Always On VPN vs. Entra Private Access: Choosing the Right Access Model for Your Organization

The predominant solution for secure remote access today in the Microsoft ecosystem is Always On VPN. Always On VPN is based on traditional Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology originally developed in the mid-1990s. However, Microsoft recently introduced Entra Private Access, which is part of the Global Secure Access (GSA) Security Service Edge (SSE). Entra Private Access is an identity-centric Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution designed to replace traditional VPN solutions. It offers significantly improved security with granular resource access without dependency on on-premises infrastructure. This article outlines where each solution fits best and how organizations can transition safely between them.

Always On VPN

First introduced in Windows 8, Microsoft Always On VPN provides seamless, transparent, secure remote access using client-based VPN protocols such as Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) and Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP). When establishing a VPN connection, a virtual network adapter is created, and an IP address is assigned to the interface to facilitate tunneled network communication with the internal network.

Architecture

Always On VPN requires substantial on-premises supporting infrastructure. In addition to the VPN servers themselves, administrators must also deploy authentication servers (RADIUS or NPS) and certificate services (AD CS). Administrators must manage public TLS certificates for SSTP connections. Also, larger deployments may require on-premises load balancers and/or cloud-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB) solutions. Further, additional configuration is needed to integrate Entra ID Conditional Access. Because this infrastructure must be publicly accessible by design, it becomes an attractive target for attackers. In addition, the complex infrastructure has many interdependencies, resulting in significant administrative overhead for network and security administrators.

Access Model

Most commonly, Always On VPN provides full network access to the internal network. Full network access is accomplished by configuring IP routing on the client to ensure internal client network subnets are routed over the VPN tunnel. In this model, clients are often implicitly trusted once connected. Once authenticated and authorized, users receive full, unfettered access to the internal network across all protocols and ports. This level of access introduces a significant security risk and does not adhere to modern zero-trust network access models. To address this, administrators must implement additional security controls internally (perimeter or DMZ firewalls) to restrict network access for Always On VPN clients.

Zero Trust Always On VPN?

Always On VPN includes support for traffic filters that can restrict network access and provide zero-trust-like access. However, these controls exist only on the client side, so an attacker with administrative access to the endpoint can easily bypass them. They should not be considered a reliable way to enforce zero trust for Always On VPN connections.

Entra Private Access

Entra Private Access is part of Microsoft’s Global Secure Access (GSA) Security Service Edge (SSE). It is a robust, cloud-based zero-trust network access (ZTNA) service that provides granular access to on-premises resources. It requires installing a client-side agent and one or more Private Network connectors on-premises to facilitate remote network access. Entra Private Access deeply integrates with Entra ID, so you can easily configure Conditional Access policies for any published resource, including multifactor authentication for legacy protocols such as SSH.

Limited Network Access

Unlike legacy VPNs, GSA does not create a virtual network interface when establishing a connection. Instead, GSA operates as a filter driver deep in the Windows networking stack, intercepting and rerouting network traffic bound for the internal network. The GSA client eliminates the complexities of IP address management, network routing, and firewalling. In addition, authentication and authorization are handled natively by Entra ID and Conditional Access.

Minimal Infrastructure

Entra Private Access is a cloud-based service with minimal on-premises supporting infrastructure requirements. Administrators must only deploy the Entra Private Network connector on one or more on-premises servers to facilitate remote access for Global Secure Access clients. The Entra Private Network is a lightweight software agent that requires little to no post-deployment support. The administrative burden is much lighter compared to Always On VPN.

Key Differences at a Glance

The table below highlights the most important architectural, security, and operational differences to help determine which solution best fits your environment.

AspectAlways On VPNEntra Private Access
ArchitectureOn-premises VPN gateway(s)Cloud-based service
Access ModelFull network access via a routable IP address assigned to the endpointPer-resource zero-trust network access (ZTNA); no full network access
AuthenticationOn-premises AD or Entra ID (AD-synced accounts only)Entra ID (AD-synced or cloud-native)
Client SoftwareBuilt-in or third-partyGlobal Secure Access client
Tunneling ProtocolsIKEv2, SSTPgRPC
Network ExposureMust expose VPN servers to the public InternetNone. Private Network Connectors require outbound access only
GranularityAll protocols and ports (default)Application-level (FQDN, IP/port, IP range, CIDR blocks)
Conditional AccessRequires additional configurationNative per-app enforcement
Device-Based ConnectivityYes – device tunnel provides pre-logon connectivityNone
Infrastructure RequirementsVPN servers, RADIUS servers, internal PKI, AD, load balancers, GSLBEntra Private Network connector (minimum one server, two recommended for redundancy)
Device SupportWindows onlyCross-platform (Windows, macOS, iOS, Android)
LicensingIncluded in OS licenseAdditional per-user costs with Entra Suite or standalone Entra Private Access license

Advantages of Always On VPN for Domain-Joined Endpoints

Always On VPN integrates more naturally with classic Active Directory domain-joined Windows devices. Always On VPN includes features that Entra Private Access does not currently provide, which administrators may require to provide full support for their mobile devices.

