resources over the public Internet. Using the Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) in combination with user certificates issued by the organization’s internal certification authority (CA) provides high assurance for remote user authentication. It includes the added benefit of making the Always On VPN connection completely seamless for the user, as their certificate is presented to the authentication server transparently during VPN connection establishment. Using PEAP with user certificates is the recommended authentication method for Always On VPN deployments.

Reason Code 16

When configuring Always On VPN to use PEAP with client authentication certificates, administrators may encounter a scenario in which a user has a valid certificate. Yet, their authentication request is rejected by the Network Policy Server (NPS) server when attempting to connect remotely. Looking at the Security event log on the NPS server, administrators will find a corresponding event ID 6273 in the Network Policy Server task category from the Microsoft Windows security auditing event source. In the Authentication Details section, you’ll find that the reason code for the failed request is Reason Code 16, with the following reason specified.

“Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect”.

Password Incorrect?

The reason code indicates the user may have entered an incorrect password. However, the user does not enter their password when using PEAP with client authentication certificates, so there’s no chance the password was entered incorrectly.

TPM

I have increasingly encountered this scenario with many customers deploying Always On VPN over the last year or so. This error is often caused by a known issue with older TPM models. Specifically, those with a TPM specification sub-version of 1.16 and earlier. You can view these TPM details by opening the Windows Settings app and entering ‘security processor’ in the search field.

Workaround

These older TPM models seem to have an issue with RSA-PSS signature algorithms, as described here. If possible, administrators should upgrade devices with older TPM versions to ensure the highest level of security and assurance for their remote users. However, in cases where that is not feasible, administrators can remove RSA-PSS signature algorithms from the registry, which forces the use of a different signature algorithm and seems to restore functionality.

To do this, open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and navigate to the following registry key.

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Cryptography\
Configuration\Local\SSL\00010003\

Double-click the Functions entry and remove the following algorithms from the Value data section.

  • RSAE-PSS/SHA256
  • RSAE-PSS/SHA384
  • RSAE-PSS/SHA512

Once complete, reboot the device and test authentication once again.

Intune Proactive Remediation

Administrators using Intune Proactive Remediation will find detection and remediation scripts to make these changes published on GitHub.

Detect-RsaePss.ps1

Remediate-RsaePss.ps1

Additional Information

Windows TPM 2.0 Client Authentication in TLS 1.2 with RSA PSS

Always On VPN NPS Auditing and Logging

Always On VPN NPS RADIUS Configuration Missing

Always On VPN NPS Load Balancing