Device Tunnel Support

The Always On VPN device tunnel provides machine-based pre-logon connectivity. The device tunnel ensures access to on-premises authentication services (domain controllers) before the user logs on to the endpoint. The device tunnel allows for logging in without cached credentials (e.g., for new users) and streamlines password changes. In addition, it ensures network access to support complete group policy processing for remote users. Entra Private Access is user-based only and does not include device-based connectivity. The device tunnel is one of the most significant functional gaps between Always On VPN and Entra Private Access.

Note: Although device-based connections are not currently available in Entra Private Access at the time of this writing, Microsoft may add the feature in the future.

Windows Native Integration

Always On VPN leverages the built-in Windows VPN client, which integrates deeply with the operating system. The Windows VPN client is mature and robust, supporting secure authentication protocols with certificates or smart cards. Always On VPN requires no additional client software. For Entra Private Access, administrators must deploy and manage a separate software component, the Global Secure Access client.

Full Network Access

The domain is a trust boundary, and domain-joined endpoints require broad network access to function. For example, domain-joined endpoints must have access to domain controllers, and most access those resources using several protocols and numerous different ports. In addition, these endpoints must be able to connect to a variety of other internal resources, such as DNS servers, certification authorities (CAs), revocation servers (HTTP, OCSP, LDAP), systems management servers, file shares, printers, and more. Furthermore, much of this access occurs via Remote Procedure Call (RPC) and Distributed COM (DCOM), which use ephemeral (dynamic) port ranges (49152-65535). Enforcing firewall policy to restrict access for remote domain-joined clients is challenging because these endpoints require significant resources.

So, if your managed endpoints are primarily domain-joined and depend on pre-logon network connectivity, Always On VPN remains the more mature and feature-complete choice today.

Why Entra Private Access is Ideal for Native Entra ID Joined Devices

Entra Private Access is designed around a cloud-first, identity-centric Zero Trust model and has explicit client and device requirements that align best with Entra ID joined devices.

Client Requirements

The Global Secure Access client required for Entra Private Access requires Windows devices to be Microsoft Entra-joined or Microsoft Entra hybrid-joined. Domain-joined only (non-hybrid) devices are not supported. Unlike the native VPN client built into Windows, the Global Secure Access client is a separate piece of software that administrators must install independently.

Per-App Zero Trust

Entra Private Access controls access using FQDNs or IPs (individual, ranges, or networks) and specific protocol/port combinations instead of full network routing. Per-app access aligns with the modern cloud-native device model by avoiding broad network exposure and evaluating every access request through Conditional Access (including device compliance, MFA for legacy protocols, and more). Unlike Always On VPN, the principle of least privilege is enforced at all times.

Simplified Management

Entra Private Access requires minimal on-premises supporting infrastructure. There’s no need for VPN servers, RADIUS servers, or complicated certificate services for VPN authentication. Entra Private Access natively uses Entra ID and Conditional Access, eliminating the need for certificate authentication.

Cross Platform

Entra Private Access provides cross-platform support. Not only does it support Windows clients (Enterprise or Professional editions), but it also supports macOS, iOS, and Android. Broad client support makes Entra Private Access a comprehensive, secure remote access solution for all your managed endpoints.

In summary, Entra Private Access provides a cleaner, more secure, and lower-management experience for organizations moving toward Entra ID joined device fleets, especially when combined with Microsoft Intune for management and Conditional Access policies for enhanced security.

Licensing

Always On VPN and Entra Private Access use different licensing models.

Always On VPN

No per-user or per-device licensing required for Always On VPN. Always On VPN licensing is included with the Windows operating system license you already own.

Entra Private Access

Entra Private Access requires a separate license and incurs an additional per-user cost. It is included with the Microsoft Entra Suite license (~$12.00/user/month), or as a separate, standalone Entra Private Access license (~$5.00/user/month). You can learn more about Microsoft Entra licensing here.

Migration Path

Migrating from Always On VPN to Entra Private Access is low-risk. Using a phased approach, administrators can move from Always On VPN to Entra Private Access with minimal disruption. Start by planning for Entra Private Access (client agent deployment, connector placement, conditional access policies, etc.), then gradually deploy the solution, initially coexisting with Always On VPN but moving toward full deployment. Once complete, decommission the legacy VPN. Key steps include:

  1. Assess your resources, devices, and Entra ID licensing.
  2. Enable Entra Private Access, deploy one or two Private Network Connectors on-premises, and install the Global Secure Access client on devices.
  3. Configure access rules. Begin with Quick Access to replicate VPN-like behavior.
  4. Run both solutions side-by-side. Pilot with a small group, migrate apps/users incrementally, and enforce Conditional Access (including MFA for sensitive applications).
  5. Phase out and decommission Always On VPN once stable.

This approach reduces infrastructure overhead, delivers granular zero trust security, and aligns with a cloud-first identity strategy.

Summary

Microsoft Always On VPN provides reliable on-premises remote access for Windows devices using protocols such as IKEv2 and SSTP. Today, it remains the best choice for environments that use traditional Active Directory domain-joined devices, where pre-logon connectivity and broad network access are required. However, Always On VPN requires heavy infrastructure and typically grants risky full network access.

Entra Private Access is the preferred solution for organizations adopting a cloud-first, Zero Trust strategy with Entra ID joined endpoints. Its per-application access model, native Conditional Access enforcement, reduced infrastructure footprint, and cross-platform support make it ideal for modern managed endpoints where least-privilege access and simplified operations are priorities.

In practice, many organizations will benefit from running both solutions in parallel during a transition period, using Always On VPN to support domain-joined endpoints and Entra Private Access for modern, Entra-joined devices. Over time, as device fleets and applications modernize, Entra Private Access can progressively replace legacy VPN infrastructure while improving security posture and reducing operational complexity.

Ready to Modernize Your Remote Access Strategy?

Schedule a free one-hour consultation to review your current Always On VPN deployment, assess readiness for Entra Private Access, and identify a secure, practical migration path tailored to your environment. We’ll cover architecture considerations, device requirements, licensing implications, and common pitfalls—no obligation required. Fill out the form below to request more information and schedule your free consultation.

Additional Information

Microsoft Entra Private Access Intelligent Local Access (ILA)

Preventing Port Exhaustion on Entra Private Network Connector Servers

Microsoft Security Service Edge (SSE) Now Generally Available

Microsoft Entra Security Service Edge (SSE) on RunAs Radio

Windows Secure Boot UEFI Certificates Expiring June 2026

For IT administrators responsible for managing Windows devices, a crucial certificate update milestone is coming in June 2026 that could result in degraded security for systems that are not updated. Specifically, the Microsoft certificates that manage UEFI Secure Boot trust will expire, potentially allowing untrusted or malicious software to load on affected machines during system boot.

Secure Boot

Windows Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware security feature that ensures a computer boots only with trusted, digitally signed operating system loaders and drivers, preventing malicious code (such as rootkits or compromised bootloaders) from loading during startup. Introduced with Windows 8, it verifies the cryptographic signatures of boot components against a database of authorized keys, blocking unauthorized or tampered software to protect system integrity from the earliest stages of boot.

Chain of Trust

The UEFI Platform Key (PK) is the ultimate root of trust in Secure Boot. It is a single public key owned by the device manufacturer and stored in firmware. The PK certificate signs the Key Exchange Key (KEK) and grants authority to modify the other Secure Boot databases, such as the allowed database (DB) and the disallowed database (DBX). The DB and DBX contain certificates and signatures for authorized and unauthorized software, respectively.

Microsoft Secure Boot Certificate Expiration

Two crucial Microsoft Secure Boot certificates are set to expire in June 2026. They are:

  • Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 (stored in KEK)
  • Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 (stored in DB)

In addition, another critical Microsoft Secure Boot certificate expires in October 2026.

  • Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 (stored in DB)

When these certificates expire, devices may fail to recognize trusted bootloaders, and future Secure Boot policies may not be applied. Updating the certificates ensures continued protection against malicious rootkits and ensures Windows firmware compliance

View Certificate Information

Ideally, administrators could use PowerShell to view these UEFI Secure Boot certificates. Sadly, the output of the Get-SecureBootUEFI PowerShell command is not particularly helpful and does not display any pertinent certificate details.

Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK

PowerShell Script

To address this limitation, I’ve created a PowerShell script that allows administrators to view all UEFI certificates, including PK, KEK, and DB certificates, and optionally save them as base64-encoded files. The script is available on GitHub and in the PowerShell gallery.

Install-Script -Name Get-UEFICertificate -Scope CurrentUser

View UEFI Certificates

After downloading the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script, run the following command to view the KEK database.

Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK

In this example, the only KEK certificate is the expiring Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate. Running the command and specifying the DB type shows only the expiring Microsoft Windows Product PCA 2011 certificate.

Note: UEFI also includes hashes of specific executables in the DB and DBX databases. By default, this script focuses on UEFI certificates and omits hash calculations for brevity. Use the -IncludeHashes switch to view this information.

Updating Microsoft UEFI Certificates

With the October 2025 updates, Microsoft introduced new registry keys to enable and monitor the update status of these UEFI Secure Boot certificates.

Status

To begin, administrators can check the status of the update process by reading the value of the UEFICA2023Status registry key.

Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing\ -Name UEFICA2023Status | Select-Object UEFICA2023Status

Update

To initiate the update process, set the value of AvailableUpdates to 0x5944.

Set-ItemProperty -Path ‘HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot’ -Name ‘AvailableUpdates’ -Value 0x5944

Next, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task.

Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName ‘\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update’

Once complete, the UEFICA2023Status indicates InProgress.

After a reboot, start the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task once more. The UEFICA2023Status should indicate that it has been updated (may require one more reboot!).

Updated Certificates

After the update process completes, run the Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell script to confirm that new certificates have been added to UEFI Secure Boot.

Updated Microsoft KEK Certificates

Updated Microsoft DB Certificates

Summary

With multiple Microsoft Secure Boot CA certificates expiring in 2026, organizations need to ensure devices are updated to maintain a valid UEFI trust chain. This guide shows how to view existing firmware certificates, apply Microsoft’s Secure Boot CA 2023 updates, and confirm that new KEK and DB certificates have been installed. Completing this process now will ensure devices remain protected from tampered or malicious boot components as the 2026 expiration dates approach.

Additional Information

Windows Secure Boot certificate expiration and CA updates

Registry key updates for Secure Boot: Windows devices with IT-managed updates

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script on GitHub

Get-UEFICertificate PowerShell Script in the PowerShell Gallery

The Case for Short-Lived Certificates in Enterprise Environments

Digital certificates, issued by an internal, private Certification Authority (CA) like Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), are commonly used in enterprise environments for user and device authentication for workloads such as VPN, Wi-Fi (802.1x), System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), IPsec, and more. But how long should a user or device authentication certificate be valid? This question is increasingly critical as organizations strive to balance security and operational efficiency. Short-lived certificates, typically valid for weeks or months rather than years, are gaining traction as a powerful tool to enhance security. By reducing the window of opportunity for attackers to exploit compromised credentials, short-lived certificates offer a proactive approach to mitigating risks while aligning with evolving security best practices and the needs of modern IT infrastructures.

What is a Certificate?

A digital certificate is a document that binds an identity to an asymmetric key pair (public key and private key). Certificates offer strong, phishing-resistant authentication that improves security and assurance for users and devices authenticating to Microsoft Active Directory (AD). When a certificate is issued, an administrator decides how long the certificate will be valid. The criticality of this setting is often overlooked.

Certificate Lifetime

Administrators must define the certificate’s validity period when creating a certificate template in AD CS or an Intune PKCS or SCEP device configuration policy. Most commonly, administrators select the default one-year validity period. However, public CAs are trending toward shorter certificate lifetimes, and strong consideration should be given to their use in private enterprise deployments.

Current Standards

Today, the maximum certificate lifetime for a publicly issued TLS certificate is 398 days (approximately 13 months). This standard is imposed by the CA/Browser Forum, a voluntary consortium of public CAs, browser vendors, and other industry stakeholders that develop and promote security standards and best practices for digital certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). They established the 398-day certificate lifetime mainly in response to the previous decade’s plethora of SSL/TLS vulnerabilities.

Challenges

Having certificates with long lifetimes poses significant challenges for administrators when responding to key compromise events or zero-day vulnerabilities. This may necessitate urgent certificate replacement, often involving manual intervention. To address these challenges and promote automation, some public CAs like Let’s Encrypt issue certificates with much shorter lifetimes than one year.

Public CA Certificates

Shorter lifetimes for public SSL/TLS certificates have numerous positive security benefits. Short-lived certificates provide agility to update cryptography settings more rapidly than long-lived certificates. Also, the short lifetime of the certificate is beneficial if the private key is compromised because it limits the amount of time an attacker can exploit the stolen key, limiting exposure and reducing potential damage. These security benefits have driven significant changes in public CA practices, as seen in today’s standards.

47 Days

Recently, I wrote about a new directive from the CA/Browser Forum, which adopted a measure reducing the current maximum lifetime of public TLS certificates to 47 days. The maximum lifetime for public TLS certificates will be gradually reduced to allow the industry to adopt short-lived certificates.

Enterprise CA Certificates

Private enterprise PKI deployments like AD CS are not required to adhere to CA/Browser Forum mandates. Organizations are free to manage their internal PKI however they choose. However, examining industry trends and ensuring that security best practices are aligned as much as possible is crucial. While public CAs set the pace, private enterprise PKI can adopt similar strategies to bolster security.

AD Authentication

As stated previously, many positive security benefits are associated with short-lived certificates, especially for authentication to Active Directory.

PKINIT

PKINIT is an extension to the Kerberos protocol that enables certificate-based authentication with Active Directory (AD). You can read about the details here, but PKINIT allows a principal (user or device) to authenticate to AD by simply demonstrating control of the private key. Thus, protecting the private key is vital.

TPM

Enrolling certificates in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is the best way to ensure private keys remain private. No one, including administrators, can export private keys protected by TPM. Administrators should ensure TPM enrollment for client authentication certificates whenever possible.

Guidance

Today, I recommend that my customers issue end entity user and device authentication certificates with a lifetime of no more than one year for 2048-bit RSA certificates with private keys stored on TPM. However, there are important considerations and compelling advantages to using much shorter lifetime certificates.

Best Practice

General use client authentication certificates should be enrolled to TPM without exception and have a valid lifetime of no more than one year. However, there is still value in using shorter lifetime certificates, even with TPM. For example, short-lived certificates ensure timely renewal, which can be helpful when implementing changes to certificate templates. A perfect example of this is the changes required to support KB5014754. Administrators may wish to use certificates with validity periods of less than one year to ensure timely replication of certificate settings changes and to provide more frequent key rotation.

Non-TPM

There may be scenarios where a client authentication certificate must be issued to a device without a TPM. Examples include virtual machines without TPM, VDI deployments, and legacy devices. These cases should be treated as exceptions and managed accordingly. Consider shortening the lifetime of non-TPM certificates to 90 days or less.

Privileged Users

Administrators or other privileged accounts enrolling for certificates can benefit from even shorter validity periods. Consider issuing client authentication certificates to these users with certificate lifetimes of 30 days or less.

Considerations

Short-lived certificates aren’t always ideal in all cases. For example, consider a scenario where a user or device is offline for a prolonged period, such as extended vacations, maternity or paternity leave, or sabbaticals. Users may experience issues accessing resources after returning from an extended absence. Of course, if they can re-enroll for certificates, this shouldn’t be a problem. For AD CS, it means connectivity to an enterprise issuing CA server. Intune-managed endpoints simply need Internet access to obtain a new certificate.

Automation

Working with short-lived certificates manually is infeasible. Automation is the key to success with short-lived certificates. For client authentication certificates issued on-premises, enabling certificate autoenrollment via group policy ensures that all domain-joined devices enroll and renew their certificates automatically. Certificates deployed and managed using Microsoft Intune are automated by default.

Summary

The next time you create a certificate template in AD CS or Intune, consider the certificate lifetime. Recommended best practice is no more than one year validity period for 2048-bit RSA end-entity certificates with hardware-backed key storage. However, consider shorter validity periods for those cases where it makes sense. Prioritize TPM enrollment and put additional controls in place for exceptions. Ensure automated enrollment and renewal are in place to reduce administrative overhead. Following the guidance outlined above, your organization will reduce its attack surface and limit exposure to compromised certificates.

More Information

If you’d like to learn more about implementing short-lived certificates in your organization, fill out the form below, and I’ll provide more information.

References

Digital Certificates for Strong Authentication

Digital Certificates and TPM

Drawbacks of Multifactor Authentication

Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT) in Kerberos Protocol